Pacheco v. The Coats Company, Inc. ( 1994 )

Opinions of the United
1994 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-6-1994
Pacheco, et al v. The Coats Company, Inc., et al.
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 93-1791
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 93-1791
___________
HECTOR PACHECO;
MARIA PACHECO,
Appellees
vs.
THE COATS COMPANY, INC.;
HENNESSY INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Appellants
___________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 89-08115)
___________
Argued
March 7, 1994
Before: MANSMANN, LEWIS and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 6 , 1994)
___________
Mark J. LeWinter, Esquire (ARGUED)
Mammuth & LeWinter
401 City Line Avenue
Suite 12
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004-1122
Counsel for Appellees
John P. Penders, Esquire
Charles W. Craven, Esquire (ARGUED)
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner,
Coleman & Goggin
1845 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellants
___________
1
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
Hector Pacheco was severely and permanently injured
when the tire he was removing or about to remove from a Coats 40-
40 tire changer exploded and launched from the tire changer table
top, striking his left elbow with such kinetic force as to
irreparably shatter his elbow. Pacheco and his wife, Maria,
brought a diversity products liability action against the Coats
Company and Hennessy Industries on the theory that the "launch-
pad effect" which caused his injury constitutes a design defect
which renders the Coats tire changer unsafe for its intended use.
The alleged defect centers on the condition of the changer table
top to act as a thrust surface, not unlike any other table top or
flat surface. The Pachecos do not assert a defect in any active
phase of the machine's function, or that the machine itself
caused the tire to rupture.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Pachecos
for $325,000. The defendants appeal from a denial of their
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, now known as
judgment as a matter of law. We must decide whether there is
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on the
questions of product defect and proximate causation.
I.
Hector Pacheco, a 42-year-old self-employed automobile
mechanic, had just completed a tire change using a Coats 40-40
2
tire changer and was about to lift the tire from the surface of
the machine, when the tire suddenly and violently exploded. The
tire and tire rim were thrust from the surface of the tire
changer and one or both of them apparently struck Mr. Pacheco's
left elbow, causing the total irreparable disintegration of the
elbow bone. Pacheco has undergone several surgical procedures,
including an elbow transplant and ultimately a replacement of the
natural bone joint with a prosthesis, which may require future
revision, and suffers a loss of arm function as well as the loss
of his employment capacity as a mechanic. The manufacturers of
the tire and tire rim have not been identified. The Pachecos
commenced a strict product liability action against the
manufacturers of the Coats 40-40 tire changer, i.e., the Coats
Company and Hennessy Industries ("Coats").0
The overwhelming evidence at trial converged to
establish that the tire explosion caused Mr. Pacheco's injury,
although some controversy centered on the exact positioning of
Mr. Pacheco's arms at the time of the explosion, and whether the
injury was necessarily the result of contact with the trajectile.
The evidence further tended to prove to a high degree of
certainty that the explosion resulted from a tire bead failure
0
Hennessy Industries is a subsidiary of Danaher
Corporation, and Coats is a brand name of Hennessy Industries.
Hennessy has been making tire changers under the Coats name since
the 1960s.
The manufacturer of the tire which exploded is unknown.
Mr. Pacheco testified that the exploded tire was removed from the
accident scene by someone other than himself, perhaps the owner,
and has not been recovered.
3
which occurred after the completion of the tire changing process.
Thus the parties agreed that a defective tire, and not the Coats
40-40, caused the explosion which injured Mr. Pacheco. Mr.
Pacheco's theory of defective design product liability, however,
is based on evidence that the table top of the Coats 40-40 served
virtually as a "launching pad" against which the ruptured tire
bead reacted, resulting in the intensely powerful thrust of
exploding tire material. Moreover, substantial evidence showed
that at the time of Mr. Pacheco's accident, this type of scenario
was foreseeable, that Coats was long aware of the serious risk of
bodily harm associated with working with compressed air and the
tire inflation process, that such risk could have been
significantly reduced through feasible product design
modifications, and that Coats failed to "design out" the product
defect.
