Albert Einstein v. Secretary HHS ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-22-2009
    Albert Einstein v. Secretary HHS
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 07-3807
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 07-3807
    ALBERT EINSTEIN MEDICAL CENTER,
    SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
    GERMANTOWN HOSPITAL AND
    MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
    Appellant
    v.
    †Kathleen
    Sebelius, Secretary of the United States
    Department of Health & Human Services
    (†Kathleen Sebelius is substituted for her predecessor
    Michael O. Leavitt, as Secretary of the
    United States Department of Health & Human Services,
    pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2))
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 04-cv-06059)
    District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
    Argued October 31, 2008
    Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON and TASHIMA * ,
    Circuit Judges
    *
    Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    (Filed May 22, 2009)
    _________
    Carel T. Hedlund (Argued)
    Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver
    Baltimore, MD 21202
    Attorney for Appellant
    Joel L. McElvain (Argued)
    United States Department of Justice
    Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
    San Francisco, CA 94102
    Michael S. Raab
    United States Department of Justice
    Washington, DC 20530
    Attorneys for Appellee
    ____
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
    Germantown Hospital and Medical Center (“Old
    Germantown”) submitted to the representative of the Secretary
    of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Medicare and
    Medicaid Services (“CMS” or “Administrator”), a
    reimbursement claim for loss on depreciable assets resulting
    from its 1997 statutory merger into Germantown Hospital and
    Community Health Services (“New Germantown”). The
    Administrator denied the claim because he found that the Old
    Germantown merger was between “related parties” and did not
    constitute a “bona fide sale.” Albert Einstein Medical Center,
    Inc. (“Einstein”), as successor-in-interest to Old Germantown
    and New Germantown, filed an action in federal court
    challenging the Administrator’s interpretations of the relevant
    2
    regulations and, in the alternative, challenging the
    Administrator’s factual findings based on those regulatory
    interpretations. The District Court, the Honorable Ronald L.
    Buckwalter of the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania, granted summary judgment to the
    Secretary upholding the decision of the Administrator. Einstein
    appeals.
    I.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Prior to the 1997 merger at issue in this case, Old
    Germantown was a not-for-profit hospital, located in
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. David Ricci, who had served as
    President and CEO, testified before the Provider Reimbursement
    Review Board (“PRRB”) that as a result of the development of
    managed care and healthcare systems in Philadelphia in the early
    1990s, small hospitals realized that they needed to “join[]
    stronger organizations in order for them to have a future.” App.
    at 685. By the mid-nineties, Old Germantown had seen a decline
    in admissions and was operating only 125-150 of its 255
    licensed beds. Ricci stated that this reduction in patient volume,
    combined with a “feeding frenzy for acquiring physician
    practices,” caused Old Germantown difficulty in retaining
    specialists. App. at 685. As a result, Old Germantown
    experienced yearly operating losses, with its 1996 operating loss
    amounting to between $2.3 and $2.5 million. In 1996, Old
    Germantown’s outstanding liabilities totaled more than $30
    million, including approximately $11.6 million in long-term
    debt. At about that time, Old Germantown’s primary lender
    decided that the hospital was such a credit risk that it would no
    longer extend credit to Old Germantown.
    By 1997, Old Germantown’s assets included endowment
    funds of approximately $37.9 million in principal, but the
    hospital could use only the annual interest from these funds.
    Accordingly, the principal could not be used to satisfy Old
    Germantown’s debts or serve as collateral on future loans. In
    1996, the interest income from these endowments was roughly
    3
    $1.3 million, but there were also restrictions on the permissible
    uses of the interest income of many of these funds. Therefore,
    even much of the interest income from these restricted funds
    could not be used to pay Old Germantown’s debts.
    Acknowledging the seriousness of its financial
    predicament, Old Germantown sent a request for proposal
    (“RFP”) to several healthcare systems on December 10, 1996,
    seeking a merger or a sale of assets. Old Germantown’s RFP
    stated:
    The principal objectives the [Old] Germantown Board
    expects to consider in evaluating proposals will be to: (i)
    ensure that Germantown continues to serve the health
    care needs of its community; (ii) enhance the health care
    services available at Germantown; (iii) maintain, to the
    extent possible, Germantown’s workforce; (iv) achieve a
    fair value for Germantown’s business and assets; and (v)
    consummate any acceptable transaction expeditiously.
    App. at 252.
    In response, Old Germantown received proposals from
    the Albert Einstein Healthcare Network (“AEHN”),1 Temple
    1
    Albert Einstein Medical Center, Inc. (“Einstein”), the
    appellant in this case, must be distinguished from the Albert
    Einstein Healthcare Network (“AEHN”), “a diversified
    organization that includes a network of healthcare facilities and
    services located throughout the [Philadelphia] metropolitan area.”
