Linwood Wilkerson v. Charles Samuels ( 2013 )

BLD-203 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4125
___________
LINWOOD WILKERSON,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR., Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons; SMOKER,
Correctional Officer, LSCI-Allenwood; SOLOMON, Factory Manager, LSCI-Allenwood
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-01462)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 18, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 3, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se Appellant Linwood Wilkerson, a federal inmate, appeals the District
Court’s order dismissing his civil rights suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), as well as his claims for a hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and
retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s
dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim
is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
In his Bivens action, Wilkerson alleged that Appellee Smoker, a supervisor in the
UNICOR factory in which Wilkerson worked at the Low Security Correctional
Institution Allenwood (“LSCI Allenwood”), verbally harassed him. In response,
Wilkerson filed a hostile work environment complaint with prison officials. He
maintained that the complaint was ignored and that Smoker retaliated by filing a false
incident report against him, resulting in disciplinary proceedings; Wilkerson was found
guilty of the incident and lost his UNICOR job for six months. He also alleged that he
was transferred to a higher custody institution as a result of the disciplinary proceedings.
“A Bivens action, which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action
against state actors, will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff’s rights under
color of federal law.” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001). To
sustain a retaliation claim under Bivens, an inmate must demonstrate that (1) he engaged
in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered adverse action; and (3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse
response. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Rauser
2
v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
The District Court determined that Wilkerson’s Bivens claim was barred under
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-47
(1997). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner may not pursue a § 1983 action
which would implicitly question the validity of the conviction or duration of sentence,
unless first demonstrating that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court extended Heck’s “favorable termination” rule to
prison disciplinary sanctions which alter the duration of a prisoner’s term of
incarceration. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48. The rule does not, however, bar a prisoner
from bringing an action which does not implicate the fact or duration of confinement.
See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004); Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98,
104 (2d Cir. 2006). While we agree with the District Court that a favorable outcome on
Wilkerson’s claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings,
it would not invalidate the underlying conviction or sentence and, therefore, is not barred
under Heck or Edwards. The sanctions imposed as a result of the disciplinary
proceedings did not affect the duration of Wilkerson’s sentence, only the location where
it was to be served. Accordingly, the claim could not be dismissed on this basis.
We also disagree with the District Court’s alternative ground for dismissal that the
retaliation claim was time barred. The basis of the retaliation claim is not the comments
which allegedly led to the false misconduct report, but the report itself which was made
on October 21, 2010, and resulted in the disciplinary proceeding; the complaint was filed
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on July 30, 2012, within the two year statute of limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 5524 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also Napier v.
Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (Bivens
actions governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions).
Wilkerson’s allegation that he was falsely charged with misconduct in retaliation
for filing complaints against Smoker may state a cognizable First Amendment claim. See
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Sprouse v. Babcock, 870
F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing cases). Although Wilkerson has no constitutional
right to his job, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981), and no constitutionally
protected liberty interest in being incarcerated in any particular prison, see Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 & n. 6 (1983), retaliation for the exercise of his
constitutional right is itself a violation of the Constitution. See White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). Although Wilkerson’s retaliation claim may ultimately
not succeed on the merits, 1 it was improperly dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the
reasons stated by the District Court.
The District Court properly dismissed Wilkerson’s Title VII claims. In
determining whether Title VII protections apply, the focus is on the employment
relationship. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1995). It is well
1
It is unclear whether Wilkerson exhausted his administrative remedies as
required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Nyhius v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 (3d Cir.
2000) (the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to federal prisoners seeking
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established that a prisoner is not an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), because the relationship is not one of employment, but arises out of the
prisoner’s status as an inmate. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir.
1999); see also Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992). Similarly, for
purposes of Title VII, Wilkerson’s relationship with UNICOR is one of a prisoner, not an
employee. See Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991); see also E.E.O.C.
Dec. No. 86-7, *3, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1892 (1986) (finding no employment
relationship between the prison and prisoner under Title VII, noting that the primary
purpose of their association was incarceration, not employment). Accordingly, he cannot
claim the protections afforded under Title VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order as
to the Title VII claims, summarily vacate the District Court’s order as to the dismissal of
the Bivens claim, and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
relief through a Bivens action). On remand, the District Court may wish to
consider whether Wilkerson has complied with the exhaustion requirements.
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