United States v. Electro-Glass Products , 298 F. App'x 157 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-16-2008
    USA v. Electro Glass Prod
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-3191
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Electro Glass Prod" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 357.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/357
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 07-3191
    _______________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    ELECTRO GLASS PRODUCTS,
    Appellant.
    _______________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (Criminal No. 06-cr-00117)
    District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
    Argued September 29, 2008
    Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: October 16, 2008)
    David M. Laigaie (Argued)
    Mariana Rossman
    DIL WORTH PAXSON, LLP
    3200 Mellon Bank Center
    1735 Market Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Appellant
    Mary Beth Buchanan
    Robert L. Eberhardt (Argued)
    700 Grant Street, Suite 400
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Counsel for Appellee
    __________________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________________
    CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
    Electro-Glass Products (“Electro-Glass”) appeals its conviction for violating the
    Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), arguing that the Government presented insufficient
    evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Electro-Glass acted willfully. Because
    the jury verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we will affirm.
    I.
    We write solely for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the factual
    context and legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts
    necessary to our analysis.
    Electro-Glass manufactures “glass preforms,” including “solder glass preforms.”
    Solder glass preforms are used, inter alia, by manufacturers of night vision equipment.
    The AECA requires manufacturers to obtain licenses before exporting military products
    that are on the United States Munitions List (“Munitions List”).
    In October 1993, a United States customs agent visited Electro-Glass to inquire
    about an order Electro-Glass received from a Dutch entity called B.V. Delft. Pursuant to
    2
    the agent’s instructions, Electro-Glass sought a commodity jurisdiction determination
    from the Department of State (“DOS”) regarding whether a license was necessary to
    export the preforms. The customs agent also made a presentation to Electro-Glass during
    this time period to educate the company’s representatives about the AECA licensing
    requirements. In January 1994, DOS issued a commodity jurisdiction determination that
    the specific preform B.V. Delft ordered was on the Munitions List, and therefore Electro-
    Glass could not ship it without a license. Electro-Glass chose not to ship to B.V. Delft.
    Eight years later, in June 2002, Electro-Glass received an order for solder glass
    preforms from an Indian company called B.E. Delft1 . Electro-Glass was aware that these
    preforms were originally developed for military application in night vision devices.
    Electro-Glass also acknowledged that it was uncomfortable with continued dealings with
    B.E. Delft and that it recognized the similarity in this entity’s name to B.V. Delft.
    Electro-Glass sought guidance from several government agencies regarding its
    ability to ship to B.E. Delft. Electro-Glass contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    and Congressman John Murtha, who referred Electro-Glass’s inquiry to United States
    Customs. Although none of these governmental agencies told Electro-Glass not to make
    shipments to B.E. Delft, Electro-Glass never received actual authorization for the
    shipments. Moreover, a United States customs agent told Electro-Glass that he would
    1
    On January 22, 2004, B.E. Delft began to operate as Bel-Optronic Devices Ltd.
    For consistency, we refer to this entity as B.E. Delft throughout the opinion.
    3
    have to make inquiries with three federal agencies, including DOS, to determine whether
    Electro-Glass could legally export the preforms. Without waiting for definitive
    authorization from the government, Electro-Glass made four shipments to B.E. Delft
    without obtaining a license.
    On December 6, 2004, two United States customs agents visited Electro-Glass and
    told the company that it would need a license to ship preforms to B.E. Delft. Only then
    did Electro-Glass stop making shipments. On April 5, 2006, a grand jury indicted
    Electro-Glass on four counts of violating the AECA, one for each shipment that Electro-
    Glass made to B.E. Delft. After a four-day trial, a jury found Electro-Glass guilty on all
    four counts. Electro-Glass filed a timely appeal.
    II.
    The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
    Because Electro-Glass is appealing from a final judgment of conviction, we have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Flanagan v. United States, 
    465 U.S. 259
    ,
    263 (1984); Catlin v. United States, 
    324 U.S. 229
    , 233 (1945).