    App. at 284. AEHN negotiated the 1997 statutory merger with Old
    Germantown and created a new subsidiary, New Germantown, for
    the purpose of that merger. Due to New Germantown’s continuing
    losses, it was merged into Einstein, a preexisting subsidiary of
    AEHN, on July 1, 1999. As Einstein explained to the District
    Court, “The assets of New Germantown, including Old
    Germantown’s claim for Medicare reimbursement for the loss
    incurred upon its merger into New Germantown, passed by
    operation of law to [Einstein].” Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
    4
    University, and Primary Health Systems, Inc. (“PHS”).2
    AEHN proposed to create a new subsidiary within its
    healthcare network that would assume all of Old Germantown’s
    assets and liabilities. AEHN’s proposal also provided that the
    Board of the new entity would “include current members of the
    [Old] Germantown Board of Trustees, current management and
    medical staff leadership as well as AEHN designees.” App. at
    276. In addition, AEHN would invest $6 million in the new
    entity over the course of its first five years of existence in order
    “to increase services to the community and to insure continued
    access to current healthcare services.” App. at 280.3
    PHS proposed to purchase the physical assets of Old
    Germantown for $15 million, with Old Germantown retaining all
    its other assets and liabilities (including its limited-use
    endowments) to pay off its debts and liabilities. The proposal
    was silent as to any continuing role of Old Germantown
    principals within the governing structure of the hospital after the
    sale.
    Old Germantown opted to pursue a merger with AEHN.
    The parties entered negotiations and the terms agreed upon were
    reflected in a non-binding Letter of Intent from AEHN’s
    president, dated February 28, 1997. The letter stated that AEHN
    would create a new subsidiary that would merge with Old
    Germantown, that members of Old Germantown’s management
    would have places on the Board of Trustees of the new entity,
    and that additional members of the Board would be appointed
    from the community served by the hospital “based upon
    Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 12 n.9, Albert
    Einstein Medical Center, Inc. v. Leavitt, No. 04-6059 (E.D. Pa.
    Mar. 14, 2006).
    2
    PHS is a hospital management company headquartered in
    Wayne, Pennsylvania.
    3
    Temple made a similar proposal (absent the pledge of the
    $6 million). The parties do not discuss Temple’s offer on appeal.
    5
    recommendations submitted by [Old] Germantown” to AEHN.
    App. at 308. However, the Letter of Intent noted that the “above
    stated board composition shall be subject to the parties’
    intentions to maximize Medicare recapture.” App. at 308. In
    addition, the Letter of Intent stated that the members of Old
    Germantown’s Board who were not offered places on the new
    entity’s Board of Trustees would be “offered the opportunity to
    serve on AEHN’s Board of Directors.” App. at 309. The Letter
    of Intent also stated that the “parties intend to preserve, to the
    extent possible, [Old] Germantown’s existing senior
    management.” App. at 309. Finally, AEHN reiterated its plan to
    contribute $6 million in funds to the new entity over the first five
    years of its existence.
    Old Germantown and AEHN signed a definitive
    agreement (“Agreement”) on May 30, 1997. In large part, the
    Agreement preserved the terms reflected in the Letter of Intent,
    except with respect to the composition of the new entity’s Board
    of Trustees and AEHN’s Board of Directors. The new entity,
    New Germantown, would have a Board of Trustees of up to
    forty members and include four members from Old
    Germantown’s Board, three members of Old Germantown’s
    medical staff, at least two of whom had not previously sat on its
    Board, the President and CEO of Old Germantown, twelve
    members from the Germantown community (not to be
    recommended by Old Germantown, as the Letter of Intent had
    contemplated), and up to twenty members chosen by AEHN. All
    Board members would be subject to the approval of the AEHN
    “Nominating Committee, which approval shall not be
    unreasonably withheld.” App. at 338. Old Germantown’s
    Chairman of the Board as of the date of the merger would serve
    as the initial Chairman of the Board of New Germantown. Two
    members of Old Germantown’s Board of Trustees would serve
    on the “Executive Committee of [AEHN]’s Board of Directors,”
    and in addition AEHN would offer the remaining members of
    Old Germantown’s Board “the opportunity to serve on
    [AEHN]’s Board of Directors.” App. at 338. Finally, the
    President and CEO of Old Germantown would become the
    President and CEO of New Germantown.
    6
    With respect to the composition of the new Board, David
    Ricci, who had served as President and CEO of Old
    Germantown, and now served as President and CEO of New
    Germantown, later conceded at the hearing before the PRRB that
    Old Germantown was worried about having more than twenty
    percent representation on the new Board because it wanted to
    “minimize anything that would jeopardize the loss of those
    [Medicare] dollars we believe we were rightfully owed.” App.
    at 710.
    In June of 1997, AEHN created a subsidiary under the
    name of Germantown Hospital and Community Health Services
    (“New Germantown”), a non-profit corporation, and on
    September 1, 1997, the parties completed the merger of Old
    Germantown into New Germantown according to the terms of
    the Agreement. Effective as of this merger, Old Germantown
    ceased to exist and all of its assets and liabilities passed to New
    Germantown by operation of law. The monetary assets assumed
    by New Germantown were valued at $57.9 million (including
    the $37.9 million in endowment funds), and the fixed assets were
    valued at $14.5 million, totaling slightly over $72 million. In
    exchange for gaining these assets, New Germantown assumed
    Old Germantown’s liabilities of $34 million. As anticipated,
    AEHN also pledged $6 million in “contingent consideration” to
    be paid to New Germantown over the next five years. App. at
    64.
