Ferreira v. Attorney General of the United States ( 2013 )


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  •                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 12-2196
    ____________
    GILMAR PACHECO FERREIRA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    __________________________________
    On a Petition For Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency No. A088-001-305)
    Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
    __________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 7, 2013
    Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and WEIS, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: February 13, 2013 )
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Gilmar Pacheco Ferreira (“Ferreira”) petitions for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we will deny
    the petition for review.
    1
    Ferreira, a native and citizen of Brazil, entered the United States in September,
    1997, on a B-2 non-immigrant visa and overstayed. After he failed to obtain lawful
    permanent resident status based on a petition for labor certification, the Department of
    Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, which charged that he was
    removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained for a time longer than permitted. Ferreira
    appeared in Immigration Court in July, 2009, conceded the charges, and applied for
    asylum under INA § 208(a), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a), and withholding of removal under INA
    § 241(b)(3), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3), claiming a fear of persecution on account of his
    membership in a particular social group, which he described as his sexual orientation and
    HIV positive status.
    In his application, Ferreira stated that he was born in Alpercata, Brazil on July 21,
    1963. His father is deceased but his mother still lives in his hometown of Coronel
    Fabriciano in the state Minas Gerais. When he was 15 years old, he was lured by another
    young man into the countryside under the false pretense that the young man wanted to
    have sexual relations with him. After he began to undress, Ferreira saw two other men
    there, so he quickly dressed and ran away. Ferreira stated that the men pursued him on
    their motorcycles and they were carrying guns, but he was able to escape by running
    toward some houses and hiding under a car. Ferreira claimed that these men had
    intended all along to kill him because he was gay. He did not consider asking the police
    for help because the police are hostile to gay men and because he feared revealing his
    sexual orientation to his family. Ferreira also stated that when he was 18 years old, he
    2
    had sexual relations with a man who was 28 years old. Afterwards, the man brandished a
    knife and took Ferreira’s watch. Again he did not report the incident to the police for the
    same reasons as before. Ferreira further claimed that he and his gay friends were
    harassed on the streets of Coronel Fabriciano on the basis of their sexual orientation. He
    claimed that a transsexual friend of his was murdered in a hotel after the assailant falsely
    claimed that his friend pretended to be a woman. Ferreira learned that he is HIV positive
    in 2003. He stated that he fears returning to Brazil because he would be beaten or killed
    on account of his sexual orientation and the Brazilian authorities would not protect him.
    When asked whether there is any place in Brazil where he would not be afraid of being
    harmed because of his sexual orientation and HIV status, he answered “No.” A.R. 98.
    Ferreira testified at his merits hearing on June 24, 2010 in support of his
    applications for relief. He explained that in the first incident that occurred when he was
    only 15 he did not think the men were interested in sex; they simply wanted to kill him
    because he was gay. A.R. 95. Ferreira testified that there was an attack at a gay pride
    parade in Sao Paulo recently at which a bomb killed one person, and it was later
    discovered that a retired police officer had been involved in the bombing. Ferreira also
    testified that the interior of Brazil is more homophobic than the urban areas and that he is
    used to country life and does not have family or friends in the city.
    In addition to his testimony and application, Ferreira offered into evidence the
    State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report on Brazil, which states that: “Federal law
    does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, but several states and
    municipalities such as Sao Paulo had administrative regulations that bar discrimination
    3
    based on sexual orientation and provide for equal access to government services.” A.R.
    140. It also states that the nongovernmental Bahia Gay Group received 115 reports of
    killings based on sexual orientation and gender identity, a decrease from 188 during the
    same period in 2008. See 
    id.
     Parana State had the most cases of killings of gay men,
    followed by the states of Bahia and Sao Paulo. See 
    id.
     Ferreira also submitted articles
    discussing discrimination against gay men in Brazil.
    The IJ issued an oral decision denying Ferreira’s applications but granting him
    voluntary departure for a period of 60 days. The IJ determined that the application for
    asylum had not been timely filed within one year of Ferreira’s entry into the United
    States, and that he did not demonstrate that he qualified for any of the exceptions. With
    respect to withholding of removing, the IJ found Ferreira to be credible and recognized
    that Ferreira’s claimed social groups qualified for protection under the INA, citing
    Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 
    328 F.3d 719
     (3d Cir. 2003). But the IJ determined that Ferreira’s
    evidence of past persecution was insufficient. The IJ found that the incidents described
    were random criminal acts that did not result in serious injury. Moreover, Ferreira’s lack
    of confidence in the Brazilian police was insufficient to show that the police were unable
    or unwilling to intervene. He offered no evidence to show that the police were complicit
    in any of the harm he suffered.
