United States v. Daaniyal Muhammad , 398 F. App'x 848 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    No. 10-2930
    __________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    DAANIYAL MUHAMMAD,
    a/ka/ Kalil, a/k/a Officer Lil,
    Appellant
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-07-cr-00737-004)
    District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
    __________
    Argued October 13, 2010
    Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: October 28, 2010)
    Peter A. Levin, Esq. (ARGUED)
    1927 Hamilton Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19130
    Counsel for Appellant
    Salvatore L. Astolfi, Esq. (ARGUED)
    Kathy A. Stark, Esq.
    1
    Office of the United States Attorney
    615 Chestnut Street
    Suite 1250
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Counsel for Appellee
    __________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    Daaniyal Muhammad appeals from the District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, which ordered that he be made fit for trial by medicating him against his
    will. In limited circumstances, Sell v. United States, 
    539 U.S. 166
     (2003), authorizes such
    orders if the Court makes four predicate findings. Before a court reaches Sell’s four-part
    inquiry, however, the government ordinarily must show why medication cannot be
    administered pursuant to other procedures, such as those described in Washington v.
    Harper, 
    494 U.S. 210
     (1990), or 
    28 C.F.R. § 549.43
    . United States v. Grape, 
    549 F.3d 591
    , 599 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We do not reach consideration of the four-factor Sell test
    unless an inmate does not qualify for forcible medication under Harper”). This case is
    unusual in that Muhammad expressly waived any claim or right he may have had under
    Harper or § 549.43. As a result, the sole question we must answer is whether the District
    Court properly applied Sell. We hold that it did, and will affirm.1
    I.
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
     because Muhammad was
    charged with violating the laws of the United States. We have jurisdiction under the
    collateral order exception to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Grape, 
    549 F.3d at 597
    .
    2
    We write for the parties in this case only, and we state the facts and the District
    Court procedures only as necessary to explain our reasoning.
    Muhammad, who was indicted for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, suffers
    from schizophrenia and other mental disorders. Although profoundly disabled by these
    diseases, Muhammad refuses antipsychotic medication, and declines to participate in
    psychotherapy or any other form of mental health treatment. In his un-medicated state, he
    is unable to appreciate the charges against him or to assist in his defense, and as a result
    he is unfit to stand trial. To restore Muhammad’s competency, the government moved for
    the District Court to order him medicated pursuant to Sell. The District Court granted the
    government’s motion after applying Sell’s four-part balancing test, and Muhammad
    appealed.
    Before oral argument, we requested additional briefing on whether Muhammad’s
    condition poses a danger to himself or others, thus triggering the due process procedures
    mandated by § 549.43 and Harper, 
    494 U.S. at 210
    . The government contended that
    Harper and § 549.43 were not relevant and Muhammad agreed, stating that they were
    “not appropriate in this case as there was no evidence that Appellant posed a danger to
    others.” Because neither party disputed Muhammad’s rights or remedies under Harper
    and § 549.43, we do not reach those issues. See United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 
    513 F.3d 908
    , 915 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a district court did not err in “honoring the
    parties’ agreement to proceed directly to the Sell inquiry.”).
    II.
    We begin with the law of pre-conviction involuntary medication. If, as in this case,
    3
    a district court finds a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court must
    commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    . The
    Attorney General must hospitalize and treat the defendant until competency returns,
    unless medical professionals determine that to do so would require an unreasonable
    amount of time. 
    Id.
     § 4241(d).
    While in the Attorney General’s custody, inmates maintain substantial liberty
    interests, including the interest in avoiding unwanted medication. Harper, 
    494 U.S. at 229
    (“The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a
    substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”). “In the case of antipsychotic drugs,”
    like the ones Muhammad may be given, “that interference is particularly severe: [t]he
    purpose of the drugs is to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to
    changes, intended to be beneficial, in his or her cognitive processes. While the
    therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that the
    drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.” Riggins v. Nevada, 
    504 U.S. 127
    , 134
    (1992) (citations omitted).
    Nonetheless, upon “a finding of overriding justification and a determination of
    medical appropriateness,” a defendant’s liberty interest may yield to the legitimate needs
    of government. 
    Id. at 135
    . The Sell Court recognized that Riggins “will permit
    involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain
    instances,” adding, “[b]ut those instances may be rare.” 
    539 U.S. at 180
    ; cf. United States
    v. McCray, 
    474 F. Supp. 2d 671
    , 678 (D.N.J. 2007); United States v. Dumeny, 
    295 F. Supp. 2d 131
    , 132-133 (D. Me. 2004). Sell authorizes such orders only in the limited
    4
    circumstances where (1) important governmental interests are at stake, (2) involuntary
    medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests, (3) involuntary
    medication is necessary to further those interests, and (4) involuntary medication is
    medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical
    condition. 
    539 U.S. at 180-181
    ; see also United States v. Gomes, 
    387 F.3d 157
    , 160 (2d
    Cir. 2004).
    III.
    We will affirm the District Court’s order. The absence of dispute regarding Harper
    and § 549.43 limits us to the narrow question of whether the Court properly applied the
    four Sell factors. We have reviewed the record and we are satisfied that the Court’s
    opinion responded to the contentions Muhammad has made before us. We will affirm its
    judgment without further discussion.
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