Brown v. Daniels , 290 F. App'x 467 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-22-2008
    Brown v. Daniels
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-3429
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/633
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 06-3429
    ________________
    KEVIN E. BROWN; ERICA BROWN,
    Appellants
    v.
    TINA DANIELS;
    BRANDY NEIDER, CPS INVESTIGATOR;
    BERKS COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-04242
    (Honorable Petrese B. Tucker)
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 19, 2007
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: August 22, 2008)
    ______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ______________
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellants Kevin and Erica Brown, proceeding pro se, appeal from the District
    Court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, its rulings on two
    motions in limine, and its denial of their motion to amend the complaint. For the reasons
    that follow, we will affirm.
    This lawsuit arises out of events beginning on May 21, 2003, when Travonne, the
    son of Erica Brown and stepson of Kevin Brown, was brought to Berks County Children
    and Youth Services (“BCCYS”) by his maternal aunt. Based on the aunt’s allegations
    that Kevin Brown had physically abused his stepson, Tina Daniels, a BCCYS caseworker,
    initiated an investigation. Daniels attempted to contact both of the Appellants by phone
    and followed up with separate letters to each of them the following week explaining that
    Travonne and his sister were residing with their maternal grandmother and that “a plan
    for guardianship or custody needs to be decided as soon as possible in order to resolve the
    matter.” A hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2003, approximately four weeks later, and
    was then continued until July 9, 2003 at Erica Brown’s request, with Travonne to remain
    with his maternal grandmother until further notice. At the July 9 hearing, the Juvenile
    Court directed the family to begin counseling and ordered that Travonne remain with his
    grandmother under the “protective supervision” of BCCYS.
    On August 11, 2003, Appellants filed the underlying complaint in the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In it, they alleged that
    BCCYS, Daniels, and Supervisor Brandy Neider violated their substantive due process
    rights by examining Travonne without their consent, notifying Kevin Brown’s employer
    2
    of the abuse allegations, and harassing them during the healing process. They further
    alleged that Appellees violated their procedural due process rights by taking Travonne
    into custody without promptly conducting a hearing. On Appellees’ motion, the District
    Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
    and in the alternative, held that Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal,
    we affirmed in part, upholding the dismissal of BCCYS, Neider, and Appellants’
    substantive due process claims from the action. We vacated and remanded the District
    Court’s judgment with respect to claims that Daniels violated Appellants’ procedural due
    process rights, holding that Appellants had sufficiently alleged a violation of their
    procedural due process rights to survive a motion to dismiss.
    Following our remand, the District Court held a two-day trial in which Erica
    Brown represented herself. During the course of the trial, Brown elicited testimony from
    Kevin Brown and other family members regarding the events of May 21. The testimony
    indicated that, upon learning that her children were at her mother’s house, Brown went to
    the police station that evening to request police assistance in getting the children back.
    She was told that there was a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order in place, and that the
    police could not assist her. All of her witnesses testified that the Browns returned from
    the police station unsuccessful in getting their children back. The remainder of the
    testimony at trial focused on the emotional, psychological and economic damages
    suffered by the Brown family as a result of the children’s removal from their home.
    3
    Appellants did not call any representatives of the police department or BCCYS as
    witnesses. At the close of Appellants’ case, Daniels moved for judgment as a matter of
    law, which motion the District Court granted in an oral opinion. Appellants then filed a
    motion for reconsideration which the District Court denied in a written opinion and order
    entered on June 19, 2006. Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal.
    Appellants challenge four of the District Court’s rulings in this appeal: (i) its grant
    of Appellee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 50(a); (ii) its grant of Appellee’s motion in limine to dismiss Kevin Brown
    from the action for lack of standing; (iii) its denial of Appellants’ motion in limine to
    exclude certain BCCYS files from the trial; and (iv) its denial of Appellants’ motion to
    amend their complaint.
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We note first
    that Appellants failed to order a transcript of the proceedings as required by Federal Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1). Appellee has urged us to dismiss Appellants’ first three
    claims on this ground. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2); see also Horner Equip. Intern., Inc. v.
    Seascape Pool Ctr., Inc., 
    884 F.2d 89
    , 92-93 (3d Cir. 1989). However, because
    Appellants are proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, we ordered the court reporter to
    prepare a transcript of the trial testimony pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(b) & 1915(c).
    Accordingly, we will not dismiss Appellants’ claims.
    We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s entry of judgment as a matter
    4
    of law. See Goodman v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm’n, 
    293 F.3d 655
    , 664-65 (3d Cir.
    2002). As with grants of summary judgment, the reviewing court “must draw all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
    determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
    530 U.S. 133
    , 150 (2000). Generally, a Rule 50 motion should be granted only if the evidence is
    not sufficient for a jury reasonably to find liability. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.,
    