    Ferreira thus was not entitled to the presumption of a likelihood of future
    persecution. The IJ then determined that there was insufficient evidence of systematic or
    pervasive persecution of gay men in Brazil. The IJ acknowledged that Brazil lacks a
    national anti-discrimination law. The IJ also acknowledged the nongovernmental
    4
    organization report of murders of gay men (observing that Minas Gerais was not among
    the states with the most murders), and acknowledged that, in March, 2002, a gay male
    choreographer was murdered in Minas Gerais, but reasoned that these things fell short of
    establishing a pattern or practice of persecution. The IJ further concluded that Ferreira’s
    evidence that he would be discriminated against on the basis of his HIV positive status
    was insufficient. Last, the IJ concluded that Ferreira could relocate to a safer part of
    Brazil to avoid the threats he claimed prevailed in his home state, noting that
    municipalities such as Sao Paulo have regulations that bar discrimination on the basis of
    sexual orientation. The IJ granted Ferreira voluntary departure and alternately ordered
    his removal to Brazil.
    Ferreira appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, challenging only the IJ’s
    determination that he failed to establish past or future persecution on account of his
    sexual orientation. He did not challenge the IJ’s determination that his asylum
    application was untimely filed. On March 30, 2012, the Board dismissed the appeal. The
    Board first held that Ferreira had waived any challenge to the IJ’s determination that his
    asylum application was untimely. Regarding the claim for withholding of removal, the
    Board concluded that the IJ did not err in determining that Ferreira had failed to establish
    past or future persecution on account of his sexual orientation. The Board agreed with
    the IJ that the two incidents did not rise to the level of persecution. The Board
    supplemented the IJ’s analysis, determining that Ferreira’s claim that he was targeted
    when he was a teenager because he was gay was speculative. The Board reasoned that
    Ferreira did not testify that his assailants said anything to him to indicate their motivation
    5
    for the attack. The Board also determined there was no evidence that the robbery was on
    account of Ferreira’s sexual orientation. With regard to future persecution, the Board
    determined that the IJ properly considered the 2009 Human Rights Report and its
    observation that there is no Brazilian national policy of persecution of gay men, adding
    that the report also mentions gay rights ordinances and a program – “Rio without
    Homophobia” – that was created in May, 2008 in Rio de Janeiro. The Board also noted
    the reported drop in murders between 2009 and 2008. The Board agreed with the IJ that
    the evidence of record was insufficient to show that a pattern or practice of persecution
    exists in Brazil on the basis of sexual orientation. Moreover, the Board noted Ferreira’s
    admission that he could live someplace other than his hometown, citing the hearing
    transcript, A.R. 98. Accordingly, the Board concluded that Ferreira had not shown a
    “clear probability” of persecution as required for withholding of removal and failed to
    establish the required nexus. The Board did not reinstate the voluntary departure order.
    Ferreira has timely petitioned for review. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1), (b)(1). He contends in his brief that the Board erred in determining that he
    did not prove past persecution because he showed that certain people when he was 15
    lured him into the countryside in order to kill him because he was gay, and because he
    showed that hundreds of gay men are killed every year in Brazil with impunity because
    of their sexual orientation. Specifically, Ferreira argues that merely because he did not
    testify about what his attackers said regarding their motivation for the attack does not
    mean that there was no other circumstantial evidence indicating their homophobic
    motivation. See Petitioner’s Brief, at 16. Moreover, substantial evidence in the record
    6
    supports his claim that the government of Brazil is unable or unwilling to control the
    killing of, and violence toward, gay men by private individuals and the police. See 
    id. at 18
    . Last, Ferreira contends that the Board mistakenly analyzed his prospects for
    relocating within Brazil to a safer location, because he testified that there is violence
    against gay men even in the big cities of Brazil. See 
    id. at 20
    .
    We will deny the petition for review. Where the Board affirms the IJ and adds
    analysis of its own, we review both the IJ’s and the Board’s decisions. See Sandie v.
    Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
    562 F.3d 246
    , 250 (3d Cir. 2009). In Ferreira’s case, the Board
    conducted a de novo review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence as it related to
    Ferreira’s application for withholding of removal, and supplemented the IJ’s analysis.
    The agency’s factual determinations are upheld if they are supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Immigration &
    Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992). Under this deferential
    standard, the petitioner must establish that the evidence does not just support a contrary
    conclusion but compels it. See 
    id.
     at 481 n.1; Gao v. Ashcroft, 
    299 F.3d 266
    , 272 (3d
    Cir. 2002).
    Under INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A), withholding of removal is
    not discretionary: “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the
    Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that
    country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group or political opinion.” As a threshold matter, the agency correctly noted that
    7
    Ferreira’s sexual orientation can be the basis for a withholding of removal claim based on
    membership in a particular social group. See Amanfi, 
    328 F.3d at 730
    .