    On May 27, 1998, New Germantown submitted a final
    cost report to Medicare’s fiscal intermediary on behalf of Old
    Germantown, claiming that it had “incurred a loss on sale of
    depreciable assets” through its merger with New Germantown,
    and sought reimbursement. App. at 620. Because the
    consideration (liabilities assumed by New Germantown) was less
    than the assets’ “net book value” (described below), New
    Germantown’s position was that the assets had depreciated more
    than Medicare had estimated and that, as a result, Medicare’s
    share of that loss was $4,876,356, later revised to $4,793,668.
    On May, 26, 1999, Medicare’s fiscal intermediary denied
    the claimed loss, and New Germantown appealed the decision to
    7
    the PRRB, which allowed the claim on September 1, 2004.
    However, the Administrator reversed the PRRB decision,
    disallowing the loss because he concluded that the merger was
    between “related parties” and did not constitute a “bona fide
    sale.” Einstein, as successor-in-interest to New Germantown
    and Old Germantown, sought review of the Administrator’s
    decision in the District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, which granted summary judgment in favor of the
    Secretary on August 1, 2007. Albert Einstein Medical Center,
    Inc. v. Leavitt (Einstein), No. 04-6059, 
    2007 WL 2221417
     (E.D.
    Pa. Aug. 1, 2007). The District Court held that the Secretary’s
    interpretations of 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.17
     (“Related Party
    Regulation”), 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (k)(2) (“Statutory Merger
    Provision”), and 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f)(2) (“Bona Fide Sale
    Provision”) were reasonable and consistent with CMS’ prior
    interpretations. Einstein, 
    2007 WL 2221417
     at *10-12. In
    addition, the District Court found that the Secretary’s factual
    findings were based on substantial evidence. Id. at *11, 14.
    Einstein timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.
    II.
    Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    The District Court had jurisdiction to review the
    Administrator’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) and we
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review the
    agency’s decision under the standards set forth in the
    Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    . 42
    U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1). As such, we “can set aside the
    Administrator’s decision only if it is ‘unsupported by substantial
    evidence,’ is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or [is]
    otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Mercy Home Health v.
    Leavitt, 
    436 F.3d 370
    , 377 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 706
    (2)(A), (E)) (alteration in original). “Substantial evidence is
    ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
    reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.’” Mercy Home Health, 
    436 F.3d at 380
     (quoting
    Richardson v. Perales, 
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971)).
    8
    Moreover, we “must afford substantial deference to an
    agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Mercy Home
    Health, 
    436 F.3d. at
    377 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp. v.
    Shalala, 
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994)). As we have noted, “[t]his
    broad deference is particularly appropriate in contexts that
    involve a ‘complex and highly technical regulatory program,
    such as Medicare, which requires significant expertise and
    entail[s] the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 
    512 U.S. at 512
    ).
    “In sum, so long as an agency’s factfinding is supported
    by substantial evidence, reviewing courts lack power to reverse
    either those findings or the reasonable regulatory interpretations
    that an agency manifests in the course of making such findings
    of fact.” Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 
    806 F.2d 1185
    , 1191
    (3d Cir. 1986). Because this court applies the same standard of
    review as the District Court, we “proceed de novo with respect
    to our review of the district court disposition.” Mercy Home
    Health, 
    436 F.3d at 377
    .
    III.
    Statutory and Regulatory Framework
    A. Provider Reimbursement
    Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (“Medicare Act”)
    establishes a healthcare program for the aged and disabled
    known as “Medicare,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1395
     et seq., which
    reimburses healthcare providers for the “reasonable cost” of
    providing services to Medicare beneficiaries, 42 U.S.C. §
    1395f(b)(1). The Medicare Act defines “reasonable costs” as
    “the cost actually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of
    incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of
    needed health services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A).
    Under the Medicare Act, the Secretary of Health and
    Human Services is authorized to promulgate “regulations
    establishing the method or methods” of calculating reasonable,
    and therefore reimbursable, costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A);
    9
    
    42 C.F.R. § 413.9
    . The CMS (known as the Health Care
    Financing Administration (“HCFA”) until July 2001)
    administers this program on behalf of the Secretary. Centers for
    Medicare & Medicaid Services; Statement of Organization,
    Functions and Delegations of Authority, Reorganization Order,
    
    66 Fed. Reg. 35,437
     (July 5, 2001). Reimbursement for
    reasonable costs to providers is made through private “fiscal
    intermediaries” with which Medicare contracts. 42 U.S.C. §§
    1395h, 1395kk-1. In addition to promulgating regulations, the
    Secretary issues manuals to assist healthcare providers and fiscal
    intermediaries in administering the system, such as the Provider
    Reimbursement Manual (“PRM”) and the Medicare Intermediary
    Manual (“MIM”).
