Kant v. Seton Hall University , 279 F. App'x 152 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-29-2008
    Kant v. Seton Hall Univ
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-4448
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 06-4448 and 06-4464
    CHANDER KANT,
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee
    v.
    SETON HALL UNIVERSITY,
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (CIVIL NO. 00-CV-05204)
    District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
    Argued April 16, 2008
    Before: AMBRO, FISHER, Circuit Judges, and MICHEL,* Chief Circuit Judge
    Filed: May 29, 2008
    *
    Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
    Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
    CHANDER KANT (ARGUED)
    19 Birchwood Drive
    Short Hills, NJ 07078
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee Pro Se
    JOHN J. PEIRANO, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
    James Lidon, Esquire
    Kimberly A. Capadona, Esquire
    McELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP
    1300 Mount Kemble Avenue
    P.O. Box 2075
    Morristown, New Jersey 07962-2075
    Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant Seton Hall University
    OPINION
    MICHEL, Chief Circuit Judge
    Chander Kant, an Associate Professor of Economics at Seton Hall University's
    Stillman School of Business, sued Seton Hall in the United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of
    the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The District Court dismissed Kant’s
    discrimination claims at summary judgment, but proceeded to a jury trial on Kant’s
    retaliation claim concerning Seton Hall’s denial of his 1998 application for promotion to
    Full Professor. The jury found Seton Hall liable for unlawful retaliation, and awarded
    Kant $80,000 in damages.
    2
    Both parties filed post-trial motions, most of which were denied by the District
    Court, and both parties now appeal. Kant appeals various aspects of the jury instructions
    and verdict sheet regarding damages, as well as the District Court’s denial of Kant’s
    motion for an injunction ordering Seton Hall to promote him. Seton Hall cross-appeals
    the District Court’s exclusion of evidence that Kant had been denied promotion several
    times before 1998, and alleges that the jury instructions and verdict sheet stated the wrong
    standard for liability.
    Because the District Court did not commit reversible error in any respect urged by
    either party, we will affirm.
    I.
    Chander Kant was born in India and is a naturalized citizen of the United States.
    Kant has a Ph.D in economics, and was hired by Seton Hall as an Associate Professor at
    the Stillman School of Business in 1989. Seton Hall granted Kant tenure in 1992 as an
    Associate Professor, and in 1996, Kant applied for a promotion to Full Professor.
    When a faculty member at Seton Hall applies for a promotion, the application
    proceeds through multiple levels of review–from the applicant’s department (e.g.,
    Economics), to the Dean and a Rank & Tenure Committee within the applicant’s school
    (e.g., the Stillman School of Business), to the University Provost and a University-wide
    Rank & Tenure Committee, and finally to the Board of Regents–with each reviewer
    providing a recommendation to the reviewers at the next level.
    3
    In 1996, Kant’s application had the support of John Dall, the Chairman of the
    Economics Department at the Stillman School. But the Stillman School Dean, John
    Shannon, and the Stillman School Rank & Tenure Committee recommended against
    promotion. The University Rank & Tenure Committee also recommended against
    promotion by a vote of 7-2, and the University Provost denied Kant’s 1996 application.
    Also in 1996, Kant sought to reduce his courseload for a semester, but his request
    was denied by Sheldon Epstein, the Associate Dean of the Stillman School. Kant filed
    an internal grievance against Epstein, alleging that Epstein had discriminated against Kant
    on the basis of national origin by denying Kant’s request while granting the similar
    request of an American-born professor. Kant’s grievance was denied by Dean Shannon.
    In 1997, Kant again applied for a promotion to Full Professor. This time Epstein,
    who had been appointed Interim Dean of the Stillman School, opposed Kant’s
    application. Kant’s application was again denied, with the University Rank & Tenure
    Committee again voting 7-2 against promotion.
    In August of 1998, Kant filed an internal grievance against Chairman Dall and
    Associate Dean Epstein. Kant alleged that Dall and Epstein had discriminated against
    him on the basis of his national origin by assigning him inferior work, denying his travel
    expense reimbursement requests, denying his request for a paid leave of absence, and
    providing misleading information about him in connection with his earlier application for
    promotion. The new Dean of the Stillman School, Dee Martin, denied Kant’s grievance.