    4 F.3d 1153
    , 1166 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (permitting entry of
    judgment as a matter of law when “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury
    trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
    evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”).
    At the close of Appellants’ case, Appellee moved for, and the District Court
    entered, judgment as a matter of law. In its written opinion and order denying
    Appellants’ motion for reconsideration, the District Court explained that it had granted
    Appellee’s motion based on its conclusion that Appellants had failed to present sufficient
    evidence to support a finding that their son had been taken into “protective custody”
    within the meaning of 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6315, or, assuming he was in “protective
    custody,” that Daniels had acted unreasonably in not initiating a hearing within 72 hours.
    Appellants contest the District Court’s conclusion, arguing that under 55 Pa. Code
    § 3490.57, placement of children with relatives constitutes protective custody, and
    therefore they should have been afforded a hearing within 72 hours.
    5
    Appellants’ claims are grounded in the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”),
    23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6301-6386. Section 6315 permits a child to be taken into
    “protective custody” if it is immediately necessary for the child’s protection. That section
    further requires that the parents be immediately informed of the whereabouts of their
    children, specifies that an informal court hearing must be held within 72 hours to
    determine whether “to allow the child to remain in the home would be contrary to the
    welfare of the child,” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6315(d); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
    § 6332(a), and defines the “place of detention” as “an appropriate medical facility, foster
    home or other appropriate facility approved by the department for this purpose.” 23 Pa.
    Cons. Stat. § 6315(e). The section of the Pennsylvania Code referred to by Appellants in
    their brief provides:
    A child taken into protective custody may be placed only in the following
    locations:
    (1) A hospital, if hospitalization is medically necessary in the
    opinion of the attending physician.
    (2) A home of a relative of the child or other individual who has a
    significant relationship with the child or the child’s family. The home shall
    be approved by the county agency for this purpose.
    (3) A foster family home approved by a licensed foster family care
    agency.
    (4) A licensed residential child care facility.
    55 Pa. Code § 3490.57(d). That section further provides that protective custody “may not
    be maintained longer than 72 hours without an informal hearing under section 6332 of the
    Juvenile act (relating to informal hearing).” 55 Pa. Code § 3490.57(a).
    6
    Against this backdrop, Appellants maintained throughout trial that they were not
    afforded a hearing within 72 hours of Travonne’s placement by Appellee with his
    grandmother, and therefore, their procedural due process rights were violated. The
    District Court held that Appellants’ claim must fail as a matter of law because they failed
    to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that Travonne had been taken into
    “protective custody” within the meaning of 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6315, or, assuming
    that he was in “protective custody,” that Daniels had acted unreasonably in not initiating a
    hearing within 72 hours.
    In entering judgment as a matter of law, the District Court focused on the
    procedures required under state statute when a child is taken into protective custody. We
    agree with the District Court that Appellants did not set forth sufficient evidence at trial to
    support a finding that Travonne was taken into “protective custody” within the meaning
    of 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6315. However, an inquiry into whether Appellants were
    afforded all of the process they were due cannot end there. It is well settled that state law
    does not define the parameters of due process for the purposes of the Fourteenth
    Amendment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    , 541 (1985)
    (“[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, the question remains what
    process is due. The answer to that question is not to be found in the [state] statute.”)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Swipies v. Kofka, 
    419 F.3d 709
    , 716 (8th
    7
    Cir. 2005) (holding that “a state statute cannot dictate what procedural protections must
    attend a liberty interest . . . as this is the sole province of federal law”).
    Whether or not under the facts of this case, compliance with the procedures set out
    in the CPSL conforms with the requirements of federal due process is an issue we need
    not decide here because we can affirm on other grounds. See Nicini v. Morra, 
    212 F.3d 798
    , 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (concluding that we may affirm the District Court on
    any grounds supported by the record). “The fundamental requirement of due process is
    the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
    Matthews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333 (1976). Whether Appellants’ procedural due
    process rights were violated by Appellee’s failure to schedule a hearing regarding the
    placement of their son with sufficient promptness can be determined by a balancing of
    three factors:
    First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
    the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
    used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
    safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
    involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
    substitute procedural requirement would entail.
    
