Coral Harbor Rehabilitation v. NLRB ( 2019 )


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  •                                       PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ______________
    No. 18-2220
    CORAL HARBOR REHABILITATION AND
    NURSING CENTER,
    Petitioner
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent
    ______________
    No. 18-2619
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Petitioner
    v.
    CORAL HARBOR REHABILITATION AND
    NURSING CENTER,
    Respondent
    _______________
    On Application for Enforcement and Cross-Petition for
    Review of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board
    (NLRB-1 No. 22-CA-167738)
    ______________
    Submitted March 11, 2019
    ______________
    Before: McKEE, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: December 26, 2019)
    Louis J. Capozzi, Jr.
    Brandon S. Williams
    Capozzi Adler
    2933 North Front Street
    Harrisburg, PA 17110
    Counsels for Petitioner in No. 18-2220
    Ruth E. Burdick
    David Habenstreit
    Saulo Santiago.
    David A. Seid,
    National Labor Relations Board
    1015 Half Street, S.E.
    Washington, DC 20570
    Counsels for Petitioner in No. 18-2619
    ______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ______________
    McKEE, Circuit Judge.
    Coral Harbor Rehabilitation and Nursing Center (the
    “Center”) asks us to review the National Labor Relations
    Board’s determination that the Center violated Sections 8(a)(5)
    and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by (1) refusing to
    bargain with 1199 Service Employees International Union
    United Healthcare Workers East (the “Union”) as the
    representative of the Center’s licensed practical nurses
    (“LPNs”) and (2) unilaterally changing their wages and
    benefits without notice to the Union or providing the Union an
    opportunity to bargain.1 Because the Board’s decision is
    consistent with precedent and supported by substantial
    evidence, we will deny the Center’s petition for review and
    grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
    1
    29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) & (1).
    2
    I.    BACKGROUND
    The Center purchased a nursing home in which the
    Union represented two separate units of employees – a unit of
    LPNs and a unit of service employees that included certified
    nursing assistants (“CNAs”).2 After the purchase, the Center
    hired a majority of the LPNs who had worked for the former
    employer, increased their wages, and changed their paid leave
    and health benefits, without making any effort to bargain the
    changes with the Union. Approximately 25 LPNs and 36
    CNAs were ultimately employed by the Center.
    After the Center changed the terms of the LPNs’
    employment, the Union filed charges of unfair labor practices,
    alleging that the Center had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1)
    of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with the Union as the
    representative of the LPNs, and by later making unilateral
    changes to their wages and benefits without notice to the Union
    or providing the Union an opportunity to bargain.
    After an initial investigation, the Board’s General
    Counsel filed a complaint of unfair labor practices against the
    Center. The Center responded that it was a Burns successor
    and therefore not under any obligation to recognize or bargain
    with the Union over the changes in the terms of the LPNs’
    employment because the LPNs had been converted into
    supervisors and were therefore exempt from the protections of
    the NLRA.
    Thereafter, an administrative law judge conducted an
    evidentiary hearing at which four of the Center’s LPNs, its
    Director of Nursing (“DON”), and its Administer testified
    about the activities and responsibilities of the LPNs.
    According to that testimony, the LPNs did not attend morning
    staff meetings with managers but did receive completed master
    schedules and could add or subtract CNAs on the schedule with
    permission from the DON. The LPNs were told that they
    2
    LPNs at the Center distribute medication, provide
    treatments, and ensure that the needs of residents are met.
    CNAs provide basic care to residents and assist with daily
    living functions, such as feeding, grooming, dressing,
    walking, hygiene, and bathing.
    3
    would play an active role in supervising CNAs, would have the
    authority to exercise their independent judgment, were
    expected to discipline employees, and complete employee
    evaluations.
    A section of the employee handbook entitled “Role of
    Licensed Professional Nurses (LPNs) and Registered Nurses
    (RNs)” stated: “RN and LPN Supervisors . . . have the
    responsibility to issue discipline (oral and written warnings) to
    nursing assistants when they believe warranted. Discipline can
    be for matters relating to resident care or for violations of the
    employee rules of conduct under Coral Harbor’s Progressive
    Disciplinary System.”3 A Notice of Disciplinary Action
    (“disciplinary notice”) is a form containing a narrative about
    an employee’s infraction and the type of discipline issued, i.e.,
    verbal warning or write-up.
    Testimony offered by the LPNs at the hearing regarding