    4
    Kant appealed to the University Provost and then to the Faculty Senate Grievance
    Committee, and both eventually affirmed the denial of Kant’s grievance.
    In October of 1998, while the grievance against Dall and Epstein was pending,
    Kant applied again for a promotion to Full Professor. Chairman Dall abstained from
    voting at the department level because of the pending grievance, and with Dall abstaining
    the Economics Department recommended Kant for promotion by a vote of 2-1. However,
    Dean Martin recommended against promotion, and the Stillman School Rank & Tenure
    Committee, which included Dall as a member, voted 3-3. Dall was one of the three votes
    against promotion–even though he had abstained at the department level, he was
    apparently told by University counsel that he could not abstain at the Stillman School
    Rank & Tenure Committee level. Kant’s application then went to the University Rank &
    Tenure Committee, which voted against promotion (this time by a vote of 8-1), and the
    University Provost denied Kant’s 1998 application.
    In 1999, after being notified that his 1998 application was denied, Kant filed
    charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that
    Dall, Epstein, Shannon, and Martin had discriminated against him on the basis of race and
    national origin. The EEOC dismissed the charges in 2000 and gave Kant notice of his
    right to sue, and on October 23, 2000, Kant sued Seton Hall in the United States District
    Court for the District of New Jersey. Kant’s suit alleged both employment discrimination
    on the basis of national origin and retaliation under Title VII, with alleged conduct dating
    5
    as far back as 1994 and continuing into 2000.
    In 2002, Seton Hall moved for summary judgment, arguing that Kant’s suit was
    untimely with respect to most of the alleged violations because they predated his EEOC
    complaint by more than the statutory limitations period, and that the University’s decision
    to deny Kant’s 1998 application for promotion was based on the deficiencies in Kant’s
    qualifications, not on his national origin or his filing of internal grievances alleging
    discrimination. The District Court granted Seton Hall’s motion with respect to events
    before December 17, 1998 and with respect to Kant’s discrimination claim, but denied the
    motion with respect to Kant’s retaliation claim. Kant v. Seton Hall Univ., No. 00-CV-
    05204, slip op. at 21-22 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2003). The District Court held that Kant’s filing
    of grievances was a protected activity and that a reasonable jury could find that Seton
    Hall’s proffered reason for the 1998 promotion decision was pretextual. 
    Id. II. Kant’s
    retaliation claim, regarding the 1998 promotion decision, proceeded to a
    jury trial in March and April of 2006. Seton Hall sought to introduce evidence of Kant’s
    unsuccessful applications for a promotion in 1996 and 1997, but the District Court
    excluded this evidence, explaining that because each promotion decision was a separate
    incident, it would be unduly prejudicial to engage in “mini-trials” of the earlier decisions
    when only the 1998 decision was challenged as retaliatory.
    At the close of evidence, the parties argued over jury instructions and the form of
    6
    the verdict sheet. Kant sought a jury instruction on punitive damages, and asked that the
    verdict sheet contain separate lines for damages due to lost wages and emotional distress.
    The District Court denied these requests. Seton Hall sought an instruction that Kant
    could only prevail if he proved “that he would have been promoted but for Dall and
    Martin’s alleged retaliation,” but the District Court instead instructed the jury that “[i]f
    you determine that defendant retaliated against plaintiff during the early stages of the
    evaluation and individuals involved in the promotion process at later stages reviewed,
    considered, and were influenced by the earlier evaluation, you may conclude that the
    retaliation had impact on the ultimate decision.” Seton Hall objected to this instruction
    after it was given on the ground that it didn’t state a high enough standard of causation.
    The District Court left this instruction in place, but also clarified to the jury, before
    deliberations began, that Kant needed to prove that “retaliation was more likely than not a
    determinative factor in Kant’s non-promotion by Seton Hall.”