At trial it was shown that in past years Coats'
engineers had conducted a number of tests which examined the
"launch effect" of exploding tires reacting to its tire changer
table top. In particular, the "Strang test," named after the
engineer who carried it out in 1966, concluded that the shape of
the machine's table surface affects its potential to serve as a
"launching pad" when a tire resting on it explodes. Although the
Coats employee charged with overseeing safety programs for the
company testified that this test was incomplete, conducted solely
for the purpose of drafting warning labels and operating
instructions, was inconclusive as to design implications, and was
superseded by subsequent studies undertaken by Coats, the weight
4
of the evidence clearly established that, from the 1960s, Coats
was aware of the phenomenon of ruptured tire beads striking the
table top and launching upwards. The evidence further showed
that other tests carried out by Coats' employees, including the
"Gottsholl test" in the 1970s and the "MacInnelli test" of 1987,
studied the height that a tire was lifted off a platform when it
exploded, and demonstrated that elevating the tire above the
platform minimizes an exploding tire's upward thrust.
Mr. Pacheco's attorney argued from the findings of
Coats' own studies that a reduction in the launch pad effect
through a redesign of the tire changer would be feasible. Dr.
Alan Milner, a professional engineer and consultant with a
special expertise in the area of tires and tire explosions,
testified on behalf of Mr. Pacheco that modifications to the
Coats 40-40 model could reduce the kinetic energy of an explosion
by 98%. He proposed a hypothetical redesign whereby the table
surface of the tire changer would be reduced to the size of the
tire rim and elevated 6-1/2" from any surrounding surface so as
to dissipate the energy emitted from an explosion. As a
theoretical matter, this would reduce the upward thrust of an
exploding tire to a mere fraction of what it would be if the tire
bead were in contact with the table top at the time of explosion.
Mr. Pacheco's attending physician, as well as an accident
reconstructionist and biomedical engineer, testified that a
substantial reduction in the upward thrust of an exploding tire
would have reduced Mr. Pacheco's injury.
5
Coats' safety program overseer countered that as a
practical matter, the effects of a thrust surface cannot be
reduced by diminishing the size of the thrust surface, and that a
reduction in the launch effect can only be achieved if the launch
surface is eliminated. Because he thought it was not possible to
design a tire changer without a table top, or so impracticable as
to make it virtually impossible, he testified that the proposed
hypothetical redesign would not be practically feasible. Coats'
witness discredited the proposed redesign as being merely
conceptual and lacking the scrutiny of the various engineering
disciplines required to complete a product design. He further
asserted that the proposed redesign would create a false sense of
security and would itself create new ergonomic problems while not
eliminating either the risk of tire explosion or the risk of
serious injury from such explosion.
Mr. Pacheco testified that he was aware of the
potential danger of the tire explosion, and that he was also
aware of the warning labels placed by Coats on the tire changer.
The parties agreed that an exploding tire would react identically
whether it exploded off of the table top of the Coats 40-40 or
off of virtually any other flat surface, such as a floor. The
parties agreed that the Coats 40-40 did not cause the explosion.
The pivotal factual dispute at trial concerned whether the flat
table top of the Coats 40-40 constitutes a defective design,
whether a redesign would have been feasible, and whether the
6
failure to implement a redesign was a substantial cause of
Mr. Pacheco's injury.0
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Pacheco on
the issues of whether the tire changer was defective and whether
the defect was a proximate cause of Mr. Pacheco's injuries. In
accordance with the jury's responses to the special
interrogatories, the district court entered judgment in favor of
Mr. Pacheco in the amount of $300,000, and in favor of Mrs.
Pacheco in the amount of $25,000 on her claim for loss of
consortium. The Coats Company and Hennessy Industries timely
moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or alternatively, for a new
trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. They
withdrew their Rule 59 motion; the district court denied their
Rule 50 motion in an order dated July 20, 1993. Notwithstanding
its acknowledgement that the trial produced conflicting evidence
as to whether the Coats 40-40 was defective in design, the court
found substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict as to
all the issues. The Coats Company and Hennessy Industries timely
appealed the district court's final order.
Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party, we must ascertain de novo whether the record
contains sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. See,
0
There was also evidence at trial concerning the extent
of Mr. Pacheco's injuries and damages. The jury verdict as to
damages is well supported by the evidence and is not in itself
contested in this appeal.
7
e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265,
1273 (3d Cir. 1979) (in banc).
II.
Mr. Pacheco's personal injury case was brought under
the laws of Pennsylvania for defective products. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts0 to govern strict product liability claims.
Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966). We review well-
settled principles of Pennsylvania law regarding this section.
A.