    specific instances of imposing discipline can be summarized as
    follows: LPN 1 testified that she has not personally disciplined
    anyone, but that she has signed and delivered disciplinary
    notices for two employees that were completed by the DON.
    The DON filled out the disciplinary notices and gave them to
    her to issue. In fact, according to LPN 1, she was not present
    when either employee committed their respective infractions.
    LPN 2 testified that she twice imposed discipline
    against the same CNA—a verbal warning and a written
    discipline for re-education. However, like LPN 1, LPN 2 did
    not witness the infraction and did not have access to the
    personnel file of the CNA to know what “level” of discipline
    to administer.       She was, however, instructed by the
    Administrator and DON on how to proceed in terms of
    discipline. The severity and ultimate approval of the discipline
    was left to the discretion of the DON.
    LPN 3 testified that she would first have to get the
    disciplinary notice from the DON and consult with the DON
    3
    JA-1224.
    4
    or a supervisor4 before disciplining anyone. When she wrote
    the narrative on the disciplinary notice for an employee, the
    verbal warning and approval of the discipline was determined
    by the DON. LPN 3 further testified that on two separate
    occasions she was asked to deliver a disciplinary notice to a
    CNA, but the notice itself had been filled out by a supervisor.
    On each of those occasions, her only role was the physical
    delivery of the notice.
    Lastly, LPN 4 testified that she issued three disciplinary
    notices, without instruction or consultation and made formal
    recommendations, but the subsequent discipline was handled
    by the unit manager. However, LPN 4 also testified that for
    three other disciplinary notices she was simply asked for her
    signature on a notice that was already completed, or she was
    instructed to write up the notice for an infraction she had not
    observed.
    The DON testified that if an LPN completed a
    disciplinary notice for a CNA, she (the DON) would
    investigate and review the personnel file, which the LPN did
    not have access to, and then determine the appropriate severity
    of the discipline. The DON confirmed that she or the staffing
    coordinator determined CNA schedules. An LPN could not
    perform independent scheduling or direct employees in their
    assignment—only the DON could. The LPNs testified that
    they were not involved in training of the CNAs; again, that was
    the responsibility of the DON.
    Based on the testimony, the ALJ found that the Center
    was a Burns successor and that it had hired a majority of its
    predecessor’s employees. The ALJ thus concluded that the
    Center had an obligation to bargain with the union of its
    predecessor. The ALJ also found that the LPNs were not
    supervisors as defined by Section 2(11) of the NLRA but were
    instead, statutory employees protected by the NLRA and
    represented by the Union. Accordingly, the ALJ held that the
    Center violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA by
    refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union,
    4
    LPN 3’s use of the term “supervisor” during her testimony
    referred to either a unit manager or the assistant DON
    (“ADON”), but never an LPN.
    5
    and by making unilateral changes to the wages and benefits of
    the LPNs without notice to the Union or giving it an
    opportunity to bargain over the changes.
    The Center filed exceptions with the Board but limited
    its challenge to the ALJ’s findings regarding the LPNs’ role in
    discipline and adjusting grievances. The Board affirmed the
    ALJ’s rulings and findings. The Board specifically concluded
    that the Center failed to establish that the LPNs (1) have
    supervisory authority to discipline or effectively recommended
    discipline or (2) possess the supervisory authority to adjust
    grievances.
    Thereafter, the Center petitioned us to review the
    Board’s decision, and the Board cross-petitioned for
    enforcement of its order.5
    II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Our “review of orders of the Board is highly deferential.”6
    “We accept the Board’s factual findings if they are supported
    by substantial evidence . . . [and] exercise plenary review over
    questions of law and the Board’s application of legal
    precepts.”7 Substantial evidence “means relevant evidence
    that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.”8
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. NLRB v. Burns
    In NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc.,9 the Supreme
    5
    The Board possessed jurisdiction over the unfair-labor-
    practice proceeding under Section 10(a) of the NLRA. 29
    U.S.C. § 160(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section
    10(e) and (f) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).
    6
    Trimm Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    351 F.3d 99
    , 102 (3d Cir.
    2003).
    7
    Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. NLRB, 
    320 F.3d 385
    , 390 (3d Cir.
    2003); see Adv. Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    820 F.3d 592
    , 606 (3d Cir. 2016).
    