    The jury deliberated for a few hours before returning a verdict, finding the
    following (in the words of the interrogatories on the verdict sheet): (1) Kant “prove[d] by
    a preponderance of the believable evidence that Dr. Dall’s vote against his promotion was
    in retaliation for [Kant’s] lodging a grievance against him or that retaliation was more
    likely than not a determinative factor in Dr. Dall’s vote”; (2) Kant did not prove the same
    for Dean Martin’s vote; (3) Dall’s retaliation “contaminated the promotion process”; (4)
    Kant “prove[d] by a preponderance of the believable evidence that [Seton Hall’s] actions
    7
    were a causal link to his losses”; and (5) $80,000 is “a fair and reasonable amount of
    money to compensate [Kant] for his damages.”
    Kant then moved for pre-judgment interest, for additur, and for an injunction
    ordering Seton Hall to promote him to Full Professor. Kant also renewed his request for
    punitive damages. Seton Hall moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in the
    alternative for a new trial. The District Court granted pre-judgment interest on an amount
    corresponding to Kant’s back-pay claim, but denied all other motions and entered
    judgment in September of 2006. Kant then moved for “revision” of the judgment, asking
    to remit part of the $80,000 jury award in exchange for an injunction ordering Seton Hall
    to promote him, but the District Court denied Kant’s motion.
    Both Kant and Seton Hall filed timely notices of appeal on October 13, 2006. We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    III.
    The parties contest various aspects of the jury instructions and verdict sheet, and
    the District Court’s decisions regarding evidence and remedies. We exercise plenary
    review to ensure that jury instructions do not misstate a legal standard, Abrams v.
    Lightolier Inc., 
    50 F.3d 1204
    , 1212 (3d Cir. 1995), but we review a district court’s
    decision to use particular language in the jury charge for abuse of discretion. Cooper
    Dist. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 
    180 F.3d 542
    , 549 (3d Cir. 1999). Similarly, we
    review the court’s formulation of jury interrogatories for abuse of discretion, Armstrong
    8
    v. Dwyer, 
    155 F.3d 211
    , 214 (3d Cir. 1998), with the limitation that “the questions asked
    of the jury [must] be adequate to determine the factual issues essential to the judgment.”
    McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 
    815 F.2d 254
    , 266 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Kornicki v.
    Calmar Steamship Corp., 
    460 F.2d 1134
    , 1139 (3d Cir. 1972)).
    We review determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
    discretion, Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 
    445 F.3d 280
    , 288 (3d Cir. 2006), with the
    understanding that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a district court with “broad
    discretion to exclude collateral matters that are likely to confuse the issues.” United
    States v. Casoni, 
    950 F.2d 893
    , 919 (3d Cir. 1991). Finally, we review the District
    Court’s decisions concerning equitable remedies for abuse of discretion, because in Title
    VII cases, “federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular
    circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution.” Franks v. Bowman Transp.
    Co., 
    424 U.S. 747
    , 764 (1976); see also Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 
    747 F.2d 885
    , 890
    (3d Cir. 1984) (“The award of future lost earnings in Title VII cases is an alternative to
    the traditional equitable remedy of reinstatement[, and t]he choice of such a remedy in
    lieu of an order that the plaintiff be reinstated rests in the sound discretion of the trial
    court.”).
    1.
    We will begin with Kant’s appeal and then will proceed to Seton Hall’s cross-
    appeal. Kant first contends that the jury instructions and verdict sheet misled the jury into
    9
    awarding inadequate relief. Specifically, Kant argues that Title VII provides separately
    for back pay and for compensatory damages, and that the District Court erred (1) by
    failing to provide separate lines on the verdict sheet for economic damages (e.g., front-
    pay and back-pay) and non-economic damages (e.g., emotional pain, suffering, mental
    anguish), and (2) by failing to list “lost prestige” as an element of compensatory damages.
    But the District Court clearly instructed the jury that if it found Seton Hall liable, it
    could award Kant lost pay and “compensatory damages for injuries such as emotional
    pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, humiliation and loss of enjoyment of
    life.” Given these instructions, the provision of a single line on the verdict sheet, asking
    “[w]hat is a fair and reasonable amount of money to compensate the plaintiff for his
    damages,” was certainly adequate to present the issues of economic and non-economic
    damages to the jury, and was not an abuse of discretion. 