0
Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)
applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
8
Section 402A imposes strict liability for injuries
caused by defective product design. See Lewis v. Coffing Hoist
Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 592 (Pa. 1987) (citations
omitted). In Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa.
1978), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the legal
standard for defective design strict liability claims. The court
held that before such a claim is submitted to a jury for factual
determinations, the court itself must resolve the legal question
of risk allocation. Id. at 1025-27; see also Griggs v. BIC
Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1432-33 (3d Cir. 1992) (the first step of a
strict liability defective product claim requires a judicial
determination as a matter of law where the risk of loss shall
fall). A judicial determination that Pennsylvania social policy
allocates the risk away from the manufacturer in a strict product
liability case is tantamount to a judicial conclusion that the
product is not defective.
If a judicial determination is made that recovery
against the manufacturer would be justified as a matter of law,
then the court may submit to the jury the question of whether the
product was sold in a defective condition as alleged. Griggs,
981 F.2d at 1432-33. The jury may find that a product is
defective if "the product left the supplier's control lacking any
element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or
possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended
use." Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1027 (footnote omitted); see also
Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322, 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(citing Azzarello); Marshall v. Philadelphia Tramrail Co., 626
9
A.2d 620, 626 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Dambacher v. Mallis, 485
A.2d 408, 420-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), appeal dismissed, 500
A.2d 428 (Pa. 1985). It is not sufficient for liability that the
product is shown to be unsafe for a use not intended; rather, a
plaintiff must prove that the product is unreasonably dangerous
to intended users for its intended use. See Griggs, 981 F.2d at
1433. We have held that the intended use of a product "includes
all those which are reasonably foreseeable to the seller."
Sheldon v. West Bend Equip. Corp., 718 F.2d 603, 608 (3d Cir.
1983). More recently, we have acknowledged that the term
"foreseeability" is associated with the law of negligence and
should not be applied in a strict liability analysis. Griggs,
981 F.2d at 1435. Nevertheless, the intended use and user, while
primarily an inquiry into the manufacturer's intent, is measured
against an objective standard of reasonableness. If the
plaintiff proves that the product was defective, the final
requisite under a strict liability cause of action is proof that
the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Griggs, 981 F.2d at 1432; Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d
49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990) (Habecker I)(causation is essential factor
in products liability action).
We note, with regard to the question of risk
allocation, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has already
concluded that "the risk of loss for injury resulting from
defective products should be borne by the suppliers, principally
because they are in a position to absorb the loss by distributing
it as a cost of doing business." Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1023.
10
This policy, however, does not make the manufacturer an
absolute insurer of any injury caused by its product, and must be
applied within the parameters of the manufacturer's intended use
of the product. The district court properly submitted to the
jury the question of whether the product was defective -- a
question which pivots on a finding as to whether the product was
being operated by an intended user for an intended use at the
time of the accident. In its July 20, 1993 order, the district
court held:
. . . Clearly, there is substantial evidence
of record to support a jury finding that the
intended use of the tire changing machine
includes placing the tire and wheel onto and
removing it from the machine before and after
the tire changing function has been completed
and allowing the wheel and tire to rest
thereon before, during, and after the tire is
changed. Also, there is substantial evidence
to support the jury determination that
Plaintiff's use of the machine was consistent
with and within its intended use.
We agree. A reasonable jury could properly conclude
that the tire changing function includes the mounting and
demounting of a tire onto and off of the tire changing machine,
and that the Coats 40-40 is engaged in its intended use during
these indispensable first and last steps of the tire changing
process. Clearly, mounting and demounting the tire was
reasonably intended by the seller. Furthermore, Mr. Pacheco was
undeniably an intended user of the Coats 40-40. The jury viewed
evidence that Coats was well aware of the "launch-pad" effect, as
well as evidence that a practical and feasible alternative design
could greatly reduce the potential for the severity of injury
11
which Mr. Pacheco suffered. Our review of the record supports
the district court's view that the jury had substantial evidence
from which it could rationally conclude that the Coats 40-40 was
defectively designed for its intended use and that an alternative
feasible redesign of the product was reasonably practicable.0
B.
