United States v. David Ballard , 551 F. App'x 33 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-1207
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DAVID BALLARD,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00455-001)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 16, 2013
Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 6, 2014)
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OPINION
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
David Ballard appeals his conviction on seven counts of mail fraud and five
counts of aggravated identity theft, as well as the sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ballard seeks a judgment of
acquittal or a new trial or, in the alternative, resentencing. For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Background
On April 7, 2011, Philadelphia police obtained a warrant (the “First Local
Warrant”) to search a storage unit rented by Ballard at a Safeguard Self Storage
(“Safeguard”) facility in Philadelphia. The warrant was supported by an affidavit
provided by Detective James Sloan, saying that, based on observations made by
management personnel at Safeguard, it was believed that flat screen televisions and game
systems that had been reported stolen out of other Safeguard storage units would be
found in Ballard’s unit. The warrant listed burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property
as the crimes Ballard was believed to have committed. It specifically identified the
following items “to be searched for and seized”: “2 42[-inch] plasma [televisions],
PlayStation 3 game system, [Xb]ox game system, Nintendo [g]ame[] system, 1 Scepter
37[-inch] flat screen [television], and any other items of evidentiary value[.]” (Supp.
App. at 78.)
Detective Sloan went to Safeguard and executed the warrant with Detectives
Timothy Hartman and Michael Acerenza. The officers found some of the items explicitly
identified in the warrant in Ballard’s storage unit, as well as other electronics. During the
search, the officers opened boot-sized shoe boxes and a milk crate that were in the
storage unit. Inside the boxes, they discovered over 500 credit report printouts, as well as
a variety of personal identifying information and identification cards – social security
2
cards, driver’s licenses, health insurance cards, school ID cards, and a library card – that
were not in Ballard’s name.
While the officers were executing the search warrant, Ballard arrived at the
storage unit and identified himself. The officers placed Ballard under arrest and, incident
to the arrest, conducted a search of his person and a bag he was carrying. That search
yielded an Apple iPod, a cellular phone, and an Apple laptop. The officers also found
notebooks in both the storage unit and on Ballard, which contained personal identifying
information of other individuals, as well as order numbers and descriptions of various
items.1
On April 9, 2011, the Philadelphia police obtained a second warrant (the “Second
Local Warrant”) to search the Apple laptop, iPod, and cell phone that had been seized.
On April 28, 2011, Philadelphia police obtained a third search warrant (the “Third Local
Warrant”) to obtain information regarding the purchase of the Apple laptop and iPod,
stating in an attached affidavit that a search of the Apple laptop and iPod had yielded
“additional (over 1,000) personal information [sic] from persons other than [Ballard]”
and that “[f]urther investigation revealed that numerous electronic devices … were
ordered fraudulently using the information found in these devices.” (Id. at 38.)
Thereafter, at the suggestion of the Philadelphia police, the FBI handled the case and
obtained a warrant (the “Federal Warrant”) to search Ballard’s storage unit for “further
evidence of [Ballard’s] identity theft scheme.” (Id. at 48.)
1
It is unclear which notebooks were recovered from Ballard’s storage unit and
which were found on his person.
3
A grand jury indicted Ballard in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on eight
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (“Counts 1-8”), and five counts of
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5) (“Counts 9-
13”). Ballard filed a motion to suppress any evidence that was obtained from the
execution of the three Local Warrants and the Federal Warrant. After holding a
suppression hearing, the District Court denied Ballard’s motion to suppress in a
memorandum opinion and order, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, witnesses testified regarding seven instances of receiving packages for
electronics that they had not purchased. The witnesses also testified to receiving bills for
credit card accounts that they had not opened. The credit reports, identification cards,
and notebooks in Ballard’s possession contained the personal identifying information of
each of the witnesses. Ballard presented no evidence. The jury found him guilty of
Counts 1-4 and 6-8 for mail fraud, and Counts 9-13 for aggravated identity theft.2
At the sentencing hearing, FBI Special Agent Mackenzie Monarko testified that
she created a spreadsheet with the names of victims. After eliminating people whose
names appeared more than once, she determined that Ballard had possessed personal
identifying information of 1,312 individuals. Based on “notes about orders placed,”
Special Agent Monarko estimated that Ballard actually used the information for over 600
of the 1,312 individuals to make purchases at the Home Shopping Network, Fingerhut,
2
Count 5, which charged mail fraud, had been dismissed on the government’s
motion.
