Common Cause PA v. Comm PA ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-26-2009
    Common Cause PA v. Comm PA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 06-3391
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    Recommended Citation
    "Common Cause PA v. Comm PA" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1794.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1794
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    PR E C E D E N T IA L
    IN TH E UN ITED STATES COUR T OF APPEALS
    THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 06-3391
    ___________
    C OM M O N CA USE OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE
    LEA G U E OF W OM EN VOTERS OF
    PENNSYLVANIA; REPRESENTATIVE GREGORY
    V ITA LI; TIM POTTS; CARL H. SILVERMAN;
    W ILLIAM R. KOCH;
    H. W ILLIA M M cIN TYRE,
    Appellants
    v.
    COM M ONW EALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; EDWA RD
    G. RENDELL, Governor; ROBERT P. CASEY III;
    D A V ID G . A RG ALL; DAVID J. BRIGHTBILL; H.
    W ILLIAM DeW EESE; ROBERT C. JUBELIRER;
    RO BERT J. M ELLOW ; JOH N M . PERZEL; SAM UEL
    H. SM ITH ; M ICH AEL V EO N; RA LPH J. CA PPY
    _______________
    On Appeal from the U nited States D istrict Court
    for the M iddle D istrict of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 1:05-cv-02036)
    District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
    Before: FLAUM , EBEL and LEVAL, Circuit Judges. *
    (Opinion filed: February 26, 2009)
    Eric B. Schnurer, Esq. (Argued)
    1690 East Strasburg Road
    W est Chester, PA 19380-0000
    and
    Paul A. Rossi, Esq.
    316 Hill Street
    M ountville, PA 17554-0000
    Attorneys for A ppellants
    M ark A. Aronchick, Esq.
    W endy Beetlestone, Esq.
    *
    Honorable Joel M . Flaum, United States Circuit
    Judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Honorable
    David M . Ebel, United States C ircuit Judge for the Tenth
    Circuit Court of Appeals, and Honorable Pierre N. Leval,
    United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit Court
    of Appeals, sitting by designation.
    2
    Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin
    One Logan Square
    18th & Cherry Streets, 27th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000
    Attorneys for A ppellee Edward G. Rendell
    C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., Esq.
    Jonathon F. Bloom, Esq.
    Thomas W . Dymek, Esq.
    Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young
    2600 One Commerce Square
    2005 M arket Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000
    A ttorneys for Appellees David G. Argall, H.
    William DeW eese, John M . Perzel, Samuel H.
    Smith, and M ichael R. Veon
    John P. Krill, Jr., Esq. (Argued)
    Linda J. Shorey, Esq.
    Amy L. Groff, Esq.
    Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis
    17 North Second Street
    18th Floor, M arket Square Plaza
    Harrisburg, PA 17101-0000
    Attorneys for Appellees David Brightbill and
    Robert C. Jubelirer
    James F. Tierney IV , Esq.
    Patrick Heffron, Esq.
    Eugene F. Hickey II, Esq.
    Cipriani & W erner
    3
    409 Lackawanna Avenue
    Suite 210
    Scranton, PA 18503-0000
    A ttorney for Appellee Robert J. M ellow
    Arlin M . Adams, Esq. (Argued)
    Paul H. Titus, Esq.
    Bruce P. M erenstein, Esq.
    Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis
    1600 M arket Street
    Suite 3600
    Philadelphia, PA 19103-0000
    and
    Howard M . Holmes
    Chief Legal Counsel
    Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts,
    1515 M arket Street, Suite 1414
    Philadelphia, PA 19102-0000
    Attorneys for Appellee Ralph J. Cappy
    OPINION O F THE COURT
    _______________________________
    EBEL, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal stems from litigation challenging a
    short-lived Pennsylvania statute (“Act 44”) that increased
    salaries for state legislators, executive officials and state
    4
    judges. Plaintiffs are Pennsylvania citizens, a state
    representative and two organizations— Common Cause and
    the League of W omen Voters.             They sued the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its governor and
    treasurer, the General Assembly’s leadership, and the
    Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in their
    individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs allege that,
    for the past ten years, members of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court have traded judicial decisions favorable to
    the Pennsylvania General Assembly in return for the
    legislature’s funding the state judiciary. According to
    Plaintiffs, this arrangem ent culminated in the General
    Assembly’s enactment of Act 44 in a sleight-of-hand
    manner during the dead of night. In this litigation,
    Plaintiffs primarily challenge the manner in which Act 44
    was enacted, seeking both declaratory and injunctive
    relief. Because Plaintiffs allege only general grievances
    shared by all citizens of Pennsylvania, however, we
    conclude that they lack standing to pursue the claim s they
    assert. Therefore, having jurisdiction to consider this
    appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the decision
    of the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action in its
    entirety.
    I. B A C K G R O U N D
    Because the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’
    claim s pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6), see
    Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 
    447 F. Supp. 2d 415
    , 419 n.1, 422 (M .D. Pa. 2006), we must accept as true
    all well-pled allegations and construe the complaint in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiffs, see Lewis v. Atlas
    5
    Van Lines, Inc., 
    542 F.3d 403
    , 405 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rule
    12(b)(6)); Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
    458 F.3d 181
    , 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)).
    A.    Factual allegations
    In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs
    alleged the following:
    1.    E vents leading up to the G eneral
    A ssem bly’s enactm ent of A ct 44
    The Pennsylvania C onstitution provides that
    [t]he judicial power of the Commonwealth
    shall be vested in a unified judicial system
    consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior
    Court, the Comm onw ealth Court, courts of
    common pleas, community courts, municipal
    and traffic courts in the City of Philadelphia,
    such other courts as may be provided by law
    and justices of the peace. All courts and
    justices of the peace and their jurisdiction
    shall be in this unified judicial system.
    Pa. Const., art. V, § 1. Based upon this constitutional
    provision, Allegheny C ounty, in 1985, sued the
    Commonw ealth, arguing that, contrary to the relevant
    Pennsylvania statutes enacted by the General Assembly,
    the Pennsylvania Constitution required the
    Commonwealth, rather than the County, to fund the
    County’s Court of Common Pleas.        See County of
    Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 
    534 A.2d 760
    , 761, 763 (Pa.
    1987). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, holding
    6
    “that the statutory scheme for county funding of the
    judicial system is in conflict w ith the intent clearly
    expressed in the constitution that the judicial system be
    unified.” 
    Id. at 765.
    N evertheless, the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court provided that,
    because this order entails that present
    statutory funding for the judicial system is
    now void as offending the constitutional
    mandate for a unified system, we stay our
    judgment to afford the General A ssembly an
    opportunity to enact appropriate funding
    legislation consistent with this holding. Until
    this is done, the prior system of county
    funding shall remain in place.
    