We turn now to the plaintiff's second task -- to show
that the product defect actually caused the claimed injury. Again
we find that Mr. Pacheco introduced sufficient evidence at trial
from which a jury could reasonably infer that the Coats 40-40
table top proximately caused Mr. Pacheco's injury. It is not
dispositive to the issue of causation that the Coats 40-40 flat
table top was merely a "passive" reactive surface and that the
machine itself did not emit the kinetic force which ruptured the
tire. Coats is not exonerated by the fact that a defective tire
or tire rim contributed proximately to Mr. Pacheco's injury if
the Coats 40-40 design defect was a substantial factor in causing
the harm. The jury heard evidence that explosive kinetic energy
reacting against a thrust surface created the potential hazard
realized in this case. Coats itself testified to the fact that
the upward thrust of exploding tire material is caused, at least
0
The dissenting opinion characterizes the majority
holding to be that "prevention or reduction of injuries from
exploding tires is an intended use of a tire changer as a matter
of law." We wish to clarify that we understand tire changing to
be the intended use of the Coats 40-40, but that the Coats 40-40
lacked an element necessary to make it safe for that intended
use. The Coats 40-40 lacked safety features which substantial
evidence showed could have been reasonably incorporated into its
design.
12
in part, by "leaping," i.e., when a ruptured tire bead is bounced
off of a flat surface. In short, the jury heard sufficient
evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that the
exploding tire's contact with the Coats 40-40 table top was a
substantial factor causing Mr. Pacheco's injury.0
III.
The district court properly submitted the factual
questions of defect and proximate causation to the jury. The
evidence of record supports a jury verdict against Coats on the
theory that a defect in the design of the Coats 40-40 tire
changer was a proximate cause of Mr. Pacheco's injury, as the
district court held in denying Coat's post-trial motion.02
0
We find it necessary to clarify that the majority
holding does not rely on "causation of enhanced injury" in the
absence here of "causation of the accident," as the dissent
indicates. We acknowledge that the Coats 40-40 did not cause the
tire bead to fail. Nevertheless, the bead failure, alone, did
not cause the injury to Mr. Pacheco. The accident, or injury,
resulted from the convergence of more than one substantial
factor, primarily among which were the bead failure and the
explosive reaction against the thrust surface of the Coats 40-40.
Thus, the Coats tire changer was a substantial, even if passive,
cause of the injury.
0
Coats' final challenge to the jury verdict attacks the
application of the "crashworthiness doctrine" to the facts of the
case. In its basic formulation, the crashworthiness doctrine
holds an automobile manufacturer liable for designing and
producing a crashworthy vehicle. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin,
537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976). Coats argues that this
doctrine has not and should not be extended to non-vehicle
product liability cases. We decline to decide that issue here.
While the district court did charge the jury on the
crashworthiness theory, there is no evidence that the jury found
for Mr. Pacheco under, or exclusively under, that theory. The
jury did find that the Coats 40-40 was defective and that the
13
We will affirm the district court's order of July 20,
1993, denying Coats' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
product defect was a substantial factor causing Mr. Pacheco's
injury, supporting Mr. Pacheco's 402A defective product cause of
action.
14
_________________________
15
Hector Pacheco, et al. v. The Coats Company,
Inc., Hennessy Industries, Inc.
No. 93-1791
Seitz, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I find myself in dissidence with the majority because, in my view, no defect i
design of the tire changer caused the injuries about which plaintiffs complain.
An exploding tire of unidentified origin shattered plaintiff Hector Pacheco's
elbow as he removed the tire from a Coats Co. 40-40 tire changer just after inflati
The experts on both sides agreed that failure of the bottom bead of the tire caused
explosion.0 Plaintiffs' experts testified that the table top was a "launching pad,
whereas the defendants' expert described it as merely a "reaction surface." Plaint
experts agreed that the result would have been the same with any horizontal or vert
surface.
The risk presented occurs only during the 30 seconds between detaching the hol
cone and removing the inflated (or overinflated) tire from the tire changer. There
risk of explosion while mounting or dismounting uninflated tires. Furthermore, the
down cone will restrain the tire if it explodes while being inflated.
I. Product Defect
Plaintiffs argue that the product was defective because it should have been de
to prevent injuries from the foreseeable event that a tire could explode in the tim
between releasing the hold-down cone and removing the tire from the tire changer.0
0
An anonymous customer who brought the tire to Pacheco for mounting reclaimed it af
accident but before its manufacturer was identified.
