United States v. McDade ( 1994 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1994 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-14-1994
    United States of America v. McDade
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 93-1487
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/46
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 93-1487
    ____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    JOSEPH M. McDADE,
    Appellant
    ____________________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Criminal No. 92-00249-01)
    ____________________
    Argued: December 2, 1993
    Before:    SCIRICA and ALITO, Circuit Judges,
    and BASSLER, District Judge*
    (Opinion Filed: June 15, l994     )
    ____________________
    G. ROBERT BLAKEY (Argued)
    Notre Dame Law School
    Notre Dame, IN 46556
    SAL COGNETTI, JR.
    FOLEY, COGNETTI & CORMERFORD
    507 Linden Street, 7th Floor
    Scranton, PA 18503
    JAMES D. CRAWFORD
    SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS
    1600 Market Street, Suite 3600
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellant, Joseph M. McDade
    ___________________________
    *Hon. William G. Bassler, United States District Judge for the
    District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
    1
    2
    MICHAEL J. ROTKO
    United States Attorney
    WALTER S. BATTY, JR.
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Chief of Appeals
    NICHOLAS C. HARBIST (Argued)
    Assistant United States Attorney
    JAMES J. EISENHOWER, III (Argued)
    Assistant United States Attorney
    615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorneys for Appellee, United States of America
    CHARLES TIEFER (Argued)
    Acting General Counsel
    MICHAEL L. MURRAY
    Senior Assistant Counsel
    RICHARD P. STANTON
    Assistant Counsel
    OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
    U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
    The Capitol, H-112
    Washington, DC 20515
    Attorney for Amici Curiae, Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership
    Group of the United States House of Representatives
    ____________________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________________
    ALITO, Circuit Judge:
    Joseph M. McDade, a member of the United States House
    of Representatives, took this appeal from a pretrial order in the
    criminal prosecution now pending against him in federal district
    court.   The order in question denied a variety of defense
    3
    motions, including a request for dismissal of all or portions of
    his indictment under the Speech or Debate Clause of the
    Constitution, Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.    We affirm the district court's
    rulings relating to dismissal of the indictment under the Speech
    or Debate Clause, but we hold that we lack jurisdiction at this
    time to review the district court's other rulings.
    I.
    In May 1992, a federal grand jury in the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania returned a five-count indictment against
    the defendant.   Counts I and III charge that the defendant
    entered into two separate conspiracies, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 371.   Each of these conspiracies allegedly had two objectives:
    first, defrauding the United States of the defendant's honest,
    loyal, and faithful service and other intangible benefits and,
    second, "directly and indirectly seeking, accepting and receiving
    things of value for and because of official acts performed and to
    be performed by [the defendant] otherwise than as provided by law
    for the proper discharge of his official duty," in violation of
    what is now 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B).0    Both counts begin by
    stating that the defendant was a member of Congress during the
    relevant period, that he became the ranking minority member of
    the House Small Business Committee "in or about 1982," and that
    he became the ranking minority member of the House Appropriations
    0
    Prior to 1986, this provision was designated as 18 U.S.C.
    §201(g).
    4
    Committee, Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations "[i]n or about
    January, 1985."
    Count I, which contains considerable factual detail,
    alleges a conspiracy involving a minority-owned small business
    called United Chem Con Corporation ("UCC"), its president and
    majority stockholder (James B. Christian), and its attorney and
    lobbyist (Raymond S. Wittig), who had previously served as
    minority counsel to the House Small Business Committee during the
    time when the defendant was the committee's ranking minority
    member.   Count I alleges that, as part of the conspiracy it
    charges, the defendant "would and did solicit, accept and receive
    money and other things of value, directly and indirectly, from
    UCC, Christian and Wittig in the form of sham campaign
    contributions, free aircraft transportation, vacations and other
    gratuities in return for his influence and because of his support
    for UCC's interests in obtaining and maintaining UCC's government
    contracts and Small Business Administration program eligibility."
    Count I further alleges, among other things, that as part of the
    conspiracy the defendant "would and did, for money and other
    things of value, use his influence to intercede and cause others
    to intercede with employees of the Department of the Navy, SBA,
    United States Postal Service and other departments and agencies"
    to obtain favorable treatment for UCC.   Count I lists 47 overt
    acts, including the defendant's writing of letters to Navy and
    SBA officials on UCC's behalf and the defendant's taking of trips
    that were paid for by UCC.
    5
    Count III charges a somewhat similar conspiracy
    involving several defense contractors (the Grumman Corporation,
    the Kane Paper Corporation, and the Sperry Corporation and its
    corporate successors), as well as James Kane (the president and
    chief executive officer of Kane Paper) and Charles Gardner (a
    vice-president of Sperry).     Count III, which also contains
    detailed factual allegations, alleges that, as part of this
    conspiracy, "James Kane and Charles Gardner would and did join
    forces in order to influence public officials including [the
    defendant], with respect to their official actions on behalf of
    Grumman and Sperry, by providing money and other things of value,
    including sham campaign contributions, free vacations and private
    aircraft transportation to public officials, and ``scholarships'
    for the children of public officials."     Count III lists 18 overt
    acts, including the defendant's writing of a letter to the
    Secretary of the Army concerning an Army radio system, known as
    SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System), for
    which Grumman was seeking a "second source" contract.
    Count II charges that the defendant violated 18 U.S.C.
    § 201(c)(1)(B) by soliciting, accepting, receiving, and agreeing
    to receive "the payment of round-trip aircraft transportation
    expenses by UCC from Washington, D.C. to Scranton, Pennsylvania,
    for and because of official acts performed and to be performed by
    [the defendant], otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
    discharge of official duty."    Count IV charges that the defendant
    violated this same provision by soliciting, accepting, receiving,
    and agreeing to receive "free aircraft transportation from
    6
    Washington, D.C. to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and then to
    Scranton, Pennsylvania from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from the
    Grumman Corporation, for and because of official acts performed
    and to be performed by [the defendant], otherwise than as
    provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty."
    Finally, Count V charges that the defendant conducted
    and participated in conducting the affairs of an enterprise
    through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1962(c).     Count V states that this enterprise consisted
    of the defendant, "his Congressional offices in Washington, D.C.,
    and in the 10th Congressional District of Pennsylvania," the
    staff members working in those offices, and "staff members who
    worked at his direction on the congressional committees on which
    he held official positions."     As predicate acts, Count V charges
    that the defendant solicited, agreed to receive, and accepted
    bribes0 and illegal gratuities,0 and committed acts of extortion.0
    In January 1993, the defendant filed what he styled an
    "omnibus" motion package.     Among other things, these motions
    sought dismissal of all or portions of the indictment on the
    ground that it violated the Speech or Debate Clause.     A bill of
    particulars and an offer of proof were also requested.     After a
    hearing, the district court denied all of these requests.      United
    States v. McDade, 
    827 F. Supp. 1153
    (E.D. Pa. 1993).     The
    0
    See 18 U.S.C.   § 201(c) (1982) (redesignated as 18 U.S.C.
    §201(b)(2) in     1986).
    0
    See 18 U.S.C.   § 201(g) (1982) (redesignated as 18 U.S.C.
    §201(c)(1) in     1986).
    0
    See 18 U.S.C.   § 1951(a).
    7
    defendant then took this appeal, invoking our jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine as applied in
    Helstoski v. Meanor, 
    442 U.S. 500
    , 506-07 (1979).
    II.
    Before addressing the arguments raised by the
    defendant, we will first comment briefly on the basis for and the
    scope of our appellate jurisdiction.     As noted, the defendant
    relies on the collateral order doctrine, under which a district
    court order entered prior to final judgment is immediately
    appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed
    question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate
    from the merits of the case, and (3) is effectively unreviewable
    on appeal from a final judgment.      See, e.g., Digital Equipment
    Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    62 U.S.L.W. 4457
    , 4458 (June 6,
    1994); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
    489 U.S. 794
    , 799
    (1989); Abney v. United States, 
    431 U.S. 651
    , 659-62 (1977);
    Kulwicki v. Dawson, 
    969 F.2d 1454
    , 1459 (3d Cir. 1992).      Recent
    cases have emphasized that the second prong of this test requires
    both that the issue be "important" and that it be completely
    separate from the merits.   Digital 
    Equipment, 62 U.S.L.W. at 4461-62
    ;   United States v. Santtini, 
    963 F.2d 585
    , 592 (3d Cir.
    1992) (citing   Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 
    947 F.2d 49
    , 58 (3d Cir. 1991)).
    In Helstoski v. 
    Meanor, 442 U.S. at 506-08
    , the Supreme
    Court held that all of the requirements of the collateral order
    doctrine were met by a district court order refusing to dismiss
    8
    an indictment pursuant to the Speech or Debate Clause.    The Court
    reasoned: (1) that this order represented "``a complete, formal
    and, in the trial court, final rejection'" of the claim that the
    indictment should be dismissed on this ground, 
    id. at 506
    (quoting 
    Abney, 431 U.S. at 659
    ); (2) that a Speech or Debate
    Clause claim is "``collateral to, and separable from, the
    principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial, i.e.,
    whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged,'"
    
