United States v. Anthony Roebuck ( 2019 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 17-2718
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY ROEBUCK,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No.: 2-00-cr-00328-002)
District Judge: Honorable Edward G. Smith
Argued on November 8, 2018
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2019)
Richard Coughlin
Federal Defender District of New Jersey
Alison Brill [Argued]
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Office of Federal Public Defender
22 South Clinton Avenue
Station Plaza #4, 4th Floor
Trenton, NJ 08609
Counsel for Appellant
William M. McSwain
United States Attorney
Robert A. Zauzmer [Argued]
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief of Appeals
Tomika N. S. Patterson
Assistant United States Attorney
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
________
O P I N I O N*
________
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Anthony Roebuck challenges the District Court’s order revoking his
term of supervised release, sentencing him to a ten-month term of imprisonment and
imposing a subsequent five-year term of supervised release. While we reject Roebuck’s
challenge to the permissible length of his term of supervised release, we hold that the
District Court plainly erred by treating the five-year term of supervised release as
mandatory. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings.
Background
In 2000, Anthony Roebuck pled guilty to conspiracy, attempt, and possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced
to twenty years of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release, which he later
successfully challenged, and the District Court then reduced it to ten years of
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
imprisonment and five years of supervised release. As a condition of supervised release,
Roebuck was not to commit a state, local, or federal crime. After Roebuck had served his
term of imprisonment, and while on supervised release, the Philadelphia Police
Department arrested and charged Roebuck with criminal conspiracy, possession with
intent to deliver narcotics, and resisting arrest. Based on this arrest, the District Court in
2013 revoked Roebuck’s supervised release, sentenced him to a 33-month prison term,
credited for time served, and imposed a subsequent five-year supervised release term
(“2013 term”). While on supervised release, Roebuck failed two drugs tests in
September and November 2016, and failed to appear for a third test in November 2016.
Based on these violations, in December, the District Court, with Roebuck’s agreement,
modified the terms of his supervised release to include intensive outpatient treatment and
60 days of home confinement (“modified term”).
In January 2017, during the 60-day home confinement, the Philadelphia Police
Department arrested Roebuck for possession of drugs and conspiracy to sell or distribute
drugs, based on the belief that Roebuck knowingly transported a co-conspirator to a drug
transaction, and that drugs were discovered in Roebuck’s home. Although that state
charge was ultimately nolle prossed, Roebuck’s probation officer filed a petition to
revoke supervised release, arguing that: (1) based on the circumstances, there is probable
cause to believe that Roebuck conspired to possess or possessed with the intent to deliver
drugs (grade A violation of supervised release); (2) Roebuck left his home without an
authorized purpose (grade C violation); and (3) Roebuck failed (or failed to appear for)
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multiple1 drug tests (grade C violation). The District Court referred the grade A violation
to a Magistrate Judge to determine if there was probable cause to believe that Roebuck
committed a state, local, or federal crime. The Magistrate Judge, finding that the
Government failed to establish probable cause that Roebuck possessed or conspired to
distribute drugs, dismissed the grade A violation. After the District Court held a hearing
on the remaining grade C violations, the District Court revoked Roebuck’s modified term
of supervised release, sentenced him to a ten-month term of imprisonment, and imposed a
subsequent five-year term of supervised release (“2017 term”).
Roebuck appeals that sentence, arguing that: (1) the District Court erred by
imposing a term of supervise release that exceeded the maximum allowed by 18 U.S.C. §
3583(h);2 (2) the Court violated Roebuck’s due process rights by relying on the same
violations that led to the modified term of supervised release to impose this term of
supervised release; and (3) it plainly erred by treating the Guidelines and § 3583(h) as
requiring a term of at least five years of supervised release after imprisonment, when they
do not. We now review those challenges here.
1
Specifically Roebuck tested positive for cocaine use on December 27, 2013; July 11,
2016; August 11, 2016; August 22, 2016; September 21, 2016; November 14, 2016; and
December 16, 2016. Roebuck failed to appear for urinalysis on August 19, 2016 and
November 3, 2016.
2
Roebuck also argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose this sentence,
because the 2013 term of supervised release also unlawfully exceeded the maximum
allowed by statute. Roebuck likely waived his right to challenge the 2013 term of
supervised release because he failed to do so at the time the sentence was imposed. But
the waiver is inconsequential because the 2013 term would have been lawful for the same
reason the 2017 term is lawful.