    Id. (footnotes omitted).
           Notwithstanding this mandate from the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court, however, the General Assembly declined
    to act to fund the courts. See Pa. State Ass’n of County
    C om m ’rs v. Commonwealth, 
    681 A.2d 699
    , 700-01 (Pa.
    1996). After nine years of inaction, the Pennsylvania
    Association of County Commissioners sought mandamus
    relief from the Pennsylvania Supreme C ourt, asking the
    Court to direct the G eneral Assembly to fund the state’s
    unified court system. See 
    id. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme
    Court granted a writ of mandamus: “Pursuant to this w rit,
    jurisdiction is retained and by further order a master w ill
    be appointed to recommend to this court a schema which
    will form the basis for the specific implementation to be
    ordered.” 
    Id. at 703.
    7
    At about this same time, the General Assembly,
    contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitution, was generally
    enacting legislation “in ways that precluded involvement
    in the legislative process by both the public and the vast
    majority of legislators.” App. at 43. Common C ause, as
    well as other parties, sued Pennsylvania in state court,
    challenging the validity of these various legislative
    enactments.
    In 1998 and 1999, the General Assembly negotiated
    with the Pennsylvania courts over the Commonwealth’s
    funding the court system. Those negotiations resulted in
    the General Assembly enacting legislation to fund the
    Commonwealth’s unified judicial system in return for the
    P en nsylvan ia S up rem e C ourt’s judicial de cisions
    upholding the legislation being challenged in state court.
    2.     E nactm ent of A ct 44
    In 2005, the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court, “in secret,” negotiated with state
    legislators for the enactment of a bill increasing the
    salaries of the Commonwealth’s judges and justices.
    Eventually, this pay hike was included in legislation that
    also increased the salaries for legislators and high-level
    executive branch employees.
    House Bill 1521, the bill that would become Act 44,
    was initially “a 24-line bill” entitled “Relating to
    Compensation for Executive Branch Officials,” which
    prohibited “any member of the executive branch or any
    board from receiving compensation greater than that paid
    to the Governor.” App. at 49. The House passed House
    8
    Bill 1521. The Senate then amended House Bill 1521,
    changing it “into a 27-line bill restricting its application to
    officials elected or appointed to an executive branch
    position after November 1, 2006.” 
    Id. at 50.
    The Senate
    passed the bill as amended. The House, however, rejected
    the revised bill and so House Bill 1521 was referred to a
    conference committee consisting of three House and three
    Senate members.       The members of this conference
    committee, named as defendants in this litigation, included
    most of the General A ssembly’s leadership.
    “At approximately 2:00 a.m . on July 7, 2005,” the
    conference committee amended House Bill 1521, changing
    it from a twenty-seven-line bill about compensation for
    executive officials into “a 22 page bill, providing for
    massive increases of up to 54% in the salary of every
    justice and judge of the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial
    System, every member of the General Assembly, and
    senior members of the executive branch including the
    Governor and m em bers of his Cabinet.” 
    Id. at 51.
    The
    revised bill also mandated “that provisions of the A ct are
    nonseverable and if any provision of the Act or its
    application to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
    the remaining provisions or applications of the A ct are
    void.” 
    Id. at 65.
    According to Plaintiffs, by including this
    non-severability provisio n, “th e C om m onw ealth
    government intentionally created a financial conflict for
    state court judges to ensure they would not deviate from
    the negotiated goal of upholding salary increases for all
    three branches of state government.” 
    Id. at 66.
           This revised bill was presented to the Senate and
    9
    House within “minutes” after being reported out of the
    conference committee “under a rule prohibiting any
    amendment.” 
    Id. at 52.
    Both chambers passed the bill.
    “A few hours later, the Governor signed” the bill “into
    law,” and it immediately took effect. 1 
    Id. at 53,
    66, 317.
    3.     R eaction to A ct 44
    “T here was a negative public response to [Act 44],
    focusing particularly upon its timing and method of
    passage . . . .” 
    Stilp, 905 A.2d at 925
    . Several state-court
    actions challenged Act 44’s validity. See 
    id. at 926-28.
    Four months after its enactment, the G eneral Assembly, on
    November 16, 2005, repealed Act 44 “in its entirety” and
    reinstated the previous pay scheme (“Act 
    72”). 2 Ohio App. at 1
            The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later held this
    legislative process did not violate the Pennsylvania
    C onstitution. See Stilp v. Commonwealth, 
    905 A.2d 918
    ,
    951-59 (Pa. 2006).
    2
    A ct 72 w as intended to decrease all state officials’
    salaries to pre-Act 44 levels. Because Act 72 repealed Act
    44, the district court in this litigation held that Plaintiffs’
    claim s seeking a declaration that A c t 44 w a s
    unconstitutional were now moot. See Common 
    Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 424
    .
    After the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case in
    its entirety, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
    (continued...)
    10
    2
    (...continued)
    that Act 72 was itself unconstitutional insofar as it
    decreased judges’ salaries. See 
    Stilp, 905 A.2d at 939
    ,
    949. Specifically, the court held that Act 72 violated the
    Pennsylvania Constitution’s provision stating that
    “Justices, judges and justices of the peace . . . shall be
    compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law.
    Their compensation shall not be diminished during their
    terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all
    salaried officers of the Commonwealth.” 
    Id. at 929-30
    (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 16(a)). The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court went on to conclude, however, “our finding
    of this unconstitutional effect does not taint the remainder
    of A ct 72. Thus, we find that the remainder of A ct 72’s
    repeal of Act 44 is valid.” 
    Id. at 949.
    Because part of Act 44, the portion increasing
    judges’ salaries, thus remained in effect, the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court went ahead and addressed the validity of
    that statute. The court held that the manner in which the
    General Assem bly enacted Act 44 did not violate
    Pennsylvania’s constitution. See 
    id. at 949-59.
    But Act
    44’s provision of unvouchered expenses to state
    legislators— a thinly veiled attempt to permit current
    legislators to enjoy the Act’s pay increase, contrary to state
    law— was invalid. See 
    id. at 960-70.
    The    state   supreme      court   then     held that,
    (continued...)
    11
    2
    (...continued)
    notwithstanding Act 44’s express non-severability clause,
    the Act actually left it to “the Judiciary to make the
    ultimate determination of severability.” 
    Id. at 973.
    The
    court then severed the invalid provision of Act 44— the
    provision of “unvouchered expense[s]” for
    legislators— from the “otherwise-constitutionally valid
    remainder of Act 44.” 
    Id. at 980-81.
    The ultimate result of the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court’s analysis was “that Act 44’s provisions . . . which
    relate solely to the formula to determine compensation
    paid to the Judiciary, remain[ed] in force.” 
    Id. at 981.
    The court further noted,
    this Court did not draft or play any role in the
    enactment of the legislation that became Act
    44. That legislation, passed by the General
    A ssembly and duly signed by the Governor,
    set the compensation judges were to receive,
    and in July of 2005 the Judiciary began
    receiving that compensation, only to have the
    compensation unconstitutionally reduced by
    Act 72.
    The Constitution of Pennsylvania
    m andates that the Judiciary shall be
    compensated as provided by law.    To
    (continued...)
    12
    2
    (...continued)
    effectuate that constitutional command, w e
    order that the Treasurer of the
    Commonwealth: (1) shall forthwith calculate
    judicial compensation in accordance with Act
    44, as explained in this Opinion; and
    (2) shall, upon receipt of vouchers prepared
    by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
    Courts, reimburse members of the Judiciary
    for the unconstitutional diminution in
    compensation effected by Act 72.
    