    id. at 507
    (quoting 
    Abney, 431 U.S. at 659
    ); and (3) that part of
    the protection conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause would be
    irreparably lost if an appeal had to await the final judgment,
    since "the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to protect
    Congressmen ``not only from the consequences of litigation's
    results but also from the burden of defending themselves,'"   
    id. at 508
    (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
    387 U.S. 82
    , 85 (1967)).
    Under this precedent, we have jurisdiction to entertain
    the defendant's claim that the Speech or Debate Clause requires
    dismissal of the entire indictment or particular charges
    contained in the indictment.   We also have jurisdiction to review
    any of the district court's other rulings regarding the Speech or
    Debate Clause that satisfy all of the requirements of the
    collateral order doctrine.   Our jurisdiction, however, extends no
    further.   See 
    Abney, 431 U.S. at 663
    .   "Adherence to [the] rule
    of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal
    prosecutions because ``the delays and disruptions attendant upon
    intermediate appeal,' which the rule is designed to avoid, ``are
    especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of
    9
    the criminal law.'"     
    Id. at 657
    (quoting DiBella v. United
    States, 
    369 U.S. 121
    , 126 (1962)).      See also Midland Asphalt
    
    Corp., 489 U.S. at 799
    ; Flanagan v. United States, 
    465 U.S. 259
    ,
    265 (1984).     Consequently, we must be especially careful not to
    exceed the scope of the limited appellate jurisdiction conferred
    on us by the collateral order doctrine.
    III.
    A.   Turning to the arguments raised by the defendant,
    we first consider his contention that the Speech or Debate Clause
    required dismissal of the entire indictment because it contains
    references to his position as ranking minority member of both the
    House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and the House Small
    Business Committee.     Relying heavily on United States v.
    Swindall, 
    971 F.2d 1531
    (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.
    Ct. 683 (1994), the defendant asserts that "[a]pplication of the
    Speech or Debate Clause does not require, as the district court
    myopically construed it, a mechanical inquiry into whether the
    legislative matter involved consists of either ``acts' or
    ``status.'"    Appellant's Br. at 18-19.    Instead, the defendant
    contends that use of committee membership or position "as a proxy
    for legislative activity . . . contravenes the Speech or Debate
    Clause."   
    Id. at 41.
       He goes on to explain that the indictment
    in this case impermissibly employs his "membership and function
    on the committees" as a proxy for protected legislative acts,
    viz., "what he did on the committee prior to the purported
    10
    agreement" and "what he did and was able to do at the time of the
    purported agreement."     
    Id. at 42.
    We reject these arguments.     We will first explain why
    proof of legislative status, including status as a member or
    ranking member of a committee, is not prohibited by the Speech or
    Debate Clause.0    We will then discuss Swindall and explain why we
    do not believe that the decision in that case supports the
    defendant's position here.0    In doing so, we will explain why
    proof of the defendant's legislative status will not constitute a
    "proxy" for proof of legislative acts.
    B.    It is now well settled -- and it is conceded by the
    defendant0 -- that the Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit
    proof of a defendant's status as a member of the United States
    Senate or House of Representatives.     Title 18, Section 201 of the
    United States Code includes two criminal offenses involving
    bribes and illegal gratuities that require proof of the
    defendant's membership in Congress.    See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(2),
    201(c)(1)(B).     Similar provisions have existed for more than a
    century,0 and governing precedent makes it clear that members of
    Congress may be prosecuted under such provisions without
    violating the Speech or Debate Clause.
    In United States v. Brewster, 
    408 U.S. 501
    (1972), the
    Supreme Court held that the defendant, a former senator, could be
    prosecuted under an indictment requiring proof of his legislative
    0
    See parts III.B. and III.C. of this opinion.
    0
    See part III.D. of this opinion.
    0
    Appellant's Br. at 41 n.24.
    0
    See United States v. Helstoski, 
    442 U.S. 477
    , 493 n.8 (1979).
    11
    status.    In that case, the indictment charged that the defendant
    had solicited, agreed to receive, and accepted bribes in return
    for being influenced in the performance of official acts in his
    capacity as a member of the Senate and a Senate committee.   The
    indictment also charged him with receiving a gratuity for and
    because of official acts that he had performed in that capacity.
    The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that
    the Speech or Debate Clause shields a member of Congress "from
    any prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative
    act."   See 
    id. at 504
    (internal quotations and citations
    omitted).
    On direct appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed.
    The Court first held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
    prohibit proof that the defendant solicited, agreed to accept, or
    took bribes in return for being influenced in the performance of
    legislative acts. The Court stated:
    The illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to
    take money for a promise to act in a certain
    way. There is no need for the Government to
    show that [the defendant] fulfilled the
    alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the
    bribe is the violation of the statute, not
    performance of the illegal promise.
    Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of
    the legislative process or function; it is
    not a legislative act. . . . And an inquiry
    into the purpose of a bribe "does not draw in
    question the legislative acts of the
    defendant member of Congress or his motives
    for performing them."
    
    Id. at 526
    (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
    383 U.S. 169
    , 185
    (1966)).
    12
    The Court further held that the Speech or Debate Clause
    did not prohibit proof that the defendant had solicited, agreed
    to receive, or accepted money for or because of official acts
    that had already been performed. The Court explained:
    To sustain a conviction [for this offense] it
    is necessary to show that [the defendant]
    solicited, received, or agreed to receive,
    money with knowledge that the donor was
    paying him compensation for an official act.
    Inquiry into the legislative performance
    itself is not necessary; evidence of the
    Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's
    illicit reasons for paying the money is
    sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
    
    Id. at 527.
       Thus, Brewster clearly means that the Speech or
    Debate Clause permits a defendant to be prosecuted under an
    indictment alleging that, as a member of Congress, he or she
    solicited, agreed to receive, or accepted bribes or illegal
    gratuities.    Since such a prosecution necessitates proof of the
    defendant's status as a member of Congress, Brewster establishes
    that such proof is allowed.
    In United States v. Helstoski, 
    576 F.2d 511
    (3d Cir.
    1978) ("Helstoski I"), aff'd, 
    442 U.S. 477
    (1979)), this court,
    applying Brewster, likewise held that a member of Congress could
    be prosecuted under an indictment requiring proof of his status
    as a member.    There, a member of the House of Representatives had
    been indicted for soliciting and receiving payments in return for
    being influenced in the performance of official acts, as well as
    for conspiracy to commit such offenses.    Relying on Brewster, the
    13
    district court had refused to dismiss the indictment.0    The
    defendant petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus, but we
    denied the petition, stating that "Brewster compel[led] the
    conclusion that the indictment . . . [did] not violate the Speech
    or Debate Clause" because the charges could be proven without
    showing that the defendant actually performed any legislative
    acts."0   
    Id. at 517.
      Consequently, our decision in Helstoski I,
    like Brewster, clearly establishes that the Speech or Debate
    Clause permits proof of a defendant's status as a member of
    Congress.
    C.   Once this point is recognized, it follows that the
    Speech or Debate Clause also permits proof of a defendant's
    status as a member of a congressional committee or as the holder
    of a committee leadership position.     Article I, § 6 of the
    Constitution, which contains the Speech or Debate Clause,
    provides, in relevant part, as follows (emphasis added):
    The Senators and Representatives shall
    receive a Compensation for their Services, to
    be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the
    Treasury of the United States. They shall in
    0
    The district court also held that proof of past legislative acts
    would not be permitted. The government appealed this ruling
    under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, but both this court and the Supreme Court
    affirmed. See United States v. Helstoski, 
    576 F.2d 511
    (3d Cir.
    1978), aff'd, 
    442 U.S. 477
    (1979).
    0
    The Supreme Court affirmed this portion of our decision on the
    ground that mandamus was not the appropriate vehicle for seeking
    review of the district court's order refusing to dismiss the
    indictment under the Speech or Debate Clause, since that order
    was "final" under the collateral order doctrine and was thus
    appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Helstoski v. Meanor, 
    442 U.S. 500
    . On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment,
    holding that evidence protected by the Speech or Debate Clause
    tainted the grand jury's deliberations, and this court affirmed.
    United States v. Helstoski, 
    635 F.2d 200
    (3d Cir. 1980).
    14
    all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach
    of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
    during their Attendance at the Session of
    their respective Houses, and in going to and
    returning from the same; and for any Speech
    or Debate in either House, they shall not be
    questioned in any other Place.
    This language confers rights on members of Congress in
    their capacity as members; it makes no reference to membership on
    a congressional committee or to any other position held within
    Congress.    Consequently, we see no textual basis for arguing that
    a member of Congress may obtain greater protection under the
    Speech or Debate Clause by becoming a member of a congressional
    committee or attaining a leadership position.    Furthermore, we
    are aware of no other evidence that the Speech or Debate Clause
    was intended to provide greater protection for committee members
    or congressional leaders, and no decision of the Supreme Court or
    of this court supports such an argument.
    It is also noteworthy that the indictment in Brewster,
    like the indictment in this case, made specific reference to the
    defendant's committee status.   The opinion of the Court in
    Brewster noted that four counts of the indictment charged the
    defendant with violating the federal bribery statute "while he
    was a Senator and a member of the Senate Committee on Post Office
    and Civil 
    Service." 408 U.S. at 502
    (emphasis added).    Justice
    Brennan's dissent likewise noted that these counts "charged
    Senator Brewster with receiving $19,000 ``in return for being
    influenced in his performance of official acts in respect to his
    action, vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which
    15
    might at any time be pending before him in his official capacity
    [as a member of the Senate Post Office Committee].'"     
    Id. at 529
    (Brennan, J., dissenting) (brackets in original) (emphasis
    added).    Nevertheless, the Court held that the Speech or Debate
    Clause did not prohibit the defendant's prosecution on these
    charges.
    Accordingly, we agree with the district court in this
    case that the Speech or Debate Clause does not require dismissal
    of any count of the indictment simply because it refers to the
    defendant's status as a member or ranking member of two
    congressional committees.
    D.   In arguing that the indictment in this case must be
    dismissed because of its references to his committee memberships
    and positions, the defendant relies chiefly on the Eleventh
    Circuit's decision in United States v. Swindall, 
    971 F.2d 1531
    .
    When Swindall is properly understood, however, we do not believe
    that it supports the defendant's position here.
    1.   While a member of the House of Representatives,
    Congressman Swindall sat on committees that considered two
    statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 31 U.S.C. § 5324, prohibiting
    "money laundering" and the "structuring" of financial
    transactions to avoid reporting requirements.     Congressman
    Swindall subsequently attempted to sell a large promissory note
    that he held, and he turned for assistance to an associate,
    Charles LeChasney, who was laundering money for a federal agent
    posing as a representative of drug dealers.     Through LeChasney,
    Congressman Swindall met and spoke with the undercover agent
    16
    about the sale of the note, but he ultimately decided not to go
    through with the transaction.    After LeChasney was indicted for
    money laundering, Congressman Swindall testified before a grand
    jury concerning his discussions about the sale of the note.     He
    was then indicted on ten counts of making false statements before
    the grand jury and was later convicted on nine of these counts.
    
