Bartelli v. Galabinski , 231 F. App'x 129 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    4-16-2007
    Bartelli v. Galabinski
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1545
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    Recommended Citation
    "Bartelli v. Galabinski" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1294.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1294
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    DLD-151                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 06-1545
    ________________
    KEITH BARTELLI, Appellant
    v.
    JOHN GALABINSKI; JAMES MCGRADY, Deputy Superintendent; DEPUTY
    THOMAS STACHELEK; BOWDEN; LONG; COUNSELOR CLARK; SGT.
    JASTREMSKI; WILLIAM LEWIS; DONALD JONES; FRITZ BLIECH
    ________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00900)
    District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
    ________________
    Submitted For Possible Dismissal Due to Untimeliness or
    Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    March 15, 2007
    Before:     BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: April 16, 2007)
    ________________
    OPINION
    ________________
    PER CURIAM
    Keith Bartelli appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of Defendants
    Bliech, Jones, Lewis, Jastremski, Clark, Long, Bowden, Stachelek and McGrady from the
    complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as well as the grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Defendant Galabinski. Because we conclude that Bartelli’s appeal
    presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
    I.
    Bartelli is a prisoner and filed his complaint against the Defendants in April
    2004. In the complaint, Bartelli raised several claims, including claims that the
    Defendants retaliated against him for filing prisoner grievances. In October 2004, the
    District Court dismissed Bliech, Jones, Lewis, Jastremski, Clark, Long, Bowden,
    Stachelek and McGrady pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Bartelli’s motion to
    amend the complaint was also denied. Subsequently, on September 27, 2005, the District
    Court adopted the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and granted
    summary judgment in favor of the remaining Defendant, Galabinski. In November 2005,
    Bartelli filed an “application for bill of judicial review,” which the District Court
    construed as a motion for reconsideration. On December 15, 2005, the District Court
    denied Bartelli’s “motion for reconsideration.” Bartelli executed a notice of appeal on
    January 13, 2006.
    II.
    We must first determine whether Bartelli filed a timely notice of appeal. As
    previously stated, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Galabinski on
    September 27, 2005. While Bartelli filed a “motion for reconsideration,” it did not toll
    the time to file a notice of appeal because it was untimely. See United States v. Fiorelli,
    
    337 F.3d 282
    , 288 (3d Cir. 2003). Therefore, Bartelli would normally have thirty days
    2
    from September 27, 2005, to file a notice of appeal. Bartelli did not file his notice of
    appeal until January 2006. However, for the following reasons, we find that Bartelli’s
    notice of appeal is timely.
    “Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 4 - in conjunction with
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 - sets out the mechanism for determining when the
    time to appeal begins.” In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 
    454 F.3d 235
    , 240 (3d Cir. 2006).
    “‘[I]f Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) requires a separate document’ to put the
    parties on notice that the time to appeal has started, the appeal period begins on the earlier
    of (1) when that separate document is entered or (2) when 150 days have run from the
    entry of the Order in the docket.” 
    Id. Because Bartelli’s
    notice of appeal was filed more
    than thirty days after the District Court’s September 27, 2005 memorandum-order, but
    before 150 days lapsed, whether Bartelli timely filed a notice of appeal depends on
    whether the District Court’s September 27, 2005 memorandum-order qualifies as a
    separate document.
    In In re Cendant Corporation Securities 
    Litigation, 454 F.3d at 241
    , this
    Court explained when an order will be treated as a separate document: “first, the order
    must be self-contained and separate from the opinion; second, the order must note the
    relief granted; and third, the order must omit (or at least substantially omit) the District
    Court’s reasons for disposing of the parties’ claims.” The September 27, 2005
    memorandum-order does not satisfy the third criterion. The separate document rule does
    not allow for an extended presentation of the facts and procedural history. See 
    id. at 243.
    3
    Here, due to the District Court’s presentation of the facts and procedural history in the
    September 27, 2005 memorandum-order, it does not constitute a separate document.
    Therefore, Bartelli’s January 2006 notice of appeal was timely because it was filed within
    150 days of the September 27, 2005 memorandum-order.
    We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our standard
    of review is plenary. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 
    184 F.3d 236
    , 240 (3d Cir.