    McNally, 815 F.2d at 266
    . And
    given the range of potential injuries listed in the jury instructions, the District Court did
    not abuse its discretion by failing to recite the exact phrase “loss of prestige.” Indeed, to
    the extent that Kant has suffered a loss of prestige in the economics profession for being
    known as an associate professor instead of a full professor, that loss is bound to be
    reflected in lost wages, mental anguish, humiliation, and inconvenience, all of which were
    included in the District Court’s instructions.
    Kant next contends that the District Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
    punitive damages. A plaintiff may recover punitive damages under Title VII in a case of
    10
    intentional discrimination “if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
    engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
    reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42
    U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he terms ‘malice’ or
    ‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in
    violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Kolstad
    v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 
    527 U.S. 526
    , 535 (1999). Further, even if a plaintiff can show
    “malice” or “reckless indifference” to his federal rights on the part of an individual, the
    plaintiff “must impute liability for punitive damages to respondent.” 
    Id. at 539.
    Thus, the
    Court has held that “in the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously
    liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these
    decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.’”
    
    Id. at 545
    (internal citation omitted).
    Here, the District Court held that Kant delayed too long before seeking punitive
    damages, substantially prejudicing Seton Hall’s defense, and that punitive damages were
    not warranted in any event. Even assuming that Kant did not delay, we agree that the
    facts of this case do not support an instruction regarding punitive damages against Seton
    Hall. The District Court found that despite any retaliation by Dall, Seton Hall made
    good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII, including by promulgating anti-discrimination
    policies and creating a council against discrimination. Kant argues that these are merely
    11
    pro-forma measures without a meaningful intent to comply with the law. But beyond the
    fact that Kant’s own internal grievances were denied by Seton Hall, he offers no
    substantial evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that Seton Hall acted in bad
    faith. Thus the District Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury regarding punitive
    damages.
    Finally, Kant contends that the District Court erred in denying his request for the
    equitable remedy of promotion in lieu of front-pay. He acknowledges that courts have
    broad discretion to choose appropriate remedies in Title VII cases, but argues that
    reinstatement or promotion is a preferred remedy, that his Complaint included a request
    for promotion, and that the District Court should not have submitted the issue of front-pay
    to the jury without first rendering a formal ruling on promotion. Cf. Hansard v.
    Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling. Co., 
    865 F.2d 1461
    , 1469-70 (5th Cir. 1989) (“the district
    court’s award of front pay in this case was improper without a precedent finding that
    reinstatement was not feasible”).
    However, Kant did not ask the District Court to rule on the feasability or propriety
    of promotion before the case was submitted to the jury, and raised the issue only after
    seeking and winning the alternative remedy of front-pay. At that point in the
    proceedings, it was well within the District Court’s discretion to rule that the jury’s award
    of front-pay was the appropriate forward-looking remedy in this case. See 
    Goss, 747 F.2d at 890
    ; cf. Feldman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 
    43 F.3d 823
    , 831 (3d Cir. 1994) (public
    12
    employee, First Amendment case) (reinstatement “is not the exclusive remedy, because it
    is not always feasible, such as when there exists ‘irreparable animosity between the
    parties’”) (internal citation omitted).
    2.
    In its cross-appeal, Seton Hall argues that the District Court erred in instructing the
    jury regarding the standard of causation required for retaliation liability. Seton Hall
    asserts–quite correctly–that the causation standard in Title VII retaliation cases in our
    Circuit is the “determinative effect” standard, i.e., “the plaintiff’s burden is to prove that
    an impermissible factor ‘played a role in the employer’s decisionmaking process and that
    it had a determinative effect on the outcome of that process.’” Woodson v. Scott Paper
    Co., 
    109 F.3d 913
    , 932 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 
    47 F.3d 586
    , 588
    (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see also Shaner v. Synthes, 
    204 F.3d 494
    , 501 n.8 (3d Cir.