    See 971 F.2d at 1538-39
    .
    On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that three of
    these counts had to be dismissed because they had been obtained
    using evidence barred by the Speech or Debate Clause.     The
    statements on which these three counts were based all related to
    Congressman Swindall's knowledge that the statutes noted above
    prohibited some of the financial transactions that had been
    discussed.   The Eleventh Circuit wrote that during the grand jury
    proceedings the prosecutor had "sought to establish, by
    questioning Swindall, that because of his memberships on the
    House Banking and Judiciary Committees, Swindall had knowledge of
    the money-laundering and transaction-structuring statutes."     
    Id. at 1539
    (footnote omitted).0    Concluding that this questioning
    violated the Speech or Debate Clause, the court explained:
    There are two reasons why the Speech or
    Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into a member
    of Congress's committee assignments even if
    the member's specific legislative acts are
    not mentioned. First, our review of Supreme
    Court precedent convinces us that the
    privilege protects legislative status as well
    as legislative acts. Second, here the
    government's inquiry into Swindall's
    committee memberships actually amounted to an
    0
    The court added that the prosecution had used the same tactic at
    Swindall's trial. See 
    id. at 1542.
    17
    inquiry into legislative acts. The
    government was allowed to argue a permissive
    inference that Swindall knew the details of
    the money-laundering statutes because of his
    status as a member of the Banking and
    Judiciary Committees. If the inference is
    drawn that Swindall acquired knowledge of the
    statutes through committee memberships, one
    sees that Swindall could have acquired such
    knowledge only by performing a legislative
    act such as reading a committee report or
    taking to a member of his staff.
    
    Id. at 1543
    (emphasis in original).       The court then devoted a
    separate section of its opinion to each of these "reasons."
    
    Id. at 1544-46.
                 Addressing the first reason in a portion of its opinion
    bearing the heading "The Speech or Debate Clause and Legislative
    Status," 
    id. at 1544,
    the court argued that Supreme Court
    precedent did not draw "a distinction between ``activity' and
    ``status,'" but instead called for an inquiry into whether
    allowing questioning about committee membership would undermine
    the legislative process or legislative independence.0        
    Id. at 1545.
        The court then concluded that these harmful effects would
    be threatened if prosecutors were permitted to use a member's
    0
    Specifically, the court wrote:
    Rather than calling for a distinction between
    "status" and "activity," Supreme Court
    precedent directs us to ask: does inquiry
    into a legislator's committee memberships
    directly impinge on or threaten the
    legislative process? Does it make
    legislators accountable before a possibly
    hostile judiciary? And does it indirectly
    impair legislative deliberations? The answer
    to each of these questions is yes.
    
    Swindall, 971 F.2d at 1545
    (citations omitted).
    18
    committee assignments for the purpose of establishing the
    member's knowledge of the contents of bills considered by the
    committee.    
    Id. Turning to
    the second reason in the portion of its
    opinion bearing the heading "Swindall's Legislative Activities,
    Not Merely His Status, Were The Subject of The Government's
    Inquiry," 
    id. at 1546,
    the court argued that the government had
    used Swindall's committee memberships to show that he had
    performed legislative acts, i.e., that he had read or otherwise
    acquired knowledge of the contents of the bills in question.      The
    court wrote:      "The government introduced evidence of Swindall's
    committee memberships to prove that he performed a legislative
    act to acquire knowledge of the contents of the bills, which is
    precisely what the clause prohibits."      
    Id. 2. While
    the Swindall opinion contains language that
    may be read out of context to mean that the Speech or Debate
    Clause flatly prohibits proof of legislative status, we believe
    that a close examination of the Swindall opinion and its
    reasoning suggests that the court did not intend to adopt such a
    broad holding.      As previously noted, the portion of the opinion
    devoted to the discussion of legislative status asserts that the
    distinction between legislative "status" and legislative
    "activity" is not dispositive for Speech or Debate Clause
    purposes and that a court entertaining a Speech or Debate Clause
    claim should instead consider whether permitting the prosecution
    to inquire into a member's committee status would undermine the
    legislative process or legislative independence.      If the Swindall
    19
    court had meant to hold that proof of legislative or committee
    status is never allowed for any purpose, one would expect the
    court to have argued, as the next step in its chain of reasoning,
    that such proof always undermines the legislative process and
    legislative independence.    Instead, however, the   Swindall court
    rested on a much narrower argument, namely, that the legislative
    process and legislative independence would be undermined if
    prosecutors could inquire into a member's committee status for
    the purpose of showing that the member had acquired knowledge of
    the contents of the bills considered by his committees.    The
    court wrote:
    It seems obvious that levying criminal or
    civil liability on members of Congress for
    their knowledge of the contents of the bills
    considered by their committees threatens or
    impairs the legislative process. . . .
    If legislators thought that their
    personal knowledge of such bills could one
    day be used against them, they would have an
    incentive (1) to avoid direct knowledge of a
    bill and perhaps even memorialize their lack
    of knowledge by avoiding committee meetings
    or votes, or (2) to cease specializing and
    attempt to become familiar with as many bills
    as possible, at the expense of expertise in
    any one area. Either way, the intimidation
    caused by the possibility of liability would
    impede the legislative process.
    