    Id. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court’s decision in Stilp
    was entered September 14, 2006. See 
    id. at 918.
    Ten
    months later, on July 13, 2007, the Pennsylvania
    legislature enacted a third statute, Act 30, which replaced
    the reinstated portions of Act 44 regarding judges’
    salaries. Apparently in order to avoid the Pennsylvania
    constitution’s prohibition against the legislature reducing
    the salaries of sitting judges, Act 30 gave the judges a one
    dollar raise from their salaries as they existed on that date,
    July 14, 2007, and enacted a new formula for calculating
    future cost-of-living raises for state court judges. The
    parties appear to agree that Act 30 repealed the remaining
    portion of Act 44 reinstated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court.
    (continued...)
    13
    53; see 
    Stilp, 905 A.2d at 924-25
    & 924 n. 3.
    B.    Procedural posture of this litigation
    Plaintiffs initiated this federal litigation on October
    6, 2005, a month before the Pennsylvania legislature
    repealed A ct 44. Plaintiffs amended their complaint once
    before that repeal, and a second time after the General
    2
    (...continued)
    The net result appears to be that, despite the now
    complete repeal of A ct 44, some Pennsylvania judges’
    salaries remain higher than they were prior to the General
    Assembly’s enactment of A ct 44. It is on this basis that
    Plaintiffs argue that, even though Act 44 has been repealed
    in its entirety, it made lasting effects on state judges’
    salaries such that Plaintiffs’ claims are not moot. Because
    we decide this appeal on the basis of standing, we need not
    address whether Plaintiffs’ claims are moot. See Friends
    of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
    U .S. 167, 180, 189 (2000) (addressing standing before
    mootness); County of Riverside v. M cLaughlin, 
    500 U.S. 44
    , 51-52 (1991) (same); United Artists Theatre Co. v.
    W alton, 
    315 F.3d 217
    , 225-26 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). See
    generally Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
    520 U.S. 43
    , 68 n.22 (1997) (noting that “[m]ootness has been
    described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
    The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
    comm encement of the litigation (standing) must continue
    throughout its existence (mootness)”) (quotations omitted).
    14
    Assem bly repealed Act 44. In their second amended
    complaint, Plaintiffs alleged five federal and eight
    state-law claims, and sought both injunctive and
    declaratory relief.
    Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’
    claims, under Fed. R. C iv. P. 12(b)(1) and (6), for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
    upon which relief can be granted. 3 In a very thorough
    decision, the district court granted Defendants’ motions to
    dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims. See Common 
    Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 419
    , 431 n.14. In light of that
    determ ination, the court held that it did not need to
    consider Plaintiffs’ pendent state-law claims and,
    therefore, dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint “in its entirety.”
    
    Id. at 431
    n.14, 438. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s
    decision dismissing their federal claims.
    II. ST A N D A R D O F R E V IE W
    The district court held, among other things, that
    Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the federal claims they
    are pursuing in this litigation. See 
    id. at 424-30.
    “Absent
    Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject
    matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and they
    3
    Before the district court, Plaintiffs conceded that
    the Commonwealth should be dismissed as a party. The
    district court also dismissed Defendant Treasurer Casey.
    Plaintiffs do not challenge either of these dismissals on
    appeal.
    15
    must be dismissed.” 
    Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188
    . This
    court reviews “dismissals for lack of standing de novo.”
    Graden v. C onexant Sys. Inc., 
    496 F.3d 291
    , 294 n.2 (3d
    Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 1473
    (2008); see also
    Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 
    539 F.3d 311
    , 316 (3d C ir.
    2008).
    In an appeal from a grant of a motion
    to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(1), we review only whether
    the allegations on the face of the complaint,
    taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke
    the jurisdiction of the district court.
    Challenges to subject m atter jurisdiction
    under Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or factual.
    Facial attacks, like this one, contest the
    sufficiency of the pleadings, and the trial
    court must accept the complaint’s allegations
    as true.
    
    Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188
    (citations, quotations omitted).
    Further, “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual
    allegations of injury resulting from the defendant[s’]
    conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we
    presume that general allegations embrace those specific
    facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan v.
    Defenders of W ildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992)
    (quotation, alterations omitted); see also Pa. Prison Soc’y
    v. Cortes, 
    508 F.3d 156
    , 161 (3d Cir. 2007).
    Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking the federal courts’
    16
    jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing their standing.
    See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
    547 U.S. 332
    , 342
    (2006).
    III. ST A N D IN G
    A.    G eneral standing principles
    Standing implicates both constitutional requirements
    and prudential concerns. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 
    543 U.S. 125
    , 128 (2004).
    In essence the question of standing is whether
    the litigant is entitled to have the court decide
    the merits of the dispute or of particular
    issues. The standing requirement is born
    partly of an idea, which is more than an
    intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit
    theory, about the constitutional and prudential
    limits to the powers of an unelected,
    unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
    government.
    Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
    542 U.S. 1
    , 11
    (2004) (quotations, citations omitted). A federal court
    “[a]lways . . . must balance the heavy obligation to
    exercise jurisdiction against the deeply rooted commitment
    not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless
    adjudication of the constitutional issue is necessary.”
    
    Id. (quotations, citations
    omitted). Thus, Article III’s
    standing requirement “is every bit as important in its
    circum scription of the judicial power of the United States
    as in its granting of that power.” Valley Forge Christian
    17
    Coll. v. Ams. United for S eparation of Church & State,
    Inc., 
    454 U.S. 464
    , 476 (1982). Invoking the power of the
    federal judiciary requires m ore than important issues and
    able litigants. See 
    id. at 489-90.
          1.     C onstitutional standing req uirem ents
    “Article III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the
    federal ‘judicial Pow er’ to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and
    ‘Controversies.’ That case-or controversy requirement is
    satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.” Sprint
    Commc’ns C o. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 
    128 S. Ct. 2531
    ,
    2535 (2008); see also Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 471
    .
    [I]n order to have Article III standing, a
    plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an
    injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and
    particulariz ed” in vasion of a “legally
    protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e., a
    “fairly traceable” connection between the
    alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct
    of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e.,
    it is “likely” and not “merely speculative”
    that the plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by
    the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).
    Sprint Commc’ns 
    Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2535
    (quoting 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61
    ) (further quotation, alterations
    omitted); see also 
    Cortes, 508 F.3d at 161
    . “In this manner
    does Art. III limit the federal judicial power ‘to those
    disputes w hich confine federal courts to a role consistent
    w ith a system of separated powers and which are
    18
    traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
    the judicial process.’” Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 472
    (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 
    392 U.S. 83
    , 97
    (1968)). “Determining that a m atter before the federal
    courts is a proper case or controversy under A rticle III
    therefore assumes particular importance in ensuring that
    the Federal Judiciary respects the proper— and properly
    limited— role of the courts in a democratic society.”
    DaimlerChrysler 
    Corp., 547 U.S. at 341
    (quotation
    omitted). “[N]o principle is more fundamental to the
    judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than
    the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to
    actual cases or controversies.” 
    Id. (quotations omitted).
    “If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts
    have no business deciding it . . . .” 
    Id. Of particular
    relevance to this case, a plaintiff must
    allege an actual, concrete injury. See Sprint Comm c’ns
    
    Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2535
    ; 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    . It is not
    enough to assert a generalized, abstract grievance shared
    by a large number of similarly situated people. See Valley
    Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83
    (citing cases).
    W e go on to discuss prudential standing.
    2.     Prudential standing requirem ents
    In contrast to constitutional standing, prudential
    standing “embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the
    exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Elk G rove Unified Sch.
    
    Dist., 542 U.S. at 11
    (quotation omitted). Although the
    Supreme Court has
    not   exhaustively    defined   the   prudential
    19
    dimensions of the standing doctrine, [the
    Court has] explained that prudential standing
    encompasses the general prohibition on a
    litigant’s raising another person’s legal
    rights, the rule barring adjudication of
    generalized grievances more appropriately
    addressed in the representative branches, and
    the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint
    fall within the zone of interests protected by
    the law invoked.
    