    1999)(stating standard of review over § 1915(e)(2) dismissal); McGreevy v. Stroup, 
    413 F.3d 359
    , 363 (3d Cir. 2005)(stating standard of review over an order granting summary
    judgment). When reviewing a complaint dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
    the court applies the same standard provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6). See 
    Tourscher, 184 F.3d at 240
    . In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to
    Rule 12(b)(6), we accept as true all allegations of the complaint and all reasonable
    inferences that can be drawn therefrom. See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
    458 F.3d 181
    , 188 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue of material fact
    and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Saldana v. Kmart
    Corp., 
    260 F.3d 228
    , 232 (3d Cir. 2001). We review the denial of a motion to amend the
    complaint for abuse of discretion. See Garvin v. City of Phila., 
    354 F.3d 215
    , 219 (3d
    Cir. 2003)(citation omitted).
    III.
    For essentially the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge in the May 27,
    4
    2004 report and recommendation, we agree with the dismissal of Defendants Bliech,
    Jones, Lewis, Jastremski, Clark, Long, Bowden, Stachelek and McGrady pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). First, we note that “a state grievance procedure does not
    confer any substantive constitutional right upon prison inmates.” Hoover v. Watson, 
    886 F. Supp. 410
    , 418 (D. Del. 1995)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d, 
    74 F.3d 1226
    (3d Cir. 1995). Second, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have
    personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
    operation of respondeat superior.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
    845 F.2d 1195
    , 1207 (3d
    Cir. 1988)(citations omitted). Here, Bartelli failed to state a claim against these
    Defendants for one or both of these reasons.1 Furthermore, the District Court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying Bartelli’s motion to amend the complaint.
    Next, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
    Galabinski. All of Bartelli’s claims (with the exception of his retaliation claim set forth in
    paragraph eight of the complaint) were time barred. While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not
    contain a statute of limitations period, “federal courts must look to the statute of
    limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.” Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
    Police Dep’t, 
    91 F.3d 451
    , 457 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996). The statute of limitations on Bartelli’s
    claims is two years. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. Furthermore, “[a] section 1983
    cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon
    1
    To the extent that Bartelli alleged that these Defendants verbally harassed him, such
    an allegation also does not state a § 1983 claim. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 
    830 F.2d 136
    , 139 (9th Cir. 1987).
    5
    which its action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 
    142 F.3d 582
    , 599 (3d
    Cir. 1998)(citation omitted). Bartelli knew or should have known of his injuries arising
    from these claims more than two years prior to filing this complaint in April 2004.
    Therefore, these claims are time barred.2
    Finally, in paragraph eight of the complaint Bartelli alleged that on April 5,
    2002, he received a false prisoner misconduct charge “in direct retaliation for [a] criminal
    complaint filed February 22, 2002.” (Compl. Part IV, ¶ 8). For essentially the reasons
    stated by the Magistrate Judge in the August 31, 2005 report and recommendation and
    adopted by the District Court, we agree that summary judgment in favor of Galabinski
    was appropriate on this claim. Specifically, we note the lack of a material issue of fact
    regarding the causal connection between Bartelli’s protected activity and the prisoner
    misconduct charge. See Rauser v. Horn, 
    241 F.3d 330
    , 333 (3d Cir. 2001)(setting forth
    elements of retaliation claim); see also, Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 
    912 F.2d 654
    , 657 (3d Cir. 1990)(stating that conclusory allegations taken from the pleadings are
    insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment once a moving party has
    presented evidentiary materials).
    IV.
    We conclude that Bartelli filed a timely notice of appeal. Additionally, the
    2
    Bartelli previously filed a complaint against dozens of Defendants (including all of
    the Defendants in this case except Long) that was dismissed without prejudice. See
    Bartelli v. Beard, Civ. No. 03-cv-00234. The filing of that complaint did not toll the
    statute of limitations. See Brennan v. Kulick, 
    407 F.3d 603
    , 606 (3d Cir. 2005).
    6
    District Court properly dismissed Defendants Bliech, Jones, Lewis, Jastremski, Clark,
    Long, Bowden, Stachelek and McGrady from the complaint and properly granted
    summary judgment in favor of Galabinski. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court
    judgment. Bartelli’s motions for the appointment of counsel are denied.
    7