0
A tire bead "is a strip of steel wire that is wrapped around and around [the inner
of a tire] to help hold the tire on the rim of the wheel." Deanna Sclar, Auto Repa
Dummies 223 (1976). When the bead "seats" properly, the air pressure holds the edg
the tire against the rim. When the bead fails, i.e., breaks, the air escapes from
tire and, much like a balloon whose neck has been released, the tire becomes a proj
0
An order granting partial summary judgment eliminated "[a]ll claims that the tire
was defectively designed because of the absence of an interlock to prevent inflatio
unless the hold-down cone was attached to the center post [or] because it lacked a
which would restrain exploding tires and/or rims." A previous order identified the
16
Defendants counter that plaintiffs' concept for redesigning the tire changer does n
eliminate explosions or serious injuries from explosions and it does eliminate the
possibility of using one changer for a variety of tire sizes. Ultimately, the thrus
the argument is that the product is not defective because it cannot proximately cau
type of accident.
Defendants assert that the district court erred by refusing to find as a matte
Pennsylvania social policy that they are not required to bear the risk of loss caus
defective tires. In a Pennsylvania strict products liability case, before submittin
case to the jury, the court is to decide "whether, under plaintiff's averment of th
facts, recovery would be justified." Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020,
(Pa. 1978).0 In other words, the court decides whether the product is "unreasonabl
dangerous" or in a "defective condition" as the term is used in Restatement (Second
Torts § 402A. Id. This involves consideration of whether the "product left the sup
control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or posse
any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use. Id. at 1027. The court
exercises its judgment as a social philosopher and a risk/utility economic analyst.
genuine issue of material fact as "whether the configuration of the tire/wheel supp
structure of the Coats tire changer was responsible for the force with which the ti
wheel assembly struck plaintiff." With the issue thus narrowed, and the plaintiffs
experts' concessions regarding the cause of the explosion, I am not sure there was
theory for the jury under the district court's rulings. However, the defendants do
explain the significance of these orders so I shall proceed as if they became irrel
in later proceedings.
0
Denying a defense motion for judgment as a matter of law (whether for summary judg
directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict) is construed as an impli
ruling that the product is unreasonably dangerous. See Hammond v. International Ha
Co., 691 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1982); Dambacher ex rel. Dambacher v. Mallis, 485 A
408, 421, 423 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), appeal dismissed, 500 A.2d 428 (Pa. 1985).
Although it might be preferable to resolve the matter pretrial by summary judgment,
cases do not find any impediment to a later motion. Therefore, the defendants' mot
for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. sufficiently preserved this point even though we
find a motion for summary judgment.
17
Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322, 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (listing factors to
considered).
Courts in other states have described the intended use of a tire changer as ex
the event about which plaintiffs complain. In a case very similar to ours, albeit
30-year older model, a unanimous Supreme Court of Iowa accepted the defendant's con
that "the machine was a tire changing machine only, and not a tire holding machine,
case of a tire explosion by reason of air suddenly escaping from or adjoining the t
Davis v. Coats Co., 119 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1963). A Florida appeals court has a
that "[t]he purpose of the machine was not to prevent a tire from exploding nor to
down if it did explode." Simpson v. Coats Co., 306 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
1975). In affirming the directed verdict for the defendant, the Simpson court went
state:
Neither was there any evidence that the use of the machine caused the explosio
nor the accident. This is not a case of faulty design nor defective
manufacture. The exploding tire was the proximate cause of the accident, not t
tire changing machine supplied by appellee.
Id. (citing Menking v. Bishman Mfg. Co., 496 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Chri
1973, no writ).
Although these cases differ on whether there was no negligence (Davis), no pro
cause as a matter of law (Simpson), or no proximate cause as a matter of fact (Menk
all concur that the responsibility properly lies with the tire manufacturer, not th
changer manufacturer.
At first blush, plaintiffs' theory holding the tire changer manufacturer liabl
some appeal because tire explosions are more likely to occur on a tire changer than
anywhere else, so it would be desirable if tire changer manufacturers designed thei
products to accommodate these aberrations. However, there are two stronger counter
arguments.
