Kleissler v. United States Forest Service ( 1999 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1999 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-30-1999
    Kleissler v. US Forest Ser
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 98-3352
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    Recommended Citation
    "Kleissler v. US Forest Ser" (1999). 1999 Decisions. Paper 180.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/180
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    Filed June 30, 1999
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 98-3352
    JAMES KLEISSLER; SUSAN CURRY; ARTHUR CLARK;
    RODGER CLARKE; ELOISE GLENN; MICHAEL KAIZAR;
    HEARTWOOD, INC.,
    Appellants
    v.
    UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; MICHAEL P.
    DOMBECK, Chief Forester for the Eastern Region, United
    States Forest Service; ROBERT T. JACOBS, Regional
    Forester for the Eastern Region - United States Forest
    Service; JOHN PALMER, Forest Supervisor for the
    Allegheny National Forest - United States Forest Service;
    PAYNE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC.;
    SPILKA WOOD PRODUCTS COMPANY,
    (Intervenors Defendants in D.C.)
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. No. 97-cv-02187)
    District Judge: The Honorable William L. Standish
    ARGUED January 13, 1999
    BEFORE: Nygaard, Alito, and Lewis, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: June 30, 1999)
    William V. Luneburg, Esq. (Argued)
    University of Pittsburgh
    School of Law
    3900 Forbes Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15260
    Attorney for Appellants
    John R. Fernan, Esq.
    Cartwright, Fernan & Whitney
    P.O. Box 467
    Ridgway, PA 15853
    Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq. (Argued)
    Office of United States Attorney
    633 United States Post Office
    & Courthouse
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    David L. McClenahan, Esq.
    James E. Scheuermann, Esq.
    William J. Labovitz, Esq.
    Daniel P. Trocchio, Esq. (Argued)
    Kirkpatrick & Lockhart
    1500 Oliver Building
    Pittsburgh, PA 15222
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiff/Appellant Kleissler1 appeals the District Court's
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. We refer to appellant as Kleissler for ease of reference. The term
    Kleissler includes individuals James Kleissler, Susan Curry, Arthur
    Clark, Rodger Clarke, Eloise Glenn and Michael Kaizar, who regularly
    enjoy and use the Allegheny National Forest for study, recreation and
    aesthetic enjoyment. Additionally, James Kleissler and Arthur Clark are
    active members of the Allegheny Defense Project, a regional organization
    dedicated to, inter alia, restoring the ecological integrity of the
    Allegheny
    National Forest. Our reference to "Kleissler" also encompasses
    Heartwood, Inc., a non-profit Indiana corporation whose objectives
    2
    summary judgment. The District Court concluded that
    Kleissler failed to exhaust administrative remedies as
    required under section 212(e) of the United States
    Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act and section
    215 of title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations governing
    Forest Service regulations.2 In its Rule 54(b) certification
    order, the District Court made "an express finding that the
    court's . . . memorandum and order involves a controlling
    question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
    difference of opinion and an immediate appeal may advance
    the ultimate termination of the litigation." Kleissler v.
    United States Forest Serv., No. 97-2187, slip. op. at 3 (W.D.
    Pa. filed June 8, 1998). We agree.
    Because the District Court's summary judgment resulted
    from its interpretations of federal regulations, statutes and
    case law, we exercise plenary review. See Venen v. United
    States, 
    38 F.3d 100
    , 101 (3d Cir. 1994). When reviewing
    scientific and technical data we defer to thefindings and
    expertise of the Forest Agency. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural
    Resources Council, 
    490 U.S. 360
    , 377-78, 
    109 S. Ct. 1851
    ,
    1861 (1989); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources
    Defense Council, 
    462 U.S. 87
    , 103, 
    103 S. Ct. 2246
    , 2255
    (1983). We will only overturn the Forest Service's Finding of
    No Significant Impact if that decision was arbitrary and
    _________________________________________________________________
    include the protection of bio-diversity and ecosystem integrity on public
    and forested lands in Pennsylvania and the central hardwood region of
    the United States. Its members are Pennsylvania residents who use and
    enjoy the educational, recreational and aesthetic opportunities offered by
    the areas of the Allegheny National Forest that are the subject of the
    Minister Watershed and South Branch Willow Creek projects.