    Id. at 12
    (quotation omitted); see also Valley Forge
    Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75
    ; Twp. of Piscataway v.
    Duke Energy, 
    488 F.3d 203
    , 209 (3d Cir. 2007).
    W ithout such limitations–closely related to
    Art. III concerns but essentially matters of
    judicial self-governance–the courts would be
    called upon to decide abstract questions of
    wide public significance even though other
    governmental institutions may be more
    competent to address the questions and even
    t h o u g h j u d ic ia l in te rv e n tio n m a y b e
    unnecessary to protect individual rights.
    Elk Grove U nified Sch. 
    Dist., 542 U.S. at 12
    (quotation
    omitted).
    Of import in this case, then, “even when the plaintiff
    has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the
    requirements of Art. III, the [Supreme] Court has refrained
    from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide public
    significance’ w hich amount to ‘generalized grievances,’
    20
    pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
    representative branches.” V alley Forge Christian Coll.,
    454 U .S. at 474-75 (quoting W arth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 499-500 (1975)).
    3.     G eneralized grievances
    “W hether styled as a constitutional or prudential
    limit on standing, the [Supreme] Court has sometimes
    determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer
    alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
    may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely
    shared grievance.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 
    524 U.S. 11
    , 23 (1998) (citing cases). Based upon this
    reasoning, the Supreme “Court repeatedly has rejected
    claims of standing predicated on the right, possessed by
    every citizen, to require that the Government be
    administered according to law.” Valley Forge Christian
    
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-83
    (quotation, alteration omitted;
    citing cases); see also M assachusetts v. E.P.A., 
    549 U.S. 497
    , 516-17 (2007) (“W e will not . . . entertain citizen
    suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the
    proper administration of the laws.”); Lance v. Coffman,
    
    549 U.S. 437
    , 442 (2007) (per curiam) (noting that the
    “[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law . . . has
    not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of
    undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct
    of government that we have refused to countenance in the
    past.”); 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74
    (“W e have consistently
    held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available
    grievance about government–claiming only harm to his and
    every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
    21
    Constitution and law s, and seeking relief that no more
    directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public
    at large–does not state an Article III case or
    controversy.”); 
    id. at 573-77
    (citing cases); 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 322
    (holding taxpayers lacked standing to assert
    claims based upon generalized injury that all persons in
    Philadelphia suffered); C 
    ortes, 508 F.3d at 164
    (holding
    voters and taxpayers lacked standing to assert a
    “g en eralize d griev an ce[] of concerned citizens”);
    
    Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 185
    , 190 (holding homeowners
    lacked standing to assert generalized challenge to local
    zoning ordinance); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J.,
    Inc. v. M agnesium Elektron, Inc., 
    123 F.3d 111
    , 120-21
    (3d Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to assert
    generalized claim that they were injured by knowing that
    creek was being polluted).
    Such claims amount to little more than attempts “to
    employ a federal court as a forum in which to
    air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of
    government.” Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U .S. at
    479 (quotation, alteration omitted). Therefore, “assertion
    of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct,
    which the Government has violated by acting differently,
    cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without
    draining those requirements of meaning.” 
    Id. at 483.
          This reasoning “invariably appears in cases w here
    the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of
    an abstract and indefinite nature— for example, harm to the
    common concern for obedience to law.” 
    Akins, 524 U.S. at 23
    (quotation om itted). “The abstract nature of the
    22
    harm— for example, injury to the interest in seeing that the
    law is obeyed–deprives the case of the concrete
    specificity . . . which . . . prevents a plaintiff from
    obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory
    opinion.” 
    Id. at 24.
    “Often the fact that an interest is
    abstract and the fact that it is w idely shared go hand in
    hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a
    harm is concrete, though widely shared, the [Supreme]
    C ourt has found ‘injury in fact.’”           Id.; see also
    M assachusetts v. 
    E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 517
    ; 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 322
    (noting in that case that “[a]ppellants lack
    standing, . . . not because the alleged injuries they suffer
    are widely felt, but because their injuries are no different
    in nature from the general interest in enforcing compliance
    with the law which the public shares”).
    In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue they are not asserting
    generalized grievances, but are instead alleging the
    deprivation of “personal rights” under the First, Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendments. Even so, Plaintiffs must allege
    that they directly suffered an actual injury to those rights.
    See Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 482-87
    ; see
    also 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 315
    , 320-22 & 322 n.7 (applying
    same standing analysis to a citizen taxpayer’s claims
    alleging the deprivation of rights under the First, Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendments to access the courts and to
    petition the legislature, and thus requiring plaintiff to
    establish an actual and direct injury to her rights in order
    to have standing).
    4.     Plaintiffs’ status
    23
    The named plaintiffs include four individuals— Tim
    Potts, Carl H. Silverman, W illiam R. Koch and H. W illiam
    M cIntyre— who are Pennsylvania residents, citizens and
    taxpayers. Plaintiff Greg Vitali is a citizen and taxpayer
    in Pennsylvania. H e is also a member of the Pennsylvania
    House of Representatives who voted against Act 44. 4
    Two of the plaintiffs— Common Cause of
    Pennsylvania and the League of W omen Voters— are
    associations. C ommon Cause “is a national non-partisan
    citizen advocacy organization concerned with advancing
    integrity in government. Common Cause’s primary goal is
    governmental accountability and responsiveness, which it
    promotes through lobbying, oversight, education, outreach
    4
    In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs
    alleged that each of the named plaintiffs, both individuals
    and associations alike, are taxpayers as well as citizens
    and residents of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs
    expressly do not rely on their status as taxpayers to
    establish their standing to assert the claims they pursue in
    this litigation. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue,
    although we note that under the present thinking of a
    majority of the Supreme Court, Plaintiffs would appear not
    to have standing as taxpayers under the circumstances
    alleged here. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found.,
    Inc., 
    127 S. Ct. 2553
    (2007) (plurality); see also 13B
    C harles A lan Wright, Arthur R. M iller & Edward H.
    Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.10.1 (3d ed.
    2008).
    24
    and litigation programs.” App. at 33. “Common Cause of
    Pennsylvania has over 10,000 members in Pennsylvania.”
    
    Id. Plaintiff League
    of W om en Voters of Pennsylvania
    “is a m em bership based, non-partisan, non-profit
    corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania.
    The League’s purpose is to promote the informed and
    active participation of citizens in their government.” 
    Id. at 34.
    Its “membership consists of [Pennsylvania] citizens,
    taxpayers, and voters.” 
    Id. An association’s
    or organization’s standing presents
    special considerations.
    [A]n organization or association may have
    standing to bring suit under tw o
    circumstances. First, an organization may be
    granted standing in its own right to seek
    judicial relief from injury to itself and to
    vindicate whatever rights and immunities the
    organization or association itself may enjoy.
    Alternatively, an association may assert
    claims on behalf of its m embers, but only
    w here the record show s that the
    organization’s individual members
    themselves have standing to bring those
    claims.
    