18
First, it is the tire manufacturer's classical manufacturing defect that cause
accident. Products liability law developed to force the manufacturer to spread the
of the few nonconforming items out of a large production lot. The law should not r
the manufacturer of another product to insure this risk. Furthermore, liability fo
manufacturing defects forces the producer to adopt the appropriate level of quality
control. Yet Coats cannot inspect nor improve products it does not control. As th
York Court of Appeals explained in refusing to hold a tire manufacturer liable for
injuries caused by a defective rim:
This is not a case where the combination of one sound product with anothe
sound product creates a dangerous condition about which the manufacturer of ea
product has a duty to warn. Nothing in the record suggests that Goodyear
created the dangerous condition in this case. Thus, we conclude that Goodyear
had no duty to warn about the use of its tire with potentially dangerous
multipiece rims produced by another where Goodyear did not contribute to the
alleged defect in a product, had no control over it, and did not produce it.
Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 226 (N.Y. 1992) (citation
omitted).
Second, this product in no way increases the risks attendant to tire changing
existed prior to the invention of the machine. Without the machine, tire changing
be done on the ground, or some other horizontal surface. See Davis, 119 N.W.2d at
That plane would provide the same reactive surface the tire changer does. The mach
does ease the task, and therefore provides utility. Among the questions to be cons
is whether the product is safe for its intended use, not whether it could be made s
See Pascale v. Hechinger Co., 627 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
Under our prediction of Pennsylvania law, the trial court should have conclude
the manufacturer of a tire changing machine is not liable for injuries caused by ex
tires. This would have ended the case.
II. Proximate Cause
19
Leaving aside whether the tire changer was "unreasonably dangerous," the case
not have gone to the jury because Coats' machine did not proximately cause the acci
Other jurisdictions have so held on almost identical facts. Simpson, 306 So. 2d at
Menking, 496 S.W.2d at 765.
Defendants appropriately compare this case with the ramp in Habecker I. In th
diversity case controlled by Pennsylvania law, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer
ramp that turned over when their decedent drove a forklift off the ramp's edge. Eve
the ramp was defective, it did not cause Mr. Habecker's death. Driving off the ram
caused the fall and the death; the ramp's twist did not contribute. Habecker v. Co
Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990). Similarly, the tire changer manufacturer sh
not be responsible for the (mis)application of other products to its machine.
The tire changer certainly did not cause this accident. Even plaintiffs' exper
agree that the tire caused the accident. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot recover under
traditional products liability law. That leads to plaintiffs' enhanced injury theo
III. Enhanced Injury
Under this variation on the crashworthiness or "second collision" doctrine,
plaintiffs show that the product proximately caused additional injuries, rather tha
causing the accident itself. In the seminal crashworthiness case, the Court of App
for the Eighth Circuit defined collisions as an "intended use" of automobiles—indee
"frequent and inevitable contingency"—and therefore held the manufacturer liable fo
subjecting occupants to unreasonable risks of injury. Larsen v. General Motors Cor
F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).0
0
Defendants contend that "crashworthiness" can apply only to vehicle design suits.
it makes no sense to call the theory "crashworthiness" for a product that does not
However, the underlying logic permitting recovery for enhanced injury is easily
transferrable. The original case adopting the theory described the liability as be
imposed for incremental injury caused by negligent design although the accident was
produced by the defect. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. The District Court for the Easte
District of Pennsylvania recently applied the theory to allow recovery for the marg
injuries caused by the inability to shut off a motor, even though a malfunction of
20
Our case differs from Larsen in several important respects. In Larsen, no prod
caused the collision. The driver who was responsible for the accident was liable f
initial injuries; the manufacturer of the car that exacerbated the injuries was lia
the increment. Here, under plaintiffs' theory of the case, another defective produ
the source of the accident. The manufacturer of that product—the tire—is the approp
defendant.
The manufacturer was held liable in Larsen because features of the car inflict
additional injuries when the passenger had a "second collision" with the interior o
automobile. Our court has reiterated that the defect must have "increased the seve
the injury over that which would have occurred absent the defective design." Habec
Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 1991) (Habecker II) (quoting Barris v.
Drag Chutes & Equip., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 1982)). Given that both parties' ex
agree any plane—including the garage floor or the backyard—would have provided the
surface, the tire changer did not increase the injuries.
Even accepting the majority's contention that prevention or reduction of injur
from exploding tires is an intended use of a tire changer as a matter of law, and
substituting causation of enhanced injury for the lack of causation of the accident
plaintiffs would be required to prove (1) an alternative, safer design, practicable
the circumstances; (2) what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternati
cheese grater to which it was attached caused the original injuries. Calloway v. H
Corp., 1992 WL 309629 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1992).