4
Dell, and Bill Me Later (collectively, the “four vendors”). (App. at 89-91.) The four
vendors suffered estimated losses of $111,925.86 from the fraudulent orders.
A Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was prepared, employing the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. For the mail fraud counts, the PSR reflected a total offense
level of 21, beginning with a base offense level of 7; adding an 8-level enhancement for
the amount of the loss, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E); and, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C),
adding a 6-level enhancement because Ballard’s offense involved 250 or more victims.
Applying the total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of I, the Guidelines
imprisonment range for the mail fraud counts was 37 to 46 months. The District Court
adopted the PSR and imposed a 46-month sentence for the mail fraud counts, to run
consecutively with a mandatory 24-month sentence for the counts of aggravated identity
theft, for a total of 70 months’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion3
Ballard argues that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
He also contends that he should be awarded a judgment of acquittal or a new trial because
the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. Alternatively, he asserts that
we should remand for resentencing because the government did not prove, as required by
the sentencing enhancement provision in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), that there were at
least 250 victims of his crime. We address each of those arguments in turn.
3
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
5
A. Motion to Suppress
We “review[] the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as
to the underlying factual findings and exercise[] plenary review of the District Court’s
application of the law to those facts.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.
2002).
Ballard argues that all evidence seized during the execution of the search warrants
should have been suppressed because (1) the First Local Warrant was facially invalid as a
general warrant; (2) his Apple laptop was searched without a warrant; and (3) the Second
and Third Local Warrants and the Federal Warrant were tainted as fruit of the poisonous
tree. The government responds that the evidence obtained during the first search was
seized pursuant to a valid warrant or in plain view and that the District Court did not
clearly err in finding that the search of Ballard’s Apple laptop was proper under the
warrant. Because there were no constitutional defects in those searches, the government
argues, the subsequent search warrants were not tainted.
As to the First Local Warrant, Ballard says it was an impermissible “general
warrant [because it] include[ed] ‘any other items of evidentiary value’ among those items
to be seized.” (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
provides, in relevant part, that warrants must “particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. We have
recognized that “[g]eneral warrants violate the Fourth Amendment because they
essentially authorize ‘a general exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.’”
United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 393 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Coolidge v. New
6
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)). To be valid, therefore, a warrant must “specify
with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized … to the end that
unauthorized invasions of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life be
prevented.” Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 492 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In Andresen, the Supreme Court considered the specificity of warrants which
added “to the exhaustive list of particularly described documents [to be seized] … the
phrase ‘together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this (time)
unknown.’” Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479. The Court held that the language of a warrant is
to be read in context. Id. at 480-81. Because the “other fruits” phrase was “limited by
what precede[d]” it, id. at 481, namely, items relating to the crime of false pretenses with
respect to a particular sale – not just any crime – “the challenged phrase … authoriz[ed]
only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to the crime of false pretenses with
respect to [that sale].” Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the phrase “any other items of evidentiary value” that appears in the
First Local Warrant was limited by the specified list of televisions and game systems
believed to be stolen from other Safeguard storage units, and by the warrant’s
identification of the violations that were being investigated, namely, burglary, theft, and
receiving stolen property. (Supp. App. at 78.) In addition, we have held that, “[w]hen a
warrant is accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit
may be used in construing the scope of the warrant.” United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d
60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982). Here, the First Local Warrant incorporated by reference Detective
7
Sloan’s affidavit, which was directed solely to the investigation of stolen goods at the
Safeguard facility. Thus, the warrant only authorized the executing officers to search for
evidence of burglary, theft, or receipt of stolen property relating to the items that were
reported stolen by Safeguard’s customers.4 When read in context, the phrase “any other
items of evidentiary value” did not invalidate the First Local Warrant. See United States
v. Am. Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1106 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Because the
items to be seized were described with sufficient particularity, the general tail, which is
not read in isolation, does not render the warrant invalid.”).