    Cortes, 508 F.3d at 162-63
    (citations, alterations omitted);
    see also Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health
    Servs., Inc., 
    280 F.3d 278
    , 283 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, “an
    organization may sue to redress its members’ injuries, even
    25
    without a showing of injury to the association itself.”
    United Food & Comm’l W orkers Union Local 751 v.
    Brown Group, Inc., 
    517 U.S. 544
    , 552 (1996).
    “‘[A]n association has standing to bring suit on
    behalf of its members w hen: (a) its members w ould
    otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
    interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
    organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted
    nor the relief requested requires the participation of
    individual members in the lawsuit.’” 
    Id. at 553
    (quoting
    Hunt v. W ash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
    432 U.S. 333
    ,
    343 (1977)); see also Pa. Psychiatric 
    Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 283
    . The first requirement, “that at least one of the
    organization’s members w ould have standing to sue on his
    own, is grounded on Article III as an element of the
    constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.”
    United Food & Comm’l W orkers Union Local 
    751, 517 U.S. at 554-55
    (quotation omitted). The second prong
    is, at the least, complementary to the first, for
    its demand that an association plaintiff be
    organized for a purpose germane to the
    subject of its member’s claim raises an
    assurance that the association’s litigators w ill
    themselves have a stake in the resolution of
    the dispute, and thus be in a position to serve
    as the defendant’s natural adversary.
    
    Id. at 555-56.
    The third prong, on the other hand, is
    prudential in nature, rather than a constitutional
    requirement. See 
    id. at 556-57.
    26
    In this case, the two Plaintiff associations base their
    standing solely on injuries suffered by their members.
    Therefore, because Plaintiffs Common Cause and the
    League of W omen Voters have “alleged no injury to
    [themselves] as an organization, distinct from injury to
    [their] taxpayer members,” their
    claim to standing can be no different from
    those of the members [they] seek[] to
    represent. The question [presented, then,] is
    whether [their] members, or any one of them,
    are suffering immediate or threatened injury
    as a result of the challenged action of the sort
    that would make out a justiciable case had the
    members themselves brought suit.
    Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 476
    n.14
    (quotation omitted). Because the standing of the two
    Plaintiff associations thus rests on the standing of their
    members, and because Plaintiffs allege that the
    associations’ members suffered the same injury as the
    individual plaintiffs, save perhaps Representative Vitali,
    we will address the associations’ standing together with
    that of the individual plaintiffs.
    B.     Plaintiffs’ claim s
    The standing inquiry “often turns on the nature and
    source of the claim asserted.” Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    , 818 (1997) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “[i]n
    determining w hether appellants have standing, we must
    consider their specific allegations and the relief which they
    seek.” 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 316
    (citing City of Los Angeles
    27
    v. Lyons, 
    461 U.S. 95
    , 105-06 (1983)). Although in their
    second amended complaint, Plaintiffs originally alleged
    five federal claims, on appeal they continue to pursue only
    three of those five claims. 5
    5
    Plaintiffs’ first federal claim, entitled “Conspiracy
    to V iolate Civil Rights,” alleged that Defendants John
    Perzel, the Pennsylvania house speaker, and Robert
    Jubelirer, the state senate president, conspired with
    “unknown members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
    be later named as Defendants” to enact Act 44, in violation
    of the Pennsylvania C onstitution, by exchanging “illegally
    negotiated legislative outcomes . . . for decisions by the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court desired by legislative
    Defendants.” App. at 67. The second amended complaint
    further alleged generally that these Defendants also
    conspired to authorize legislation enacted in violation of
    the Pennsylvania Constitution. Plaintiffs asserted this
    claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. In their appellate
    briefs, however, Plaintiffs do not ever mention this
    conspiracy claim. Therefore, we deem Plaintiffs to have
    abandoned it. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    , 182
    (3d Cir. 1993).
    Plaintiffs’ second federal claim alleged that the fact
    that Defendants included a non-severability clause in Act
    44 deprived Plaintiffs of due process because that clause
    denied Plaintiffs “a fair hearing before an impartial
    tribunal.” A pp. at 68. Plaintiffs, however, do not reassert
    (continued...)
    28
    1.     The state judiciary’s invo lvem ent in the
    legislative process deprived Plaintiffs of
    due process
    In their second amended complaint, Plaintiffs
    alleged only that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of due
    process w hen D efendants “engaged in private
    conversations on legislative matters w ith one or more
    justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that might
    com e before the court.” A pp. at 69. The district court
    held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this claim.
    See Common 
    Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 426-30
    . W e agree.
    Clearly these allegations, w hich challenge the legislative
    process, are insufficient to allege more than a generalized,
    abstract grievance, shared by all Pennsylvania citizens.
    The complaint does not attempt to identify an actual,
    concrete injury that this conduct caused any of the named
    Plaintiffs. Cf. 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 315
    , 320-22 (dismissing
    taxpayers’ access-to-court claim because their alleged
    “injuries are no different in nature from the general
    interest in enforcing compliance with the law which the
    public shares”).
    For the first time on appeal, Plaintiffs attempt to
    focus on the potential state judicial process, arguing that
    Defendants’ actions deprived Plaintiffs of due process, and
    5
    (...continued)
    any challenge to the non-severability clause itself on
    appeal. Therefore, we also deem that specific claim
    abandoned. See 
    Kost, 1 F.3d at 182
    .
    29
    specifically an impartial decisionmaker, because (1) Act
    44 gave the judiciary a pecuniary interest in any litigation
    challenging that Act; (2) the judiciary participated in
    creating the challenged legislation; and (3) the
    Pennsylvania Chief Justice 6 negotiated with the legislature
    for the predetermined result of any later court challenges
    to Act 44 brought before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    A litigant generally cannot create standing through new
    allegations asserted for the first time on appeal. See
    Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 
    322 F.3d 293
    ,
    297 (3d Cir. 2003); see also In re M ystic Tank Lines
    Corp., 
    544 F.3d 524
    , 528 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]his
    court has consistently held that it will not consider issues
    that are raised for the first tim e on appeal,” absent
    “exceptional circumstances”). Even considering these new
    allegations, however, Plaintiffs have still failed to
    establish that they suffered an actual injury from this
    challenged conduct sufficient to give them standing.
    For example, Plaintiffs do not allege that they ever
    challenged Act 44 in state court and that, in doing so, they
    w ere deprived of an impartial decisionmaker. Instead,
    they allege, in the abstract, that if Plaintiffs had brought
    suit in Pennsylvania courts challenging Act 44, they would
    not have had an impartial decisionmaker: “The Appellants
    6
    Plaintiffs, on appeal, make this allegation against
    a named defendant, Chief Justice Cappy, as well as against
    unnamed “other Justices” of the Pennsylvania Supreme
    Court. See Aplt. Br. at 35 n.7, 36-37.
    30
    here, w ho have challenged such enactments before and
    could be expected to do so again, were thereby denied any
    chance of the constitutionally required access to an
    impartial tribunal, and thus due process of law , in state
    court.” Aplt. Br. at 16. That is not sufficient to state the
    actual or imm inent injury necessary for constitutional
    standing. See M assachusetts v. 
    E.P.A., 549 U.S. at 517
    ;
    
