Gregg Smith, Jr. v. Luzerne County Wilkes Barre Po , 517 F. App'x 65 ( 2013 )

BLD-165 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4589
___________
GREGG L. SMITH, JR.,
Appellant
v.
LUZERNE COUNTY WILKES BARRE POLICE DEPARTMENT;
OFFICER MORRIS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-01204)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 21, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 10, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro Se Appellant Gregg L. Smith, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below,
we will summarily affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. See
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
On June 25, 2012, Smith filed a complaint against the “Luzerne County Wilkes
Barre Police Department” and Officer Morris alleging that Officer Morris conducted an
illegal search of Smith while he was at the corner of Prospect and Grove Streets. Smith
alleged that Officer Morris searched him for no reason and took his ID from him. This
was one of five civil rights actions filed by Smith. On October 26, 2012, a Magistrate
filed a report and recommendation in which he recommended that all five civil rights
actions filed by Smith be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failure to state a
claim. In the report, the Magistrate explained that Smith failed to state a claim for
municipal liability and that the police department was not an appropriate defendant in a
§ 1983 action. The Magistrate’s report did not specifically address Smith’s claims
against Officer Morris, but stated that overall, Smith failed to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that he failed to
identify the constitutional right in question in each of his complaints. On November 30,
2012, the District Court adopted the Magistrate’s report and recommendation and
dismissed Smith’s complaints with prejudice. Smith then timely filed this appeal.
II.
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.
We agree with the District Court that Smith’s complaint fails to state a claim
against the “Luzerne County Wilkes Barre Police Department” under § 1983. Municipal
liability under § 1983 only arises if the plaintiff demonstrates that “‘execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’” Andrews v.
City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). A municipal policy encompasses a “statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers.” Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). A custom, on the other hand, need not have received formal
approval through official decision-making channels, but it “must have the force of law by
virtue of the persistent practices” of municipal officials. Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167 (1970)). Furthermore, a municipality cannot be
constitutionally liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Here, Smith has made no allegations regarding
Luzerne County’s or the police department’s policies or customs. Therefore, his § 1983
claims against the “Luzerne County Wilkes Barre Police Department” fail.
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IV.
We do not agree with the District Court that Smith’s complaint failed to state a
claim against Officer Morris. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Allah, 229 F.3d at
223. To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). This Court affirms a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only
if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any
reasonable reading of the complaint.” McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114,
115 (3d Cir. 2009).
In light of the liberal construction we must give to pro se pleadings, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we cannot agree that Smith’s complaint against
Officer Morris fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A § 1983 claim
has two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of must be “committed by a
person acting under color of state law”; and (2) this conduct must “deprive[] a person of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, Smith’s complaint states “sufficient factual matter” to support the
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plausibility of his § 1983 claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Specifically, Smith’s complaint
alleges the following:
On 6-7-12 Office Morris of the plolice (sic) dept elegaly (sic) searched (sic)
me at Prospect St. an Grove at the corner wile (sic) I was talking on the
phone with the mother of my children. He asked me for my ID an (sic) ran
my name. Everything with my name was ok. Then 3 officers were there an
officer Morris sherched (sic) me for no reason as well called me out for my
name crake (sic) head, crack baby, drug dealer, went through my wallet an
(sic) asked me, “how I got money,” as well as were (sic) do I live. I came
to find out he took my ID after. I tried to retrieve it an (sic) he said it at
PennDot.
These allegations are “short and plain statement[s] of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief,” as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Affording Smith the leeway due pro se litigants, we read his complaint as alleging that
Officer Morris, a state actor, deprived him of his right, among others, to be secure against
unreasonable searches, as set forth in the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, by stopping and searching him without justification. While we express no
view as to the merits of Smith’s claims against Officer Morris, we conclude that the
District Court erred by dismissing Smith’s complaint against Officer Morris for failure to
state a claim.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm in part and vacate in part the
District Court’s order dismissing Smith’s complaint and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.
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