    In order to obtain a Medicare reimbursement, a health
    care provider files an annual cost report with its fiscal
    intermediary. 
    42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20
    (b), 413.24(f). The
    intermediary then determines the amount of the reimbursement
    and issues a Notice of Amount of Program Reimbursement to
    the provider. 
    42 C.F.R. § 405.1803
    . If a provider disagrees with
    the intermediary’s determination, it may file an appeal with the
    PRRB. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo; 
    42 C.F.R. § 405.1835
    . The
    decision of the PRRB becomes the final administrative decision
    after sixty days unless the Secretary, through the Administrator,
    elects to review the decision within that time period. 42 U.S.C.
    § 1395oo(f)(1). A provider may seek judicial review of the final
    decision of the PRRB or the Administrator in a federal district
    court. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1).
    B. Depreciable Assets
    The Medicare regulation governing claims for losses on
    depreciable assets provides that “[a]n appropriate allowance for
    depreciation on buildings and equipment used in the provision of
    patient care is an allowable cost” for which a provider may claim
    reimbursement. 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (a). The annual
    depreciation for which the provider is reimbursed by Medicare is
    calculated by prorating the “historical cost” (i.e., the price the
    provider paid to acquire the asset) over the asset’s estimated
    useful life. 
    42 C.F.R. §§ 413.134
    (a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1). As the
    10
    PRRB explained in this case, the CMS reimbursed providers
    annually “for a percentage of the yearly depreciation equal to the
    percentage the asset was used for the care of Medicare patients.”
    App. at 69.4 The historical cost of an asset, minus the annual
    recognized depreciation, is known as its “net book value.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (b)(9).
    The PRRB explained that because the net book value is
    based on estimates of the yearly depreciation, “the regulation at
    
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f) provided for the determination of a
    depreciation adjustment where a provider incurred a gain or loss
    on the disposition [e.g., a sale] of a depreciable asset.” App. at
    69 (alteration added). As the Administrator noted,
    Basically, when there is a gain or loss, it means either that
    too much depreciation was recognized by the Medicare
    program resulting in a gain to be shared by Medicare, or
    insufficient depreciation was recognized by the Medicare
    program resulting in a loss to be shared by the Medicare
    program. An adjustment is made so that Medicare pays
    the actual cost the provider incurred in using the asset for
    patient care.
    App. at 42.
    C. The Statutory Merger Provision
    The Statutory Merger Provision of the regulation
    governing depreciable assets provides for a possible adjustment
    where assets are disposed of through a statutory merger, which is
    defined as: “[A] combination of two or more corporations under
    4
    As the PRRB noted, “[a] depreciation adjustment for a
    gain or loss was removed from the [Medicare] program’s
    regulations effective December 1, 1997.” App. at 69 n.3; see also
    Medicare Program; Limit on the Valuation of a Depreciable Asset
    Recognized as an Allowance for Depreciation and Interest on
    Capital Indebtedness After a Change of Ownership, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 1379
     (Jan. 9, 1998).
    11
    the corporation laws of the State, with one of the corporations
    surviving. The surviving corporation acquires the assets and
    liabilities of the merged corporation(s) by operation of State
    law.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (k)(2).5
    However, a statutory merger results in a Medicare gain or
    loss adjustment only if the merger was between “unrelated
    parties,” as defined by 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.17
    . 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (k)(2)(i).6 In addition, the Statutory Merger Provision
    states that if “the merged corporation was a [healthcare] provider
    before the merger, then it is subject to the provisions of
    paragraph[] . . . (f) of this section concerning recovery of
    accelerated depreciation and the realization of gains and losses.”
    
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (k)(2)(i). It is the referenced provision of 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f) that is at issue here. Section (f), the Bona
    Fide Sale Provision, covers gains and losses resulting from the
    disposition of depreciable assets through “sale, scrapping, trade-
    in, exchange, demolition, abandonment, condemnation, fire,
    theft, or other casualty.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f). At the time of
    the transaction in this case, a sale of assets that resulted in a gain
    or loss would trigger a Medicare adjustment only if it was a
    “bona fide sale.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f).7
    The purpose behind both the Related Parties Regulation
    5
    At the time of the Germantown merger, this subsection
    was designated as 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (l); in 2000 it was
    redesignated as subsection (k) without alteration to its content.
    Medicare Program; Payment Amount if Customary Charges are
    Less Than Reasonable Costs: Technical Amendments, 
    65 Fed. Reg. 8660
     (Feb. 22, 2000) (codified at 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    ).
    6
    According to CMS, this regulation originally contemplated
    only mergers between for-profit providers. See App. at 653.
    7
    This regulation provides that adjustments for gains or
    losses are required with respect to the bona fide sale or scrapping
    of assets only if the assets were disposed of before December 1,
    1997, 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f)(2), and the merger in this case was
    effective September 1, 1997.