    Id. at 334035;
    see also Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 
    174 F.3d 368
    . The private interest
    here is the right to family integrity, which this Court has indicated must be balanced
    against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being abused. See 
    Miller, 174 F.3d at 373
    ; Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Serv., 
    103 F.3d 1123
    ,
    8
    1125 (3d Cir. 1997). As explained in Patterson v. Armstrong, 
    141 F. Supp. 2d 512
    (W.D. Pa. 2001):
    . . . While not dispositive, the statutory schemes adopted by the
    Pennsylvania legislature in the familial integrity arena are highly relevant to
    this Court’s consideration of the second and third factors. . . .
    The “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” that the
    defendants should have followed in this case were those carefully crafted
    and interlocking procedures of the CPSL and the Juvenile Act. The
    “probable value” of following the legislatively mandated procedures,
    providing for quick judicial review, is in the greatly reduced risk of
    erroneous interference with parental rights and the integrity of the family
    unit. Similarly, the legislature obviously considered the fiscal and
    administrative burdens that would fall on child protective services agencies
    and local law enforcement officials charged by the CPSL, the Juvenile Act,
    the PFA Act with protecting the safety and welfare of children and with
    safeguarding the constitutional rights of parents and the family, and enacted
    related legislation mandating specific procedural requirements. The
    Pennsylvania General Assembly must be presumed to have intended those
    burdens be carried by the appropriate local officials.
    
    Id. at 538.
    It is well-settled that “in emergency circumstances which pose an immediate threat
    to the safety of a child, officials may temporarily deprive a parent of custody without
    parental consent or a court order.” Hollingsworth v. Hill, 
    110 F.3d 733
    , 739 (10th Cir.
    1997). However, “in those extra-ordinary situations where deprivation of a protected
    interest is permitted without prior process, the constitutional requirements of notice and
    an opportunity to be heard are not eliminated, but merely postponed.” Suboh v. District
    Attorney’s Office of Suffolk, 
    298 F.3d 81
    , 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]hen the state removes a child from her parents, due
    9
    process guarantees prompt and fair post-deprivation judicial review.” Berman v. Young,
    
    291 F.3d 976
    , 985 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 
    174 F.3d 368
    ,
    372 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Initiating child custody proceedings by ex parte orders is
    generally constitutional if a prompt post-deprivation hearing is held.”).
    There is no bright-line rule for deciding whether a post-deprivation hearing is
    sufficiently “prompt. See Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 
    326 F.3d 290
    , 299 (1st Cir. 2003)
    (approving post-deprivation hearing three days after children’s removal); 
    Berman, 291 F.3d at 985
    (concluding that 72-day delay was “rather outrageous,” but finding no actual
    damages); Whisman v. Rinehart, 
    119 F.3d 1303
    , 1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
    hearing held 17 days after the state had taken custody was not “prompt”); Jordan v.
    Jackson, 
    15 F.3d 333
    , 351 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 65-hour delay in judicial
    review of emergency removal was “near, if not at, the outer limit of permissible delay”);
    Cecere v. City of New York, 
    967 F.2d 826
    , 829-30 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that 4-day
    delay was constitutionally permissible); Lossman v. Pekarske, 
    707 F.2d 288
    , 290 (7th Cir.
    1983) (approving 12-day delay, based on parents’ request for additional time to prepare).
    The evidence introduced at trial indicates that, on May 21, while Travonne may
    not have been in “protective custody,” he was residing at his grandmother’s house and
    Appellants were unable to regain physical custody of him due to the presence of the PFA
    order. It further reveals that the first dependency hearing was scheduled for June 25, at
    least four weeks after Travonne began residing with his grandmother. The hearing was
    10
    then continued for two weeks at Appellants’ request. On July 9, 2003, the Juvenile Court
    ordered that Travonne remain with his grandmother pending permission from his therapist
    to return home. According to Kevin Brown’s testimony, Travonne did not return home
    until over six months after the hearing.
    Whether or not the hearing here satisfied due process “promptness,” we will affirm
    the judgment of the District Court. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim where a
    “prompt” post-deprivation hearing was not conducted after the removal of a child, a
    plaintiff must establish “with some degree of probability[] that a timely hearing would
    have prevented the extended infringement on their familial rights. In other words, [she]
    must demonstrate actual damages resulting from the delay in the post-deprivation
    hearing.” Berman v. Young, 
    291 F.3d 976
    , 985 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation and
    quotation omitted); see also Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 264 (1978) (holding that, in
    order to obtain compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress caused by denial
    of procedural due process, plaintiff must adduce proof that the injury was caused by the
    deprivation of due process). Here, Appellants did receive a hearing on July 9, 2003, at
    which time the juvenile court judge ordered that Travonne remain with his grandmother.
    There is no indication in the record that had the hearing been conducted earlier, a
    different result would have been reached. Thus, because the state court approved the
    placement of Travonne with his grandmother on July 9, and in light of the testimony
    presented at trial, we conclude that Appellants have not demonstrated any compensable
    11
    injury resulting from the delayed hearing. See 
    Berman, 291 F.3d at 985
    (concluding that,
    “especially given that the state court approved the removal” of the child from her home,
    the parents could not demonstrate any injury resulting from the delayed hearing); see also
    