    Id. at 1545.
      This reasoning does not suggest that permitting
    inquiry into committee membership should never be allowed, but
    only that such inquiry should not be allowed when made for the
    limited purpose discussed.
    20
    Based on this understanding of Swindall's discussion
    of legislative status, we do not believe that that discussion
    supports the defendant's position here.   In this case, the
    indictment does not recite, and the prosecution does not propose
    at trial to use, the defendant's committee memberships or
    positions for the purpose of establishing that he thereby
    acquired knowledge of bills under consideration by the committee.
    Accordingly, Swindall's holding regarding legislative status is
    inapplicable.
    3.    Similarly, the defendant in this case is not aided
    by   Swindall's discussion of legislative "activities."   In
    Swindall, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the government used
    proof of the defendant's membership on certain committees to show
    that he had performed what the court regarded as legislative
    acts, i.e., reading or otherwise acquiring knowledge about bills
    considered by those committees.    Attempting to analogize his
    situation to that in Swindall, the defendant in this case argues
    as follows:
    Just as evidence of membership on the House
    Banking and Judiciary committees in Swindall
    implied knowledge of the money laundering and
    transaction structuring statutes . . . so
    evidence of Congressman McDade's membership
    and function on the committees is a proxy for
    what he did on the committee prior to the
    purported agreement and what he did and was
    able to do at the time of the purported
    agreement. Stated differently, Congressman
    McDade acquired these abilities only through
    the committee memberships and only by
    performing legislative acts.
    Appellant's Br. at 42.
    21
    This argument is fallacious and is contrary to the
    Supreme Court's reasoning in leading Speech or Debate Clause
    decisions.     In those decisions, the Court has held that the
    Clause prohibits only proof that a member actually performed a
    legislative act.     As the Court has put it, the protection of the
    Clause "extends only to an act that has already been performed."
    United States v. 
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 490
    .    Thus, the Court has
    held, the Clause does not prohibit closely related but
    nevertheless distinct showings, such as that a member promised to
    perform a legislative act in the future or even that a member was
    thought to have performed a legislative act in the past and was
    paid in exchange for or because of it.     See id.; 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526-27
    .    Once this is recognized, the fallacy in the
    defendant's argument is apparent, for in this case the indictment
    relies on the defendant's committee status, not to show that he
    actually performed any legislative acts, but to show that he was
    thought by those offering him bribes and illegal gratuities to
    have performed such acts and to have the capacity to perform
    other similar acts.
    That the argument made by the defendant in this case is
    contrary to Brewster and Helstoski I can be demonstrated by
    showing that precisely the same argument could have been made for
    the purpose of establishing that the Speech or Debate Clause
    prohibited proof of Senator Brewster's or Representative
    Helstoski's membership in Congress.     Thus, if the previously
    quoted statement from the defendant's brief were correct, the
    following version of that statement (in which references to the
    22
    defendant have been replaced by references to Senator Brewster
    and Representative Helstoski) would also be correct:
    Just as evidence of membership on the House
    Banking and Judiciary committees in Swindall
    implied knowledge of the money laundering and
    transaction structuring statutes . . . so
    evidence of [Senator Brewster's or
    Representative Helstoski's] membership [in
    Congress] is a proxy for what he did [in
    Congress] prior to the purported agreement
    and what he did and was able to do at the
    time of the purported agreement. Stated
    differently, [Senator Brewster or
    Representative Helstoski] acquired these
    abilities only through [their membership in
    Congress] and only by performing legislative
    acts.
    We know, however, that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
    prohibit proof of Senator Brewster's or Congressman Helstoski's
    membership in Congress.   Likewise, in this case, the Speech or
    Debate Clause does not prohibit proof of the defendant's
    committee status for the purposes proffered by the prosecution.
    In sum, we do not believe that Swindall, when properly
    understood, supports the defendant's arguments in this case.     If,
    however, we have misinterpreted the intended meaning of the
    Swindall court and that court meant to embrace the proposition
    that the Speech or Debate Clause broadly prohibits proof of
    legislative or committee status, we would be compelled, for the
    reasons already explained, to disagree.
    IV.
    The defendant also contends that the indictment in this
    case violates the Speech or Debate Clause because it will force
    23
    him to introduce evidence of legislative acts in order to refute
    the charges against him.    Again, we disagree.
    First, the text of the Speech or Debate Clause does not
    support the defendant's argument.     The Clause protects a member
    of Congress from being "questioned," and a member is not
    "questioned" when he or she chooses to offer rebuttal evidence of
    legislative acts.
    Second, the defendant's argument seems to us contrary
    to the clear implication of the Supreme Court's holding in
    Brewster.    In Brewster, as discussed above, the Court held that a
    member of Congress may be prosecuted for soliciting, agreeing to
    receive, or receiving a bribe or illegal gratuity in exchange for
    or because of his or her performance of a legislative act.    Such
    a charge, however, often makes it tactically advantageous for a
    member to respond with proof of his or her legislative acts.    If,
    for example, the member is charged with accepting a bribe in
    exchange for supporting certain legislation, and the member
    ultimately did not support the legislation, the member may well
    find it tactically beneficial to introduce evidence of his or her
    lack of support.    Or, if the member did ultimately support the
    legislation, the member may well find it tactically advantageous
    to offer evidence of his or her assertedly legitimate reasons for
    doing do.   In either event, the charge may be said to have
    pressured the member into responding with proof of legislative
    acts.   Thus, implicit in the type of bribery prosecution
    24
    sanctioned in Brewster is the very sort of tactical pressure of
    which the defendant in this case complains.0
    For these reasons, we agree with the Second Circuit's
    reasoning and conclusion in United States v. Myers, 
    635 F.2d 932
    ,
    942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 956
    (1980):
    The protection against being "questioned"
    outside of Congress prevents the use of
    legislative acts against a Member. It does
    not prevent him from offering such acts in
    his own defense, even though he thereby
    subjects himself to cross-examination.0
    V.
    We turn next to the defendant's and his amici's
    arguments concerning count V of the indictment, which charges
    that the defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) by conducting and
    0
    The Brewster Court was undoubtedly aware that a member of
    Congress being prosecuted for accepting a bribe or illegal
    gratuity might find it advantageous to introduce evidence of
    legislative acts to rebut the government's case against him or
    her. 
    See 408 U.S. at 561
    (White, J., dissenting):
    In the trial of a Congressman for making a
    corrupt promise to vote . . . proof that his
    vote was in fact contrary to the terms of an
    alleged bargain will make a strong defense. .
    . . As a practical matter, to prosecute a
    Congressman for agreeing to accept money in
    exchange for a promise to perform a
    legislative act inherently implicates
    legislative conduct.
    0
    Of course, a Congressman cannot be forced to refute charges that
    directly implicate legitimate legislative acts. See Gravel v.
    United States, 
    408 U.S. 606
    , 616 (1972) ("We have no doubt that
    Senator Gravel may not be made to answer -- either in terms of
    questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution. . .
    ."
    25
    participating in the affairs of a RICO enterprise through a
    pattern of racketeering activity.
    A.   The defendant contends that this charge violates
    the Speech or Debate Clause because the prosecution, in order to
    prove the existence of an enterprise within the meaning of the
    RICO statute, will be compelled to prove that he performed
    legislative acts.   The defendant correctly notes that a RICO
    enterprise must be something more than simply the pattern of
    racketeering activity through which the racketeers conducted or
    participated in its affairs.   See, e.g., United States v.
    Pelullo, 
    964 F.2d 193
    , 211 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
    Riccobene, 
    709 F.2d 214
    , 221-24 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    464 U.S. 849
    (1983).0 Relying on this doctrine, the defendant maintains:
    Since the enterprise encompasses
    congressional and committee staff members
    with purely legislative responsibilities, the
    Department [of Justice] cannot excise this
    legislative conduct from "The Office of the
    Honorable Joseph M. McDade" and still meet
    its burden of proof on the issue of
    separateness in establishing the RICO
    enterprise.
    Appellant's Br. at 36-37.   The defendant further argues that the
    prosecution will be required to prove how his office
    0
    As we explained in 
    Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 211
    , proof of an
    enterprise requires evidence:
    (1) that the enterprise is an ongoing
    organization with some sort of framework for
    making or carrying out decisions; (2) that
    the various associates function as a
    continuing unit; and (3) that the enterprise
    be separate and apart from the pattern of
    activity in which it engages.
    26
    "legitimately functioned" and that it will therefore be required
    to prove that legislative acts were committed.    
    Id. at 37.
    Contrary to the defendant's arguments, however, we see
    no basis for concluding that the prosecution will be unable to
    prove the enterprise charged in count V of the indictment without
    proving that the defendant or staff members acting under his
    direction performed legislative acts.   For one thing, the
    prosecution may be able to establish the existence of this
    enterprise by proof relating to official but (for Speech or
    Debate Clause purposes) non-legislative acts.    The Speech or
    Debate Clause does not immunize every official act performed by a
    member of Congress.   See Doe v. McMillan, 
    412 U.S. 306
    , 313
    (1973).   Rather, as the Supreme Court has stated:
    The heart of the Clause is speech or debate
    in either House. Insofar as the Clause is
    construed to reach other matters, they must
    be an integral part of the deliberative and
    communicative processes by which Members
    participate in committee and House
    proceedings with respect to the consideration
    and passage or rejection of proposed
    legislation or with respect to other matters
    which the Constitution places within the
    jurisdiction of either House.
    Gravel v. United States, 
    408 U.S. 606
    , 625 (1972).   See also
    Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 
    421 U.S. 491
    , 504
    (1975); 
    McMillan, 412 U.S. at 314
    .   Accordingly, the Clause does
    not shield "a wide range of legitimate ``errands' performed for
    constituents, the making of appointments with Government
    agencies, assistance in securing Government contracts, preparing
    so-called ``news letters' to constituents, news releases, and
    27
    speeches delivered outside the Congress."     
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    .   See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
    443 U.S. 111
    (1979)
    (issuance of press releases and newsletters not protected);
    McMillan, 
    412 U.S. 306
    (public dissemination of a congressional
    report not protected); Gravel v. United States, 
    408 U.S. 606
    (private republication of documents introduced and made public at
    a congressional hearing not protected).    Thus, the prosecution in
    this case may be able to prove the existence of the enterprise
    charged in count V based on evidence relating to some of these or
    other similar unprotected activities.
    In addition, the prosecution may be able to prove the
    existence of the enterprise in question by evidence relating to
    unofficial or ultra vires conduct that is separate from the
    pattern of racketeering activity.     What the prosecution will
    ultimately attempt to show and what it will be able to show in
    this regard are not dispositive for present purposes.    Because it
    is clearly possible for the prosecution to prove the separate
    existence of the enterprise charged in count V without violating
    the Speech or Debate Clause, we must affirm the district court's
    decision not to dismiss that count.0
    B.   The defendant's amici, the Speaker and Bipartisan
    Leadership Group of the United States House of Representatives,
    0
    We also disagree with the defendant's argument that the Speech
    or Debate Clause requires excision from the indictment of all
    RICO predicate offenses that are based on the illegal receipt of
    gratuities and extortion. The defendant contends that these
    predicates improperly rely on his status as a committee member,
    but this contention is merely a variant of the argument that we
    discussed and rejected in Part III of this opinion.
    28
    advance a different Speech or Debate Clause argument pertaining
    to the RICO count.   The amici begin by contending that the Speech
    or Debate Clause prohibits a RICO charge that defines the
    "enterprise" as Congress or a congressional committee.     This
    rule, the amici maintain, is needed to protect Congress and its
    committees from Executive Branch intimidation or interference.
    The amici then argue that this prohibition cannot be circumvented
    by defining a RICO enterprise as an association-in-fact
    consisting of all of the members and staff of Congress or of a
    particular congressional committee.
    We are skeptical about the validity of these arguments
    and, in any event, we do not believe that they are applicable
    here.   First, we are doubtful that an indictment alleging that a
    congressional committee constitutes an "enterprise" under 18
    U.S.C. § 1962(c) would intimidate or interfere with Congress, as
    the amici suggest.   Such a charge would not accuse the committee,
    as a formal entity, with wrongdoing; nor would it seek the
    imposition of any sanctions on the committee as such.     Rather,
    such a charge would imply that, in the view of the grand jury,
    the committee had been exploited by the individuals charged as
    defendants.   A major purpose of the RICO statute was to protect
    legitimate enterprises by attacking and removing those who had
    infiltrated them for unlawful purposes.   See Russello v. United
    States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 28 (1983);    United States v. Turkette, 
    452 U.S. 576
    , 591 & n.13 (1981).   Consequently, an indictment
    defining a congressional committee as the "enterprise" under 18
    29
    U.S.C. § 1962(c) would suggest that the committee as a formal
    entity was a victim, not a wrongdoer.
    Second, assuming for the sake of argument that the
    Speech or Debate Clause prohibits an indictment under 18 U.S.C.
    §1962(c) that defines a congressional committee as the
    enterprise, we fail to see why the RICO charge in this case would
    have to be dismissed, since it does not define the enterprise as
    a committee.    The amici contend that prosecutors should not be
    able to accomplish indirectly what they cannot accomplish
    directly and that therefore they should be precluded from
    proceeding under an indictment that charges all of the members of
    a committee and its staff as an association-in-fact RICO
    enterprise.    This argument, however, is both inapplicable to this
    case and questionable on its own terms.     The RICO count in this
    case does not allege an enterprise consisting of all of the
    members and/or staff of the committees to which the defendant
    belonged.     Instead, as we have noted, that count defines the
    "enterprise" as consisting of only one committee member (the
    defendant) and only those staff members who worked under his
    direction.
    Moreover, even if the amici's argument were applicable
    to this case, we would find it questionable.     Suppose that all of
    the members of a committee and its staff formed an association
    that satisfied all of the requirements of a RICO enterprise and
    that the committee members and staff engaged in a pattern of
    soliciting and receiving bribes and illegal gratuities from a
    large number of persons or entities interested in the outcome of
    30
    the committee's work.     The Speech or Debate Clause would not
    prevent all of the committee and staff members from being
    individually prosecuted on substantive charges of taking bribes
    and illegal gratuities.     See Brewster, 
    408 U.S. 501
    .   Nor would
    the Clause prevent all of the committee and staff members from
    being prosecuted for conspiring to take illegal bribes or
    gratuities.      See Helstoski 
    I, 576 F.2d at 517
    .   We therefore find
    it difficult to understand why the Speech or Debate Clause would
    protect these same individuals from being prosecuted under 18
    U.S.C. § 1962(c) for participating in a RICO scheme based on
    essentially the same underlying conduct.     If the substantive and
    conspiracy charges mentioned above would not unconstitutionally
    intimidate or interfere with Congress, it is unclear why a RICO
    charge based on essentially the same underlying conduct would do
    so.
    C.   In addition to these arguments based on the Speech
    or Debate Clause, the amici also offer an argument grounded on
    RICO itself.     Specifically, the amici maintain that Congress did
    not intend to include itself or its committees within the meaning
    of the term "enterprise" as it is used in the RICO statute and
    that Count V therefore does not state a RICO offense.      We hold,
    however, that our limited appellate jurisdiction under the
    collateral order doctrine does not encompass this argument. Since
    this argument is not based on the Speech or Debate Clause, it
    does not fall within the reasoning of Helstoski v. Meanor, 
    442 U.S. 500
    .   Rather, it is governed by the holding in 
    Abney, 431 U.S. at 663
    , that "an order denying a motion to dismiss an
    31
    indictment for failure to state an offense" is not appealable
    pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.       Thus, we lack
    jurisdiction to review this question at this time.
    VI.
    We now come to the defendant's final group of
    arguments.     The defendant contends that the district court should
    have dismissed the indictment because it "runs afoul of the
    Speech or Debate Clause, both on its face and by being vague as
    to whether various allegations involve legislative or purely
    political acts."     Appellant's Br. at 25.    Relying on Government
    of the Virgin Islands v. Lee, 
    775 F.2d 514
    (3d Cir. 1985), In re
    Grand Jury Investigation (Eilberg), 
    587 F.2d 589
    (3d Cir. 1978),
    and precedent concerning double jeopardy claims,0 the defendant
    then argues that the district court at least should have ordered
    the government to provide a bill of particulars or should have
    conducted a pretrial proceeding to explore Speech or Debate
    Clause issues.     At one point, the defendant suggests that the
    government should have been compelled before trial to "provide
    proof, subject to appellate review, that the prosecution does not
    violate the Clause."     
    Id. at 26.
        Later, however, he states that
    the Speech or Debate Clause did not require pretrial rulings on
    all of the evidentiary questions that might develop during the
    trial but instead "necessitate[d] an inquiry limited to the
    allegations implicating the Speech or Debate Clause."       
    Id. at 30
    0
    See United States v. Inmon, 
    568 F.2d 326
    (3d Cir. 1977).
    32
    n.15.   "[T]he precise scope of that inquiry," he adds, "depend[s]
    on the indictment."   
    Id. As we
    understand the defendant's arguments, they pose
    the following four questions.    First, was the district court
    required to dismiss the entire indictment or any part of the
    indictment for lack of the specificity allegedly required by the
    Speech or Debate Clause?    Second, was the district court required
    to dismiss any charge in the indictment (or to conduct a hearing
    in order to determine whether to dismiss any charge in the
    indictment) on the ground that it is based on conduct that is
    protected by the Speech or Debate Clause?   Third, even if no
    charge had to be dismissed, was the district court required to
    strike any allegations in the indictment (or to conduct a hearing
    in order to determine whether to strike any allegations in the
    indictment) on the ground that they concern legislative acts
    protected by the Speech or Debate Clause?    And, fourth, was the
    district court required to make a pretrial ruling barring the
    prosecution from proving these allegations at trial?   We will
    discuss each of these questions in turn.
    A.   Was the district court required to dismiss the
    entire indictment or any part of the indictment for lack of the
    specificity allegedly required by the Speech or Debate Clause?
    We do not believe that the Speech or Debate Clause
    required dismissal of all or any part of the indictment for
    vagueness. The defendant cites no authority for the proposition
    that the Clause imposes pleading requirements, and we do not
    think that the Clause imposes such requirements per se.   We agree
    33
    that the prosecution, in a case with potential Speech or Debate
    Clause issues, must provide sufficient notice of the nature of
    the charges so that a motion for dismissal on Speech or Debate
    Clause grounds can be adequately litigated and decided.   However,
    we see no basis for concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause
    requires that this notice be furnished in the indictment itself.
    Furthermore, the indictment in this case is replete with factual
    details, and as noted below,0 the defendant has specifically
    cited only a few allegations that he claims are impermissibly
    vague.   Thus, we reject the defendant's argument that the
    indictment in this case is too vague to satisfy the Speech or
    Debate Clause.0
    B.   Was the district court required to dismiss any
    charge in the indictment (or to conduct a hearing in order to
    determine whether to dismiss any charge in the indictment) on the
    ground that it is based on conduct that is protected by the
    Speech or Debate Clause?   The defendant cites two categories of
    allegations in the indictment that he claims are ambiguous and
    therefore necessitated evidentiary exploration in order to
    determine whether they violate the Speech or Debate Clause:
    allegations concerning his travels and allegations concerning his
    contacts with the Executive Branch.   We agree with the defendant
    0
    See infra, pp. 35, 38-39.
    0
    We clearly lack jurisdiction at this time to consider whether,
    pursuant to provisions of law other than the Speech or Debate
    Clause, the indictment is sufficient or the government provided
    sufficient notice of the charges against the defendant.
    Consequently, our opinion should not be interpreted as expressing
    any view on such questions.
    34
    that if a district court lacks sufficient factual information to
    determine whether dismissal of a particular charge in an
    indictment is required under the Speech and Debate Clause, the
    court must obtain that information before trial by conducting a
    hearing or by some other means.      See 
    Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25
    ; In
    re Grand Jury 
    Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597
    .     In this case,
    however, no hearing or other procedure was needed for this
    purpose with respect to either of the categories of allegations
    that the defendant cites.
    1.     Travel.   Travel is an essential element of some of
    the offenses charged in the indictment,0     but we fully agree with
    the Second Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Biaggi, 
    853 F.2d 89
    , 104 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
    489 U.S. 1052
    (1989),
    that travel by a member of Congress to or from a location where
    the member performs legislative acts is not itself protected by
    the Speech or Debate Clause.
    The text of Article I, § 6 of the Constitution supports
    this view.     In addition to the Speech or Debate Clause, this
    provision contains the clause providing that "Senators and
    Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony,
    and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
    Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
    0
    For example, Counts II and IV charge the defendant with
    violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) by, among other things,
    actually receiving a thing of value for and because of official
    acts. The thing of value alleged in these counts is travel or a
    payment for travel. If travel or a payment for travel were
    protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, and could therefore not
    be proven, receipt of the specified thing of value could not be
    established.
    35
    going to and returning from the same . . ." (emphasis added).
    Since this clause specifically addresses the protection enjoyed
    by members "in going to and returning from" the site of
    legislative activity and limits that protection to a qualified
    freedom from civil0 arrest, it seems most unlikely that the very
    next clause, which is couched in terms of "Speech or Debate in
    either House," was meant to confer additional protection with
    respect to such travel.
    Supreme Court precedent fortifies this conclusion.   As
    observed earlier, the Court has held that the Speech or Debate
    Clause protects matters other than actual speech or debate only
    if they are "an integral part of the deliberative and
    communicative processes by which Members participate in committee
    and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and
    passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
    other matters which the Constitution places within the
    jurisdiction of either House."     
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625
    .   Travel
    to and from the Capitol or any other site where legislative acts
    are performed, although a necessary precondition for the
    performance of these acts, is not an integral part of Congress's
    deliberative and communicative processes.     If it were, then the
    Speech or Debate Clause would produce seemingly absurd results,
    such as immunizing a member of Congress from being prosecuted or
    sued for striking a pedestrian with his or her car while racing
    to the Capitol.     As the Second Circuit has aptly stated:
    0
    See 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614
    .
    36
    [U]nless the focus of the legislation itself
    is transportation, the mere transport of
    oneself from one place to another is simply
    not "an integral part of the deliberative and
    communicative processes by which members
    participate in committee and House
    proceedings." We conclude that the Speech or
    Debate Clause does not immunize a congressman
    from prosecution for interstate travel in
    furtherance of receipt of an unlawful
    gratuity, any more than it would immunize him
    for a charge of theft of services if he
    traveled as a stowaway.
    
    Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 104
    (citations omitted).
    In this case, the defendant's briefs, in challenging
    the travel allegations in the indictment, do not claim or offer
    to prove anything more than that the travel in question was
    undertaken so that he could perform what he claims were
    legislative acts upon arriving at one of his final or
    intermediate destinations.   Therefore, the defendant's briefs do
    not claim or offer to prove facts that would be sufficient to
    establish that the travel at issue is protected by the Speech or
    Debate Clause, and we consequently have no basis for concluding
    that the district court was required to dismiss the charges based
    on the defendant's travel or to conduct a pretrial proceeding or
    otherwise delve further into the indictment's travel allegations.
    2.   Executive Branch Contacts.   The Supreme Court has
    repeatedly stated that the Speech or Debate Clause does not apply
    to efforts by members of Congress to influence the Executive
    Branch.   See, e.g., 
    McMillan, 412 U.S. at 313
    ; 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625
    ; 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    ; 
    Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172
    .
    37
    Nevertheless, the defendant and his amici argue that these
    statements do not apply to legislative "oversight."
    Neither the defendant nor his amici have provided a
    definition of "oversight," but the term, as usually employed,
    appears to have a broad meaning.     For example, a recent study
    explains that the term is used to refer to "a variety of
    techniques" for monitoring components of the Executive Branch,
    ranging from "formal procedures or processes, such as committee
    hearings" to "informal" techniques, "such as communication with
    agency personnel by staff or committee members" and even
    "casework" and program evaluations performed by private
    individuals or groups.   Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye
    - The Politics of Congressional Oversight 130, 132 (1990).
    Activities at one end of this spectrum, such as committee
    hearings, are clearly protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
    See 
    Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-06
    .    Activities at the other end of
    the spectrum, such as routine casework for constituents, are just
    as clearly not protected.   See 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    . Whether
    the Speech or Debate Clause shields forms of "oversight" falling
    between these extremes -- for example, letters or other informal
    communications to Executive Branch officials from committee
    chairmen, ranking committee members, or other committee members -
    - is less clear.   See, e.g., 
    Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121
    n.10;
    Chastain v. Sundquist, 
    833 F.2d 311
    , 313-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
    cert. denied, 
    487 U.S. 1240
    (1988); In re Grand Jury
    