    12
    and the Bona Fide Sale Provision is to eliminate the potential for
    self-dealing and ensure that Medicare only reimburses providers
    for their actual costs. See, e.g., Monsour Med. Ctr., 806 F.2d at
    1191 n.15 (discussing related parties); Via Christi Reg’l Med.
    Ctr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 
    509 F.3d 1259
    , 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2007)
    (discussing bona fide sale).
    D. Bona Fide Sale Provision
    In May 2000, the Secretary amended the PRM with
    regard to the Bona Fide Sale Provision through a transmittal of
    changes to the PRM (“2000 PRM Amendment”):
    A bona fide sale contemplates an arm’s length transaction
    between a willing and well informed buyer and seller,
    neither being under coercion, for reasonable
    consideration. An arm’s-length transaction is a
    transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in
    its own self interest.
    PRM § 104.24; App. at 649. This additional language was listed
    under the section of the transmittal setting forth changes “added
    to clarify existing instructions;” the agency did not list it as new
    material requiring an effective date. App. at 648.
    Similarly, on October 19, 2000, the CMS issued a
    Program Memorandum on the “Clarification of the Application
    of the Regulations at 42 CFR 413.134(l)8 to Mergers and
    Consolidations Involving Non-profit Providers” (“2000 PM”).
    App. at 653.9 The 2000 PM notes that “non-profit organizations
    . . . associate or affiliate through mergers or consolidations for
    reasons that may differ from the traditional for-profit merger or
    consolidation.” App. at 654. “Because there is no similar
    regulation specifically addressing mergers and consolidations
    between or among non-profit entities, we are clarifying the
    8
    Now at 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (k).
    9
    The 2000 PM expired in 2001. An identical PM was
    issued in 2001, but the parties refer to and cite the 2000 PM.
    13
    applicability of the [Bona Fide Sale Provision and Related
    Parties Regulation] sections to such mergers or consolidations.”
    App. at 653.
    With respect to the Bona Fide Sale Provision, the 2000
    PM clearly stated that a merger must constitute a bona fide sale,
    noting:
    Unlike for-profit mergers or consolidations, which are
    typically driven by the ownership equity interests to seek
    fair market value for the assets involved in the
    transaction, many non-profit mergers and consolidations
    have only the interests of the community-at-large to drive
    the transaction.
    App. at 655. The 2000 PM defined a bona fide sale as one
    negotiated at “arm’s-length” between unrelated parties and
    involving “reasonable consideration.” App. at 655. It continued
    that “a large disparity between the sales price (consideration) and
    the fair market value of the assets sold indicates the lack of a
    bona fide sale.” App. at 655 (emphasis omitted).
    Regarding its interpretations of both the Bona Fide Sale
    Provision and the Related Parties Regulation, the 2000 PM
    stressed that it was not establishing new rules: “This PM does
    not include any new policies regarding mergers or consolidations
    involving non-profit entities.” App. at 656.
    IV.
    Discussion
    The Administrator denied Einstein’s claim because he
    concluded that the 1997 merger did not constitute a bona fide
    sale and because the merger occurred between related parties.
    Because either of these findings, if correct, was a sufficient
    independent basis on which to deny Einstein’s claim, we will
    limit our focus to the bona fide sale issue. See Robert F.
    Kennedy Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 
    526 F.3d 557
    , 563 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (declining to reach the related parties issue because the bona fide
    14
    sale issue “is dispositive in this case”).
    A. The Administrator’s Regulatory Interpretation
    Einstein argues that a merger is not a sale and, therefore,
    is not subject to the Bona Fide Sale Provision. In support of this
    argument, Einstein relies on a letter written by William Goeller
    in 1987 when he was HCFA’s Director of the Division of
    Payment and Reporting Policy in the Office of Reimbursement
    Policy at the Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and
    Coverage. This letter does not mention that a merger must be a
    bona fide sale and instead states that, “[f]or purposes of
    calculating the gain or loss, the amount of the assumed debt
    would be used as the amount received for the assets.” App. at
    129. The significance of this letter as support for Einstein’s
    position is questionable as the letter also states that whether a
    gain or loss is recognized will be governed by 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f), which encompasses the Bona Fide Sale Provision.
    Einstein also relies on a letter from Charles R. Booth,
    another former agency official, and on the testimony of former
    HCFA officials, Michael Maher and Eric Yospe. See
    Appellant’s Br. at 45-46. Citing our decision in Mercy Home
    Health, 
    436 F.3d at 378-79
    , the Secretary argues that “statements
    from former subordinate officials are not owed deference;
    instead, it is the Secretary’s announced interpretation to which
    deference is due.” Appellee’s Br. at 49-50 n.14. Although
    Mercy Home Health does not stand for the proposition that
    statements of former officials are owed no deference, we agree
    with the Secretary to the extent that his “announced
    interpretation[s]” are owed greater deference.
