John Murphy v. Township of Radnor , 542 F. App'x 173 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-4202
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JOHN J. MURPHY,
Appellant
v.
RADNOR TOWNSHIP
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-11-cv-04743)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
(Submitted: July 8, 2013)
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: October 23, 2013)
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OPINION
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
John Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Radnor Township (“Radnor”) on his claim of discriminatory treatment under
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Military Affairs Act
(“PMAA”), 51 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7301 et seq. For the reasons provided below, we
will reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the essential
facts. Because we are reviewing the grant of Radnor’s motion for summary judgment,
we view the facts in the light most favorable to Murphy. See Scheidemantle v. Slippery
Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).
Murphy joined the Air Force in 1997 and served on active duty until 2002. Since
2002, Murphy has served in the Active Reserves and currently holds the rank of Major.
In June 2009, Murphy applied for the position of Township Manager for Radnor. After
Murphy submitted his application materials, he received a phone call from Radnor’s then
Interim Township Manager, John Granger (“Granger”), asking Murphy to come in for an
interview before Radnor’s Board of Commissioners (“Board”). Seven other applicants
were selected for a first-round interview. On June 27, 2009, before the scheduled
interview, Murphy’s brother, a Congressman from Pennsylvania, called and left a
message for Commissioner Thomas Masterson (“Masterson”). Masterson testified at his
deposition that the message was brief: Congressman Murphy stated that he was calling on
behalf of his brother and asked that his call be returned. Masterson did not return the
phone call.
2
The interview was conducted on July 22, 2009 before four members of Radnor’s
Board: Masterson, John Fisher (“Fisher”), Enrique Hervada (“Hervada”), and Harry
Mahoney (“Mahoney”). Granger was also present. The interview lasted approximately
45 minutes, during which Masterson spent ten minutes questioning Murphy on his
military obligations, including how many days he was absent during his previous
employment due to his military duties and how Radnor would be affected by any future
military obligations. Murphy contends that Masterson also specifically asked him how
many days he would be absent due to future military obligations. Murphy responded that
he would be absent approximately 35 days per year. In response to these questions,
Murphy offered to go on inactive reserves in order to secure the job.
This line of questioning ended after Granger became concerned about the legality
of these questions and intervened. Following Granger’s interruption, the commissioners
turned to other topics of discussion, including how Murphy’s past military experience
and civilian employment suited him for the position of Township Manager.
On July 27, 2009, Granger spoke to Murphy on the phone, informing him that he
was not being asked to return for a second-round interview. Although Granger does not
remember the contents of the conversation, Murphy contends Granger told him that,
while Murphy was in the Board’s top four choices, the Board was not going to invite him
back for a second-round interview. Murphy also maintains Granger specifically told him
that the Board had “serious reservations about [his] ongoing military obligation.” (App.
173.) None of the other applicants interviewed or offered a second-round interview have
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a military background or current military obligations.
Murphy subsequently filed suit against Radnor, alleging violations of USERRA
and PMAA. Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Radnor. Murphy v. Radnor Twp., 904 F. Supp. 2d 498 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The District
Court held that, although Murphy had met his burden in proving that his military
obligations were a motivating factor in Radnor’s decision not to hire him, Radnor
“presented evidence of numerous legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, other than
[Murphy’s] military obligations” sufficient to overcome the claims. Id. at 515.
Specifically, the District Court concluded that Murphy could not withstand the summary
judgment motion because Radnor “adduced sufficient evidence from which no reasonable
jury could find that its reasons for not hiring Murphy were invalid.” Id. at 514. Murphy
timely appealed.
We believe that the District Court erred by requiring Radnor to show that no
reasonable jury could find its reasons for not hiring Murphy as invalid. This is not the
standard required under USERRA. Instead, USERRA requires that Radnor show a
legitimate reason for not hiring Murphy that is “so compelling” and “so meagerly
contested” that there is no genuine dispute that Murphy would not have been hired
regardless of his future military obligations. We do not believe Radnor has met the
USERRA standard as a genuine dispute of fact exists on whether Radnor would have
hired Murphy absent his future military commitments.