    8 N.L.R.B. v
    . ImageFIRST Unif. Rental Serv., Inc., 
    910 F.3d 725
    ,
    732 (3d Cir. 2018).
    9
    
    406 U.S. 272
    (1972).
    6
    Court held that a successor employer is ordinarily free to set
    initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a
    predecessor. It is therefore undisputed that as a successor-
    employer, the Center had the right to set the initial terms of
    employment for LPNs when it took over operations for the
    nursing home. Accordingly, “[a] new employer has a duty
    under §8(a)(5) [of the NLRA] to bargain with the incumbent
    union that represented the predecessor’s employees when there
    is a ‘substantial continuity’ between the predecessor and
    successor enterprises.”10 As the Court explained in Burns:
    Although a successor employer is ordinarily free
    to set initial terms on which it will hire the
    employees of a predecessor, there will be
    instances in which it is perfectly clear that the
    new employer plans to retain all of the
    employees in the unit and in which it will be
    appropriate to have him initially consult with the
    employees’ bargaining representative before he
    fixes terms.11
    Thus, under Burns, “the new employer, succeeding to the
    business of another, had an obligation to bargain with the union
    representing the predecessor’s employees.”12
    Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees “the right
    to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
    to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
    choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
    purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
    protection.”13
    Section 8(a)(1) states: “[i]t shall be an unfair labor
    practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or
    coerce employees in the exercise of” their Section 7 rights.14
    Section 8(a)(5) states: “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for
    10
    Chester ex rel. NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co., 
    666 F.3d 87
    , 100 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
    Corp. v. NLRB, 
    482 U.S. 27
    , 43 (1987)).
    11
    
    Burns, 406 U.S. at 294
    –95.
    12
    Fall River 
    Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 29
    (citing 
    Burns, 406 U.S. at 278
    –79).
    13
    29 U.S.C. § 157.
    14
    29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
    7
    an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
    representatives of [its] employees.”15
    However, not all employees are included under the
    protective umbrella of the NLRA and collective bargaining.
    Employers are not required to afford collective bargaining
    rights to supervisory employees.16 The Center concedes that it
    refused to bargain with the Union on behalf of the LPNs and
    that it unilaterally changed the LPNs’ wages and benefits
    without notice to the Union and without providing the Union
    an opportunity to bargain. Therefore, resolution of this dispute
    turns on whether the LPNs were statutory supervisors under
    Section 2(11) of the NLRA.
    B. NLRB v. Kentucky River
    “To be entitled to the [NLRA’s] protections and
    includable in a bargaining unit, one must be an ‘employee’ as
    defined by the [NLRA].”17 The NLRA states that the term
    “employee” includes:
    any employee, and shall not be limited to the
    employees of a particular employer, unless this
    subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall
    include any individual whose work has ceased as
    a consequence of, or in connection with, any
    current labor dispute or because of any unfair
    labor practice, and who has not obtained any
    other regular and substantially equivalent
    employment, but shall not include any
    individual employed as an agricultural laborer,
    or in the domestic service of any family or person
    at his home, or any individual employed by his
    parent or spouse, or any individual having the
    status of an independent contractor, or any
    individual employed as a supervisor, or any
    individual employed by an employer subject to
    the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
    time, or by any other person who is not an
    15
    29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
    16
    See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
    17
    Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, 
    666 F.3d 850
    , 853 (3d Cir.
    2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); NLRB v. Kentucky River
    Cmty. Care, Inc., 
    532 U.S. 706
    , 711 (2001)).
    8
    employer as herein defined.18
    Thus, the NLRA excludes supervisors from the definition of
    “employee.” “Supervisor” is defined as:
    any individual having authority, in the interest of
    the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
    recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
    discipline other employees, or responsibly to
    direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
    effectively to recommend such action, if in
    connection with the foregoing the exercise of
    such authority is not of a merely routine or
    clerical nature, but requires the use of
    independent judgment.19
    Supervisors are not protected under the NLRA provisions that
    protect employees, and supervisors are not included in a
    bargaining unit.20
    “Whether someone is a supervisor is a question of fact,
    and thus will be upheld if . . . supported by substantial
    evidence.”21 In Kentucky River, the Supreme Court decided
    “which party in an unfair-labor-practice proceeding bears the
    burden of proving or disproving an employee’s supervisory
    status; and whether judgment is not ‘independent judgment’ to
    the extent that it is informed by professional or technical
    training or experience.”22 The Court acknowledged that the
    NLRA does not “expressly allocate the burden of proving or
    disproving a challenged employee’s supervisory status.”23 The
    Board “has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that
    the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is
    a supervisor.”24
    As the party claiming supervisory status, the Center
    18
    29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphasis added).
    19
    29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
    20
    See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
    21
    Mars 
    Home, 666 F.3d at 853
    .
    
