James Coe v. Anthony Brullo ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-2536
__________
JAMES COE,
Appellant
v.
ANTHONY BRULLO
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-13338)
District Judge: Honorable Julien X. Neals
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 22, 2023
*
Before: AMBRO , KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed February 23, 2023)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
Judge Ambro assumed senior status on February 6, 2023.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant James Coe appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Coe was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and was supervised
by appellee Anthony Brullo. Although Coe’s amended operative complaint did not
specify a legal theory for relief, (which we discuss in more detail below), he appeared to
allege that, on or around April 1, 2005, Brullo locked Coe inside an office, called the
police, and claimed that Coe was making terrorist threats. Coe was placed on off-duty
suspension without pay due to insubordination shortly thereafter. Coe’s request for relief
included full back pay, benefits, and compensatory and punitive damages. And, in
several filings later submitted in the District Court, Coe appeared to allege that the
suspension was racially motivated, as Coe is African-American.
Brullo moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because
Coe failed to state a short and plain statement of his claim for relief as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and his claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. The Magistrate Judge issued a report and
recommendation (R&R), therein recommending that the District Court dismiss Coe’s
complaint with prejudice. The District Court reviewed the R&R, noted that Coe had not
objected to it, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Coe timely filed a notice of
appeal.
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1,2 We exercise plenary review
over a District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See
Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018), and we review
the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the requirements
of Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d
Cir. 2019).
Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted), but a complaint must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a court should liberally construe the pleadings of
a pro se plaintiff, the complaint must still allege sufficient facts to support a claim for
relief. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
1
The District Court’s with-prejudice dismissal order is a final and appealable order that
this Court has jurisdiction to consider. See In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA
Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2007).
2
Brullo contends that Coe waived all arguments related to the District Court’s dismissal
order because he failed to meaningfully challenge the dismissal in his opening brief.
While Brullo used the term “waiver,” the issue is more accurately described as
“forfeiture.” See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136,
147 (3d Cir. 2017); see also M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d
120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020). Liberally construing Coe’s opening brief, as we must,
see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we decline to find that he forfeited his
arguments pertaining to the District Court’s dismissal order.
3
In assessing Coe’s complaint, the Magistrate Judge explained that although Coe
referred to his loss of wages and employee benefits, and requested relief for those losses,
Coe did not explain the legal wrong committed by Brullo, nor did he cite to any legal
authority supporting his claim. See ECF No. 55 at p. 5. Upon review, we agree that the
allegations in Coe’s amended complaint are too sparse to discern which legal theories
support his claim for relief. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (“Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires
that a complaint provide fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”) (cleaned up). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint under Rule 8.
Furthermore, even if Coe had raised claims under a conceivable legal theory, we
agree with the Magistrate Judge that the claims would be barred by any applicable statute
of limitations. A complaint can be dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a
statute of limitations defense only when such a defense is apparent on the face of the
complaint. See Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017). Here, it is
apparent from Coe’s complaint that any applicable statute of limitations has expired, as
thirteen years have elapsed between the date his cause of action accrued (around April 1,
2005) and the date that the District Court received Coe’s complaint (August 27, 2018).3
3
Because we will affirm the dismissal order for two independent reasons, we need not
consider whether the District Court properly dismissed Coe’s complaint for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. To the extent that Coe raises an argument on appeal
challenging the dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust, see C.A. No. 7 at pp. 48
& 49, that argument has no bearing on our disposition.
4
On appeal, Coe argues that the District Court should have considered his untimely
filed objections to the R&R. See C.A. No. 7 at p. 14. Because the District Court
received the objections after it had dismissed Coe’s complaint, it cannot be faulted for
failing to consider them. Moreover, Coe’s objections would not have cured the pleading
or statute of limitations deficiencies in his complaint. Even if the District Court had
considered Coe’s objections, it still would have dismissed his complaint because of those
deficiencies.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5