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61
    .
    Further, Plaintiffs go on to articulate this claim as
    follow s:
    The      Appellants—in             fact,    all
    P ennsylvanians— started w ith sta te
    constitutional righ ts to an open and
    deliberative legislative process guaranteed
    them by Article III of the state constitution;
    these rights . . . have consistently been found
    to be justiciable and defensible in the
    Pennsylvania courts, and thus the plaintiffs
    here also possessed a legal right to bring suit
    in state court to challenge the deprivation of
    their Article III rights by the passage of Act
    44 and other legislation challenged in the past
    or potentially challengeable at the time of
    these events.
    Aplt. Br. at 40 (emphasis added); see also 
    id. at 24
    (arguing Defendants, w ho are “leading figures of the
    Pennsylvania state government[,] attempted systematically
    to deny [a neutral and disinterested decision maker] to the
    people of their Commonwealth”); 
    id. at 37-38
    (asserting
    31
    “the Chief Justice and potentially other Justices agreed
    before the pay-raise legislation was even enacted that the
    state courts would uphold it . . . against legal challenge by
    any citizens”) (emphasis added).           These argum ents
    highlight the fact that Plaintiffs are asserting only a
    generalized, abstract grievance held by “all
    Pennsylvanians.” Plaintiffs have, thus, failed to allege that
    they have directly suffered a personalized, actual or
    imminent injury, as Article III requires.
    For all of these reasons, we conclude the district
    court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ due process
    claim because they lacked standing to assert it.
    2.      The truncated          legislative        process
    u n d er ly ing t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b ly ’ s
    enactm ent of A ct 44 deprived Plaintiffs of
    equal protection and due process
    Plaintiffs, in their second amended complaint, next
    challenged the manner in which the General Assembly
    e n a cte d A c t 4 4 , a lle g in g t h a t D e f e n d a n ts , b y
    “implement[ing] a truncated legislative process, as part of
    a continuing pattern of illegal statutory enactment,”
    deprived Plaintiffs of both due process and equal
    protection. App. at 69-70. The district court held that
    Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this claim, as well. See
    Common 
    Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 426-30
    . Again, w e
    agree. Plaintiffs failed to allege how this legislative
    process actually injured them directly. Instead, they
    alleged a generalized, abstract grievance shared by all
    Pennsylvanians.
    32
    On appeal, Plaintiffs assert only an equal protection
    claim. Thus, we deem them to have abandoned any due
    process challenge to the manner in which the General
    Assembly enacted Act 44, although our conclusion that
    Plaintiffs lack standing would equally bar Plaintiffs’ due
    process claim had it been preserved. See 
    Kost, 1 F.3d at 182
    .
    For the first time on appeal, Plaintiffs make
    additional allegations to support their standing to
    challenge the w ay Act 44 was enacted. They also
    differentiate the grounds on w hich the citizen plaintiffs
    have standing from the basis for Representative Vitali’s
    standing.
    Again, Plaintiffs generally cannot create standing
    through new allegations asserted for the first time on
    appeal. See 
    Storino, 322 F.3d at 297
    ; see also In re M ystic
    Tank Lines 
    Corp., 544 F.3d at 528
    . Nonetheless, even
    considering these additional allegations, Plaintiffs have
    failed to establish that they have constitutional standing to
    pursue this equal-protection challenge to the procedures by
    which the General Assembly enacted Act 44.
    On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that
    the extra-legal process designed by
    [Defendants] to enact Act 44, in which a
    select few legislators were the only ones
    allowed–secretly–to draft, propose or alter
    even a single word of the legislation,
    deprived the vast majority of legislators,
    in c lu d in g A p p e lla n ts [ ’] R e p re se n ta tiv e
    33
    [Plaintiff] Greg Vitali, and their constituents
    such as Appellants of equal protection of the
    law s as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution.
    Aplt. Br. at 43. M ore specifically, Plaintiffs argue on
    appeal that Defendants deprived them of equal protection
    by assigning the original house bill to a conference
    committee, composed of only named Defendants, w hich
    completely redrafted the original house bill in secret, and
    then submitted it to the General Assembly under a rule
    prohibiting any of the other legislators from amending the
    submitted bill.
    As a result [Defendants] ensured that they
    and only they were able to exercise the full
    panoply of legislative functions in drafting,
    debating and amending the text of the Act,
    while consigning [Plaintiff] Representative
    Greg Vitali and the elected representatives of
    the rem aining A ppellan ts to a m ere
    up-or-down vote on final passage. A small
    class of legislators thus was given the
    abilities constitutionally appertaining to
    membership in the General Assembly to draft,
    discuss, debate, and amend the legislation at
    issue— all others were completely and
    expressly denied such ability.
    
    Id. at 44.
         Because     Plaintiffs    differentiate  betw een
    Representative Vitali’s standing and that of the other
    34
    citizen Plaintiffs, we will address Vitali’s standing
    separately. 7
    7
    In their complaint, Plaintiffs never suggested that
    Vitali suffered any injury, as a state legislator, that was
    different from any injury suffered by the citizen plaintiffs.
    But in their brief to the district court opposing Defendants’
    motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs did suggest that Vitali had
    standing based upon his being a legislator:
    Plaintiff Greg Vitali is a member of the
    General Assembly and was personally
    excluded from his right to participate, as an
    elected representative of the 166th state
    legislative district, in the legislative process
    required by the state constitution. A process
    bypassed by individual defendants to this
    action resulting in the violation of Plaintiff
    Vitali’s right to free speech, due process and
    equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
    the federal constitution.
    App. at 191-92. How ever, in that brief, when Plaintiffs
    addressed the specifics of their equal protection claim,
    Plaintiffs never alleged that the manner in which Act 44
    was enacted specifically deprived Vitali of equal
    protection of the law on any basis different from that
    alleged to have involved the other citizen plaintiffs. 
    Id. at 216-22.
    Thus, this claim suffers the additional fatal defect
    (continued...)
    35
    a.     Plaintiff V itali’s standing
    “‘[L]egislators, like other litigants in federal court,
    m ust satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of A rticle III
    standing.’” 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 317
    (quoting Russell v.
    DeJongh, 
    491 F.3d 130
    , 133 (3d Cir. 2007) (alteration
    omitted)).
    Concerns for separation of powers and the
    limited role of the judiciary are at the core of
    A rticle III standing doctrine and the
    requirement that a plaintiff allege an injury in
    fact. Those concerns are particularly acute in
    legislator standing cases, and they inform the
    analysis of whether a legislator plaintiff has
    asserted an injury in fact sufficient to confer
    standing to sue.
    
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 133
    .
    On appeal, Plaintiffs suggest that D efendants
    deprived Vitali of equal protection of the law by denying
    him, and other legislators, the ability to discuss, debate
    and perhaps amend A ct 44 before having to vote on that
    legislation. As Plaintiffs point out in their brief, state
    legislators have, under different circumstances, sued based
    upon a direct injury suffered by that particular legislator.
    For instance, in Bond v. Floyd, state representative Julian
    Bond sued the Georgia legislature, seeking declaratory and
    7
    (...continued)
    that it w as not adequately raised below.
    36
    injunctive relief that would permit him to take his seat in
    the Georgia legislature, after that body excluded him for
    comments Bond m ade against the Vietnam W ar, among
    other things. See 
    385 U.S. 116
    , 118, 125-26 (1966).
    Similarly, in A m m ond v. M cGahn, a N ew Jersey state
    senator, Alene Ammond, a D emocrat, sued the Democratic
    senate caucus after the caucus excluded her for making
    negative remarks about the caucus. See 
    390 F. Supp. 655
    ,
    657 (D. N.J. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 
    532 F.2d 325
    ,
    329 (3d. C ir. 1976); see also Parker v. M erlino, 
    646 F.2d 848
    , 849, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1981) (concluding, without
    addressing standing, that there was no merit to the claim
    asserted by several state legislators that other legislators
    violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
    terminating the opportunity for further debate before the
    legislature voted on two pending bills); G ewertz v.
    Jackman, 
    467 F. Supp. 1047
    , 1050, 1055-56 (D. N.J. 1979)
    (holding federal court had authority to consider state
    legislator’s claim challenging the D emocratic caucus’s
    decision to rem ove him from the Appropriations
    Com m ittee; noting that, although the legislator’s claim
    implicated operations of the state’s legislative body, the
    federal court was “require[d]” to consider this individual
    legislator’s claim “that his constitutional rights have been
    violated by the legislature or its leaders”); see Davids v.
    Akers, 
    549 F.2d 120
    , 122-23 (9th Cir. 1977) (considering
    merits of claims brought by state legislators challenging
    the committee appointments made by the state house
    speaker).
    In each of these cases, the courts addressed the
    37
    merits of these claims brought by individual state
    legislators without specifically discussing whether those
    legislators had standing to assert those claims. However,
    the Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that the existence
    of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential
    effect.” Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 352 n.2 (1996); see
    also Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund,
    
