Juan Newland v. Lori Reehorst ( 2009 )

Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-12-2009
Juan Newland v. Lori Reehorst
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-2306
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2306
___________
JUAN MAURICE NEWLAND,
Appellant
v.
LORI REEHORST, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-00258)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
MARCH 13, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 12, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Juan Maurice Newland, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil
rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Newland filed a complaint on October 9, 2007, alleging that his parole officer,
Lori Reehorst, imposed a restriction that “my wife can’t live with me and we’ve been
married since 2003.” He claimed that Reehorst met him in Central Park in Johnstown,
Pennsylvania, on October 9, 2007, and warned him that she would charge him with a
violation of parole if his wife, Angie Newland, stayed at his apartment. Newland
supplemented the complaint a short time later with a signed a “Special Conditions of
Parole” form. The form states that “[y]ou are not permitted to move anyone into your
approved residence without first receiving permission from your supervising parole
agent.” He sought equitable relief and damages.
Reehorst filed an answer in which she admitted that she had prohibited Newland
from living with his wife, further explaining that Newland’s criminal history of violent
crimes and his prison record led her to believe that he might act violently toward Angie
Newland. She also averred that she required Newland’s participation in domestic abuse
counseling before she would approve his living arrangements with his wife. Reehorst
asserted that the complaint was moot because Newland was charged in November 2007
with technical violations of his parole (positive urine test for cocaine and admissions of
drug abuse), and because Newland’s or his wife’s circumstances might change by the
time he was released from prison. She raised qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense to Newland’s claim for damages.
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that Newland’s claim for equitable relief was moot
because there was no evidence that Newland’s wife would be at liberty to live with him or
that Reehorst would be supervising him upon his release from prison. As for Newland’s
claim for damages, after reciting the facts contained in Reehorst’s Answer, the Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) of Newland’s marital
association claim on the ground that Reehorst enjoyed qualified immunity. The
Magistrate Judge found that Newland’s constitutional rights were not violated because the
law allowed for parole restrictions such as those Reehorst imposed on Newland.
Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found that, “even if the law were not positively against
the plaintiff, the mere absence of controlling legal authority forbidding defendant from
giving plaintiff what appears to be a reasonable order is enough reason to enter judgment
for Reehorst.” Newland objected, stating, among other things, that Reehorst had told him
that he could not live with Angie Newland, not because of anything that he would do, but
because Mrs. Newland would make him relapse into using drugs and alcohol.1 The
District Court overruled Newland’s Objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and dismissed the § 1983 complaint. Newland filed this timely appeal.
1
Newland admitted that he had one criminal conviction for voluntary
manslaughter in 1976, but denied any other record of convictions for violent crimes or for
domestic violence. He admitted that his wife had filed two petitions for abuse against
him when she left him in the past, but that she had dropped both petitions. He further
claimed that Reehorst lied when she testified at the child custody hearing that Newland
had broken his wife’s jaw and he denied ever being convicted of corrupting a minor in
1974, to which Reehorst allegedly testified. See Objections at 2.
3
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review of
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Allah v. Seiverling,
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). In considering a dismissal for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, we “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Pinker v. Roche
Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2007)). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 n. 8 (2007). We will affirm.
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Newland’s claim for equitable
relief for the reasons stated by the Magistrate Judge. We add only that sometime in
November 2007, Newland was incarcerated on a parole violation. Newland does not
dispute that he will no longer be on parole when he is released.2
Turning to Newland’s claim for damages against Reehorst, we conclude that,
because of the unique set of circumstances in this case, the District Court did not err in
dismissing his complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) on the basis of qualified immunity.
The statute permits sua sponte dismissal on immunity grounds where it is clear on the
2
Prison records indicate that Newland will complete his maximum sentence in
August 2009.
4
face of the complaint that a party is immune from suit.3 See Walker v. Thompson, 288
F.3d 1005, 1010 (7 th Cir. 2002).
Qualified immunity operates “to ensure that before they are subjected to suit,
officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001). Qualified immunity protects officers’ action or inaction in the course of
performing their duties, but that protection is forfeited when an officer’s conduct violates
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The question whether a
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and the question whether
the officer acted reasonably are matters of law for the court to decide. See Bartholomew
v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000).
There is no mandatory procedure that courts must follow in determining whether
qualified immunity is warranted in any particular case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.
Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (noting that while the two-step inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz “is
often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory”). A court may follow
the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, that is, (i) looking first to whether “a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged . . .” and, (ii) if so,
whether the right was “clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. The first prong
3
We caution, however, that it is generally unwise to venture into a qualified
immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in
the vast majority of cases.
5
of the two-step process may be difficult to employ at the pleading stage, however,
because the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to
identify. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819. A court may decide in such cases to proceed
directly to the second prong in Saucier and determine whether the law prohibiting an
officer’s conduct was clearly established. Id. at 821-22.
We choose to approach the qualified immunity question here by proceeding
directly to the second prong of the Saucier analysis, whether the law was so clearly
established that Parole Officer Reehorst’s conduct would have appeared unlawful to an
objectively reasonable officer. We agree with the District Court that, because of the
peculiar facts presented in this case, it would not have been apparent to an objectively
reasonable officer that the parole condition she sought to impose on Newland violated
clearly established law. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (stating
that the reasonableness inquiry considers not only whether the right at issue was clearly
established, but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed her conduct was
lawful, in light of the information she possessed at the time). We include among these
peculiarities the fact that both Newland and his wife were in the criminal justice system
and that, even in Newland’s telling of the events, the parole officer was concerned that
the Newlands would be a poor influence on each other. We recognize, however, that
serious constitutional questions exist regarding governmental restrictions imposed on an
individual’s right of marital association. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)
6
(recognizing that “to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be
secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in
safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme”). See
also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987) (striking down as unconstitutionally
invalid a prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from marrying unless the Superintendent
approves it after finding compelling reasons to do so). Thus, although we hold that
Officer Reehorst’s actions were reasonable based on the unique circumstances in this
case, we do not prejudge whether Newland would have a claim if he faced similar
restrictions in the future.
After thorough consideration, we conclude that Newland’s remaining claims on
appeal lack merit.4 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court Order dismissing
Newland’s complaint. We emphasize that the dismissal is without prejudice to
Newland’s filing a new complaint if circumstances warrant.
4
Newland filed two supplements to his complaint on March 13, 2008 (the date on
the document), and March 29, 2008. We note that there is no certificate of service
attached to either supplement and, thus, it appears from the record that Reehorst did not
receive them. In his second supplement, Newland claimed that Reehorst violated his
rights by testifying that Newland had a criminal record at a hearing held by the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division to determine the custody of his
one year old daughter. We will affirm the dismissal of the claims contained in the
supplements without prejudice to Newland’s filing a new complaint if the circumstances
warrant it.
7