    2. This appeal is limited to addressing whether Kleissler exhausted his
    administrative remedies and the effect of that decision as to Kleissler's
    Landscape Corridor claims as they concern areas of the Allegheny
    National Forest encompassed within the Minister Watershed and South
    Branch Willow Creek projects. We note that the District Court presently
    has pending before it a claim by Kleissler that the Forest Service adopted
    a landscape approach to preservation of old growth forests and
    biodiversity on the Allegheny National Forest without complying with the
    National Environmental Protection Act and the National Forest
    Management Act. Accordingly, we are not deciding any issues that
    pertain to that claim.
    3
    capricious. See 
    Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375-77
    , 109 S. Ct. at
    1860-61; Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 
    702 F.2d 426
    ,
    442 (3d Cir. 1983). Applying this standard, we will affirm.
    I.
    Factual Background
    The Allegheny National Forest is approximately 510,530
    acres in size and located in Elk, Forest, McKean and
    Warren counties in northwestern Pennsylvania. Each
    national forest is required by federal statute to have a Land
    and Resource Management Plan. The Allegheny National
    Forest is currently being managed by the United States
    Forest Service under a Land and Resource Management
    Plan adopted in 1986 which can be amended by following
    the procedures and requirements of the National
    Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").3 Under this plan, the
    Allegheny National Forest is divided into Management Areas
    which share a common management direction to achieve a
    common goal. Forest management and planning is divided
    into two main levels: decisions concerning individual timber
    cutting projects, e.g., the Minister Watershed and South
    Branch projects, and decisions concerning forest
    management as a whole, i.e., Land and Resource
    Management Plans.
    Procedural History
    In accordance with 36 C.F.R. S 215.5, the Forest Service
    mailed letters concerning the Minister Watershed and
    South Branch projects to notify the public of the proposed
    projects and provide an opportunity for public comment.
    After receiving and reviewing various responses during the
    thirty-day comment period and the Environmental
    Assessments for the respective projects, the District Ranger
    of the Bradford Ranger District of the Allegheny National
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. NEPA requires that an environmental impact statement be prepared
    by the respective government agency before approval of any major federal
    action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42
    U.S.C. S 4321. An agency determines whether the action will significantly
    affect the quality of the human environment by preparing an
    environmental assessment under 40 C.F.R. SS 1501.4(b) and (c).
    4
    Forest approved the final Environmental Assessments and
    issued Decision Notices and Findings of No Significant
    Impact for each project. As to both projects, the District
    Ranger concluded that implementing the plans "is not a
    major federal action, individually or cumulatively, and will
    not significantly affect the quality of the human
    environment."
    Kleissler filed administrative appeals for both the
    Minister Watershed and South Branch projects. He raised
    the following four claims and concerns in the notice of
    appeal for the Minister Watershed project: (1) the adverse
    effects on the Indiana Bat; (2) the potential killing of
    migratory birds or disturbance of their habitats as a
    violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; (3) the need to
    amend the Land and Resource Management Plan for the
    Allegheny Forest to provide population management
    objectives for species in the project area; and (4) the Forest
    Service's failure to respond adequately to public comments.
    After an informal appeal disposition meeting, the Regional
    Forester affirmed the decision of the District Ranger. This
    decision was the final administrative decision by the
    Department of Agriculture concerning the project.
    Kleissler's administrative notice of appeal for the South
    Branch project was more extensive. His claims and
    concerns for this project can be categorized as follows: (1)
    the failure to consider recreational values; (2) the lack of
    statistics on the level of mortality due to insects and
    disease; (3) the need for dead trees in the forest for wildlife
    refuge; (4) the impacts on microorganisms; (5) the nutrient
    loss to the soil from the removal of trees from the forest; (6)
    the cumulative impact of the Porter Hollow and South
    Branch projects; (7) the effect of herbicides; (8) concerns
    regarding the adverse effect on the Indiana bat's habitat; (9)
    the killing of birds or disturbance of habitats as a violation
    of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; (10) the need for
    population and management objectives for sensitive
    species; and (11) the need to consider other alternatives
    and mitigation measures. Once again, the Regional Forester
    conducted an informal appeal disposition meeting and
    affirmed the decision of the District Ranger. Like the
    decision for the Minister Watershed project, this was the
    5
    final administrative determination by the Department of
    Agriculture concerning the South Branch project.