Turning to the seizure of evidence of identity theft, the question becomes whether
that seizure was proper under the “plain view” doctrine, which provides that police may
“seize incriminating evidence in plain view during the course of a lawful search because
such a seizure ‘does not involve an intrusion on privacy.’” United States v. Menon, 24
F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990)).
For seizure of evidence in plain view to be valid, three conditions must prevail: first, “the
officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in ‘arriving at the place from
which the evidence could be plainly viewed’”; second, “the incriminating character of the
evidence must be ‘immediately apparent’”; and third, “the officer must have ‘a lawful
right of access to the object itself.’” Id. at 559 (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136). The
4
The government also argues that, even if the First State Warrant lacked sufficient
particularity, suppression of evidence was not appropriate because the detectives
“execute[d] a search in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant’s authority.”
(Appellee’s Br. at 44 (quoting United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001))
(internal quotation marks omitted).) Because the First State Warrant contained sufficient
particularity, we need not reach that argument.
8
plain view doctrine is applicable when “the police have a warrant to search a given area
for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of
incriminating character.” Horton, 496 U.S. at 135; see also United States v. Stabile, 633
F.3d 219, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2011); Menon, 24 F.3d at 560.
Because the First Local Warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the
officers were lawfully within Ballard’s storage facility, the first “plain view” condition is
met. As for the second condition – the requirement that the incriminating character of the
evidence be immediately apparent – the Supreme Court has held that the condition
generally requires that “there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal
activity.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42 (1983) (quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980)). It does not require an officer to “know” that items are
evidence of a crime, but “merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime … .” Id. at 742 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detectives Sloan and Hartman testified that
they “immediately” recognized the printouts in the boxes as credit reports as soon as they
saw them (Supp. App. at 114, 142), and the District Court credited their testimony.
Given the volume of credit reports and personal identifying information that the officers
found, it is clear that the officers executing the First Local Warrant had probable cause to
believe that the items were evidence of identity theft or other criminal activity.
With respect to the third condition – the officers’ lawful right of access to the
objects – we have held that this requirement is met “if the [government] agent’s search
9
fits within the literal terms of the warrant and is a reasonable means of obtaining the
objects described in the warrant.” Menon, 24 F.3d at 560. Detectives Sloan, Hartman,
and Acerenza testified at the suppression hearing that they opened boxes in the storage
unit to look for “stolen items” (Supp. App. at 109) or “electronics that could have been
taken in the burglaries” (id. at 142). Detective Sloan explained that he was “looking for
any items of evidentiary value … that could fit” in the boxes (id. at 113), such as “games,
which could be CDs[,] … any paperwork for any of the[] items, … remote controls,
cables, so forth” (id. at 102). The District Court found the officers “were all credible
witnesses” (id. at 205), and determined that items within the scope of the First Local
Warrant, such as gaming systems and electronic accessories, “were capable of fitting
inside” the boxes that were searched. (Id. at 216.) In light of the evidence, the Court’s
factual finding that items within the scope of the First Local Warrant could have been in
the boxes was not clearly erroneous. The officers’ search of the boxes, therefore, was a
reasonable means of executing the First Local Warrant, and the government met the
“lawful right of access” condition for application of the plain view doctrine.
Therefore, all of the conditions for application of the plain view doctrine have
been met. Although the credit report printouts, identification cards, and other evidence of
identity theft were seized outside the explicit scope of the First Local Warrant, the seizure
was valid under that doctrine.
Ballard also argues that the contents of his Apple laptop were searched without a
warrant. As he did in District Court, he asserts that the April 8, 2011, “report date” of the
affidavit attached to the Third Local Warrant, which noted the results of searching
10
Ballard’s Apple laptop and iPod, indicates that the Apple laptop and iPod were searched
before the Second Local Warrant authorizing their search was issued on April 9, 2011.