    513 U.S. 88
    , 97 (1994); U nited States v. L.A. Tucker
    Truck Lines, Inc., 
    344 U.S. 33
    , 37-38 (1952). See
    generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 91 (1998) (noting that Supreme Court has “often said
    that drive-by jurisdictional rulings . . . have no
    precedential effect”).
    In this case, in any event, Vitali does not allege that
    he has suffered a direct and concrete injury specific to
    him, as a result of D efendants’ challenged conduct.
    Rather, he challenges a procedure that excluded most of
    the Pennsylvania legislators.
    Other cases, also relied upon by Plaintiffs, have
    concluded that a legislator has standing to challenge the
    nullification of his particular vote.
    [L]egislators have a legally protected interest
    in their right to vote on legislation and other
    matters committed to the legislature, which is
    som etimes phrased as an in terest in
    “maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”
    Not every affront to a legislator’s interest in
    the effectiveness of his vote, however, is an
    injury in fact sufficient to confer standing to
    38
    sue.
    
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 134
    (citing cases). For example,
    courts have drawn a distinction . . . between
    a public official’s mere disobedience of a law
    for which a legislator voted–which is not an
    injury in fact–and an official’s “distortion of
    the process by which a bill becomes law” by
    nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a
    legislator of an opportunity to vote–which is
    an injury in fact.
    
    Id. at 135.
           Cases w here a public official has directly injured a
    particular legislator by nullifying his vote, however,
    involve circumstances m uch different than those alleged
    here. See 
    id. at 135-36
    & 135 n.4 (citing cases); cf.
    Bender v. W illiamsport Area Sch. Dist., 
    475 U.S. 534
    , 544
    & n.7 (1986) (noting, in dicta, that a lone dissenting
    school board member might have standing to assert a claim
    seeking to maintain the effectiveness of his vote, if state
    law required a unanim ous board vote and the rest of the
    board, nevertheless, acted without the dissenting member’s
    consent).
    The Third Circuit addressed several such cases in
    
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 135-36
    . There, this court noted, for
    example, that Coleman v. M iller, 
    307 U.S. 433
    (1939),
    “‘stands, at most, for the proposition that legislators whose
    votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
    specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that
    39
    legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into
    effect) on the ground that their votes have been completely
    nullified.’” 
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 135
    n.4 (quoting 
    Raines, 521 U.S. at 823
    ) (emphasis added); see also Baird v.
    Norton, 
    266 F.3d 408
    , 411-13 (6th Cir. 2001).
    And in D ennis v. Luis, 
    741 F.2d 628
    (3d Cir. 1984),
    the Third Circuit
    held that a group of legislators had standing
    to challenge the appointment by the Governor
    of the Virgin Islands of an “acting”
    C ommissioner of Comm erce w ithout
    consulting them, where § 16(c) of the
    Organic Act, 48 U .S.C. § 1597(c), provided
    that the appointment of a Commissioner of
    Commerce was subject to the advice and
    consent of the Legislature. The plaintiffs in
    Dennis thus alleged that they possessed a
    specific right under § 16(c) of the Organic
    Act that the Governor had violated, and they
    had no clear recourse through the political
    process.
    
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 135
    n.4.
    Further, in Silver v. Pataki, 
    755 N.E.2d 842
    (N.Y.
    App. 2001),
    the New York Court of Appeals recognized
    an injury in fact when a state assembly
    member alleged that the governor made
    illegal use of his line item veto power by
    40
    using it on bills that were not lawfully subject
    to the line item veto. The state assembly
    member had voted in favor of the bills in
    question, and the New York Court of Appeals
    held that the plaintiff had standing. . . . In
    Silver, the Governor’s veto nullified the
    pending bills and forced the assembly
    m em ber to try [to] persuade a supermajority
    of his colleagues to override the governor’s
    veto if he wished to restore the status of the
    bills as law .
    
    Russell, 491 F.3d at 135
    n.4.
    The circumstances alleged in this case are much
    different. Here, Representative Vitali was not precluded
    from voting on Act 44. C f. 
    id. at 135-36
    (concluding
    legislator, asserting claim that Governor violated
    applicable deadlines in nominating justices of the Virgin
    Islands Supreme Court, did not allege that his ability to
    vote had been nullified where the legislator was still able
    to “confirm, reject, or defer voting on the Governor’s
    nominees”). Nor has V itali alleged that his vote w as in
    any other way nullified. At most, Vitali merely alleges he
    was denied full input on the drafting and consideration of
    Act 44. But the denial w as not specific to him; rather, its
    impact was felt by all legislators other than the select
    leadership. However, the legislative process inevitably
    involves a division of responsibilities, and leadership
    necessarily will have greater input in legislation being
    considered.
    41
    For these reasons, we conclude that Vitali has failed
    to allege that the manner in which the General A ssembly
    enacted Act 44 actually and concretely injured him in
    particular. Even if Vitali had alleged such an injury
    (which we conclude he has not), Vitali has also failed to
    satisfy prudential standing concerns. Vitali’s challenge to
    the manner in which the General Assembly enacted Act 44
    is a clear example of one of those “‘abstract questions of
    wide public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized
    grievances,’ pervasively shared and m ost appropriately
    addressed in the representative branches” which the
    Supreme Court counsels federal courts to avoid
    adjudicating. Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75
    (quoting W 
    arth, 422 U.S. at 499-500
    ); see also 13B
    Charles Alan W right, Arthur M iller & Edward H. Cooper,
    Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.11.3 (3d ed. 2008)
    (noting that “m ost disagreements among state legislators
    will involve matters of state law, or issues of federal law
    that cannot be disentangled from the political functions of
    the legislature. Standing should be denied as to the federal
    questions, for reasons of federalistic deference to state
    legislatures that mirror the separation-of-powers deference
    to Congress”).
    For these reasons, the district court did not err in
    concluding Plaintiff V itali lacked standing to challenge the
    manner in which the General Assembly enacted Act 44.
    b.     C itizens Plaintiffs’ standing
    On appeal, the citizen Plaintiffs (and the
    associations whose members are Pennsylvania citizens)
    42
    allege that their elected state representatives were, like
    R epresentative Vitali, precluded from drafting, debating
    and amending Act 44. The New Jersey district court has
    suggested that a state legislator’s constituents might be
    able to assert such a claim:
    The action by the Caucus in denying Senator
    A mmond the opportunity to attend its
    deliberations deprived her constituents of the
    Equal Protection of the law. In effect, the
    action by the Caucus created two classes of
    voters. One class consists of those citizens
    whose Senators could effectively participate
    fully in the legislative process and another
    class whose Senator could participate only to
    a limited degree.
    