4
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4323, 28 U.S.C. § 1331and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same
standard as the district court. Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 385 (3d Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is only appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2011). We are
not only to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but we
must draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock
Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). “Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,” and are thus inappropriate at the
summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
“[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
III. ANALYSIS
A. USERRA
5
USERRA was enacted, in part, “to prohibit discrimination against persons because
of their service in the uniformed services.” 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(3). USERRA prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of military service. The operative section of
this Act provides:
A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has
performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a
uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment,
retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership,
performance of service, application for service, or obligation.
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).
An employer violates USERRA if “the person’s membership [in the military] is a
motivating factor in the employer’s action.” Id. 4311(c)(1). The employer will not be in
violation of the Act, however, if “the employer can prove that the action would have been
taken in the absence of such membership.” Id. Thus, as the District Court properly
noted, “the statute, by its terms, prohibits discriminatory actions where a person’s
military status is simply a motivating factor, not the sole motivating factor.” Murphy,
904 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
USERRA, by its own terms, establishes a two-step burden-shifting framework by
which to analyze such claims. 1 First, the plaintiff alleging the discriminatory act bears
1
USERRA was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v.
Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559 (1981), in which the Supreme Court interpreted
USERRA’s predecessor (Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974),
to require that an employee’s military status be the sole motivation for the employer’s
action. See Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the initial burden of showing that the “employee’s military service was a substantial or
motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Sheehan v. Dep’t of Navy, 240
F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A motivating factor does not mean that it had to be the sole cause of the
employment action. Instead, it is one of the factors that a truthful employer
would list if asked for the reasons for its decision. Indeed, [m]ilitary status
is a motivating factor if the defendant relied on, took into account,
considered, or conditioned its decision on that consideration.
Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
If the plaintiff meets his burden, the burden of proof then shifts to the employer,
who must prove that it would have taken the adverse action for non-discriminatory
reasons, regardless of the employee’s military service. 2 Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013. This
standard of proof is the “but for” test. Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1238. “All that is meant [by
this standard] is that if the [employer] had two reasons for taking an adverse action
against the [employee], one of them forbidden by the statute and the other not, and the
[employer] can show that even if the forbidden one had been absent the adverse action
would still have been taken, the [employee] loses.” 3 Madden v. Rolls Royce Corp., 563
F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2009).
2
The statute is explicit that the employer carries the burden of proof once the plaintiff has
made his initial showing. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).
3
To note, this two-step framework differs starkly from the familiar McDonnell Douglas
three-step framework used in most employment discrimination cases. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas
7
Courts have thus held that summary judgment for the employer is appropriate if
the employer can produce uncontested evidence that it would have taken the adverse
employment action even in the absence of an improper motive. See, e.g., Leisek v.
Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the standard on
summary judgment is whether the employer “has established as an uncontroverted fact
that it would have terminated [the employee] even if he had not been a member of the
[military forces]”); Hill v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2001)
(granting summary judgment where employer presented evidence which “clearly
established that it would have fired [the employer for the proffered reasons] even in the
absence of any improper motive”); see also Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto
Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he employer must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the stated reason was not a pretext; that is, that the
action would have been taken in the absence of [the employee’s military] service.”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Although the [employer]
has the burden of proving that the adverse action would have been taken in any event,”
summary judgment is appropriate where the employer’s evidence is “so compelling and
so meagerly contested . . . that a trial would be a waste of time.” Madden, 563 F.3d at
638.
framework, unlike here, the burden of persuasion always remains with the employee. See
Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).
