Varley Ramos Costa v. Attorney General United States ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 18-1420
    _______________
    VARLEY RAMOS COSTA, AKA Varley Costa;
    SUELI GOMES CORREA COSTA, AKA Sueli Costa,
    Petitioners
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent
    _______________
    On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    United States Department of Justice
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency Nos. A213-090-873 & A213-090-874)
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    on November 14, 2018
    Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: December 12, 2018)
    _______________
    OPINION*
    _______________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
    Though aliens may reasonably fear foreign prisons, ordinarily they may not invoke that
    fear as a ground to remain here. Varley and Sueli Costa entered the United States illegally
    and are removable. They both applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
    the Convention Against Torture. They have shown that they will likely be imprisoned in
    Brazil and that Brazilian prisoners are often abused. But they cannot show that they belong
    to a particular social group. Their claimed group (Brazilian prisoners and detainees) does
    not qualify because it is neither socially distinct nor defined by a shared immutable char-
    acteristic. And the Costas cannot show that they are more likely than not to be tortured. So
    we will deny the petition.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Because its findings are plausible (indeed, persuasive), we accept the facts as found by
    the agency under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B). The Costas are a married couple and are Bra-
    zilian citizens by birth. They entered the United States illegally. More than a decade later,
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents detained them and charged them as remov-
    able because they entered illegally.
    The Costas learned to their surprise that they are wanted for murder in Brazil. Brazilian
    authorities had issued arrest warrants and Interpol red notices for both of them. The Costas
    deny any involvement in the murder. But they fear that, upon returning to Brazil, they will
    be imprisoned and tortured.
    So the Costas applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture. In a joint decision that addressed the claims of both Costas,
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    the Immigration Judge denied the Costas’ applications. They appealed to the Board of Im-
    migration Appeals, raising the same claims and also claiming that the Judge erred by con-
    sidering their applications jointly. The Board dismissed their appeal, reasoning that the
    Costas were not members of a particular social group, had not shown a likelihood of per-
    secution, and had not shown that Brazil would likely torture them. And the Board held that,
    while the Judge had erred by considering their applications jointly, that error was harmless.
    The Costas now petition for review, raising the same arguments. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo while according
    them Chevron deference. Huang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
    620 F.3d 372
    , 379 (3d Cir. 2010).
    And we review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence, overturning them only
    if the evidence “compels” a “contrary conclusion.” Abdille v. Ashcroft, 
    242 F.3d 477
    , 483-
    84 (3d Cir. 2001).
    II. THE COSTAS ARE NOT PART OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP AND HAVE NOT
    SHOWN THAT BRAZIL WILL LIKELY TORTURE THEM
    A. Asylum and withholding of removal
    To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, the Costas must show that they cred-
    ibly fear persecution based on their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion.” 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
    (a)(42)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A) (emphasis
    added). In defining a particular social group, a key question is whether people in that coun-
    try perceive that group “as a distinct segment of the population.” S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen.,
    
    894 F.3d 535
    , 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2018). To answer that question, we ask whether the “group
    is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined
    3
    with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” 
    Id. at 547, 549
    (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 
    26 I. & N. Dec. 227
    , 237 (BIA 2014)).
    The Costas claim that they satisfy this test. They define their group as Brazilian police
    detainees and prisoners. And they assert that the Judge and Board failed to address that
    group.
    But both the Judge and the Board rejected the group of those detained or wanted by
    Brazilian police as lacking immutable characteristics, particularity, or social distinction.
    See AR 4-5, 128. And rightly so. Those arrested for murder in Brazil may be acquitted and
    released. And the Costas maintain their innocence. Detainees come from all walks of life.
    And the Costas offer no proof that Brazilians see prisoners or detainees as a separate social
    group. So their claims for asylum and withholding of removal fail.
    Plus, substantial evidence supports the finding that the Costas do not have a well-
    founded fear of persecution. They “assert[ ] that arrest warrants were issued by corrupt
    police who seek to extort them,” but that assertion “is entirely speculative.” AR 6. And
    Brazilian officials have tried to fight corruption.
    B. Convention Against Torture
    The Costas’ Convention claim likewise fails. For relief under the Convention, the Cos-
    tas bear the burden of proving that, if removed to Brazil, they will “more likely than not”
    be tortured. Shardar v. Ashcroft, 
    382 F.3d 318
    , 325 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing “legiti-
    mate prosecution” from “persecution”); 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2). They must also prove that
    Brazilian officials will “consent to or acquiesce in” their torture. Roye v. Att’y Gen. of the
    U.S., 
    693 F.3d 333
    , 343 (3d Cir. 2012). The Board found that the Costas failed to prove
    4
    either requirement. To prevail on their petition, the Costas must show that the Board lacked
    sufficient evidence for both those findings and that the evidence “compels” a “contrary
    conclusion.” Abdille, 242 at 483-84. They have not done so.
    To show a likelihood of torture, the Costas rely on a State Department human-rights
    report, which states: “Credible testimony from [Brazilian] inmates . . . pointed to the fre-
    quent use of torture and mistreatment, varying in methods and the severity of the pain and
    suffering inflicted.” AR 323. Both police and prison guards take part. But an act can be
    frequent without happening a majority of the time. The Costas offer no proof that torture
    is so frequent that it is more likely than not.
    Nor have the Costas shown that Brazil consents to or acquiesces in torture. The same
    State Department report explains that Brazil has investigated inhumane prison conditions
    and let nongovernmental observers monitor them. Given Brazil’s efforts, the Board had
    sufficient evidence that Brazil does not acquiesce in torturing its prisoners.
    C. Severance
    Grasping at a final straw, the Costas claim that the Judge and Board erred by consider-
    ing their applications together. But the Board found that this error was harmless. In their
    opening brief, the Costas simply assert in passing that the Board’s conclusion was wrong
    but offer no argument against it. So they have waived their argument. See Kost v. Kozakie-
    wicz, 
    1 F.3d 176
    , 182 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1993).
    We will thus deny the petition for review.
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