    Investigation, 587 F.2d at 594-95
    ; Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
    579 F.2d 1027
    , 1031-32 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other
    38
    grounds, 
    443 U.S. 111
    (1979); McSurely v. McClellan, 
    521 F.2d 1024
    , 1036-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
    In this case, the defendant's briefs mention only two
    specific allegations in the indictment -- overt act 16 in Count I
    and overt act 17 in Count III -- that concern the defendant's
    contact with Executive Branch officials0 and that are claimed to
    involve protected "oversight,"0 and we therefore limit our
    inquiry to consideration of these overt acts.   Overt act 16 in
    count I alleges that the defendant caused a letter to be sent to
    the Secretary of the Navy warning that the Navy's decision to
    issue a "stop work" order with respect to UCC's work on a Navy
    project, the "Sea Shed" program, would be viewed by the defendant
    with "extreme gravity."   Overt act 17 in count III alleges that
    the defendant wrote to the Secretary of the Army requesting that
    the Army delay in making a final decision on a possible "second-
    source" contract for the SINCGARS program.   Both the "Sea Shed"
    program and the SINCGARS program fell within the jurisdiction of
    committees on which the defendant sat, and while the "Sea Shed"
    letter openly lobbies on behalf of UCC, a business in the
    defendant's district, the SINCGARS letter does not explicitly
    refer to any particular business seeking a "second-source"
    0
    See Appellant's Br. at 32-33; Appellant's Reply Br. at 21.
    0
    The defendant also mentioned his efforts to raise funds for a
    concert held at the Capitol on July 4, 1983. Appellant's Br. at
    33 n.18. Raising money for this concert is mentioned in
    predicate act 1 of count V, which alleges that the defendant
    extorted from UCC a $10,000 contribution for this concert. This
    is not an allegation of contact with the Executive Branch.
    Moreover, we do not see how this alleged conduct can possibly be
    viewed as "oversight" or as protected under the Speech or Debate
    Clause.
    39
    contract.    Instead, the SINCGARS letter discusses the broader
    policy question whether the Army should award such a contract
    before the General Accounting Office has completed its review of
    the "second-source" selection process.    Thus, whatever the
    defendant's motivation in writing the SINCGARS letter, the letter
    appears on its face to fall into the above-described middle
    category of oversight activities.
    Even if we were to hold, however, that both of the
    overt acts in question are invalid, no charge in the indictment
    would have to be dismissed.    Both counts I and III, which charge
    conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371, allege numerous other overt
    acts, and an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 371 need only allege
    one overt act.    See, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 
    329 U.S. 211
    , 216 (1946); United States v. Kapp, 
    781 F.2d 1008
    , 1012 (3d
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    475 U.S. 1024
    (1986).     Thus, irrespective of
    the validity of the two overt acts in question, it is apparent
    that the district court was not required to dismiss (or to
    conduct a hearing in order to determine whether to dismiss)
    either count I or count III.
    C.   Even if no charge had to be dismissed, was the
    district court required to strike any allegations in the
    indictment (or to conduct a hearing in order to determine whether
    to strike any allegations in the indictment) on the ground that
    they concern legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate
    Clause?     Since we have held that the defendant's arguments
    regarding travel lack merit under the Speech or Debate Clause,
    the remaining allegations that we must now address are those
    40
    concerning the defendant's contacts with the Executive Branch.
    But before considering whether the district court was required to
    strike these allegations or to conduct a hearing to determine
    whether they should be stricken, we must decide whether we have
    jurisdiction at this time to decide these questions.    Although
    the parties and the amici in this case seem to assume that any
    ruling under the Speech or Debate Clause is appealable under the
    collateral order doctrine, neither the Supreme Court nor this
    court has so held.    In Helstoski v. 
    Meanor, 442 U.S. at 508
    , the
    Supreme Court held only that the collateral order doctrine
    authorizes a pretrial appeal of an order refusing to dismiss
    criminal charges under the Speech or Debate Clause.    Therefore,
    we must decide whether to go beyond Helstoski v. Meanor and hold
    that the collateral order doctrine applies to a pretrial refusal
    to strike overt acts that are not essential to the offense
    charged.0   We conclude that it does not apply to this category of
    claims.
    The question whether the two overt acts should have
    been stricken (divorced from the question whether proof of those
    acts at trial should have been barred) does not satisfy the
    requirement that the right at issue in a collateral order appeal
    must be jurisprudentially "important," i.e., "sufficiently
    0
    Although we have found no indication that the defendant asked
    the district court for this precise form of relief, we will
    assume, under the particular circumstances here, that such a
    request was subsumed within the defendant's request for dismissal
    of the indictment and, similarly, that the district court's
    refusal to dismiss the indictment constituted a refusal to strike
    these two overt acts.
    41
    important to overcome the policies militating against
    interlocutory appeals." 
    Santtini, 963 F.2d at 592
    (quoting Lauro
    Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 
    490 U.S. 495
    , 502 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
    concurring)). See also Digital Equipment 
    Corp., 62 U.S.L.W. at 4461-62
    ; Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 
    878 F.2d 98
    , 100 (3d
    Cir. 1989); Praxis 
    Properties, 947 F.2d at 56
    .    As we have noted,
    striking these overt acts would not require the dismissal of any
    charge in the indictment.   In addition, neither retention of
    these overt acts in the indictment nor their removal would in
    itself have any evidentiary significance.    As juries are
    customarily instructed, the indictment is not evidence.0
    Retention of these overt acts in the indictment does not
    necessarily mean that the prosecution will attempt or will be
    permitted to prove them at trial.    Similarly, the absence of
    these overt acts from the indictment would not in itself preclude
    the prosecution from proving them or from relying on such proof
    to satisfy the overt act requirement contained in 18 U.S.C.
    §371.0   Accordingly, the asserted right to have the two overt
    acts stricken before trial (or to have a hearing on that
    question), far from being important, appears to have little
    significance.0
    0
    See, e.g., Fetters v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 
    283 U.S. 638
    , 641-42 (1931); United States v. DePeri, 
    778 F.2d 963
    , 979
    (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
    476 U.S. 1159
    (1986).
    0
    See, e.g., United States v. Adamo, 
    534 F.2d 31
    , 38 (3d Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    429 U.S. 841
    (1976); United States v. United States
    Gypsum Co., 
    600 F.2d 414
    , 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    444 U.S. 884
    (1979).
    0
    Under some circumstances, language in an indictment, even though
    lacking any legal effect, may be prejudicial. See, e.g., United
    States v. Vastola, 
    899 F.2d 211
    , 231-32 (3d Cir.), vacated, 497
    42
    D.   Was the district court required to make a pretrial
    ruling barring the prosecution from proving these allegations at
    trial?    We need not decide if the question whether the district
    court should have barred proof of these acts at trial is
    jurisprudentially "important" because this question fails to
    satisfy other requirements of the collateral order doctrine.       For
    one thing, the district court did not "conclusively" rule on this
    question; rather, the court deferred any ruling on such
    evidentiary questions until trial.     
    See 827 F. Supp. at 1170
    .
    Furthermore, it is settled that a ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence at a criminal trial is not completely separate from the
    merits of the case.    See 
    DiBella, 369 U.S. at 131-32
    ; Cogen v.
    United States, 
    278 U.S. 221
    , 227-28 (1929); United States v.
    Johnson, 
    690 F.2d 60
    , 62-63 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
    459 U.S. 1214
    (1983).    Instead, such a ruling is "but a step in the
    criminal case preliminary to the trial thereof," 
    Cogen, 278 U.S. at 227
    , and may not be reviewed before trial under 28 U.S.C.
    §1291.0   Accordingly, we cannot decide at this time whether the
    admission of evidence of these acts would violate the Speech or
    U.S. 1001 (1990) (remanded for reconsideration in light of United
    States v. Rios, 
    495 U.S. 257
    (1990)). The language of the overt
    acts at issue in this case, however, clearly was not so
    prejudicial that it should have been stricken from the
    indictment.
    0
    Thus, to the extent that the defendant seeks review of other
    purely evidentiary questions, e.g., whether the district court
    was correct in ruling that general evidence about how Congress
    works would not violate the Speech or Debate Clause, see
    Appellant's Br. at 16, we must likewise refuse review at this
    time.
    43
    Debate Clause.0 United States v. Carney, 
    665 F.2d 1064
    (D.C.
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    454 U.S. 1081
    (1981).   See also United
    States v. Levine, 
    658 F.2d 113
    , 125 n.22 (3d Cir. 1981)
    (collateral estoppel); United States v. Mock, 
    604 F.2d 336
    , 337-
    41 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
    VII.
    For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district
    court's refusal to dismiss any of the charges in the indictment.
    To the extent that the defendant challenges the district court's
    other rulings, we lack jurisdiction to hear these challenges at
    this time, and his appeal is therefore dismissed.
    0
    The question discussed above (whether the district court should
    have barred proof of these acts at trial) may be viewed as
    conceptually distinct from the question whether the district
    court should have ruled one way or the other on whether this
    evidence could be admitted at trial. Under the circumstances
    here, however, the timing of the district court's ruling on these
    evidentiary questions is not "jurisprudentially important." This
    timing did not affect the defendant's appellate rights, cf. Fed.
    R. Cr. P. 12(f), because even if the district court had denied
    the defendant's pretrial request for suppression of this evidence
    he could not have appealed that decision for the reasons
    explained above. Moreover, it is not apparent from the record of
    this case that the district court's decision not to issue a
    pretrial ruling on the relatively narrow evidentiary questions
    presented by the defendant prejudiced him in any other way.
    44
    United States v. McDade, No. 93-1487
    SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting in part.
    I would hold that true legislative oversight falls within the protection
    Speech or Debate Clause.   I write separately only because I believe we have jurisdi
    to decide whether overt acts in the indictment violate the Speech or Debate Clause
    that one of the overt acts here may be privileged.    In all other respects I fully j
    majority opinion.
    I.
    The majority holds that jurisdiction to determine whether overt acts chal
    on Speech or Debate grounds should be stricken "does not satisfy the requirement th
    right at issue in a collateral order appeal be jurisprudentially ``important,'"    Maj
    at 41, because "striking these overt acts would not require the dismissal of any ch
    the indictment."0   
    Id. at 42.
      I respectfully disagree.
    The Supreme Court recently stated, "[w]hen a policy is embodied in a
    constitutional or statutory provision entitling a party to immunity from suit . . .
    is little room for the judiciary to gainsay its ``importance.'"    Digital Equip. Corp
    Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    62 U.S.L.W. 4457
    , 4461 (U.S. June 6, 1994). Our cases indicat
    issue is jurisprudentially important under the collateral order doctrine if it is "
    and unsettled." United States v. Santtini, 
    963 F.2d 585
    , 592 (3d Cir. 1992); Praxis
    Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 
    947 F.2d 49
    , 56 (3d Cir. 1991).   Bo
    tests appear to be satisfied here. Grounded in our concept of separation of powers,
    Helstoski v. Meanor, 
    442 U.S. 500
    , 506 (1979) ("guarantees of that Clause are vital
    0
    As the majority notes, McDade's briefs refer to only two overt acts in the indictm
    involving contact with the executive branch. Maj. Op. at 39.
    45
    important to our system of government . . . ."), the Speech or Debate Clause was wr
    into the Constitution "to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insur
    independence of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 
    408 U.S. 501
    , 5
    (1972).   Since the privilege is part of the "``practical security' for ensuring the
    independence of the legislature," United States v. Johnson, 
    383 U.S. 169
    , 179 (1966
    determining its boundaries requires us to examine the relationship between the thre
    branches of government.   It is, therefore, a serious matter and important enough to
    overcome judicial policies militating against interlocutory appeals.0
    The issue is also unsettled.   Neither party has identified a case where a
    has ruled on whether the Speech or Debate privilege applies to oversight.    Although
    Supreme Court has held that certain contacts between Members of Congress and execut
    agencies are not immunized by the Speech or Debate Clause, see Brewster, 408 U.S. a
    Gravel v. United States, 
    408 U.S. 606
    , 625 (1972); 
    Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172
    , it has
    held that all contacts with executive agencies are outside the privilege.    As the m
    has noted, the Court has drawn a distinction between legislative and political acts
    which the former are protected while the latter are not.    Thus, in Brewster, after
    Court defined legislative acts as those things "generally done in Congress in relat
    the business before 
    it," 408 U.S. at 512
    , it stated that many contacts between Memb
    executive agencies are not protected because "they are political in nature rather t
    legislative . . . ." 
    Id. Therefore, the
    second part of the "jurisprudentially impor
    test is satisfied. Cf. 
    Santtini, 963 F.2d at 592
    (case of first impression is
    jurisprudentially important).
    0
    The Speech or Debate Clause protects our constitutional separation of powers. See
    