    Dissatisfied with these results, Kleissler filed a complaint
    in the United States District Court for the Western District
    of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin the Minister Watershed
    and South Branch projects. In brief, Kleissler's complaint
    alleged that, with regard to the Minister Watershed project,
    the designation of 3,923 acres for inclusion in a"landscape
    corridor" represents a change in the Land and Resource
    Management Plan for the Allegheny National Forest
    requiring an amendment to the Plan only after adequate
    opportunity for public comment and an environmental
    impact statement. The complaint also alleged: (1) an
    adverse effect of even-aged timber cutting; (2) an adverse
    effect resulting from the use of herbicides in 569 acres; (3)
    a failure to conserve soil and water; (4) a failure to maintain
    diversity of plant and animal communities; (5) a need to
    protect endangered species such as water shrews, blue
    herons, bald eagles, Indiana bats and goshawks; (6)
    recreational impairment; (7) a need for environmental
    impact statement; (8) an inadequate range of alternatives
    and mitigation measures; and (9) an inadequate
    environmental assessment.
    In sum, the allegations raised in federal court concerning
    the South Branch project can be grouped into two main
    complaints: that the Forest Service violated the National
    Forest Management Act,4 and that the Forest Service
    violated NEPA.5
    _________________________________________________________________
    4. Kleissler contends that the Forest Service violated the National Forest
    Management Act by failing to fulfill its duty to: conserve soil and water;
    maintain the diversity of plant and animal communities; protect the
    habitat of endangered species; consider the "potential effects on residual
    trees and adjacent stands"; protect "water quality and quantity and
    wildlife and fish habitat, forage production, recreation uses, and
    aesthetic values"; "consider alternatives to even-aged management for
    the project area"; consider the "environmental, biological, aesthetic, and
    other impacts of the proposed even-aged cutting";"limit the use of even-
    aged management to exceptional circumstances"; and "insure that
    authorized logging will be carried out in a manner consistent with the
    protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic
    resources, and regeneration of the timber resource."
    5. Kleissler contends that the Forest Service violated NEPA by (1) failing
    to file an environmental impact statement based on: the size of the area
    6
    The District Court concluded that the issues raised in the
    administrative notices of appeal differed significantly from
    the claims raised in the District Court complaint. Therefore,
    the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest
    Service and other defendants.
    II.
    The first question is whether Kleissler has exhausted
    administrative remedies. Plaintiffs generally must exhaust
    administrative remedies. See Southwestern Pa. Growth
    Alliance v. Browner, 
    121 F.3d 106
    , 112 (3d Cir. 1997). It is
    axiomatic that we cannot review "issues that have not been
    passed on by the agency . . . whose action is being
    reviewed." New Jersey v. Hufstedler, 
    724 F.2d 34
    , 36 n.1
    (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 
    470 U.S. 632
    , 105 S.
    Ct. 1555 (1985). As we noted in Southwestern
    Pennsylvania, federal court consideration of the myriad of
    issues raised in a complaint "without the benefit of the
    [agency's] expert input . . . would undermine a fundamental
    principle of our system of judicial review of administrative
    
    decisions." 121 F.3d at 112
    . We follow this approach
    because it will: (1) avoid "premature interruption of the
    administrative process," (2) allow the agency to"develop the
    necessary factual background," (3) give the agency the "first
    chance" to exercise its discretion, (4) properly defer to the
    agency's expertise, (5) provide the agency with an
    opportunity "to discover and correct its own errors," and (6)
    deter the "deliberate flouting of administrative processes."
    McKart v. United States, 
    395 U.S. 185
    , 194-95, 89 S. Ct.
    _________________________________________________________________
    of logging, "the exclusive use of even-aged management," the use of
    herbicides, the potential impact on "specially protected animal species,
    including the Indiana Bat," the degradation of streams, the impact on
    recreational activities, the cumulative effect of the South Branch project
    with other "timber-cutting projects in the [Allegheny National Forest]"
    and "the extent of public interest"; (2) failing to consider the South
    Branch project and Mortality II project together as major federal action
    requiring an environmental impact statement; (3) failing to consider
    alternatives; (4) performing an inadequate environmental assessment; (5)
    improperly "tiering" the environmental assessment; and (6) acting
    arbitrarily by failing to consider relevant factors and other
    alternatives.
    7
    1657, 1662-63 (1969). Moreover, we "usurp[ ] the agency's
    function when [we] set[ ] aside the administrative
    determination upon a ground not theretofore presented" to
    the agency. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v.
    Aragon, 
    329 U.S. 143
    , 155, 
    67 S. Ct. 245
    , 251 (1946).
    Here, the statute is very specific. In conjunction with the
    exhaustion provisions, Forest Service regulations require
    that "the Responsible Official must consider all written
    comments," 36 C.F.R. S 215.6(c)(2)(emphasis added), "a
    person must submit a written appeal to the Appeal
    Deciding Officer" to have objections considered, 
    id. S 215.13(a)
    (emphasis added), "interested parties must
    submit written comments to the Appeal Reviewing Officer,"
    
    id. S 215.13(e)
    (emphasis added), and administrative appeal
    notices must "provide sufficient written evidence and
    rationale to show why the Responsible Official's decision
    should be remanded or reversed." 
