David Onyiuke v. Cheap Tickets , 435 F. App'x 137 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3830
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DAVID C. ONYIUKE,
Appellant
v.
CHEAP TICKETS, INC.; VIRGIN ATLANTIC LTD.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-00891)
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 5, 2011)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant David C. Onyiuke, proceeding pro se, appeals from the orders of
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying his motion for reconsideration. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
I.
In April 2009, Onyiuke filed an amended complaint against Virgin Atlantic
Ltd. (“Virgin Atlantic”) and Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a Cheaptickets.com (“Cheaptickets”),
alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
conversion, arising from the cancellation of service between Newark Liberty
International Airport and Gatwick Airport in London, England.
In August 2008, Onyiuke purchased plane tickets through the online travel
site Cheaptickets.com. Under to the flight arrangement, he was scheduled to fly from
Newark to London on December 12, 2008 on a plane owned and operated by Continental
Airlines, which undertakes certain flight obligations from Virgin Atlantic. Onyiuke was
then scheduled to fly – via Virgin Nigeria Airlines – to Lagos, Nigeria, his final
destination. Under the arrangement, Onyiuke would embark on a return flight to New
Jersey on January 12, 2009. He paid a total of $1,563.70 for the tickets.
On or about November 7, 2008, Continental Airlines discontinued service
between Newark and Gatwick Airport. Cheaptickets notified Onyiuke about this change
in service on December 3, 2008 and offered a modified flight arrangement whereby
Onyiuke would have to provide his own transportation from Heathrow Airport to
Gatwick Airport in order to catch his connecting flight to Nigeria. Alternatively,
Cheaptickets offered to refund the full cost of his flight. Onyiuke refused to accept either
alternative.
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The following day, Onyiuke contacted Cheaptickets customer service and
was again offered a refund. After refusing to accept Cheaptickets’ refund offer for a third
time, Onyiuke booked his flights with a different travel agency for $3,163.29 and
initiated suit against Cheaptickets and Virgin Atlantic.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Onyiuke’s claims because the amended complaint
failed to satisfy the amount of money in controversy required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The Court granted the motions, concluding that the amount in controversy did not meet
the minimum jurisdictional amount. Onyiuke filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the District Court denied. Onyiuke appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review a District Court’s determination of its jurisdiction de novo. See Emerald Investors
Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). To the extent that
a District Court makes factual findings in determining jurisdiction, we review for clear
error. Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998).
We will not disturb the factual findings of the District Court unless we are “left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” in the District Court’s
fact-finding. Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation
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omitted).
Diversity jurisdiction requires that the controversy be between citizens of
different states, and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1). Whether diversity jurisdiction exists is determined by examining “the facts
as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490
U.S. 826, 830 (1989); Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart
Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).
In determining whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the
Court generally accepts the plaintiff’s good faith allegations. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995). However, the case may
be dismissed for failure to meet the amount in controversy requirement if it appears to a
“legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); Dardovitch v. Haltzman,
190 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 1999). It necessarily follows that whether the claims are for
less than the jurisdictional amount depends on what damages a plaintiff could
conceivably recover under state law. Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 584 (3d Cir.
1997). When punitive damages are recoverable, they are properly considered in
determining whether the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied, see Packard v.
Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir. 1993), but when a claim for punitive
damages is frivolous, “such damages are unavailable as a matter of law” and “that claim
must be stricken from the amount in controversy,” id.
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Onyiuke sought identical damages of $127,793.57 from each defendant, a
sum composed of nominal, actual, and special contract damages; punitive damages;
damages for mental agony; and litigation expenses. Notably, of the $127,793.57 that
Onyiuke sought from each Defendant, he allotted more than $87,000 to his conversion
claim (with $80,000 representing punitive damages), and more than $40,000 to his breach
of contract claim (with $25,000 representing his mental agony damages). After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err in determining that
the amount in controversy did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.
First, assuming that punitive damages are recoverable in New Jersey for the
tort claim of conversion, such damages may only be awarded if a plaintiff demonstrates
by “clear and convincing evidence, that the harm [he] suffered was the result of the
defendant’s acts or omissions, and [that] such acts or omissions were actuated by actual
malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who foreseeably
might be harmed by those acts or omissions.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.12(a).1
We agree with the District Court that Onyiuke failed to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate that the Defendants acted with the requisite malice or willful
disregard to justify his demand for punitive damages arising from the alleged conversion
1
Actual malice is defined as “an intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded
act.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.10. Furthermore, wanton and willful disregard is a
“deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm to
another and reckless indifference to the consequences of such act or omission.” Id.
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of $1,563.70. As the District Court noted, Onyiuke’s claims arise from his dissatisfaction
with the changes to his itinerary, the refund policy in place, and the unwillingness of the
Defendants to meet his demands. Such allegations do not support a claim for punitive
damages as defined under the statute.
We now turn to Onyiuke’s request for damages of $25,000 from each
Defendant for mental agony arising from the alleged breach of contract. Contrary to
Onyiuke’s assertion, the District Court applied the correct legal standard to evaluate his
claim. The Court correctly observed that, under New Jersey law, a plaintiff may recover
for emotional distress damages resulting from a breach of contract where the breach was
“both intentional and outrageous and proximately cause[d] severe, foreseeable emotional
distress.” See Picogna v. Bd. of Educ., 671 A.2d 1035, 1037 (N.J. 1996). The “conduct
must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.” Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc’y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46).
We agree that Onyiuke failed to allege intentional conduct on the part of the
Defendants so outrageous as to cause emotional distress. Although Onyiuke was
undoubtedly inconvenienced by the cancellation of his flight, “complaints [that] amount
to nothing more than aggravation, embarrassment, an unspecified number of headaches,
and loss of sleep” do not amount to severe emotional distress. Id. at 864. Indeed,
Onyiuke ultimately traveled to Nigeria as planned and also declined Defendants’ offer to
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reimburse him for the cost of his alternate travel arrangements.
Without the demands for punitive damages and damages for mental agony,
the amount in controversy does not meet the threshold amount for diversity jurisdiction.
Thus, we find no error in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District
Court’s denial of Onyiuke’s motion for reconsideration. Onyiuke did not demonstrate
any basis for granting the motion, such as intervening change in controlling law, new
evidence, or the need to correct clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice.
See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.
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