Victor v. Superintendent Lawler ( 2013 )


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  •                                                            NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-2591
    ___________
    WILLIAM VICTOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    SUPERINTENDENT R. M. LAWLER, Warden, SCI-Huntingdon; DEPUTY SUPT.
    FISHER; DEPUTY SUPT. CORBIN; CAPTAIN HARRIS; CAPTAIN HARMAN; LT.
    COOPER; LT. MORRISON; LT. STEVENS; LT. LALLI; SGT. CLAPPER; C. HEING
    EXAMINER C. MITCHELL; C.O. GOODMAN; C.O. GARZARELLI; C.O. BUTLER;
    C.O. MAUL; C.O. N. LEHMAN; HALLIE RITCHEY; NURSE MILLER;
    NURSE VICKIE; NURSE JOHN DOE, black male approx 9 pm 6/28/08; NURSE JANE
    DOE, white female approx 9pm 6/28/08; LT. BAIRD, now employed at SCI-Cresson;
    LT. DIFFIN; SGT. BUSCO; C.O. A.W. EBERLING; C.O. PYLE; C.O. N. GROVE;
    C.O.D. PLUMMER; C.O. SNYDER; DR. RONALD LONG, SCI SMITHFIELD
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:08-cv-01374)
    Magistrate Judge: Honorable Martin C. Carlson
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 17, 2013
    Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 18, 2013)
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    William Victor, a Pennsylvania inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the
    District Court‟s denial of his request for spoliation of evidence sanctions, various pre-trial
    evidentiary rulings, and the entry of judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the
    defendants. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
    I.
    In July 2008, Victor filed a complaint pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , alleging that
    on June 28, 2008, he was assaulted by correctional officers during a cell extraction in the
    Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI Huntingdon. Victor further alleged that staff
    were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs following the incident and that officers
    retaliated against him during the incident by filing false misconduct reports, entering his
    cell under false pretenses, and beating him.
    Victor filed several motions seeking spoliation sanctions for his claim that some
    correctional officers destroyed, manufactured, or failed to record evidence from the cell
    extraction. The Magistrate Judge1 held a week-long evidentiary hearing and
    subsequently granted in part and denied in part Victor‟s motions. Specifically, the
    Magistrate Judge denied Victor‟s request for sanctions but ruled that Victor would be
    1
    The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(1).
    2
    allowed to present evidence at trial regarding his claim that some staff falsely claimed
    that he was attempting to hang himself at the time of the cell extraction.
    During the pretrial conference, the Magistrate Judge ruled that evidence
    concerning the substance of the internal and disciplinary investigations conducted for the
    incident would be excluded because it would “lead to confusion of issues [and] prolong
    and complicate proceedings.” However, the Magistrate Judge ruled that Victor would be
    allowed to elicit testimony regarding statements made by defendants during these
    investigations. The Magistrate Judge also granted Victor‟s request that writs of habeas
    corpus ad testificandum issue for several inmate-witnesses, including Harold Leaphart.
    The jury trial began before the Magistrate Judge on May 21, 2012, and lasted until
    May 29, 2012, when the jury returned its verdict in favor of the defendants. This appeal
    followed. The Magistrate Judge subsequently denied Victor‟s timely motion for a new
    trial.2
    II.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review the Magistrate Judge‟s
    evidentiary rulings and decision regarding the request for spoliation of evidence sanctions
    for abuse of discretion. See Bull v. UPS, Inc., 
    665 F.3d 68
    , 73 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In
    2
    We lack jurisdiction to review the Magistrate Judge‟s order denying Victor‟s motion for
    a new trial because he did not file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal from
    this order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. McGlory, 
    202 F.3d 664
    ,
    3
    re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 
    489 F.3d 568
    , 574 (3d Cir. 2007)); McKenna v. City
    of Phila., 
    582 F.3d 447
    , 460 (3d Cir. 2009).
    III.