    Id. S 215.14
    (emphasis
    added). Mere vague references or conclusory statements do
    not meet the statutory requirements. Rather,
    an appeal must . . . (4) identify the specific change(s)
    in the decision that the appellant seeks or portion of
    the decision to which the appellant objects; (5) state
    how the Responsible Official's decision fails to consider
    comments previously provided, either before or during
    the comment period specified in S 215.6 and, if
    applicable, how the appellant believes the decision
    violates law, regulation, or policy.
    
    Id. S 215.14
    .
    The U.S.D.A. Reorganization Act of 1994, section 212(e)
    provides that "a person shall exhaust all administrative
    appeal procedures established by the Secretary or required
    by law before the person may bring an action in a court of
    competent jurisdiction against (1) the Secretary; (2) the
    Department; or (3) an agency, office, officer, or employee of
    the Department." 7 U.S.C. S 6912(e). Importantly, 36 C.F.R.
    S 215.20 advises that "unless waived in a specific case, it is
    the position of the Department of Agriculture that any filing
    for Federal judicial review of a decision subject to review
    under this part is premature and inappropriate unless the
    plaintiff has first sought to invoke and exhaust the
    procedures available under this part."
    8
    Similarly, 36 C.F.R. S 217, which governs the appeal of
    National Forest Land and Resource Management Plans,
    requires written notices of appeal that must
    [i]dentify specifically that portion of the decision or
    decision document to which the requestor objects;
    [s]tate the reasons for objecting, including issues of
    fact, law, regulation, or policy, and, if applicable,
    specifically how the decision violates law, regulation, or
    policy; and [i]dentify the specific change(s) in the
    decision that the appellant seeks
    36 C.F.R. SS 217.8, 217.9.
    And,
    [t]he review of decisions appealed under this part
    focuses on the documentation developed by the
    Deciding Officer in reaching decisions. The records on
    which the Reviewing Officer shall conduct the review
    consists of the notice of appeal, any written comments
    submitted by intervenors, the official documentation
    prepared by the Deciding Officer in the decision-
    making process, the Deciding Officer's letter
    transmitting those documents to the Reviewing Officer,
    and any appeal related correspondence, including
    additional information requested by the Reviewing
    Officer pursuant to S 217.13 of this part.
    
    Id. S 217.15
    (emphasis added). Again, the Department of
    Agriculture notes that its position is "that anyfiling for
    Federal judicial review of a decision subject to review under
    this part is premature and inappropriate unless the plaintiff
    has first sought to invoke and exhaust the procedures
    available under this part. This position may be waived upon
    written a written finding by the Chief [of the Forest
    Service]." 
    Id. S 217.18.
    The policy underlying these regulations is simple:
    objections and issues should first be reviewed by those with
    expertise in the contested subject area. See 
    McKart, 395 U.S. at 194-96
    , 89 S. Ct. at 1663-64; Southwestern
    
    Pennsylvania, 121 F.3d at 112
    . Proper written notice fully
    alerts the responsible agency to the appellant's objections.
    See Glisson v. United States Forest Serv., 
    55 F.3d 1325
    ,
    9
    1327 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that an "agency cannot
    evaluate the strength of the objection" if the objector has
    not given a statement of reasons).
    Kleissler urges us to take a flexible and liberal view of the
    exhaustion of remedies requirement such that any
    reference during the administrative appeals process to
    issues related to claims set forth in the federal complaint
    satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Kleissler specifically
    asks us to consider the audiotaped discussions held during
    the informal disposition meetings. The statute simply does
    not permit us to do that. Moreover, to do so wouldflex the
    statutes and regulations beyond recognition. Our view can
    be neither restrictive nor expansive, rather, we must be
    precise in following the law. It is abundantly clear by the
    plain language of the applicable statutes and regulations
    that the Forest Service must be given written notice of an
    objector's challenges. Therefore, we will consider only those
    allegations and comments contained in written
    documentation and correspondence to the Forest Service.