    Ammond, 390 F. Supp. at 660
    .
    Even if we were to adopt the District of New
    Jersey’s reasoning, however, the citizen Plaintiffs in this
    case are able to assert only a generalized, abstract
    grievance shared by most Pennsylvanians— that Defendant
    legislators denied Plaintiffs’ representatives the equal
    opportunity to draft, debate and amend Act 44 before
    voting on that bill. See App. at 277 (Plaintiffs arguing to
    the district court that Defendants, through “their
    mechanism by avoiding the legislative process mandated
    by the Pennsylvania C onstitution, . . . cut out the vast
    majority of the representatives and the people of
    Pennsylvania from the deliberative processes of the
    General A ssem bly. These are representational rights that
    43
    are personal to every citizen in this state.”) Such injury is
    insufficient to confer constitutional standing.
    And even if they had established constitutional
    standing (which we conclude they did not), the citizen
    Plaintiffs cannot satisfy prudential standing concerns. See
    Valley Forge Christian 
    Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75
    .
    c.     C onclusion
    It is clear that, before the district court, all of the
    Plaintiffs failed to establish their standing under A rticle III
    to pursue their due process/equal protection claim
    challenging the manner in which the General Assembly
    enacted Act 44. For the first time on appeal, Plaintiffs
    make additional standing arguments. Nevertheless, even
    if w e were to consider those newly raised arguments,
    Plaintiffs have ultimately still failed to meet their burden
    of alleging that they suffered an actual and concrete injury
    sufficient to support constitutional standing. Nor can
    Plaintiffs satisfy prudential standing concerns. For all of
    these reasons, this court affirm s the district court’s
    decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ due process/equal protection
    challenge to the process by which Act 44 was enacted.
    3.     First A m endm ent        right    to   petition
    governm ent
    A s their final federal claim, Plaintiffs alleged in
    their second amended complaint that Defendants, in
    enacting Act 44 in the manner they did, deprived Plaintiffs
    of their First and Fourteenth Amendment “freedom of
    speech to lobby their elected state representatives
    44
    concerning passage of House Bill 1521 before it was
    enacted into law as A ct 44.” A pp. at 70. Specifically
    Plaintiffs alleged that
    Defendants, acting at all times under color of
    state law, implemented the legislative process
    used to enact Act 44, as part of a continuing
    pattern of illegal statutory enactment, thereby
    depriving Plaintiffs [of] their right to freedom
    of speech to lobby their elected state
    representatives concerning passage of House
    Bill 1521 before it w as enacted into law as
    Act 44, as guaranteed by the First and
    Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    C onstitution, as more fully described in the
    preceding paragraphs, all in violation of 42
    U.S.C. § 1983, for which the individual
    Defendants are individually liable.
    
    Id. In the
    “preceding paragraphs” of the complaint,
    Plaintiffs further asserted that
    [t]he truncated legislative process used by the
    Leaders [of the General Assembly] to enact
    Act 44, and the early morning hour at which
    it was triggered, intentionally inhibited
    P lain tiff s[ ’] ability to receive tim ely
    information regarding proposed government
    actions necessary to exercise their First
    Amendment right of free speech to support or
    o p p o s e th e S e n a te - H o u s e c o n f e r e n c e
    committee’s new version of H ouse Bill 1521
    45
    before it was enacted         by the    General
    A ssembly into law.
    
    Id. at 56.
    8 The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked
    standing to assert this claim because they alleged only a
    generalized, abstract grievance shared by all
    Pennsylvanians. See Common 
    Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 426-30
    . Plaintiffs reiterate these same arguments on
    appeal. 9
    On appeal, Plaintiffs expand their First Amendment
    claim to encompass the alleged secret discussion of Act 44
    that occurred between officials of the three branches of
    Pennsylvania’s government, prior to the enactment of that
    8
    On appeal, Plaintiffs make clear that they are not
    challenging the late hour at which the General Assembly
    considered Act 44: “Appellants do not allege that the
    Petition Clause prevents a state legislature from round the
    clock legislative sessions or constrains a legislature from
    enacting law s to times convenient to a citizen’s right to
    petition government.” Aplt. Br. at 61.
    9
    Defendant Chief Justice Cappy complains that
    Plaintiffs, before the district court, alleged only a violation
    of their First Amendment freedom of speech and to lobby.
    According to Cappy, it is only in their appellate briefs that
    Plaintiffs expressly assert the deprivation of their freedom
    to petition the Government. It appears, however, that the
    gist of Plaintiffs’ claim before the district court remains
    the same now on appeal.
    46
    legislation. Again, Plaintiffs generally cannot create
    standing through new allegations asserted for the first time
    on appeal. 1 0 See 
    Storino, 322 F.3d at 297
    ; see also In re
    M ystic Tank Lines 
    Corp., 544 F.3d at 528
    .
    Even considering all of these allegations, however,
    Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they in particular were
    actually and concretely injured by Defendants’ challenged
    conduct. Instead, Plaintiffs continue to allege only a
    general, abstract grievance shared by all Pennsylvanians.
    10
    For the first time in their appellate reply brief,
    Plaintiffs allege that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on July
    6, 2005, citizen Plaintiff Potts contacted the executive
    director of Plaintiff Common C ause to find out if the
    General Assembly was to consider “anything of note” that
    night. Aplt. Reply Br. at 32 n.18. If so, Potts intended to
    “exercise his right to petition.” 
    Id. The executive
    director
    of Common Cause “made inquiries within the General
    Assembly and he was assured nothing of import or
    surprising would occur that night.” 
    Id. The Common
    Cause executive director informed Potts, who then “left on
    vacation.” 
    Id. The General
    Assembly enacted Act 44 at
    2:00 a.m. the follow ing morning. Because Plaintiffs
    waited until their appellate reply brief to make these
    allegations, we do not consider them. See United States v.
    Pellulo, 
    399 F.3d 197
    , 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
    appellant ordinarily may not raise issue for the first time
    in a reply brief, absent exceptional circumstances); see
    also 
    Storino, 322 F.3d at 297
    .
    47
    To illustrate this point, Plaintiffs specifically alleged in
    their complaint that “[t]he Leaders [of the General
    Assembly] intentionally deprived Plaintiffs, and the entire
    Pennsylvania electorate, of any notice of the text of H ouse
    B ill 1521 . . . before it was enacted into law by a
    legislative process lasting a few hours in the very early
    morning.” A pp. at 56 (emphasis added). And on appeal,
    Plaintiffs argue that
    the Petition Clause . . . must forbid individual
    sta te actors from intentionally a n d
    affirmatively orchestrating sophisticated
    modes of total interference w ith A ppellants’
    right to informally petition and communicate
    with their elected state representatives on any
    issue of concern, including the Act in this
    case. The Petition Clause must preserve
    some small quantum of effective
    communication between the electorate and
    the elected from intentional interference by
    other state actors. To hold otherwise is to
    condemn a First A m endment right to a mere
    privilege subject to the whims of political
    elites; elites who far too often are beyond the
    electoral reach of those whose rights they
    have intentionally invaded.
    Aplt. Br. at 61-62.
    Because these allegations and arguments are only
    generalized, ab stract grievances held b y all
    Pennsylvanians, the district court did not err in concluding
    48
    Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge their First
    Amendment claim. Cf. 
    Goode, 539 F.3d at 315
    , 320-22
    (dismissing taxpayers’ right-to-petition claim because their
    alleged “injuries are no different in nature from the
    general interest in enforcing compliance with the law
    which the public shares”). 1 1
    IV . C O N C LU SIO N
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Plaintiffs
    lack standing to pursue the federal claims they assert in
    this action. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    decision dismissing those claims.
    11
    Appellants’ Request, dated February 5, 2009, for
    Leave to File Post-Argument Letter Brief is denied.
    49