    22 532 U.S. at 708
    .
    23
    
    Id. at 710.
    24
    
    Id. at 710–11.
    9
    bears the burden of establishing it here.25 Whether an
    individual is a statutory supervisor is a question of fact
    particularly suited to the Board’s expertise and therefore
    subject to limited judicial review.26 We must uphold the
    Board’s supervisory-status conclusion as long as it is supported
    by substantial evidence, “even if we would have made a
    contrary determination had the matter been before us de
    novo.”27
    In Kentucky River, the Court established the following
    three-part test for determining whether an individual is a
    supervisor:
    Employees are statutory supervisors if (1) they
    hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12
    listed supervisory functions [in Section 2(11)],
    (2) their exercise of such authority is not of a
    merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
    use of independent judgment, and (3) their
    authority is held in the interest of the employer.28
    The Center alleges that the LPNs were supervisors under the
    NLRA because they had authority to discipline or effectively
    recommend discipline of CNAs. We disagree.
    It is clear under Kentucky River that our inquiry here
    must focus on whether the LPNs have “use of independent
    judgment” to impose discipline.29 A person exercises
    independent judgment if she “act[s], or effectively
    recommend[s] action, free of the control of others and form[s]
    an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.”30
    Judgment is not independent if it is “dictated or controlled by
    detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or
    rules, the verbal instructions of a higher authority, or in the
    25
    Mars 
    Home, 666 F.3d at 854
    .
    26
    
    Id. at 853.
    27
    Citizens Publ’g & Printing Co. v. NLRB, 
    263 F.3d 224
    , 232
    (3d Cir. 2001).
    
    28 532 U.S. at 713
    (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    29
    
    Id. 30 In
    re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 
    348 N.L.R.B. 686
    , 693
    (2006).
    10
    provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.”31 Moreover,
    in order for judgment to be independent, it “must involve a
    degree of discretion that rises above the ‘routine or clerical.’”32
    This standard seeks to distinguish “between straw bosses,
    leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees,”
    who are included within the NLRA’s protections, “and the
    supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives
    as” those established under Section 2(11).33
    This record supports the Board’s conclusion that the
    Center’s LPNs lacked independent judgment as required under
    Section 2(11). The Board agreed with the ALJ’s findings that
    “[a]ll discipline must be cleared with the DON or manager and
    the DON or manager must approve all recommendations of
    discipline of employees.”34 While the four LPNs who testified
    stated that they issued disciplinary notices to CNAs, they all
    also testified that they did not fill out the level or type of
    discipline on the disciplinary notices. Instead, that section of
    the notice was left open to be “signed off” and imposed by the
    DON.
    Moreover, the LPNs did not have access to employee
    personnel files and therefore could not know what level of
    discipline was appropriate in any given case. Rather, it was the
    DON who filled out disciplinary notices herself or received
    notices from an LPN, investigated the matter, talked to the
    CNA, and determined the appropriate level of discipline.
    Accordingly, it can hardly be said that the LPNs were
    responsible for administering discipline to the extent required
    for supervisory status under the NLRA.
    Furthermore, it is unclear whether there are established
    policies that control whether a verbal warning will be issued
    for a given infraction as opposed to a written one or whether
    there is some form of incremental discipline. “Under its
    written disciplinary policy, [the Center] retains discretion to
    31
    