8
Discrimination may be proven through circumstantial evidence. Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996). This is because
discrimination is often subtle, Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Co., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082
(3d Cir. 1996), and not “open or notorious,” Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014. We may thus
reasonably infer discriminatory motivation under USERRA from a variety of factors,
including proximity in time between the employee’s military activity and
the adverse employment action, inconsistencies between the proffered
reason and other actions of the employer, an employer’s expressed hostility
towards members protected by the statute together with knowledge of the
employee’s military activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees
compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses.
Id.
In the case at bar, the District Court concluded that Murphy had satisfied his initial
burden because he “ha[d] adduced sufficient direct evidence that his military
commitments were a substantial or motivating factor” in Radnor’s decision to not extend
a second-round interview. Murphy, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 506-07. We agree.
Murphy alleges, and Granger and the commissioners confirmed, that the Board
engaged in an extended line of questioning regarding Murphy’s military obligations,
including the specific number of days Murphy’s absence is required per year. This
particular line of questioning was substantial and lengthy enough that Granger felt
compelled to intervene. Additionally, Murphy asserts that Granger specifically told him
that the Board declined to grant him a second-round interview because of his “ongoing
military obligations,” a conversation that caused Murphy sufficient concern that he wrote
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down notes about the call soon after it took place. We find that this evidence is sufficient
for Murphy to satisfy his initial burden.
The District Court then undertook the task of analyzing the evidence in light of the
burden shift to Radnor. Although the District Court correctly recited the two-step
burden-shifting framework under USERRA, we believe the District Court committed
error by holding Radnor to a lower standard than that required under the statute.
Specifically, the District Court held that, despite the evidence that Murphy’s military
obligation was a motivating factor, Radnor’s proffered “legitimate, non-discriminatory”
alternative reasons for not offering Murphy the job were “sound and well-supported” and
“no reasonable jury could find that its reasons for not hiring Murphy were invalid.”
Murphy, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 505, 514. This is not the standard. Under USERRA, the
employer does not merely have the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason; rather the employer has the burden of producing a legitimate reason for the
adverse employment action that is so overwhelming, “so compelling,” and “so meagerly
contested” that there is no genuine dispute that the employee would have received the
same treatment regardless of his future military obligations. Madden, 563 F.3d at 638.
Having clarified the correct standard, we believe that Radnor’s proffered reasons for not
hiring Murphy fail to meet it.
Radnor proffered several non-discriminatory reasons for its decision not to hire
Murphy: (1) that the other candidates were more qualified than Murphy; (2) that Murphy
had exaggerated the extent of his prior municipal experience; (3) that Murphy’s
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application was riddled with typos and errors; and (4) that the call from Murphy’s brother
to Masterson was inappropriate and led the commissioners to question Murphy’s
character.
The District Court underwent a thorough analysis of the qualifications of the other
candidates who were offered the position and concluded that all possessed qualifications
that Murphy did not and that Radnor’s assertion that they all were substantially more
qualified than Murphy was reasonable. Indeed, several of the candidates have more than
20 years of experience in municipal service, compared to Murphy’s seven. But while
Radnor insists that each and every candidate offered the job was objectively more
qualified than Murphy, it has not presented evidence so compelling and so meagerly
contested that it conclusively demonstrates Murphy would not have received an offer of
employment despite his future military obligations. See id. at 637, 639 (affirming grant
of summary judgment under USERRA where the employee had lied about having a
graduate engineering degree and was “dangerously incompetent” at his job).
For example, the District Court found that candidate Christopher Canavan
(“Canavan”) was more qualified than Murphy because his prior municipal experience
was in a township whose governing structure was more similar to Radnor’s than was that
of Wilkes-Barre. But other factors suggest that Murphy was more qualified than
Canavan in other ways. Canavan had six months less than Murphy’s seven years’
experience in municipal government. Moreover, in his position as City Administrator for
Wilkes-Barre, Murphy managed a $40 million budget in a city of 44,000; Canavan
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managed a town of 17,500 residents with a $12 million budget. Radnor has thus failed to
meet its burden of producing evidence so compelling that no reasonable jury could
possibly determine that based on his qualifications, and irrespective of his future military
obligations, Murphy would not have been hired for the job.
