Galo v. Attorney General ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-14-2008
    Galo v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-4874
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    Recommended Citation
    "Galo v. Atty Gen USA" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1227.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1227
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 06-4874
    ____________
    ARBEN GALO,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    ____________
    On Petition for Review from an
    Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Board No. A96-017-570)
    Immigration Judge: Miriam K. Mills
    ____________
    Argued March 3, 2008
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: May 14, 2008)
    Thomas C. Brannen (Argued)
    Elizabeth C. Surin
    Morley, Surin & Griffin
    325 Chestnut Street, Suite 1305-P
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorneys for Petitioner
    Richard M. Evans
    Nancy E. Friedman (Argued)
    Marion E. Guyton
    United States Department of Justice
    Office of Immigration Litigation
    P.O. Box 878
    Ben Franklin Station
    Washington, DC 20044
    Attorneys for Respondent
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    FISHER, Circuit Judge.
    Arben Galo petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”)
    dismissal of his appeal from the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his
    applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition insofar
    as it relates to Galo’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal. We will grant the
    petition with regard to Galo’s CAT claim and remand to the BIA.
    I.
    We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
    legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
    analysis.
    Galo was born on July 27, 1983, in Albania. His father began participating in the
    Democratic Party of Albania (DP) when Galo was a child. Galo became active with the
    DP Youth Group at age fourteen. After Albania’s transition from communism, power in
    the 1990s alternated between the Socialist Party and the DP. In Galo’s village, support
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    for the communists remains strong. The police in the village are Socialist Party
    supporters.
    In his affidavit and his testimony before the IJ, Galo related that his family was
    mistreated because of their affiliation with the DP. Galo states that in 1996, he was
    beaten and detained overnight by the police, who accused him and his friends of
    “negatively affecting the youth of Albania.” In 1998, men in plain clothes ransacked his
    home and took his father to the police station, where he was detained for three days,
    beaten, and underfed. In 1999, Galo participated in a peaceful DP demonstration in his
    village. The police came to the demonstration and began to arrest demonstrators. Upon
    learning Galo’s name, the police beat and kicked him and said that he should remember to
    tell his father everything that happened.
    In May 1999, Galo’s father began receiving threats over the phone that his children
    would be kidnapped unless he began supporting the Socialist Party. His father fled to
    Greece in September 1999 and prepared for the family to join him. Galo, who was
    sixteen years old, did not join his father in Greece immediately because he did not feel
    scared. Instead, he stayed in his village with his grandfather.
    On November 24, 1999, Galo and two of his DP Youth Group friends were
    walking to a meeting regarding an upcoming DP youth conference. They stopped at a
    convenience store. Galo and one friend went into the store, but the third friend, Sami,
    stopped to talk to a man who approached him outside the store. While Galo was paying
    3
    for a soft drink, he heard a gunshot. He, his friend, and the storekeeper went outside and
    saw Sami laying on the ground, while the man who had been talking to him was running
    away with a gun in his hand. Sami died from the gunshot wound. Galo reported the
    incident to the police; he says the police did not do anything in response to his report.
    At 10:00 p.m. the same day, someone knocked on Galo’s grandfather’s door.
    When Galo’s grandfather opened the door, Galo saw two men, including the man who
    had killed Sami. The men pushed Galo’s grandfather aside and hit him, shooting their
    guns inside the house. Galo fled, but he learned the next day that the men had ransacked
    the house. They told Galo’s grandfather than Galo had “seen too much” and was “a
    witness who could cause trouble.” They threatened to kill Galo just like they killed his
    friend. Galo believes Sami’s murder was politically motivated, and he says that prior to
    the murder, Sami had received threats that he should cease his DP activities.
    Galo fled Albania six days later and joined his family in Greece, where he
    remained for three years. He states that he could not get permanent residency status in
    Greece and did not feel safe there because the Socialist Party is active in Greece, as it is
    in Albania.
    Galo entered the US with an altered Italian passport in 2002. He was detained and
    referred to an IJ. On July 16, 2003, Galo submitted an I-589 Application for Asylum.
    After a hearing, the IJ found Galo not credible, denied all forms of relief, and ordered him
    removed to Albania. Galo appealed to the BIA.
    4
    The BIA stated that the credibility determination did not “comport with applicable
    caselaw in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.” The BIA explained
    that in light of contemporaneous country reports, “we cannot conclude that political
    violence is outside the realm of possibilities in Albania or that the applicant’s story is
    necessarily incredible in light of country conditions.” Despite this qualified rejection of
    the IJ’s credibility finding, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Galo was not
    eligible for relief, agreeing with the IJ that there was no nexus between the persecution
    Galo described and any protected ground. The BIA did not discuss the IJ’s
    determinations with regard to withholding of removal and CAT protection; nevertheless,
    it dismissed Galo’s entire appeal. Galo filed a timely Petition for Review.
    II.
