United States v. Smith ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-8-2008
USA v. Smith
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3222
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-3222
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GERALD L. SMITH,
Appellant
________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00201)
District Judge: Honorable James T. Giles
____________
Argued June 6, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 8, 2008)
Robert Epstein (Argued)
Sarah S. Gannett, Esq.
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Suite 540 West – Curtis Center
601 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellant
James R. Pavlock (Argued)
United States Attorney’s Office
615 Chester Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Gerald Smith appeals the District Court’s order revoking his supervised
release and imposing a sentence of five years’ incarceration. Smith argues that the
District Court erred in ruling that his conviction of unlawful restraint/involuntary
servitude in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902(a)(2) constituted a “crime of violence”
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and imposed an unreasonable sentence. We disagree and
will affirm the order of the District Court.
I.
As we write only for the parties, we do not set out the facts in great detail.
On May 24, 2007, Gerald Smith’s probation officer filed a petition for Violation of
Supervised Release. The District Court held a hearing on the matter, at which the
Government presented evidence that Smith pled guilty in state court to multiple
new offenses, including: (1) two counts of unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude
in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902(a)(2); (2) two counts of recklessly endangering
another person in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; (3) various drug possession
offenses; and (4) various traffic offenses. The Government also presented
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evidence that Smith had failed to report to his probation officer in June, July, and
August of 2006.
The District Court revoked Smith’s supervised release based on his
admissions that he committed a crime and failed to report to his probation officer
while on supervised release. The District Court concluded that Smith’s conviction
for unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude constituted a “crime of violence,” and
was therefore a Grade A violation. The court imposed the maximum sentence of
five years imprisonment to be served consecutively with his state sentence.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction over the final decision of the District Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and over the sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
We review de novo whether a particular crime constitutes a “crime of violence.”
United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007). We review sentences
imposed for violations of supervised release for reasonableness. United States v.
Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). We must determine whether the
District Court “reasonably applied” the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
to this case. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006). Our
review of the District Court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is deferential,
“[b]ecause the trial court is in the best position to determine the appropriate
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sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” United States v.
Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).
III.
Smith argues that the District Court erred in its conclusion that his
conviction for unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude constituted a crime of
violence. We disagree.
The Sentencing Guidelines define the term “crime of violence” as
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, that-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(2) . . . or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). In order to determine whether a conviction
constitutes a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, we apply the
“formal categorical approach,” under which we “‘must look only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses’ and may not ‘consider other evidence concerning
the defendant’s prior crimes,’ including, the ‘particular facts underlying [a]
conviction[].’” Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)); see also United States v.
Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007).
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The categorical approach “requires three steps. First, we must establish for
which specific crimes [Smith] was convicted. Second, we must interpret the
necessary elements of those crimes. Third, we must determine whether those
elements necessarily bring the state crime within one of the definitions of [crime of
violence], as we construe them.” United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 792-
93 (3d Cir. 2005).
At the revocation hearing, the Government presented evidence that Smith
was convicted and sentenced under Pennsylvania law of “knowingly . . . hold[ing]
another in a condition of involuntary servitude.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902(a)(2). The
Government argued, and the District Court agreed, that the plain language of
Pennsylvania’s unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude statute “connotes . . . the
use of force or some kind of imprisonment that was accomplished by force or
threatened force.” Appendix (App.) 35.
We conclude that the conviction satisfies the definition set forth in the
second prong of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). “Knowingly” “hold[ing]” a person
“involuntarily” involves an inherent risk of physical injury. Even if the person is
not held by force, there is a strong likelihood that a person would use force to
resist being held, and physical injury would ensue. See, e.g., United States v.
Luster, 305 F.3d 199, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2002) (determining that the crime of escape
under Pennsylvania law, “by its nature, present[s] a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another”); United States v. Riva, 440 F.3d 722, 723-25 (5th Cir.
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2006) (explaining that under Texas law, unlawful restraint – “whether
accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception” – creates a serious potential
risk of injury and is therefore a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)).
Moreover, Smith’s reliance on Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581(2008), in which the Supreme Court considered the definition of “violent felony”
under the Armed Career Criminal Act, is unavailing. Contrary to Smith’s
contention, his conviction for unlawful restraint/involuntary servitude is not akin
to a conviction for the strict liability offense of driving under the influence of
alcohol.
Accordingly, we conclude that Smith’s conviction for unlawful restraint/
involuntary servitude constitutes a Grade A violation of supervised release for
sentencing purposes. Given our determination that this conviction constitutes a
crime of violence, we need not consider whether his conviction for reckless
endangerment also constitutes a Grade A violation of supervised release.
IV.
Smith argues that the District Court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence
of five years was unreasonable in light of his need for rehabilitative and
transitional services and the length of his state sentence. According to Smith, the
District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. We disagree.
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To satisfy the reasonableness requirement, the “record must demonstrate
the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. A district
court need not [however] discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” Parker, 462 F.3d at 276 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The
District Court heard from defense counsel about Smith’s medical condition as well
as his difficulty with the transition back into society after nearly 20 years of
incarceration. Smith also testified as to his need for treatment and asserted that he
was remorseful for his actions. The court, however, rejected Smith’s request for
leniency on the ground that Smith could have sought help from his probation
officer, but instead failed even to report to him.
The District Court sufficiently stated its reasons for the sentence it imposed
and meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors in fashioning a sentence
appropriate to the circumstances of Smith’s case. The sentence was within the
upper end of the advisory guidelines range for a Grade A violation. We conclude
therefore that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
V.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
revocation of supervised release and the sentence imposed.
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