    Moreover, we hold that the claims raised at the
    administrative appeal and in the federal complaint must be
    so similar that the district court can ascertain that the
    agency was on notice of, and had an opportunity to
    consider and decide, the same claims now raised in federal
    court.6 We are admonished that:
    _________________________________________________________________
    6. Kleissler asserts that because he was unrepresented by counsel
    during the administrative process preceding approval of the Minister
    Watershed and South Branch projects, we should relax the harshness of
    the exhaustion requirements. This contention is unavailing. We see no
    reason to relax a defined standard simply because the parties who failed
    to follow the law chose not to be represented by counsel during the
    administrative appeal. Kleissler is not a neophyte to the administrative
    appeal process. To the contrary, the Allegheny Defense Project, of which
    Kleissler is a founding member, professed that it employs the "Paper
    Monkeywrench" tactic to protect the ecological integrity of the region.
    The group's website described its "Paper Monkeywrench" methods as
    responding to scoping letters "with comments and . . . public input"
    such that the Forest Service has "more work to do." The site also
    instructed that another common tactic is to appeal the final decision of
    the Forest Service "within 45 days trying to demonstrate either how [the
    Forest Service] ha[s] not followed the Forest Plan or how they have
    10
    administrative proceedings should not be a game or a
    forum to engage in unjustified obstructionism by
    making cryptic and obscure reference to matters that
    ``ought to be' considered and then, after failing to do
    more to bring the matter to the agency's attention,
    seeking to have that agency determination vacated.
    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
    Defense Council, Inc., 
    435 U.S. 519
    , 553-54, 
    98 S. Ct. 1197
    ,
    1217 (1978).
    A. Minister Watershed Project
    As for the Minister Watershed project, Kleissler's
    administrative notice of appeal is limited in scope to claims
    concerning the Indiana Bat, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
    the failure of the Land and Resource Management Plan to
    address the needs for "sensitive species in the project area,"
    and the failure to respond to public concerns and
    comment. In contrast, the federal complaint alleges
    violations of NEPA and the National Forest Management Act
    predicated on alternatives to even-aged management and
    the need for an Environmental Impact Study. As the
    District Court correctly observed, Kleissler's federal action
    chiefly alleges that an Environmental Impact Statement of
    the Minister Watershed project must be prepared because
    of:
    (1) the Minister Project's relationship to the landscape
    corridor; App. 3212-15; Summary Judgment Brief
    at II.A.;
    (2) the likelihood of cumulative or synergistic adverse
    environmental effects attributable to forest
    fragmentation; App. 3215-16; S.J. Br. at II.B;
    (3) the relationship of the Minister Project to the
    North Country National Scenic Trail; App. 3216-
    17; S.J. Br. at II.C.;
    _________________________________________________________________
    violated some aspect of NEPA." Finally, the Defense Project encouraged
    its web site readers to "ask [the Allegheny National Forest Supervisor] to
    put you on the mailing list for ALL districts of the[Allegheny National
    Forest] . . . . Now you can start your own Paper Monkeywrenching!" App.
    3432.
    11
    (4) concerns with respect to herbicides and water
    quality; App. 3217-19; S.J. Br. at II.D.; and
    (5) the public comments submitted in response to the
    Draft Environmental Assessment; App. 3220-21;
    S.J. Br. at II.E.
    See Kleissler, No. 97-2187, slip op. at 21-22.
    These claims are not the same. These objections were
    raised during the administrative appeal:
    (1) The Forest Service violated the Endangered
    Species Act and NEPA by insufficiently analyzing
    the potential effects of the proposed timber sale on
    the Indiana Bat. App. 3030-34; Notice at 2-13;
    (2) The Forest Service violated the Migratory Bird
    Treaty Act by permitting logging to occur during
    the nesting season for migratory birds, app. 3041-
    42, and violated NEPA by failing to prepare an
    environmental impact statement in connection
    with its decision on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
    App. 3042-43;
    (3) The Forest Service failed to amend the Land and
    Resource Management Plan to provide population
    objectives for sensitive species in the project area.
    App. 3043-44;
    (4) The Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to
    adequately respond to public comments. App.
    3044-46.
    At most, the claims raised in federal court were only
    vaguely and cryptically referred to, if at all, during the
    administrative appeal. Therefore, the required correlation is
    sorely lacking. Thus, we conclude that Kleissler has failed
    to meet the statutorily imposed exhaustion requirements as
    to the Minister Watershed project claims.