    Victor first alleges that the Magistrate Judge did not apply “the full scope of
    spoliation review” to his request for spoliation of evidence sanctions. The cell extraction
    was videotaped by both fixed surveillance cameras and a handheld camera operated by
    Officer Goodman. Furthermore, some members of the extraction team stated that they
    observed either a noose or bedding draped around Victor‟s neck. However, the actual
    sheet was not preserved for evidence; only a photograph of the knotted sheet was
    preserved. Victor asserts that the loss of the actual bedding, the failure to retain all
    surveillance videos, and the eight-second interruption in the handheld camera footage
    filmed by Officer Goodman are proof of willful spoliation.
    We agree that Victor failed to demonstrate culpable spoliation of evidence by the
    defendants.   See Bull, 
    665 F.3d at 79
     (“[A] finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation
    determination.”). Officers preserved footage depicting both the cell extraction and Victor
    bleeding in the observation cell following the extraction. Although they did not
    immediately act upon Victor‟s request to preserve footage from the fixed surveillance
    cameras in the RHU corridors, this delay was not intentional because they were working
    to preserve other relevant videos and evidence. Victor correctly asserts that an eight-
    668 (3d Cir. 2000).
    4
    second interruption did occur in the footage from the handheld camera, but the
    interruption did not occur during any pertinent activity, and several witnesses testified
    regarding Goodman‟s inexperience because he had never before served as a videographer
    during a cell extraction. Overall, the record permitted the District Court to act within its
    discretion and draw an inference that the defendants had not engaged in intentional
    spoliation. See 
    id. at 74
    .
    Victor next argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by excluding from evidence the
    substance and outcomes of any disciplinary investigations into the incident. Rule 403 of
    the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
    The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
    substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
    unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
    wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
    The Magistrate Judge had broad discretion in his application of Rule 403 and may be
    reversed only if the ruling was “„arbitrary or irrational.‟” United States v. Lee, 
    612 F.3d 170
    , 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Univ. Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 
    205 F.3d 657
    , 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
    Here, the issues before the jury were whether the defendants used force in a good
    faith effort to maintain or restore discipline during the cell transfer, whether defendants
    Diffin or Ritchie demonstrated deliberate indifference to Victor‟s serious medical needs,
    and whether the defendants retaliated against Victor by filing false misconduct reports,
    entering his cell under false pretences, and beating him. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503
    
    5 U.S. 1
    , 7 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 106 (1976); Carter v. McGrady, 
    292 F.3d 152
    , 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002). The substance and outcomes of these disciplinary
    investigations did not involve similar issues, and so the Magistrate Judge correctly
    determined that such evidence would confuse the issues and complicate jury proceedings.
    Furthermore, Victor was permitted to question the investigating officers regarding
    statements made by the defendants during the investigations. Accordingly, we cannot
    agree that the Magistrate Judge‟s application of Rule 403 was arbitrary or irrational.3
    Finally, Victor asserts that the jury‟s verdict in favor of the defendants “shocked
    the conscience” because it was based upon allegedly false testimony given by the
    defendants. However, it was the jury‟s duty, not ours, to “weigh evidence [and]
    determine the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Beckett, 
    208 F.3d 140
    , 151 (3d
    Cir. 2000); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
    100 F.3d 1061
    , 1076 (3d
    Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“a . . . court [must] not
    substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the
    jury”). In light of the evidence presented at trial, a ruling for Victor here would be an
    impermissible substitution of our assessment of witness credibility for the jury‟s.
    3
    Furthermore, Victor‟s assertion that the Magistrate Judge ruled that he was not allowed
    to call Harold Leaphart as a witness is belied by the record. The Magistrate Judge
    granted Victor‟s request for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to issue for
    Leaphart. Victor himself chose not to call Leaphart as a witness.
    6
    Accordingly, we cannot agree with Victor that the jury‟s verdict shocks the judicial
    conscience.4
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    4
    Victor also alleges that the defendants‟ counsel made impermissible inflammatory
    comments during closing argument. Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) requires an appellant to
    order a transcript of the parts of the district court proceedings “not already on file as the
    appellant considers necessary.” Our local rules also require that an appellant order the
    transcript or, if the appellant cannot afford the cost of a transcript, file a motion for the
    provision of the transcript pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 753
    (f). 3d Cir. L.A.R. 11.1. Victor
    has not provided a transcript of the defendants‟ counsel‟s closing argument; accordingly,
    we are unable to review the merits of this claim.
    7