We also do not believe that Murphy’s exaggeration of his duties as City
Administrator for Wilkes-Barre is a sufficient justification to overcome any genuine
dispute. There is no dispute that Murphy was City Administrator during Wilkes-Barre’s
financial turnaround. There is also no dispute that Wilkes-Barre enlisted the services of
an outside consulting firm. But we are not convinced that this fact — the use of an
outside consulting firm — so diminished Murphy’s accomplishments as City
Administrator that it compels a finding in Radnor’s favor. Moreover, neither
Commissioner Hervada, nor Commissioner Higgins, could recall the alleged
exaggeration as being a basis for declining to grant Murphy a second round interview.
Where the decision makers do not agree as to the proffered reason for the adverse
employment action, we cannot say that the evidence is “so compelling” as to mandate
summary judgment.
Radnor’s remaining two proffered reasons do not bolster its proof beyond dispute.
Although some commissioners testified that they viewed Murphy’s brother’s call as a
negative, Commissioner Hervada testified that it did not surprise him and he was not
12
aware that others viewed it in a negative light. 4 Indeed, a jury may find the contents of
the phone call so innocuous, that it may discredit the commissioners’ testimony that the
call had any effect at all. And while there is no dispute that typos and errors exist in
Murphy’s application, we cannot ignore Murphy’s testimony that Granger explicitly told
him that his “ongoing military obligations” were a primary concern for the Board in not
extending the second-round interview.
Even when viewed in the aggregate, we cannot say that Radnor’s four proffered
reasons are compelling enough to leave no dispute. Accord Hill, 252 F.3d at 310-11 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding that no genuine dispute existed as to whether employer would have
fired employee who falsified time cards despite military service where the employer
presented uncontroverted evidence that its policy was to terminate all employees who
intentionally falsified their time cards).
Because Radnor has failed to produce evidence that is so overwhelming and
compelling as to leave no genuine dispute that Murphy would not have been hired
regardless of his future military obligations, we must reverse the grant of summary
judgment as to the USSERA claim. 5
B. PMAA
4
This certainly implies that the issue may not have been discussed among the
commissioners during their decision-making process.
5
Likewise, because we will reverse in light of all the evidence, we need not address
Murphy’s argument that the testimony of all interested parties should be disregarded at
the summary judgment stage. (See Appellant Br. 17-20.)
13
Like USERRA, PMAA prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of
military service. Under PMAA,
[i]t is unlawful for the Commonwealth or any of its departments, boards,
commissions, agencies or any political subdivision, or for any private
employer, to refuse to hire or employ any individual not on extended active
duty because of his membership in the [military] . . . or to discharge from
employment such individual, or to otherwise discriminate against such
individual with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of such membership . . . .
51 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7309(a).
As the District Court recognized, there is scant case law in our Circuit on this
statute. “In the absence of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling on the precise question
of law presented, we must predict how it would resolve the question.” Klein v. Weidner,
--- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 4712752, *2 (3d Cir. 2013). In the employment-discrimination
context generally, Pennsylvania courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework. See,
e.g., Allegheny Hous. Rehab. Corp. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 532 A.2d 315, 317-
19 (Pa. 1987); Garner v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 16 A.3d 1189, 1198 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2011).
PMAA provides, however, that, “[i]t is the intent of this title that it shall be in
conformity with all acts and regulations of the United States affecting the same subjects,
and all provisions of this title shall be construed to effectuate this purpose.” 51 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 103. Therefore, under PMAA’s very terms, we believe PMAA should be
interpreted in conformity with USERRA, and we will apply the same two-step burden-
shifting framework to claims brought under PMAA as we do to claims under USERRA.
14
We have already applied the two-step framework to Murphy’s USERRA claim
and determined that reversal was required. Analyzing Murphy’s PMAA claim under the
same framework yields the same result.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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