    Lossman, 707 F.2d at 291
    (holding that, even if a hearing had been conducted earlier, the
    result presumably would have been the same, and therefore, causation did not exist).
    Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law on
    Appellants’ procedural due process claim.
    Appellants’ next two claims are that the District Court erred in granting Appellee’s
    motion in limine to dismiss Kevin Brown from the action immediately prior to the start of
    the trial for lack of standing and in denying their motion in limine to bar Appellee from
    introducing at trial materials from her files from the abuse investigation. Under the
    CPSL, only a “parent, guardian or other custodian” is entitled to a hearing. See 23 Pa.
    Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6315. Because Kevin Brown had no legal relationship with Travonne,
    the Court held that he would not have been entitled to a hearing and therefore lacked
    standing to assert a violation of his due process rights on this basis. While Appellee
    certainly placed the Browns at a disadvantage by raising this issue on the day of trial, it is
    clear that standing can never be waived. See United States v. Hays, 
    515 U.S. 737
    , 742
    (1995). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Kevin Brown as a
    party to this action. We will also affirm the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion
    12
    in limine, as it is clear that the materials Appellants sought to suppress were relevant and
    necessary to Appellee’s defense.
    Finally, Appellants contest the District Court’s denial of their motion to join
    certain parties to the complaint. We review the District Court’s denial of Appellants’
    motion to amend their complaint for abuse of discretion. See Garvin v. City of
    Philadelphia, 
    354 F.3d 215
    , 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Appellants maintain that they attempted
    to file a motion for joinder of additional parties on July 11, 2005. In the motion, they
    sought to add, as plaintiffs, their minor children, and as defendants, Alfred Crump, a
    Solicitor for BCCYS, Wendie Ziegler, a Court-Appointed Guardian ad litem, and James
    Trupp, a BCCYS caseworker. The motion did not appear on the District Court’s docket
    until February 21, 2006, six days before trial was originally scheduled to begin. The
    Court adjourned the trial date, gave Appellee an opportunity to respond, and on May 11,
    2006, denied the motion and re-scheduled the trial for late May.
    While the motion was captioned under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure, the Court properly analyzed it under Rule 15, which governs the amendment
    of pleadings. Relying on Rule 15(c), the District Court held that the motion for leave to
    amend had been filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations, and that Appellants
    had not offered any evidence to show that the proposed defendants had received either
    actual or imputed notice of the action within 120 days of filing the complaint. See
    Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs., 
    266 F.3d 186
    , 194 (3d Cir. 2001).
    13
    Accordingly, the Court held that Appellants could not satisfy the relation back
    requirements, and therefore, denied their motion to amend.
    Appellants argue that they filed the motion on July 11, 2005, within the statute of
    limitations, but that it was not entered on the Court’s docket until February 21, 2006. In
    light of this discrepancy, we will not affirm the District Court’s decision on this basis.
    We will, however, affirm on other grounds. See 
    Nicini, 212 F.3d at 805
    . While Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend “shall be freely given when
    justice so requires,” it may be denied when amendment would be futile. Appellants claim
    that both Crump and Ziegler discriminated against them on the basis of race by objecting
    to the reunification of Appellants’ family in the context of the dependency proceedings.
    Based on the record below, we conclude that Crump and Ziegler would have been entitled
    to absolute immunity for their roles in Appellants’ dependency proceedings. See Ernst v.
    Children & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 
    108 F.3d 486
    , 495 (3d Cir. 1997)
    (defendants entitled to “absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of the state in
    preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings”). In light of the
    proposed defendants’ immunity, Appellants would have been unable to withstand a
    motion to dismiss, and therefore amendment would have been futile. See Hill v.
    Scranton, 
    411 F.3d 118
    , 134 (3d Cir. 2005).
    14
    We will also affirm the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to amend the
    complaint to add caseworker James Trupp as a defendant.1 See 
    Nicini, 212 F.3d at 805
    .
    Appellants allege that Trupp discriminated against them on the basis of race and violated
    their rights to due process and family integrity by contacting Dr. Thomas Baker, a
    psychologist who was appointed by the Juvenile Court to evaluate the family, and
    requesting a copy of his assessment without Appellants’ consent, objecting to the
    reunification of the family at the dependency hearing, and seeking to remove Erica
    Brown’s daughter from her custody. Appellants’ allegations against Trupp do not
    demonstrate violations of their constitutional rights. The transcript from the July 9, 2003
    Juvenile Court hearing clearly indicates that the court ordered that Dr. Baker’s report be
    made available to the guardian and the agency. Trupp’s objection to the reunification of
    the family and his participation in dependancy proceedings likewise do not amount to
    violations of Appellants’ constitutional rights. See Miller v. Philadelphia, 
    174 F.3d 368
    ,
    377 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that, to constitute a substantive due process violation, a social
    worker’s conduct must “shock the conscience”); Croft v. Westmoreland County Children
    & Youth Servs., 
    103 F.3d 1123
    , 1125 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The right to familial integrity, in
    other words, does not include a right to remain free from child abuse allegations.”).
    1
    We note that Appellants initially sought to add Trupp as a defendant on October 13,
    2003, two months after the initial complaint was filed. The District Court denied
    Appellants leave to amend without prejudice pending its ruling on Appellees’ motion to
    dismiss.
    15
    Finally, Appellants sought to add their minor children as plaintiffs in the action.
    As pointed out by Appellee, Appellants, as non-lawyers, would not be permitted to
    represent their children in an action in federal court. See Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College
    of Pennsylvania, 
    937 F.2d 876
    , 884 (3d Cir. 1991). As Appellants’ proposed
    amendments would have been futile, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying appellant’s motion for leave to amend.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-3429

