Warren Gladden v. Secretary US Department of Agr , 483 F. App'x 664 ( 2012 )

GLD-148 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-3001
___________
WARREN K. GLADDEN,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS J. VILSACK,
SECRETARY US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 5-10-cv-05228)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 29, 2012
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 27, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Warren K. Gladden sued the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, alleging
that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and age when he was not
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considered for a position in the United States Forest Service. The District Court
dismissed his complaint on the Secretary’s motion, concluding that Warren could not
state a prima facie case for race- or age-discrimination based on his allegations and the
attachments to the complaint. (Specifically, the District Court concluded that the
information that he presented showed that he was not considered for the position only
because he was not within the sufficiently large pool of qualified applicants who were
already federal employees.)
Warren appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review
is plenary. McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). On
review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because no substantial
question is raised by this appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII on
the basis of race or age, a plaintiff must show that he or she is a member of a protected
class, was qualified for the position, was not hired, and that, under circumstances that
raise an inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out
individuals with qualifications similar to the plaintiff’s to fill the position. See Sarullo v.
United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). Whereas Title VII claims
can be maintained with a showing that an improper consideration was a motivating factor
for the employer’s action, see Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349
(2009), a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) requires a
showing that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action,” id. at 2351.
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However, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish the elements of a
prima facie case; a plaintiff merely must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citations
omitted).
We accordingly turn to Warren’s complaint to see if he pleaded “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). See
also Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176-
177 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the Twombly/Iqbal standard). As we have noted
previously, Twombly’s “plausibility paradigm . . . applies with equal force to analyzing
the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing
Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Warren alleges that he is a member of a protected class based on his race and age.
Construing all inferences in his favor, we will take his allegations about his education and
experience to mean that he was qualified for the open position. We also note that he
described the hiring of a younger, white woman for the position. However, based on his
own allegations and his attachments to his complaint, Warren did not suggest that the
employer declined to hire him under circumstances that raise an inference of
discriminatory action. He essentially took issue with the fact that the employer
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considered only eligible candidates who applied through the job announcement for
current and former federal government employees (“federal employees”). He
complained that he was not hired because federal employees were considered before
outside candidates. He did not allege that he was treated differently from others who
applied through the same job announcement that he used, which was for persons other
than federal employees. In fact, he alleged that all who applied with him under the same
job announcement received the same treatment. The discrimination between candidates
who were federal employees and those who were not is not the discrimination Title VII
or the ADEA protects against. In short, as the District Court concluded, Warren did not
state a plausible claim for discrimination on the basis of age or race.
For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s decision.
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