    We agree with Judge Buckwalter’s analysis of the
    relationship between the Statutory Merger Provision and the
    Bona Fide Sale Provision as follows:
    [T]he Statutory Merger Regulation specifically references
    
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f), stating, “If the merged
    corporation was a provider before the merger, then it is
    subject to the provisions of paragraphs (d)(3) and (f) of
    15
    this section concerning recovery of accelerated
    depreciation.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    [(k)(2)(i)]. A
    reasonable interpretation of this provision is that
    recognition of a loss resulting from a statutory merger is
    only permitted if otherwise allowed under paragraph (f).
    Under paragraph (f), the treatment of the gain or loss
    depends upon the manner of disposition of the asset. 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (f)(1). Paragraphs (f)(2) th[r]ough (f)(6)
    identify the specific means through which a depreciable
    asset can be disposed including, bona fide sale or
    scrapping; exchange, trade-in or donation; demolition or
    abandonment; or involuntary conversion. 
    Id.
     at §
    413.134(f)(2)-(f)(6). Of all the circumstances listed, the
    disposition most applicable to the present case is the bona
    fide sale requirement.
    Einstein, 
    2007 WL 2221417
    , at *12. The Court concluded,
    therefore, that the Administrator’s interpretation of the merger
    regulation to require that the transaction constitute a bona fide
    sale was reasonable.
    In addition to arguing that the Bona Fide Sale Provision
    does not apply to mergers, Einstein argues that the
    Administrator’s interpretation of this provision is inconsistent
    with prior agency statements. In its decision in this case, the
    Administrator, quoting the 2000 PRM, held that, “a bona fide
    sale contemplates an arm’s length transaction between a willing
    and well-informed buyer and seller, neither being under
    coercion, for reasonable consideration. An arm’s length
    transaction . . . is negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in
    its own self-interest.” App. at 62. Einstein, noting that this
    definition is found in the 2000 PRM Amendment and the 2000
    PM, argues that this interpretation was impermissibly applied
    here because it was not articulated until after the 1996 merger at
    issue. Einstein, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, argues that a
    “bona fide sale” is simply one in which “valuable consideration”
    is given. It argues, therefore, that any disparity between the fair
    market value of its assets and the amount of consideration it
    received from New Germantown (in the form of assumption of
    liabilities) is irrelevant.
    16
    The Secretary responds that 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (b)(2)
    requires that “a sale cannot be ‘bona fide’ if it is not an exchange
    for fair value.” Appellee’s Br. at 31. This regulatory provision
    defines “fair market value” as “the price that the asset would
    bring by bona fide bargaining between well-informed buyers and
    sellers at the date of acquisition.” 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.134
    (b)(2).
    We note that the regulation may not have the significance
    ascribed to it by the Secretary as it defines fair market value, not
    bona fide sale. However, this regulation demonstrates the
    agency’s understanding of a relationship between a bona fide
    sale and fair market value.
    The Secretary argues that the agency “has looked to the
    reasonableness of consideration since long before the transaction
    at issue in this case.” Appellee’s Br. at 31. For example, in
    Hosp. Affiliates Int’l., Inc. v. Schweiker, Medicare denied
    reimbursement because a sale was not bona fide and held:
    “There is no evidence in the record that the purchase price bore
    any relation to the actual value of the property. Without such
    evidence, no determination of the transaction’s being bona fide
    is appropriate.” 
    543 F. Supp. 1380
    , 1389 (D. Tenn. 1982)
    (emphasis omitted). This case shows that, contrary to Einstein’s
    contention, at least as early as 1982 the agency looked to the fair
    market value when conducting the bona fide sale inquiry.
    Einstein points to decisions that it contends hold that sales
    were bona fide even though the consideration paid was less than
    the appraised value of the assets. However, as the Secretary
    correctly notes, in each of those cases “the Board found that
    parties with adverse interests had negotiated at arm’s length to
    arrive at reasonable consideration for the exchange.” Appellee’s
    Br. at 32 n.8 (citing Vallejo Gen. Hosp. v. Bowen, 
    851 F.2d 229
    ,
    232 (9th Cir. 1988); Ashland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross &
    Blue Shield Ass’n/Blue Cross & Blue Shield of W. Pa., 1998
    Medicare & Medicaid Guide 57,577 (P.R.R.B. 1998);
    Edgecombe Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n/Blue
    Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 1993 Medicare & Medicaid Guide
    37,394 (P.R.R.B. 1993); Lac Qui Parle Hosp. of Madison, Inc. v.
    Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n/Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
    Minn., 1995 Medicare & Medicaid Guide 44,473 (P.R.R.B.
    17
    1995)). For instance, in Vallejo Gen. Hosp. v. Bowen, the
    Administrator considered the sale of an asset from one hospital
    to another and deemed the sale price to be the fair market value
    because “it is in the interest of both parties bargaining rationally
    at arm[’]s-length to evaluate accurately the [assets].” 
    851 F.2d at 232
    .