    Defendant bears a heavy burden on appeal. When considering the sufficiency of
    the evidence to uphold a criminal conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Government. See Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942); see
    also United States v. Dent, 
    149 F.3d 180
    , 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that this Court
    applies a “particularly deferential standard of review when deciding whether a jury
    4
    verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence”). Seen in that light, we affirm if “any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979). “[T]he evidence need not
    unequivocally point to the defendant’s guilt as long as it permits a finding of guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis, 
    183 F.3d 231
    , 238 (3d Cir. 1999); see also
    United States v. McNeill, 
    887 F.2d 448
    , 450 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Only when the record
    contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may an appellate court overturn the verdict.” (quoting
    Brandom v. United States, 
    431 F.2d 1391
    , 1400 (7th Cir. 1970))).
    III.
    To establish a violation of the AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), the government must
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant exported an article from the
    United States, (2) that article is listed on the Munitions List, (3) the defendant exported
    the article without a license, and (4) the defendant did so willfully. See United States v.
    Tsai, 
    954 F.2d 155
    , 160 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992). We have noted that the “willfulness”
    element of the AECA is established only “[i]f the defendant knew that the export was in
    violation of the law.” 
    Id. at 162.
    The Government does not need to prove the basis of
    that knowledge, or that the defendant was aware of the licensing requirement. 
    Id. Electro-Glass asserts
    that the Government failed to prove the “willfulness” element
    of the offense. To differentiate its case from those where AECA violations have been
    5
    established, Electro-Glass points to cases involving defendants who either admit knowing
    that their conduct was illegal or who act in a manner that demonstrates such knowledge
    by misrepresenting information to the Government. Electro-Glass also argues that most
    AECA cases involve shipments of military items to war-torn or hostile countries. See,
    e.g., 
    Tsai, 954 F.2d at 158-59
    (affirming a guilty verdict where the defendant falsified
    documents to smuggle items through Customs, had been informed that a license was
    required to export his product, and told an undercover agent to “act dumb” about the
    licensing requirement).
    Pointing to more extreme AECA violations, however, does not automatically
    imply that Electro-Glass’s conduct did not rise to the level of willfulness, and it certainly
    does not allow Electro-Glass to meet its heavy burden on appeal. The fact remains that
    Electro-Glass had a four-day jury trial, during which it had a full and fair opportunity to
    present a defense to the Government’s charges. After weighing the evidence and
    evaluating the credibility of witnesses, the jury determined that the Government proved,
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that Electro-Glass violated the AECA willfully. In reviewing
    the jury verdict, we exercise great deference and affirm if any rational trier of fact could
    have found willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that the record contains
    evidence which could have supported a contrary conclusion does not warrant reversal as
    long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict. Here, we
    conclude that there is.
    6
    Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, with all of
    the credibility inferences viewed in favor of the Government, we find that a rational trier
    of fact could infer that Electro-Glass knew about the AECA licensing requirements dating
    back to the 1993-1994 time period and, therefore, that the company knew that at least
    some of its solder glass preforms were military products that could not be shipped without
    a license at the time Electro-Glass made shipments to B.E. Delft. Specifically, a rational
    trier of fact could have concluded that: (1) a United States customs agent made a
    presentation to Electro-Glass representatives in 1993 about the AECA licensing
    requirements; (2) this presentation and the 1994 DOS commodity jurisdiction
    determination put Electro-Glass on notice that certain military products cannot be
    exported without a license; (3) Electro-Glass knew that the preform at issue in this case
    was “originally developed for military application,” (Appendix 00753), and was therefore
    subject to DOS licensing; and (4) when Electro-Glass made the four shipments to B.E.
    Delft without obtaining a license or even requesting a commodity jurisdiction
    determination, it knew that doing so was illegal. Thus, a rational trier of fact could have
    found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Electro-Glass violated the AECA willfully.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    7