    An alien may qualify for withholding of removal by demonstrating that he has
    suffered persecution in the past, in which case a rebuttable presumption of future
    persecution applies. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
    665 F.3d 496
    , 505 (3d Cir. 2011).
    See also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(C) (“In determining whether an alien has demonstrated
    that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened … the trier of fact shall determine
    whether the alien has sustained the alien’s burden of proof” in the manner described in
    the asylum statute). If the rebuttable presumption of future persecution does not apply,
    an alien may meet his burden by showing a “clear probability” that his life or freedom
    would be threatened on account of a protected ground in the proposed country of
    removal. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
     (1984). Clear
    probability is defined to mean that it is more likely than not that an alien would be subject
    to persecution. See 
    id. at 429-30
    . And, as with any claim of persecution, the acts must
    be committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling
    to control. See Garcia, 
    665 F.3d at 505
    . It is the applicant’s burden to prove his case. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1).
    To overturn the Board’s decision, Ferreira must show that his evidence was “so
    compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find” in his favor. Elias-Zacarias,
    
    502 U.S. at 483-84
    . Ferreira has not made this showing. Persecution “denotes extreme
    conduct.” Fatin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
    12 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 n.10 (3d Cir.
    1993). It does not encompass “generalized lawlessness.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 
    242 F.3d
                                                8
    477, 494 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing acts of private violence and xenophobic attitude of
    some South African citizens and politicians toward African immigrants). Regarding the
    incidents that occurred when Ferreira was a teenager, even if it might be inferred from the
    circumstances that the assailants involved sought to harm him because he was gay, it
    cannot be said that this is the only conclusion compelled by the record. The attacks also
    could represent opportunistic private acts of violence, and “[w]here the record supports
    plausible but conflicting inferences … [the agency’s] choice between those inferences is,
    a fortiori, supported by substantial evidence.” Hincapie v. Gonzales, 
    494 F.3d 213
    , 219
    (1st Cir. 2007). Moreover, as the IJ noted, Ferreira was not harmed on either occasion,
    and his lack of confidence in the Brazilian police was insufficient to show that the police
    were unable or unwilling to intervene. See generally Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
    443 F.3d 310
    , 316 (3d Cir. 1006) (applicant must show: (1) one or more incidents rising to the
    level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and
    (3) is committed either by the government or by forces the government is unable or
    unwilling to control). Accordingly, Ferreira was not entitled to the presumption of future
    persecution.
    Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Ferreira failed to
    demonstrate a clear probability of future persecution in Brazil. “In evaluating whether it
    is more likely than not that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in a
    particular country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion, the [agency] shall not require the applicant to provide
    evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for such persecution if: (i) The
    9
    applicant establishes that in that country there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a
    group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion,
    nationality, membership in a particular social group.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(2).
    Although the materials Ferreira submitted in support of his application indicate that
    violence against gay men, including even murder, continues to be a problem in Brazil, it
    does not establish that the Brazilian government is unable or unwilling to control those
    who are responsible for such violence. Ferreira presented no evidence that the Brazilian
    state police were involved in the unlawful killings of gay men. Moreover, the 2009
    Human Rights Report notes anti-discrimination ordinances in the big cities, the existence
    of gay rights groups, and a nongovernmental organization’s report that there was a drop
    in the murders from 2008 to 2009. One of Ferreira’s articles discusses ongoing
    cooperation between the president of the Commission Against Impunity and Violence of
    the Legislative Assembly and the police in Rio de Janeiro, including an effort to provide
    training to police officers to deal with homophobic violence. A.R. 200-01. In Lie v.
    Ashcroft, 
    396 F.3d 530
     (3d Cir. 2005), we held that, “to constitute a pattern or practice,
    the persecution of the group must be “systemic, pervasive, or organized.” 
    Id. at 537
    (internal quotation marks removed). Ferreira’s evidence was insufficient to meet this
    standard. And, “as with any claim of persecution, violence or other harm perpetrated by
    civilians against the petitioner’s group does not constitute persecution unless such acts
    are committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling
    to control.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks removed).
    10
    Last, Ferreira’s argument regarding relocation within Brazil is unavailing. He
    presented insufficient evidence that he faces persecution in his home state of Minas
    Gerais and thus relocation is not clearly even necessary. Moreover, an applicant cannot
    demonstrate that his life or freedom would be threatened if the agency finds that the
    applicant could avoid a future threat by “relocating to another part of the proposed
    country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the
    applicant to do so.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(2). Ferreira frankly admitted at his hearing
    that he could relocate to an urban and more progressive area of Brazil, notwithstanding
    his subjective fear that no place is safe for gay men, and it would be reasonable to expect
    him to do so.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
    11