    Having considered these cases, we conclude that the
    agency’s requirement that a bona fide sale be one in which
    “reasonable consideration” is exchanged is not inconsistent with
    the agency’s previous statements. The Tenth Circuit recently
    came to the same conclusion in Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
    509 F.3d 1259
     (10th Cir. 2007). It stated, “[e]ven if the Secretary
    further clarified the definition of ‘bona fide sale’ in interpretive
    materials issued after the consolidation in this case, [the
    hospital] was on notice that § 413.134(f) and its ‘bona fide sale’
    requirement would be more than a nullity.” Id. at 1276; see also
    Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 
    526 F.3d at 563
     (upholding the
    Administrator’s decision that a transfer of $50 million in assets
    for $30.5 million in “consideration” was not a “bona fide sale”).
    Moreover, requiring “reasonable consideration” is in
    keeping with the underlying and long-standing purpose of the
    Medicare Act, i.e., to reimburse for only actual and reasonable
    costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A). For that reason, we
    conclude that an interpretation of the Bona Fide Sale Provision
    that would permit hospitals to sell their assets at less than
    reasonable value and, as a result, gain reimbursement for losses
    that do not reflect losses actually incurred would be
    impermissible as contrary to the Medicare statute. Therefore, we
    hold that the 2000 PRM Amendment and the 2000 PM offered a
    clarification of the Bona Fide Sale Provision that was not
    inconsistent with previous agency policy. It follows that the
    Administrator did not commit an error of law in applying the
    bona fide sale requirement to Einstein’s claim.
    B. Substantial Evidence Supported the
    Administrator’s Decision
    The Administrator’s finding that the Old
    18
    Germantown/New Germantown merger was not a bona fide sale
    is supported by substantial evidence in the record. First, it does
    not appear that Old Germantown and AEHN negotiated at arm’s
    length. Instead, the record shows that Old Germantown
    consistently acted with the well-being of the new entity in mind
    and had no incentive of its own to bargain for more. It
    negotiated for $6 million in “contingent consideration” from
    AEHN, which would only benefit New Germantown. App. at
    64. Indeed, Ricci conceded in his testimony before the PRRB
    that Old Germantown never tried to get this $6 million as part of
    the sale price to Old Germantown. Moreover, Old Germantown
    was concerned with structuring the transaction in order to
    maximize Medicare reimbursement, a gain that would also
    benefit only New Germantown. In essence, the evidence showed
    that the motivation of Old Germantown’s Board in negotiating
    with AEHN was not to maximize the consideration paid by
    AEHN but rather to assure the success of Old Germantown’s
    mission in the future (i.e., delivering quality health services to its
    community). We do not suggest that there was anything
    inappropriate in such a motivation. Old Germantown’s
    willingness to bargain for benefits that would only inure to New
    Germantown - while laudable with respect to its commitment to
    the community - shows that the parties did not negotiate the
    terms of this merger at arm’s length.
    Second, the Administrator’s finding that New
    Germantown did not give reasonable consideration was
    supported by ample evidence. Einstein does not dispute that Old
    Germantown surrendered $72.4 million in assets for New
    Germantown’s assumption of $34.2 million in debt and $6
    million in contingent consideration, a discrepancy of
    approximately $32 million.10 Einstein argues that Old
    10
    The District Court arrived at different figures, amounting
    to a discrepancy of $35.2 million. We refer to the Administrator’s
    findings, which both parties cite in their briefs. See Appellant’s
    Br. at 53-55; Appellee’s Br. at 34-35. Einstein argues that the
    balance sheets do not reflect fair market value because they include
    unknown liabilities and because Old Germantown could not access
    19
    Germantown chose “‘the best deal that was on the street at that
    time.’” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 25 (quoting Ricci Testimony,
    App. at 693). However, the Administrator found that the PHS
    proposal could have resulted in a net gain of $27 million.
    Einstein now argues that the PHS offer actually would have
    resulted in a loss of $10 million because Old Germantown’s total
    debt was $34 million, which it could not cover with its $18
    million in non-endowment fund assets, and it could not access
    the $37.9 million in principal of the endowment funds to pay this
    debt. The Administrator rejected Einstein’s current explanations
    because “these reasons were not on [their] face self-evident at
    the time of the proposal and in part are comprised of conjectures.
    Thus, they do not explain the Provider’s failure to follow-up at
    that time on [PHS’s] proposal. It does suggest that interests,
    other than monetary, were more primary to a successful deal for
    the Provider.” App. at 64. The Administrator concluded that, at
    the very least, Old Germantown should have followed up with
    PHS to negotiate more favorable terms.
    Einstein also argues that the consideration was reasonable
    because the almost $38 million in endowment funds “were . . .
    limited use assets and were not the equivalent of $38 million in
    cash that New Germantown could immediately use as
    necessary.” Appellant’s Br. at 55. That is admittedly so.
    However, as the Secretary points out, Einstein’s own accountant
    (albeit not on this transaction) testified before the PRRB that
    approximately $37 million was the fair market value of the
    endowments. Even if the fair market value of these funds should
    have been discounted to adjust for the fact that they were
    limited-use, that adjustment could hardly make up for a
    discrepancy of $32 million.11
    the principal of the endowment funds. However, Einstein does not
    suggest alternate values for these assets that would make the
    discrepancy reasonable.