    B. South Branch Project
    The South Branch project claim is arguably more
    difficult, in part because Kleissler raised more objections
    and challenges to the South Branch project than the
    Minister Watershed project during the administrative
    12
    appeal. Nevertheless, we conclude that although numerous,
    the challenges and objections raised during the
    administrative appeal again differ from the claims raised in
    federal court, and the administrative agency had no
    opportunity to develop an adequate record for review. As
    the District Court correctly observed, Kleissler raised the
    following objections in the administrative notice of appeal
    for the South Branch Project:
    (1) The Forest Service failed to include in th e
    Environmental Assessment an analysis of the
    economic impact of recreation on the local
    economy. App. 3088-89; Notice at 2-3;
    (2) The Forest Service failed to sufficientl y define
    "significant impact" in the Decision Notice and
    Finding of No Significant Impact and failed to
    conclude that decreased forest health due to edge
    effect is significant. App. 3089; Notice at 3;
    (3) The Forest Service violated NEPA by failin g to be
    sufficiently well-informed on the effects of forest
    disease and pests on the forest, app. 3089-90;
    Notice at 3-4, and on the effects of logging. App.
    3090-91; Notice at 4-5;
    (4) The Forest Service failed to sufficientl y consider
    the effects of logging on microorganisms, app.
    3091; Notice at 5, the loss of nutrients from
    logging, see 
    id., and the
    cumulative impact of the
    Porter Hollow Project. App. 3092; Notice at 6;
    (5) The amount of dead wood and trees needed f or
    wildlife nesting will be insufficient. App. 3091-92;
    Notice at 5-6;
    (6) The Forest Service has made inconsistent
    statements on the effects on fertilizer and
    herbicides; App. 3092; Notice at 6;
    (7) The Forest Service's information on
    nonmerchantable versus merchantable trees is
    unreliable and inconsistent, see id.;
    (8) The Forest Service violated NEPA by failin g to
    conduct site-specific analyses for activities
    13
    occurring outside of the project area such as road
    construction, see id.;
    (9) The Forest Service failed to consider pote ntial
    fragmentation caused by roads. App. 3093; Notice
    at 7;
    (10) The Forest Service failed to observe beaver dams,
    see id.;
    (11) The Forest Service violated the appeal regulations
    by restricting public comments to "site-specific"
    comments. App. 3093-94; Notice at 7-8;
    (12) The Forest Service violated the Endangered
    Species Act and NEPA by insufficiently analyzing
    the potential effects on the Indiana Bat. App.
    3094-3110; Notice at 8-24;
    (13) The Forest Service violated the Migratory Bird
    Treaty Act, app. 3110; Notice at 24, and NEPA by
    failing to prepare an Environmental Impact
    Statement in connection with its decision on the
    Migratory Bird Treaty Act. App. 3110-11; Notice
    at 24-25;
    (14) The Forest Service failed to amend the Land and
    Resource Management Plan to provide population
    objectives for sensitive species. App. 3111-12;
    Notice at 25-26.
    Kleissler, No. 97-2187, slip op. at 22-24.
    In contrast, as the District Court correctly concluded,
    Kleissler raised the following issues in the Complaint filed
    with the federal court:
    (1) The South Branch Project, as approved by the
    Decision Notice/Finding of No Significant Impact,
    allegedly violates the National Forest Management
    Act and its regulations, including the requirements
    that forest projects:
    (a) conserve soil and water resources and not allow
    significant or permanent impairment of the
    productivity of the land;
    14
    (b) provide for and maintain diversity of plant and
    animal communities;
    (c) include adequate measures to prevent the
    831adverse modification of the habitat of the
    threatened and endangered species;
    (d) consider potential effects on residual trees and
    adjacent stands; and
    (e) protect against deleterious effects on water
    quality and quantity, wildlife and fish habitat,
    forage production, recreation uses, and aesthetic
    uses.
    App. 3152-53; Compl. P 55. Kleissler, No. 97-2187, slip op.
    at 24.
    (2) The South Branch Project allegedly violates the
    National Forest Management Act because the
    Forest Service:
    (a) failed to formally consider alternatives to even-
    aged management;
    (b) failed to carefully analyze potential
    environmental, biological, aesthetic and other
    impacts from the proposed even-aged cutting
    and the consistency of the project with the
    multiple use of the area;
    (c) failed to limit the use of even-aged management
    to exceptional circumstances; and
    (d) failed to insure that logging will be carried out
    consistent with the protection of soil, watershed,
    fish, wildlife, recreation, aesthetic resources, and
    regeneration of timber.
    App. 3l53; Compl. PP 56-57; Kleissler, No. 97-2187, slip op.
    at 24-25.
    (3) The Forest Service allegedly violated NEPA by
    failing to prepare an Environmental Impact
    Statement for the South Branch Project, App.
