Asia Frasier-Kane v. City of Philadelphia , 517 F. App'x 104 ( 2013 )

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-1757
___________
ASIA FRASIER-KANE,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;
POLICE OFFICER DEONA S. CARTER
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-06055
(Honorable Legrome D. Davis)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 7, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 29, 2013)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court‟s order granting defendants‟ motion to dismiss
her claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because plaintiff brought suit outside of the
limitations period, we will affirm.
1
I.
Plaintiff Asia Frasier-Kane alleges that on May 15, 2005, defendant Deona S.
Carter, a police officer, assaulted her and then falsely told other police officers who
responded to the scene that plaintiff had been the instigator. Plaintiff alleges these
officers then arrested her. Plaintiff alleges that after investigating the incident, the
Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department found Carter had falsified
her May 15, 2005 police report and suspended her from active duty for twenty days.
Following the suspension, plaintiff alleges Carter regularly threatened to harm her—
particularly if plaintiff “sa[id] anything else.” Compl. ¶ 27. Plaintiff further alleges Carter
and fellow officers routinely engaged in acts of intimidation toward her. As a result,
plaintiff contends she did not pursue legal action out of fear Carter would “severely injure
or kill her.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff asserts she only brought suit once she learned that other
individuals had safely brought similar suits against Carter.
Plaintiff filed suit against Carter and the City of Philadelphia on September 27,
2011, asserting civil rights violations under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 as well as state law claims.
The district court dismissed plaintiff‟s suit as untimely, finding the Pennsylvania two-
year limitations period for personal injury torts applied and rejecting plaintiff‟s argument
that the statute of limitations should be tolled for duress under Pennsylvania or federal
equitable tolling principles.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her claims as untimely.1
1
The district court had jurisdiction over plaintiff‟s federal claims under

28 U.S.C. § 1331

and had supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff‟s state law claims under

28 U.S.C. § 2

II.
“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is
not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384

, 388 (2007).
“Under federal law, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run,
„when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is
based.‟” Kach v. Hose,

589 F.3d 626

, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sameric Corp. v. City
of Philadelphia,

142 F.3d 582

, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). The limitations period for an action
under § 1983 is the limitations period for personal injury torts in the state where the cause
of action arose. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387. The state‟s tolling principles also generally
govern § 1983 claims, but “[w]here state tolling principles contradict federal law or
policy, federal tolling principles may apply in certain limited circumstances.” Kach, 589
F.3d at 639. We have recognized three general circumstances in which federal equitable
tolling is appropriate: “(1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to
her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as
a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims
1367(a). As this is an appeal from final judgment, we have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We have plenary review of an order granting a motion to dismiss a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc.,

263 F.3d 296

, 325 (3d Cir. 2001). “We „accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.‟” Byers v.
Intuit, Inc.,

600 F.3d 286

, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l
Ctrs.—Glen Hazel,

570 F.3d 520

, 523 (3d Cir. 2009)). A statute of limitations defense
may be asserted in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “where the complaint facially
shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly
appears on the face of the pleading.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,

38 F.3d 1380

, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
3
in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.” Lake v. Arnold,

232 F.3d 360

,
370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).
The parties agree plaintiff‟s cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, which has a
two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (citing

42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524

(2)). Plaintiff‟s cause of action accrued on May 15, 2005, the
date of the alleged assault. Because plaintiff did not file suit until September 27, 2011,
her claims are untimely unless the statute of limitations is tolled.
Plaintiff does not argue that Pennsylvania would toll the statute of limitations on
the circumstances of this case. See

id. at 640

 (“[N]either the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania nor either of Pennsylvania‟s intermediate appellate courts has definitively,
or even circumspectly, addressed whether duress may toll the statute of limitations.”).
But plaintiff contends Pennsylvania tolling principles are inconsistent with the policies
underlying § 1983, and therefore federal tolling principles should apply. Plaintiff argues
we should toll the statute of limitations because the duress under which she was placed
by defendant Carter constituted an extraordinary circumstance.
While we are skeptical that Pennsylvania tolling principles frustrate the policies
underlying § 1983, we need not consider the issue because, like the district court, we find
even our federal equitable tolling principles would not toll the statute of limitations for
plaintiff.
“Federal courts may toll statutes of limitations for federal laws where the plaintiff
„in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights.‟” Lake,

232 F.3d at 370

 (quoting Robinson v. Dalton,

107 F.3d 1018

, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997)). But
4
“[t]he remedy of equitable tolling is extraordinary, and we extend it „only sparingly.‟”
Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States,

559 F.3d 189

, 197 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

498 U.S. 89

, 96 (1990)). In Kach, the plaintiff alleged she was
held captive by a security guard from her middle school for ten years, from February
1996, when she was fourteen, to March 2006. 589 F.3d at 630-32. Kach brought a § 1983
suit against city officials, school district officials, and others in September 2006,
contending her claims should not be barred by Pennsylvania‟s two-year statute of
limitations2 because, among other reasons, she was under duress from her captor until she
was removed from his house in March 2006. Id. at 639-40. We affirmed the district
court‟s grant of summary judgment for defendants, finding Kach‟s § 1983 claims
untimely. Id. at 651. We explained that while “[t]he circumstances of Kach‟s case
certainly may be described as „extraordinary‟ in the vernacular sense of that word[,] [w]e
nevertheless conclude that Kach has not met her burden of showing that this is one of
those extraordinary cases warranting the application of any federal equitable tolling
provision.” Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
Kach effectively forecloses plaintiff‟s argument that duress should toll the statute
of limitations. If there were any doubt, a comparison to Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,

103 F.3d 767

 (9th Cir. 1996), which plaintiff cites in her brief for support, is illustrative. In
Hilao, a class of Philippine nationals brought suit against their former president,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, alleging they suffered torture and other human rights violations
under his regime.

Id. at 771

. The Ninth Circuit tolled the statute of limitations on
2
With accrual at her eighteen birthday in October 1999.
5
plaintiffs‟ claims for the time that Marcos was president because many victims “did not
report the human-rights abuses they suffered out of intimidation and fear of reprisals,”
which the court found understandable, and because of “the effective dependence of the
judiciary on Marcos” as well as his immunity from suit while in office.

Id. at 773

.
Hilao is clearly distinguishable on its facts. First, the alleged duress in Hilao was
one of several compelling factors influencing the court‟s decision to toll the statute of
limitations. Second, Marcos allegedly exercised comprehensive control over Philippine
society and hence over the plaintiffs‟ ability to obtain relief. Defendant Carter is by no
means an authority figure capable of exerting influence of a similar magnitude.
Very few situations will be considered “extraordinary” like those in Hilao.
Plaintiff‟s alleged circumstances—much like those in Kach—do not rise to such a level.
Accordingly, the statute of limitations may not be tolled.
III.
We will affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff‟s claims with
prejudice.3
3
“[I]nadequate complaints should be dismissed without granting leave to amend . . . if
amendment would be . . . futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103