4
Analysis
Roebuck failed to raise his claims in the District Court. As a result, we review for
plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Roebuck has the burden to establish that (1) the Court erred; (2) the error was “plain” or
“obvious”; (3) the error affected “substantial rights,” such that it affected the outcome of
the proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness of the judicial
proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993). Because successive
terms of supervised release relate back to the initial offense, we rely on the relevant
language of the Guidelines and statutes at the time of the initial conviction. United States
v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Peugh v. United States, 569
U.S. 530, 549 (2013) (applying Ex Post Facto Clause to Guidelines).
1. The District Court did not impose a term of supervised release greater
than the maximum allowed by statute.
We first address Roebuck’s challenge to the length of the term of his supervised
release, which relies on a strained reading of several cross-referencing statutory
provisions to argue that the District Court could not impose a five-year term. 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e) sets forth the maximum term of imprisonment that can be imposed following
revocation of supervised release, depending on the class of the felony on which the
revocation was based.3 Another subsection, § 3583(h), governs the term of supervised
release that can be imposed after the term of imprisonment imposed under § 3583(e).
3
Section 3583(e)(3) specifically limits a defendant’s term of imprisonment after
revocation to five years if the original offense is a Class A felony, 3 years for a Class B
5
Section 3583(h) provides:
(h) Supervised release following revocation.--When a term of supervised
release is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of
imprisonment that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized under subsection (e)(3),4 the court may include a requirement
that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after
imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not
exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense
that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (emphasis added). Roebuck urges that the statute that authorized the
original term of supervised release, and therefore sets the maximum length of supervised
release that the District Court could impose, is 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), which provides:
(b) Authorized terms of supervised release.—Except as otherwise provided,
the authorized terms of supervised release are—
(1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years;
(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and
(3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty
offense), not more than one year.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). The problem with this argument is that the statute that actually
authorized Roebuck’s original term of supervised release is his statute of conviction, 21
U.S.C. § 841, which authorizes “a term of supervised release of at least 5 years in
addition to such term of imprisonment[.]” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
We have held that where a statute sets a statutory minimum with no maximum, the
felony, and 2 years for a Class C or D felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Roebuck does not
dispute that his term of imprisonment was valid: the District Court here imposed a ten-
month term, clearly within the five-year period for conspiring to sell or distribute drugs, a
Class A felony.
4
Congress deleted the phrase “that is less than the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized under subsection (e)(3)” in a later amendment.
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maximum is life. United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, 294 F.3d 563, 567 (3d Cir. 2002).
Therefore, the District Court did not err by imposing a supervised release term of five
years, when it could have imposed a term up to life.
We rejected the premise of Roebuck’s argument in United States v. Sanchez-
Gonzalez:
[W]e reject the . . . view that § 3583 ever limits the term of supervised
release in cases under § 841. Our reasons are not complicated. The plain
meaning of § 3583 is that it always yields to other statutes, such as § 841,
that specifically provide terms of supervised release. Any other reading
fails to give full effect to the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” carveout in §
3583. Section 841(b) does “otherwise provide” and therefore trumps the
default maximum terms of supervised release provided in 18 U.S.C. §
3583.
Id. at 566 (emphasis in original). Although Sanchez-Gonzalez did not address subsequent
supervised releases under § 3583(h), the result is no different: § 841, not § 3583(b),
authorized supervised release for the original term, and therefore governs subsequent
terms. Thus, the District Court did not exceed the statutory maximum allowed when it
imposed a five-year term of supervised release, because § 841(b)(1)(A) authorized the
original term of supervised release, and permits a life term of supervised release for
successive terms.5
5
Roebuck raises two other arguments that are equally unpersuasive. First, Roebuck
argues that permitting terms of supervised release up to life renders the “subtraction
clause” of § 3583(h) meaningless, because one cannot subtract a term of imprisonment
from a lifetime sentence. As other courts have recognized, “the more appropriate course
is simply to recognize that this is one of those rare situations where Congress did not
expect the literal terms of its handiwork to be applied to a lifetime term of supervised
release[.]” United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2012). And second,
Roebuck argues this holding is contrary to our decisions in United States v. Brady, 88
F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1996), and United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2010). But, in
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2. The District Court did not violate Roebuck’s due process rights when, in
imposing this term of imprisonment and supervised release, it considered
conduct that was also the subject of the modified term of supervised
release.