Citation Numbers: 290 F. App'x 467

Judges: Scirica, Fuentes, Smith

Filed Date: 8/22/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (24)

gary-c-goodman-v-pennsylvania-turnpike-commission-bonney-c-daubenspeck , 293 F.3d 655 ( 2002 )

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 120 S. Ct. 2097 ( 2000 )

christopher-jordan-by-his-parents-and-next-friends-philip-and-betty-sue , 15 F.3d 333 ( 1994 )

United States v. Hays , 115 S. Ct. 2431 ( 1995 )

Patterson v. Armstrong County Children and Youth Services , 141 F. Supp. 2d 512 ( 2001 )

gina-cecere-v-the-city-of-new-york-william-j-grinker-administrator , 967 F.2d 826 ( 1992 )

patricia-a-hollingsworth-v-arnold-hill-individually-and-in-his-official , 110 F.3d 733 ( 1997 )

Norman Berman v. Jackie Young , 291 F.3d 976 ( 2002 )

Thomas C. Lossman v. Mary H. Pekarske , 707 F.2d 288 ( 1983 )

Tower v. Leslie-Brown , 326 F.3d 290 ( 2003 )

Kenneth Harold Swipies v. Frank Kofka , 419 F.3d 709 ( 2005 )

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill , 105 S. Ct. 1487 ( 1985 )

Mathews v. Eldridge , 96 S. Ct. 893 ( 1976 )

phyllis-hill-robert-k-murray-donald-hickey-paul-w-graham-v-city-of , 411 F.3d 118 ( 2005 )

dorothy-singletary-individually-and-as-administrator-of-the-estate-of , 266 F.3d 186 ( 2001 )

sandra-miller-corey-miller-a-minor-by-and-through-his-mother-and-natural , 174 F.3d 368 ( 1999 )

henry-l-croft-jr-carol-croft-individually-and-as-parents-and-natural , 103 F.3d 1123 ( 1997 )

jennifer-and-monica-osei-afriyie-minors-individually-by-their-parent , 937 F.2d 876 ( 1991 )

anthony-nicini-jr-v-edward-morra-new-jersey-department-of-health-and , 212 F.3d 798 ( 2000 )

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