    To the extent that “the BIA issues a decision on the merits and not simply a
    summary affirmance, we review the BIA’s, not the IJ’s, decision. We must treat the
    BIA’s findings of fact as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Li v. Att’y Gen., 
    400 F.3d 157
    , 162 (3d Cir.
    2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To the extent that the BIA adopts
    the findings of the IJ, we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA. Chen v.
    Ashcroft, 
    376 F.3d 215
    , 222 (3d Cir. 2004).
    We review the agency’s factual findings under the deferential “substantial
    evidence” standard. Gao v. Ashcroft, 
    299 F.3d 266
    , 262 (3d Cir. 2002). Under this
    5
    standard, we will uphold the findings of the IJ and the BIA “unless the evidence not only
    supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 
    242 F.3d 477
    , 483-
    84 (3d Cir. 2001).
    III.
    Galo asserts that the BIA erred in determining that he was not eligible for asylum,
    withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT. He argues that his persecutors were
    motivated by his political opinion, and therefore he qualifies for relief.
    In order to qualify for asylum, an individual must prove that he has “a well-
    founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(A). In order to
    qualify for withholding of removal, the applicant must demonstrate a “clear probability”
    that persecution will result if the applicant is removed to a particular country. I.N.S. v.
    Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
    , 413 (1984).
    In order to qualify for relief under the CAT, the applicant must present evidence
    establishing “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to
    the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). “Torture is an extreme form
    of cruel and inhuman treatment.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. It consists of “any act by which
    severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
    person” for purposes such as punishment, intimidation, coercion, or the obtaining of
    information or a confession. 
    Id. An act
    is not considered torture if it is not “inflicted by
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    or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
    person acting in an official capacity.” 
    Id. A. The
    BIA concluded that Galo did not qualify for asylum because the persecution
    he experienced was not based on one of the protected grounds (race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). When the intruders came
    to Galo’s grandfather’s house on the night of Sami’s murder, they threatened Galo
    because he had “seen too much” and was “a witness who could cause trouble.” Thus, the
    threats were based on Galo’s status as the witness to a crime, rather than on his political
    opinion.
    Galo argues that he does not “bear the unreasonable burden” of establishing
    exactly why the intruders threatened him. He states that their actions were motivated at
    least in part by his political opinions, and this is sufficient to show persecution based on
    one of the protected grounds. Galo does not cite our “mixed motive” cases, which would
    provide the strongest support for his argument. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 
    406 F.3d 191
    , 197-98 (3d Cir. 2005); Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 
    328 F.3d 719
    , 727 (3d Cir. 2003). Even
    if we take the mixed motive cases into account, the IJ and BIA determined that Galo’s
    persecutors were not motivated by Galo’s political opinion, but instead by the fact that he
    had witnessed a murder.
    7
    There is substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that Galo
    was not persecuted based on one of the protected grounds, and therefore we will not
    disturb it. Because Galo’s mistreatment was not based on one of the protected grounds,
    he does not qualify for asylum.
    B.
    In order to qualify for withholding of removal to a particular country, an alien must
    show a clear probability that his “life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
    account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion.” Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 
    333 F.3d 463
    , 469 (3d Cir. 2003). The BIA concluded that
    there was no nexus between the threats and Galo’s political opinion, so there is
    substantial evidence to support the determination that Galo does not qualify for
    withholding of removal.
    C.
    The BIA dismissed Galo’s CAT claim without providing any reasoning for its
    decision. We have explained:
    A petition for protection under the [CAT] differs significantly from
    petitions for asylum or withholding of removal because the alien need not
    demonstrate that he will be tortured on account of a particular belief or
    immutable characteristic. Matter of S—V—, [21 I&N Dec. 1306 (BIA
    2000)]. Rather, in assessing whether an alien is more likely than not to be
    tortured in the proposed country of removal, INS regulations identify a non-
    exclusive list of factors to consider: (1) evidence of past torture . . . ; (2) the
    possibility the alien could relocate to another part of the country where his
    torture is unlikely; (3) evidence of “gross, flagrant or mass violations of
    8
    human rights” in the country; and (4) any other relevant country conditions
    information. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3).
    
    Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 725
    .
    The IJ denied Galo’s CAT claim on the basis of the adverse credibility
    determination, but the BIA determined that Galo’s story was “not necessarily incredible
    in light of country conditions.” The BIA’s conclusion that Galo was not threatened on
    account of his political opinion forecloses his claims for asylum and withholding of
    removal, but is not relevant to his claim to CAT relief. We are unable to determine, based
    on the record, why the BIA denied Galo’s CAT claim. “In order for us to be able to give
    meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some insight into its reasoning.”
    Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 
    341 F.3d 227
    , 232-33 (3d Cir. 2003). We will remand so that the
    BIA can specifically consider Galo’s CAT claim and provide insight that would allow us
    to review its decision on appeal.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, will we grant the petition for review and remand for
    further agency action on Galo’s CAT claim only, in accordance with this opinion.
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