Roebuck argues that the District Court violated his due process rights when it
revoked his supervised release, because he never received notice that the Court could
modify his conditions of supervised release based on past conduct, and then revoke his
supervised release based on that same conduct. Specifically, Roebuck argues that when
the District Court modified his terms of supervised release in December 2016 based on
one missed and two failed drug tests, then one month later revoked his supervised release
based on the probation officer’s revocation petition, which included the same conduct, his
due process rights were violated. He further asserts that his waiver of counsel and a
hearing when he agreed to the December modified term was not knowing and voluntary
because he was unaware that he could be punished for the same conduct twice. And,
even if that waiver was knowing and voluntary, it is fundamentally unfair to impose a
harsher sentence for the same conduct.
A district court has broad discretion to impose special conditions on supervised
release or modify its terms. United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2012).
In doing so, it shall consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The District Court here
both cases, the specific calculation at issue here was not central to the holding, and thus
was dicta. See Brady, 88 F.3d at 228; Doe, 617 F.3d at 775.
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did not plainly err when it considered Roebuck’s past conduct, because there is no
dispute that the District Court also considered new home-confinement violations that
formed the basis of, at least in part, the District Court’s decision to revoke supervised
release, even if the drug offenses were the “more serious” violations. App. 215. As a
result, to the extent the District Court may have punished Roebuck for the same conduct
twice, that error is not “plain” or “obvious” nor did it affect substantial rights because
new conduct also formed the basis of the decision to revoke supervised release.
3. The District Court plainly erred by treating the five-year term of
supervised release as mandatory.
Roebuck argues that the District Court plainly erred by treating 18 U.S.C. §
3583(h) and the relevant provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which
mirrors § 3583(h), as requiring a five-year term of supervised release, when in fact, there
is no minimum.
Here the District Court plainly erred by believing it had to impose at least a five-
year term of supervised release, when the applicable statute only requires that the term of
supervised release cannot exceed the term authorized under the statute that resulted in the
original term, which was life. The Court first erred when it stated, “[a]nd do both counsel
agree that for a C violation, the statutory maximum is five years of incarceration, and the
guideline range would be four months to ten months with supervised release of at least
five years?” App. 136 (emphasis added). Later, it had the following exchange
confirming its belief:
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The Court: And do both Counsel agree that I – the recommended
statutory max is at least five years for supervised
release?
Ms. Patterson: Your Honor, yes, there is a statutory max of five
years.6
The Court: At least five years.
Ms. Patterson: At least five years for – for custody, and then there’s at
least five years for supervised release.
The Court: Okay. Counsel?
App. 212 (emphasis added). It appears that, while referring to a “statutory max” of “at
least five years,” the Court actually believed that it was required to impose a term of
supervised release, as evidenced by the persistent use of “at least” by the Court when
stating the term of supervised release as “five years,” including correcting the
Government attorney that the statutory max is “at least five years.” Id. The only curative
language can be found when the Court said “the recommended statutory max,” but that
statement is followed by “at least five years,” and the Government’s attorney only
confirmed that mistake by stating “and then there’s at least five years for supervised
release.” Id. (emphasis added). The District Court thus erred by believing it was required
to impose a sentence of at least five years, when neither the Guidelines nor § 3583(h)
require it to do so.
Even though this error is reviewed under the plain error standard, we believe it
meets that high burden. The error is obvious, because the District Court persistently
suggested that the statute requires at least five years of supervised release, and it is clear
that the Guidelines and § 3583(h) each contain “cannot exceed” language and do not
6
Evidencing further confusion in this colloquy, under § 841, the “statutory max” would
be life, and the statutory minimum would be “five years,” neither of which are mandatory
to impose under § 3583(h) or U.S.S.G. § 7B1(g)(3).
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require a subsequent term of supervised release. That error affected substantial rights:
The District Court’s belief that the term of supervised release was mandatory prejudiced
Roebuck, and it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Roebuck and the Government
both proposed more lenient terms of supervised release that may have not been
considered because the District Court believed it was required to impose at least a five
year term of supervised release. Thus, it plainly erred by treating the Guidelines and §
3583(h) as mandating at least a five-year term of supervised release.
Conclusion
We will vacate the District Court’s sentence and remand for further proceedings.
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