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507
    ; see also Robert J. Reinstein and Harvey A. Silverglate,
    Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1139 (19
    (Framers "recognized the unique and vital role of this privilege in the system of s
    powers."). Policies militating against interlocutory appeal include restraining ap
    intervention in tentative decisions and "combin[ing] in one review all stages of th
    proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgmen
    results." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    , 546 (1949).
    46
    I agree that striking either overt act would not result in dismissing any
    in the indictment, and I recognize the government may decide not to introduce evide
    the challenged overt acts at trial, obviating the need to reach this issue.0 But th
    Supreme Court has held a Member cannot be forced to defend against charges which im
    legitimate legislative activity. 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616
    ; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 3
    82, 85 (1967) (per curiam).   Therefore, if the indictment recites an overt act that
    colorably violates the Clause, it would seem a Member of Congress is entitled to a
    pre-trial even though striking the overt act would not result in dismissing any cha
    the indictment. See 
    Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 508
    ("[I]f a Member ``is to avoid exposur
    [being questioned for acts done in either House] and thereby enjoy the full protect
    the Clause, his . . . challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before . . . e
    [to trial] occurs.'") (alterations in original) (quoting Abney v. United States, 43
    651, 662 (1977)).0
    II.
    With respect to the substance of McDade's challenge, it appears one of th
    acts may refer to protected activity, and could be stricken from the indictment.   T
    Speech or Debate Clause prevents a Member from being questioned outside of Congress
    respect to any legislative activity.   Legislative activity comprises any act that i
    integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members part
    in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
    rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Consti
    0
    Indeed, the government appears to concede this possibility. See Government Brief at
    ("[E]ven if some of McDade's interactions with the executive and military had a par
    oversight component such evidence will not be presented by the government.").
    0
    Rather than prejudice, see Maj. Op. at 43 n.27, the issue is constitutional privil
    Thus, where a colorable claim is made that an overt act in an indictment refers to
    privileged activity, inclusion of other, unprotected acts should not cure the
    infringement.
    47
    places within the jurisdiction of either House." 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625
    .   True
    legislative oversight fits within this definition.
    Generally speaking, oversight is the way Congress evaluates legislation,
    the appropriate manner, monitors the operations of executive departments and agenci
    Properly done, oversight is part of our system of checks and balances. The term cov
    range of formal and informal activities, of which some may be privileged. See Maj.
    38.   The key to identifying privileged oversight lies in the political-legislative
    distinction. Cf. 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    ; 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618
    ("the Court has
    to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and j
    oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator.).
    At the extremes the cases will be clear. Compare 
    Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616
    have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer . . . for the events th
    occurred at the subcommittee meeting.") with 
    Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172
    ("No argument
    made, nor do we think that it could be successfully contended, that the Speech or D
    Clause reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to influence the Depart
    Justice, that is in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative proce
    For example, constituent casework including attempts to win government contracts wo
    be privileged, see 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    , while contacts made as part of a
    congressional investigation might be, see, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicem
    Fund, 
    421 U.S. 491
    , 504 (1975)("The power to investigate and to do so through compu
    process plainly falls within [the legitimate legislative sphere].").
    Only one of the challenged overt acts here colorably refers to Speech or
    privileged material.   Count III, overt Act 17 states "On or about June 7, 1988, def
    MCDADE, wrote to the Secretary of the Army requesting that the Army delay in making
    final decision on a possible ``second source' for the SINGCARS program."   That lette
    states, in part:
    48
    [The Subcommittee] believed the actual source selection process should
    result in a selection which minimized technological and financial
    risk, while emphasizing lower life cycle costs, interoperability, and
    the benefits of eventual competition. In order to insure source
    selection in conformance with these criteria, the conferees on the
    Fiscal Year 1988 Defense Appropriations Act directed the GAO to
    monitor the entire second source selection process and report its
    findings to the Committees on Appropriations.
    The committee has received interim reports from GAO, and the Army
    has completed its source selection. However, the GAO's final report
    will not be completed until July 15th. In the meantime, I am advised
    the Army intends to award the second source contract by June 10th,
    well in advance of the final GAO report. While I have no knowledge of
    any findings by GAO which may cast doubt on the source selection, I
    believe a contract award in advance of GAO's final review and
    assessment is ill-timed and ill-advised.
    The government contends the letter is evidence of McDade's attempt to steer the awa
    the SINGCARS contract to Grumman corporation, who allegedly was paying McDade bribe
    gratuities.   As the ranking minority member on the subcommittee charged with monito
    the SINGCARS program, McDade would likely be involved with reviewing the Army's con
    award.
    McDade has made a colorable claim that the letter referred to in overt ac
    legitimate oversight.   If, as the government argues, McDade was involved in a consp
    to influence the Army's choice of suppliers, the government would still have the
    opportunity to prove its case, but would have to do so without the benefit of privi
    material. Cf. 
    Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185
    ("With all references to this aspect of the
    conspiracy eliminated, we think the Government should not be precluded from a new t
    this count, thus wholly purged of elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause
    By contrast, the government alleges in count I, overt act 16 that "McDade
    a letter to be directed to the Secretary of the Navy warning that the Navy's decisi
    issue a ``stop work' order on [United Chem Con's] Sea Shed production would be viewe
    McDade with ``extreme gravity.'" McDade states in that letter:
    On the topic of Sea Sheds, my staff is informed by the Director
    of Strategic Sealift that Sea Sheds produced at the Renovo,
    Pennsylvania plant in my District were apparently not in dimensional
    49
    conformance with applicable specifications. The Director advised that
    in a parallel situation he was obliged to issue a stop work order.
    I view the issue of a stop order against the Renovo plant with
    extreme gravity since Sea Sheds production is the town's single
    industry. . . . I have asked Ms. Deck [of my Defense committee staff]
    to ascertain why this highly qualified producer should suddenly be
    delivering inacceptable [sic] items and report to me on the probable
    cause.
    This letter does not constitute legislative activity, but rather represents unprivi
    constituent service. See 
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 512
    (unprotected activities include
    performed for constituents).
    III.
    I recognize that in some cases it may be difficult to distinguish true ov
    from lobbying, and that some future legislator might attempt to shield illegal acti
    with the subterfuge of oversight.   But "the risk of such abuse was ``the conscious c
    of the Framers' buttressed and justified by history." 
    Eastland, 421 U.S. at 510
    (qu
    
    Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516
    ).    I would, therefore, require the district court to dete
    prior to trial whether the overt acts violate the Clause.
    50
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93-1487

Filed Date: 6/14/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/13/2015

Authorities (37)

Russello v. United States , 104 S. Ct. 296 ( 1983 )

Fiswick v. United States , 329 U.S. 211 ( 1946 )

United States v. Henry Helstoski, D. John Mazella, Alfred A.... , 635 F.2d 200 ( 1980 )

United States v. Paul Levine , 658 F.2d 113 ( 1981 )

United States v. Mario Biaggi and Meade Esposito , 853 F.2d 89 ( 1988 )

United States v. Turkette , 101 S. Ct. 2524 ( 1981 )

Cogen v. United States , 49 S. Ct. 118 ( 1929 )

United States v. Inmon, Martel A/K/A Marty , 568 F.2d 326 ( 1977 )

The Nemours Foundation v. Manganaro Corporation, New England , 878 F.2d 98 ( 1989 )

United States of America, at Nos. 89-5372/5383, at No. 89-... , 899 F.2d 211 ( 1990 )

United States of America, in 81-2838 v. Howard U. Johnson, ... , 690 F.2d 60 ( 1982 )

united-states-v-mario-riccobene-in-no-82-1399-v-joseph-ciancaglini-in , 709 F.2d 214 ( 1983 )

United States v. Brewster , 92 S. Ct. 2531 ( 1972 )

DiBella v. United States , 82 S. Ct. 654 ( 1962 )

united-states-of-america-no-92-5105-v-paulo-santtini-aka-carlos , 963 F.2d 585 ( 1992 )

United States v. Lawton Scott Mock , 604 F.2d 336 ( 1979 )

Fetters v. United States Ex Rel. Cunningham , 51 S. Ct. 596 ( 1931 )

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lee, Sidney , 775 F.2d 514 ( 1985 )

Ronald R. Hutchinson v. William Proxmire and Morton Schwartz , 579 F.2d 1027 ( 1978 )

United States v. Michael O. Myers , 635 F.2d 932 ( 1980 )

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