    Id. 32 Id.
    33
    N.L.R.B. v
    . Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 
    416 U.S. 267
    , 280–81 (1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
    Sess., 4 (1947).
    34
    JA-22.
    11
    impose whatever level of discipline it determines is
    appropriate, and the disciplinary notices in the record do not
    follow any defined progression.”35 However, it is clear that
    LPNs cannot exercise independent discretion to decide the
    level of discipline that will be imposed.
    The Board agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that: (1)
    LPNs do not have the authority to assign or the responsibility
    to direct CNAs with use of independent judgment; (2) LPNs
    do not have authority to discipline CNAs and others; (3) the
    evaluations of CNAs are not determinative of LPN supervisory
    status; and (4) LPNs do not have accountability nor authority
    to responsibly direct.36
    C. NLRB v. Vista Nursing
    The Center further argues that under our decision in
    NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, the NLRA
    does not preclude an LPN from having supervisory authority
    merely because her recommendation is subject to a superior’s
    investigation.37 In New Vista, we identified two considerations
    which do not negate supervisory status: “(1) whether a nurse’s
    supervisor undertakes an independent investigation; and (2)
    whether the employees exercise their supervisory authority
    only a few times (or even just one time).”38 We also recognized
    that three factors – considered in the aggregate – may establish
    that an individual is a statutory supervisor: “(1) the [individual]
    has the discretion to take different actions, including verbally
    counseling the misbehaving employee or taking more formal
    action; (2) the [individual’s] actions ‘initiate’ the disciplinary
    process; and (3) the [individual’s] action functions like
    discipline because it increases severity of the consequences of
    35
    Coral Harbor Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. & 1199 SEIU United
    Healthcare Workers E., 366 NLRB No. 75, *1 n.6 (May 2,
    2008).
    36
    Under the third prong of our Kentucky River inquiry we
    determine whether the authority of the alleged supervisors is
    held in the interest of the employer; however, since we
    conclude that the Board correctly ruled that the Center’s
    LPNs are not statutory supervisors under prongs one or two,
    we need not reach prong three. 
    See 532 U.S. at 713
    .
    37
    
    870 F.3d 113
    , 132–33 (3d Cir. 2017).
    38
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    12
    a future rule violation.”39
    Here, after the Board decided that the ALJ’s conclusion
    was consistent with Kentucky River, it specifically cited to our
    decision in New Vista, explaining that “the same result would
    obtain under the standards employed by the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit [in New Vista
    Nursing].”40 We agree.
    Notwithstanding the Center’s reliance on New Vista, it
    is clear that the LPNs here lacked discretion to impose
    discipline. The Board found, “[i]n every instance where an
    LPN-witness was questioned about a specific disciplinary
    notice, the witness testified, without contradiction, that a
    manager had instructed the LPN to fill out and sign the
    disciplinary notice, had actually filled out the disciplinary
    notice and simply instructed the LPN to sign it, or had brought
    a CNA’s infraction to the LPN’s attention and suggested that a
    disciplinary notice was warranted.”41 It is clear that the
    Center’s LPNs do not have “discretion to take different
    actions,”42 unless instructed by a manager.
    The Center has failed to carry its burden and did not
    establish that the LPNs “initiate a progressive disciplinary
    process”43 or that such a process even exists. Nowhere in the
    Center’s brief does it offer an explanation of how any of its
    disciplinary actions follow a progressive disciplinary policy
    “and the disciplinary notices in the record do not follow any
    defined progression.”44 And because the LPNs lacked access
    to CNA personnel files, they could not determine appropriate
    levels of discipline. The LPNs’ inability to determine which
    level of discipline was appropriate demonstrates that there was
    a clear lack of “supervisor” training for LPNs and their actions
    did not “initiate a progressive disciplinary process.”45
    39
    
    Id. at 132.
    40
    366 NLRB at *1 n.6.
    41
    
    Id. 42 New
    Vista, 870 F.3d at 132
    .
    43
    
    Id. at 136.
    44
    Coral Harbor, 366 NLRB at *1 n.6.
    45
    New 
    Vista, 870 F.3d at 132
    .
    13
    Lastly, the Center has not established that an LPN’s
    involvement with disciplinary notices “increases severity of
    the consequences of a future rule violation.”46 As we have
    explained, unit managers, the ADON, or the DON impose the
    level of discipline they deem to be appropriate at any given
    time. There is also evidence of individual CNAs receiving the
    same level of discipline for multiple infractions. Nowhere
    does the record establish that a subsequent infraction increased
    the severity of discipline after an LPN was involved in issuing
    a prior disciplinary notice.
    IV.
    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that
    substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that
    the LPNs were not statutory supervisors and they were
    therefore not excluded from the NLRA’s protections.
    Accordingly, the Center had an obligation to inform the Union
    of the changes it made in the LPNs’ duties and to refrain from
    making those changes in the absence of bargaining with the
    Union. We will therefore deny the Center’s petition for review
    and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
    46
    
    Id. at 136.
    14