United States v. Hadima , 160 F. App'x 224 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-22-2005
    USA v. Hadima
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-2667
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Hadima" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 55.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/55
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-2667
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    SAMEH HADIMA,
    Appellant
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    D.C. Crim. 04-cr-00178-1
    District Judge: The Honorable William W. Caldwell
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 18, 2005
    Before: BARRY and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,* District Judge
    (Opinion Filed: December 22, 2005)
    OPINION
    *
    The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, District Judge, United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    Sameh Hadima appeals his conviction for making a false statement about a material
    fact in an immigration document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). For the reasons
    stated below, we will vacate the conviction.
    In August 2000, Hadima, a native of Egypt, married Kathy Masden, a United
    States citizen. In January 2001, Hadima filed an application to register as a permanent
    resident. His application was approved in June 2001, and he was granted conditional
    permanent resident status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. In April 2003,
    two months before his conditional resident status was set to expire, Hadima filed an
    Application for Naturalization (N-400) and a Petition to Remove Conditions of Residence
    (Form I-751) (“Petition”). The basis for Hadima’s Petition was that “[his] conditional
    residence [was] based on [his] marriage to a U.S. citizen . . . and [they were] filing th[e]
    petition together.” (App. at 7.) Therefore, both Hadima and his wife were required to
    sign the Petition. Hadima admits that he signed Masden’s name. He claims, and the
    government has never disputed, that Masden expressly authorized him to do so.1
    In July 2004, Hadima was charged, in an eight-count Second Superseding
    Indictment, with marriage fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1325(c); making false
    statements in the course of an official investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1007;
    1
    Hadima has consistently claimed that Masden signed a copy of the Petition at their
    home, but that he was away on active duty with the United States Army Reserves when
    the filing deadline arrived. He called Masden, “and she explicitly and specifically
    authorized him to sign her name on another I-751 Petition.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.
    2
    making false statements in immigration documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546; and
    aiding and abetting the foregoing offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. In November
    2004, Hadima entered into a written plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to
    an Information charging him with making a false statement in an immigration document,
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, in exchange for which the government agreed to dismiss
    the Indictment. Hadima pleaded guilty to the agreed-upon charge and was sentenced to
    three months in prison and assessed $100. He has served his sentence.
    Before accepting Hadima’s guilty plea, the District Judge conducted the colloquy
    required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(2), and asked the prosecutor to
    outline what the government would have been prepared to prove at trial. The prosecutor
    provided some background information, and then stated:
    On or about April 8, 2003, [Citizenship and Immigration Services]
    accepted a petition to remove conditions on residence -- conditions on his
    residence, a Form I-175, that was filed by the defendant and Masden based
    on their marriage. Now that form was required to be signed by both the
    alien, in this case the defendant, and the United States citizen, in this case
    Ms. Masden Hadima. The form also contained a certification that it
    actually was being signed by the persons whose names appeared on the
    form.
    That form was completed, signed, and mailed to Citizenship and
    Immigration Services, however, by the Defendant while he was on active
    duty in the United States Army. The Defendant contends that he requested
    permission to retrieve another form, this one reportedly signed by Ms.
    Masden Hadima herself, to send to immigration officials, but he was denied
    that opportunity by people in his command. The Defendant also contends
    that he had oral permission from Ms. Masden Hadima to sign her name to
    that form before sending it to immigration officials.
    Nonetheless, as the Defendant well knew, he, in fact, signed [Masden’s] name to
    that form. Knowing it was not being signed by her, and then submitted that form to
    immigration officials as if it had been signed by her personally.
    3
    (App. at 49-50) (emphasis added). The District Judge asked Hadima if he agreed with
    that statement of the facts, and Hadima replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” (App. at 51.)
    Satisfied that all of the Rule 11 requirements were met, the Judge accepted the guilty
    plea. However, the facts as stated by the prosecutor were not correct. The government
    now admits that the prosecutor “mis-spoke” when he said that the form contained a
    separate certification that it was actually being signed by the persons whose names
    appeared on the form. Appellee’s Br. at 13 n.3. No such certification exists.
    Hadima seeks to have his conviction vacated on the ground that he did not commit
    a crime when he signed his wife’s name. We admit to some surprise that the government
    has persisted in opposing this request even though it has been forced to admit that there
    was no separate certification signed by Hadima, much less one stating that Hadima’s wife
    had, in fact, signed her own name. That would have been a false statement. So, too,
    would it have been a false statement had her signature been “falsified” which is “where,”
    the government alleged, “the offense lies.” (App. at 50-51).