    3154-55; Compl. PP 58-62, failing to study,
    develop and describe an adequate range of
    alternatives and mitigation measures for the South
    15
    Branch Project, see App. 3156, Compl. PP 66-69,
    failing to prepare an adequate Environmental
    Assessment, App. 3156-57; Compl. PP 70-72, and
    improperly tiering7 the South Branch
    Environmental Assessment to the Environmental
    Assessment for the Klondike Opportunity Area.
    App. 3157; Compl. PP 773-76.
    (4) The Forest Service should have considered the
    cumulative impacts of the South Branch Project
    and the Mortality II Project. App. 3155-56; Compl.
    PP 63-65.
    (5) The Forest Service violated the APA by acting
    arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to adequately
    consider the potential environmental effects of the
    project and reasonable alternatives. App. 3158-59;
    Compl. PP 77-81.
    Kleissler, No. 97-2187, slip op. at 26-27.
    Although closer, nonetheless the challenges raised during
    the administrative appeal did not sufficiently place the
    Forest Service on notice, giving it an opportunity to address
    all of the allegations ultimately raised in federal court.
    Because the issues raised by Kleissler in federal court are
    not the same as those raised in the notice of appeal for the
    South Branch project, Kleissler failed to exhaust the
    administrative remedies.
    III.
    Kleissler contends nonetheless that the dismissal should
    have no effect on the allegations that the Landscape
    Decision is an unlawful forest-wide management
    determination and therefore the Minister Watershed and
    South Branch projects are illegal. Kleissler argues that his
    landscape corridor claims, regarding areas of the Allegheny
    National Forest encompassed within the Minister
    Watershed and South Branch projects, survive because
    Forest Service policy and rules prohibited Kleissler from
    _________________________________________________________________
    7. "Tiering" is the incorporation of documents by reference when
    preparing environmental assessments for site-specific projects.
    16
    raising these claims during the administrative process.
    Specifically, Kleissler contends that "in May 1995 or at any
    subsequent time [there were no] administrative procedures
    for appealing an agency action like the Landscape
    Decision." Appellant's Br. at 45. We disagree.8
    A Landscape Corridor Approach provides the general
    recommendation or framework for implementing Forest
    Plan objectives. The specific plans for implementing the
    general recommendation are the individual forest
    management projects. It is during the planning stage of the
    site-specific projects that the public is afforded an
    opportunity "to provide specific comments on each
    decision." A Landscape Approach to Providing Late-
    Successional Forests and Associated Functions and Values
    on the Allegheny National Forest, App. 1843. Because
    achieving the goals set forth in the Landscape Corridor
    Approach is necessarily dependent on the site-specific
    projects, we find the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio
    Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 
    118 S. Ct. 1665
    (1998),
    instructive.
    In Ohio Forestry, the Court addressed whether an
    environmental group could maintain a claim alleging that a
    Land and Resource Management Plan permitted too much
    logging and clear-cutting in a national forest. See 
    id. at 1668.
    Without reaching the merits, the Court concluded
    that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial review and
    ordered that the case be remanded and dismissed. See 
    id. at 1673.
    Before reaching its decision, however, the Court
    advised that challenges to Land and Resource Management
    Plans are more appropriately brought as "challenges to
    _________________________________________________________________
    8. We note that this contention contradicts Kleissler's earlier assertion
    that "the basic issues related to the design and location of the corridor
    were in fact raised in the two specific project appeals at issue in this
    case." Plaintiff 's Br. in Support of the Cross-Motion for Summary
    Judgment on Claims Related to the Landscape Decision at 3; App.7. This
    argument also contradicts Kleissler's argument that we adopt a broad,
    flexible and liberal interpretation of Forest Service Regulations. Here,
    Kleissler seems to encourage a strict and narrow reading of the Forest
    Service Regulations. Once again, we take neither an expansive nor
    restrictive approach to the law. Rather, our role is to apply the law with
    precision.
    17
    each site-specific logging decision" which could have a
    preclusive effect on other site-specific plans and therefore
    "effectively carry the day." 
    Id. at 1671
    (citing Lujan v.
    National Wildlife Fed'n, 
    467 U.S. 871
    , 894, 
    110 S. Ct. 3177
    ,
    3191-92 (1990)). Thus, although the Supreme Court did
    not address the specific issue raised here, we read Ohio
    Forestry as requiring that objections to Land and Resource
    Management Plans be made during the administrative
    process conducted for each site-specific plan. Therefore,
    contrary to Kleissler's assertions that the Landscape
    Decision does not fall within 36 C.F.R. SS 215 or section 217,9
    _________________________________________________________________
    9. 36 C.F.R. S 215.7 states:
    Decisions subject to appeal
    Only the following decisions are subject to appeal under this part:
    (a) Project and activity decisions documented in a Record of
    Decision or Decision Notice, including those which, as a part of
    the
    project approval decision, contain a nonsignificant amendment to a
    National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan
    (b) Timber harvest project and activity decisions as described in
    paragraph 4, Section 31.2 of the Forest Service Handbook 1909.15
    which are documented in a decision memo.