However, Detective Geliebter testified that the April 8, 2011, date was a clerical error,
which the District Court found to be credible. His testimony was corroborated by the
date on the affidavit’s seal and the date that the Third Local Warrant was issued – both
April 28, 2011. The District Court found that, in light of this evidence, it was “satisfied
that the Third [Local] Warrant, including the accompanying continuation of probable
cause, was prepared and issued on April 28, 2011.” (Supp. App. at 203 n.8.) We do not
discern any error, let alone clear error, in that factual finding. Ballard’s contention that
his Apple laptop was searched before the Second Local Warrant issued is simply false.
Because the seizure of evidence pursuant to the First Local Warrant was lawful,
Ballard’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument fails. The subsequent Local Warrants
and the Federal Warrant were all supported by probable cause stemming from evidence
that had been lawfully seized. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of
Ballard’s motion to suppress.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ballard further argues that the District Court should have granted a judgment of
acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 because the government
“failed to tie in enough of the important aspects … to make [its] case.” (Appellant’s Br.
at 14.) In particular, he contends that there was no evidence presented at trial about how
he would have obtained the personal information of the victims, ordered the credit
reports, or orchestrated the fraudulent scheme.
11
Because Ballard did not timely file a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule
29, we review his claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error. United
States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001). “A conviction based on insufficient
evidence is plain error only if the verdict ‘constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.’” United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Ballard fails to meet that high burden. “The elements of mail … fraud [under 18
U.S.C. § 1341] are (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud for the purpose of obtaining money
or property, (2) participation by the defendant with specific intent to defraud, and (3) use
of the mails … in furtherance of the scheme.” Nat’l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65,
105 (3d Cir. 2012). An individual who “during and in relation” to a mail fraud offense
“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person” is also guilty of aggravated identity theft. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A. Ballard primarily challenges the proof of his role in the scheme. However, the
government only needed to prove his participation, not how each detail in the scheme
was devised or carried out. Additionally, jurors may infer the requisite knowledge and
intent from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 333
(3d Cir. 2010).
The government presented evidence that Ballard possessed either identification
cards or personal identifying information for each of the five victims. The five victims
identified in the indictment also testified regarding each instance of mail fraud and
aggravated identity theft for which Ballard was convicted. The evidence presented at
12
trial was more than sufficient for a jury to find that the government had proven all of the
elements for each count of mail fraud and aggravated identity theft. Ballard has not met
his burden of showing that his conviction was infected by plain error.5
C. Resentencing
Alternatively, Ballard argues that we should remand for resentencing because the
District Court erred in applying the 6-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) for crimes involving 250 or more victims. He asserts that the number
of victims should be limited to the four vendors because the government failed to prove
that any individual victims suffered even a temporary financial loss.
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines. United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2004). We review
factual findings that support Guidelines enhancements for clear error. United States v.
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 590 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
A showing of financial loss is not always necessary when determining the number
of victims for purposes of the § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement. Application Note 4(E) to
§ 2B1.1 provides that, “[f]or purposes of subsection (b)(2), in a case involving means of
5
Ballard also argues that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and
that he should be granted a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. As
just noted, however, the evidence was sufficient. Moreover, Ballard did not timely move
for a new trial under Rule 33. Generally, when a defendant fails to move for a new trial,
the district court has no motion upon which to exercise its discretion, and we are left
without an exercise of discretion to review. See United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237,
248 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “we need not reach the merits of [appellant’s] argument
… [for] a new trial” because he failed to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33).
Therefore, Ballard’s Rule 33 argument is not properly before us.
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identification[,] ‘victim’ means … any individual whose means of identification was used
unlawfully or without authority.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E). “‘Means of
identification’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), except that
such means of identification shall be of an actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual … .”
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), “means of identification”
includes, inter alia, “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with
any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any … name, social
security number, date of birth, [and] official State or government issued driver’s license
or identification number.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7).
Special Agent Monarko estimated that Ballard purchased items fraudulently from
the four vendors using the personal identification information of over 600 actual
individuals. Even if this estimate was not precise, there was substantial evidence that
Ballard’s scheme involved at least 250 actual individuals “whose means of identification
[were] used unlawfully or without authority.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E). The
District Court thus did not clearly err in concluding that Ballard’s scheme involved at
least 250 victims and applying the enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the conviction on all counts of mail
fraud and aggravated identity theft, as well as Ballard’s sentence.
14