    Generally, knowing and voluntary guilty pleas waive all non-jurisdictional defects.
    See Woodward v. United States, 
    426 F.2d 959
    , 964 (3d Cir. 1970) (“A[n unconditional]
    plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defenses . . . .”); Abram v. United States, 
    398 F.2d 350
    , 350 (3d Cir. 1968) (same). However, “application of th[is] rule is misplaced”
    when “a defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime and . . . the defendant is actually
    innocent of the charged offense.” United States v. Andrade, 
    83 F.3d 729
    , 731 (5th Cir.
    1996). Courts have permitted attacks on guilty pleas in the interest of justice when the
    4
    defendant has pled guilty to something that was not a crime. See, e.g., Andrade, 
    83 F.3d 729
    (permitting an attack on a guilty plea where “intervening law has established that a
    defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime . . . .”); United States v. Barnhardt, 
    93 F.3d 706
    (10th Cir. 1996) (allowing the defendant to attack the validity of his conviction “if
    the facts he pled guilty to are subsequently determined not to be criminal”); United States
    v. Barboa, 
    777 F.2d 1420
    (10th Cir. 1985) (vacating defendant’s sentence on the ground
    that his guilty plea was invalid because his actions did not constitute a crime); Woodward
    v. United States, 
    426 F.2d 959
    , 964 (3d Cir. 1970) (“[T]he truth of [a] defendant’s claim
    of innocence may provide a basis for a finding that the guilty plea was not entered
    intelligently or that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice.”)
    We agree that, as the Tenth Circuit put it, a defendant who pled guilty to
    something which was not a crime “is not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional
    defect, which goes ‘to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to
    answer the charge brought against him.’” 
    Id. Permitting a
    guilty plea to stand when the
    defendant’s actions do not constitute a crime would be a miscarriage of justice.
    We must, therefore, determine whether Hadima committed a crime. It is
    undisputed that Hadima signed his wife’s name to the Petition. Hadima claims, and the
    government has not disputed, that he had her permission to sign her name, and that he
    believed it was legal for him to do so. These facts do not establish a violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 1546(a), which provides, in relevant part that:
    “Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or . . . knowingly subscribes as
    5
    true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application,
    affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations
    prescribed thereunder, or knowingly presents any such application,
    affidavit, or other document containing such statement -- Shall be fined
    under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
    We do not agree with the government that Hadima “made a false statement when
    he signed both his and his ‘wife’s’ names on the Form I-571.” Appellee’s Br. at 26. We
    refuse to find that signing a spouse’s name, with permission, constitutes a “false
    statement” within the meaning of § 1546(a). No federal court has ever found an
    authorized signature to be a violation of any federal false statement statute, and the
    Second Circuit, for one, expressly found that a defendant’s assertion that he was
    authorized to sign his spouse’s name was an affirmative defense to a charge of violating
    18 U.S.C. § 1014, a similarly worded false statement statute.2 United States v. West, 
    666 F.2d 16
    (2d Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Hamer, 10 Fed. Appx. 205, 216 (4th Cir.
    2001) (“[H]ad the evidence supported a finding that Douglas authorized [the defendant]
    to apply for credit in Douglas’s name for Douglas’s benefit and with the intent to bind
    Douglas, the authority would have negated the intent required to support a conviction
    under § 1014.”); United States v. Nelson, 
    485 F. Supp. 941
    , 944 (D. Mich. 1980).
    We, therefore, conclude, given Hadima’s uncontested assertion that he had
    permission to sign his wife’s name on the Petition, that he did not commit a crime. We
    2
    Section 014 states, in relevant part that: “Whoever knowingly makes any false statement
    or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Farm Credit
    Administration, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation or a company the Corporation reinsures . . .
    shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years or both.”
    6
    will vacate his judgment of conviction.3
    3
    As part of the plea agreement, Hadima agreed “that the United States may . . .
    reinstate any dismissed counts in the event that the charges to which [he] has pleaded
    guilty . . . are subsequently vacated . . . [and he] further agrees to waive any defenses to
    the reinstatement of those charges . . . .” (App. at 25-26.) We are confident that the
    government will let this case end – now.
    7