    36 C.F.R. S 215.8 notes that "(a) [t]he following decisions are not
    subject
    to appeal under this part: (1) Project or activity decisions included in a
    Record of Decision for significant amendment, revision, or approval of a
    land and resource management plan, appeal of which is governed by 36
    C.F.R. section 217."
    36 C.F.R. S 217.3 states in pertinent part:
    Decisions subject to appeal.
    (a) The following decisions are subject to appeal under this part:
    (1) Decisions to approve, amend, or revise a National Forest Land
    and Resource Management Plan including project or activity
    decisions for which environmental effects have been analyzed and
    disclosed in a Record of Decision including approval, significant
    amendments, or revisions of a land and resource management plan.
    36 C.F.R. S 217.4 advises that "[t]he following decisions are not subject
    to appeal under this part. (a) Decisions on projects or activities
    implementing National Forest Land and Resource Management Plans
    including project decisions that include a non-significant amendment to
    a National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan."
    18
    we conclude that claims concerning the Landscape
    Decision's effect on the areas encompassed by the Minister
    Watershed and South Branch Project areas should have
    been raised at the same time Kleissler brought his site-
    specific objections to the attention of the Forest Agency.
    Kleissler contends that the Forest Service prohibited him
    from asserting concerns with the Landscape Decision
    during the administrative process for the Minister
    Watershed and South Branch projects. That is not so.
    Although the District Ranger and Appeal Reviewing Officer
    encouraged specific comments, the issues raised and
    addressed were not limited to site-specific comments. In
    fact, the record shows that the public raised concerns
    about the Landscape Corridor and that the Forest Service
    responded to these complaints. See, e.g., Table G-D, App.
    2416-18. When the Forest Service did decline to respond to
    forest wide concerns, or stated that a challenge was beyond
    the scope of this project, it did so in response to comments
    general in nature that related to forest or national issues
    more appropriately addressed at the national level through
    a change in the laws that set policy for the national forests.
    See, e.g., Table G-B, App. 2403 Public Comment B.1 ("[t]he
    issue of the impact of the song bird declines on forest
    growth needs to be addressed"); Response B.1 ("We believe
    that what you actually wish to question is the opposite; or,
    the relationship between the age of forested stands and bird
    populations, the inference being that an increase in early
    successional habitat leads to declines in songbird
    populations. This is a regional and forest-wide issue and
    beyond the scope of the [Environmental Assessment]. For
    the past six years, the [Allegheny National Forest] has been
    conducting breeding bird surveys in 11 different habitats
    across the forest."); Response B.2 (explaining that
    comments such as "Don't log public forests" is an example
    of a comment that must be addressed at the national level).
    Moreover, as the Brief for Defendant-Intervenors points
    out, Kleissler's grievance is not with the Landscape Corridor
    Approach, per se. The grievance actually concerns
    implications of the Landscape Corridor on areas outside of
    and adjacent to the Corridor. Accordingly, these are
    concerns that could appropriately be raised during the
    19
    administrative process of the specific site plans. Therefore,
    our conclusion that Kleissler failed to exhaust his
    administrative remedies encompasses Kleissler's claims
    concerning the Landscape Decision as they relate to the
    Minister Watershed and South Branch project areas.
    IV.
    In sum, the plain language of the applicable statutes and
    Code of Federal Regulations precludes an objector to a
    forest management project from bringing a claim to federal
    court without first exhausting all administrative remedies.
    Forest Service regulations mandate that all concerns be
    placed in writing and submitted to the appropriate
    reviewing officer. We are not at liberty to relax these
    standards. A side-by-side comparison of the claims raised
    during the administrative appeal of the South Branch and
    Minister Watershed projects shows that Kleissler failed to
    exhaust the administrative remedies requirements. The
    District Court properly dismissed these claims. Because
    Kleissler's challenges to the effects of the Landscape
    Corridor Approach on areas outlying the Corridor relate to
    the plans for site-specific projects, we likewise conclude
    that Kleissler could have, and should have, raised them
    during the administrative process for the Minister
    Watershed and South Branch projects. Accordingly, we
    affirm.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    20