    11
    Einstein also argues that New Germantown’s assumption
    of unknown liabilities drove the sale price lower. Einstein points
    to liabilities incurred after the merger as proof. However, at the
    time of the Merger, Old Germantown warranted that it had no
    20
    In addition, Einstein argues that the “Secretary’s
    argument that Old Germantown received no benefit in exchange
    for ‘surrendering’ its Medicare loss claim makes no sense
    because that would be the case in every merger,” because all the
    assets (including a Medicare claim) pass, by operation of law, to
    the surviving entity. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 22-23. That is an
    inadequate response to the point made by the Secretary. The
    merger between the two healthcare providers was structured to
    maximize Medicare reimbursement. There was nothing
    improper in that effort, but the Secretary was not obliged to
    accommodate that wish. Medicare determined how much it
    would owe Old Germantown by comparing the consideration
    received in the merger for the assets with the assets’ net book
    value (i.e., their original purchase price, minus the actual
    recognized annual depreciation). The difference would
    determine whether Old Germantown received a loss or a gain. It
    therefore appears that the only reason that Old Germantown was
    able to claim a loss was because it sold its assets for far less than
    their value. Because Old Germantown was a non-profit
    organization - rather than a corporation with equity stake holders
    - it suffered no loss by selling its assets for less than their value.
    The Administrator could reasonably conclude that it was not a
    bona fide sale.
    Therefore, because we conclude that the Administrator’s
    interpretation of the Bona Fide Sale Provision was reasonable
    and his application of the rule to the Germantown merger was
    based on substantial evidence, we uphold the Administrator’s
    denial of the loss claim on the ground that the merger did not in
    fact constitute a bona fide sale. Because this is an independent
    ground upon which the Administrator denied the claim, we need
    not address whether the parties were “related” within the
    meaning of 
    42 C.F.R. § 413.17
    , and decline to do so.
    undisclosed material liabilities. Moreover, it is hard to imagine
    how an adjustment in price for this risk could account for such a
    large discrepancy between consideration given and the market
    value of the assets.
    21
    C. Einstein’s Other Arguments
    Einstein makes numerous additional arguments, which the
    District Court succinctly characterized as follows: “Generally,
    Plaintiff is arguing that the Secretary’s continuity of control and
    bona fide sale positions conflict with the Statutory Merger
    [Provision’s] plain terms and/or prior interpretations, thus
    effectively resulting in a new regulation, which was issued
    contrary to numerous statutory safeguards.” Einstein, 
    2007 WL 2221417
    , at *14. For instance, Einstein argues that the 2000 PM
    was a new rule that was a “‘fundamental modification of a
    previous interpretation’” and, therefore, required formal notice
    and comment rulemaking under the APA. Appellants Br. at 66
    (quoting SBC Inc. v. FCC, 
    414 F.3d 486
    , 498 (3d Cir. 2005)).
    These arguments hinge on whether the 2000 PM (stating
    that mergers are subject to a “continuity of control test” and the
    Bona Fide Sale Provision) and the 2000 PRM Amendment
    (stating that a bona fide sale requires arm’s length negotiation
    and reasonable consideration) are inconsistent with prior agency
    interpretations. Essentially, the arguments turn on whether these
    agency statements are legislative or interpretive rules. We have
    previously described the difference in this way:
    Legislative rules are subject to the notice and comment
    requirements of the APA because they work substantive
    changes in prior regulations or create new law, rights, or
    duties. [Interpretive] rules, on the other hand, seek only to
    interpret language already in properly issued regulations. .
    . . [Interpretive], or procedural, rules do not themselves
    shift the rights or interests of the parties, although they
    may change the way in which the parties present
    themselves to the agency. . . . [Interpretive] or
    procedural rules and statements of policy are exempted
    from the notice and comment requirement of the APA.
    SBC Inc., 
    414 F.3d at 497-98
     (quotations and citations omitted).
    After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we
    conclude that the agency’s interpretation of the Bona Fide Sale
    22
    Provision is consistent with previous agency statements and in
    keeping with the underlying policy of the Medicare Act.
    Moreover, these interpretations did not retroactively alter
    Einstein’s legal rights or duties. As noted above, prior agency
    statements, such as those in the 1982 case of Hosp. Affiliates
    Int’l, 543 F. Supp. at 1389, put Old Germantown “on notice that
    § 413.134(f) and its ‘bona fide sale’ requirement would be more
    than a nullity.” Via Christi, 
    509 F.3d at 1276
    . We hold that the
    2000 PM and 2000 PRM Amendment are “interpretive rules”
    that did not require notice and comment rulemaking. Therefore,
    Einstein’s arguments with respect to improper rulemaking are
    without merit.
    V.
    Conclusion
    We will accordingly affirm the District Court order
    granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary for the
    reasons set forth above.
    23