    2000) (“We recently have made clear that a plaintiff’s ultimate burden in a retaliation
    case is to convince the factfinder that retaliatory intent had a ‘determinative effect’ on the
    employer’s decision.”).
    Here, at Seton Hall’s urging, the District Court explicitly instructed the jury that
    for Kant to prevail, he needed to prove that “retaliation was more likely than not a
    determinative factor in [his] non-promotion by Seton Hall.” Conceding that this
    instruction stated the proper standard for causation, Seton Hall now argues that the
    District Court nevertheless erred by refusing to withdraw its earlier instruction (“if you
    13
    determine that defendant retaliated against plaintiff during the early stages of his
    evaluation and individuals involved in the promotion process at later stages reviewed,
    considered, and were influenced by the earlier evaluation, you may conclude that the
    retaliation had an impact on the ultimate decision”).
    We do not think that the District Court’s combined instructions misstated the
    applicable law or were so confusing or misleading as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
    See Grazier v. City of Philadelphia, 
    328 F.3d 120
    , 126 (3d Cir. 2003) (“in evaluating jury
    instructions, we shall only find discretion abused ‘if the instruction was capable of
    confusing and thereby misleading the jury’”) (internal citation omitted). Kant’s theory of
    liability, as the District Court explained at the post-trial motions hearing, was that
    “instead of a positive vote coming out of the [Stillman] school’s determination, they had a
    split vote [because of Dall’s negative vote in the Stillman School Rank and Tenure
    Committee] which, in effect, [a]ffected the other reviewing board’s impression of the
    plaintiff.” Kant, No. 00-CV-05204 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2006) (transcript). Thus, the jury
    instructions were consistent with Kant’s theory and the applicable law; the “determinative
    factor” instruction accurately conveyed Kant’s burden of proof, and the earlier instruction
    conveyed to the jury that it was allowed to make certain inferences to reach a finding that
    Kant had met his burden. See, e.g., Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 
    852 F.2d 715
    , 727 (3d Cir.
    1988) (“[A] plaintiff in a discrimination case need not prove intentional discrimination at
    every stage of the review process. . . . [I]t plainly is permissible for a jury to conclude that
    14
    an evaluation at any level, if based on discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking
    process and thus allowed discrimination to infect the ultimate decision.”).
    Seton Hall similarly contends that the District Court erred by framing the verdict
    sheet to ask the jury whether Dall’s retaliation “contaminated the promotion process,”
    rather than asking explicitly whether Dall’s retaliation had a “determinative effect” on
    Seton Hall’s ultimate promotion decision. But in light of the District Court’s instruction
    to the jury that it was to decide whether retaliation was “more likely than not a
    determinative factor in Kant’s non-promotion by Seton Hall,” we think the verdict sheet
    was “adequate to determine the factual issues essential to the judgment.” McNally, 
    815 F.2d 266
    .
    Finally, Seton Hall contends that the District Court abused its discretion by
    excluding evidence that Kant had been denied a promotion to Full Professor in years prior
    to 1998, while admitting evidence that Dall had changed his vote in 1998. According to
    Seton Hall, the earlier denials represent an academic consensus among many evaluators
    that Kant was not qualified to be a Full Professor, and the District Court’s exclusion of
    this evidence deprived Seton Hall of the opportunity to prove to the jury that this
    academic consensus–not retaliatory animus–explained the denial of Kant’s 1998
    application.
    However, Kant has a very different view of these earlier promotion decisions–he
    contends that Seton Hall discriminated against him on the basis of national origin. In
    15
    light of that dispute, the District Court reasonably concluded that Seton Hall’s
    introduction of the prior denials would lead to a series of “mini-trials” over Kant’s pre-
    1998 discrimination claims–the very claims the District Court had already dismissed as
    time-barred at summary judgment. A court has broad discretion to exclude evidence that
    is merely collateral to the issues in the case, Gay v. Petsock, 
    917 F.2d 768
    , 773 (3d Cir.
    1990), and the District Court did not abuse that discretion here. Nor did the District Court
    abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Dall’s votes, as Dall’s change of position
    was central to Kant’s claim of retaliation.
    IV.
    For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and orders of the District
    Court.
    16