The parties also seem confused by this court's holding in Barris v. Bob's Drag
& Equip., 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1982). Barris does not refuse to extend the crashwor
theory to non-vehicles. Plaintiffs sued for the failure of a race car harness to r
the driver during a rollover, resulting in his death. Of course, this is the inten
of such a harness. This was not a manufacturing defect. Nor was it an unintended
effect of the harness performing some other useful function. The defective design
prevented the harness from fulfilling its purpose—reducing or preventing all injuri
Therefore, jury instructions for a typical § 402A strict liability case were correc
Barris did not require enhanced injury proofs because that was the doctrinally corr
holding, not because the plaintiff did not introduce the theory.
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safer design been used; and (3) as a corollary to the second element, the extent of
enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
737-38 (3d Cir. 1976).0
Plaintiffs' proof of each of the three required elements is lacking. They hav
shown an alternative design that performs the required functions nor have they show
sufficient specificity the injuries that would have occurred with the use of this
hypothetical redesign and therefore the increment of enhanced injuries.
Plaintiffs' expert proposes using a disk the size of the interior diameter of
to support the tire instead of the tabletop. Defendants respond that this will not
accommodate all sizes of tires as the changer does now, and will not prevent explos
serious injuries from explosions. When asked for details of the redesign, such as
height of the disk, plaintiffs' expert cavalierly responded that he would use the
ergonomic data. This is not an adequate redesign.
Our prediction of Pennsylvania enhanced injury law requires proof of an altern
feasible design. Plaintiffs are not prepared to say that their proposal will work
show that it can perform the same tasks as the current model. Plaintiffs' expert c
that he has not done any engineering studies, much less built a prototype or produc
product. Defendants explained that the proposed disk cannot handle the forces requ
mount a tire. The studies offered by the plaintiff showed that a smaller disk redu
height the tire flew, but if you cannot change a tire on the alternative machine, a
shorter flight path is irrelevant. I conclude that plaintiffs' "design" is not evi
of a "feasible alternative, practicable under the circumstances" sufficient to go t
jury.
0
Huddell embodied the Third Circuit's prediction of New Jersey law. 537 F.2d at 73
rule has since been adopted as a prediction of Pennsylvania law until its supreme c
speaks. Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd without op. 591 F
1334 & 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Roe v. Deere & Co., 855 F.2d 151, 153 & n.2 (3
1988).
22
Plaintiffs' proof of enhanced injuries is also vague. The only evidence I fin
what the injuries would have been is the orthopedic surgeon's testimony that the fr
would not have been comminuted and could have been repaired if the force had been
substantially reduced. Our court's prediction of Pennsylvania law requires proof o
impairment the simple fractures would have precipitated, but I do not find such evi
here. The plaintiffs' failure expert contended that his design would have reduced t
force by 98%. However, the design was not shown to perform the necessary tasks, no
the 98% figures demonstrated to apply to the facts of this accident. Moreover, the
reduction in force cannot be directly applied to reduce the injuries or the medical
expenses by 98%. This too is a failure of proof.
Because the tire changer did not cause the accident, enhanced injury is the on
theory under which the plaintiffs could recover. Yet the jury was erroneously perm
to award damages for the entire injury.0
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the problems of proof in the crashworthiness case, crashworthine
still a subset of design defect strict liability law. Pennsylvania courts would ap
regular products law before limiting damages to the incremental injury. Therefore,
finding of nondefectiveness as a matter of law prevents recovery under either theor
Even without holding that the risk of loss belongs to the tire manufacturer,
plaintiffs should have been limited to recovery for their enhanced injuries only.
have not borne their burdens on this record. I would reverse the judgment for plai
0
Plaintiffs argue that defendants requested the enhanced injury instruction and sho
be allowed to object to its use. Plaintiffs also assert that "there is no evidence
whatsoever" that the jury based its verdict on an enhanced injury theory. In my vi
parties have reversed their roles. It was in the plaintiffs' interest to request t
instruction and to secure a verdict based on this theory because their own experts
conceded that the tire changer did not cause the accident. In the face of this
concession, no rational jury could have found for the plaintiffs without an enhance
injury theory. Accepting plaintiffs' statement in their appeal brief that the jury
the product defective in a customary § 402A defective design case, plaintiffs canno
recover.
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