James Deemer v. Jeffrey Beard , 557 F. App'x 162 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-1986
_____________
JAMES MARTIN DEEMER,
Appellant
v.
JEFFREY BEARD, Former Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,
in his individual capacity; JOHN KERESTES, Superintendent of SCI-Mahanoy,
in his individual capacity; KRIS CALKINS, Records Officer, SCI-Mahanoy,
in her individual capacity; DON YOUNG, Records Officer, SCI-Mahanoy,
in his individual capacity; CATHERINE C. McVEY, Former Chairperson,
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, in her individual capacity; AMY
CLEWELL, Supervisor, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,
in her individual capacity; JOHN DOE NOS. 1 THROUGH X
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-01143)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________
Argued: January 16, 2014
____________
Before: RENDELL, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 27, 2014)
____________
Paul W. Hughes, Esq. (Argued)
Charles A. Rothfeld, Esq.
Jason R. LaFond, Esq.
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20006
-AND-
Philip D. Lauer, Esq.
Lauer & Sletvold, P.C.
701 Washington Street
Easton, PA 18042
Counsel for Appellant
Alan M. Robinson, Esq. (Argued)
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
1101 S. Front Street, Suite 5100
Harrisburg, PA 17104
Counsel for Appellees
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
James Deemer, a former Pennsylvania inmate, filed this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that he was confined for a year and a day beyond the date on which his
prison sentence should have expired. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, finding that Deemer had failed to establish that his term of incarceration had
been overturned, a prerequisite under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), for
challenging the duration of confinement in a § 1983 action. Heck, as authoritatively
interpreted by our Court, bars Deemer’s claim. We, therefore, will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
1
The facts are drawn from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, which
we assume to be true, and judicial and administrative orders that form part of the record
2
On June 25, 2007, Deemer was released on parole from a Pennsylvania prison,
where he was serving a two-to-six year sentence for his conviction on two counts of retail
theft. At the time of his release, he had 489 days remaining on his sentence.
One of the conditions of Deemer’s parole was that he enroll in a residential drug
treatment program. He failed to report to the program, however, and, two days after he
was paroled, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) declared him
delinquent and issued a detainer warrant. He remained a fugitive until November 14,
2007, when he was arrested in Warren County, New Jersey and charged with a violation
of New Jersey law. For the next 366 days until the Warren County charges were
dismissed, he was detained by the County without bail.2
Following his detention in New Jersey, Deemer was returned to Pennsylvania and
incarcerated at SCI Mahanoy. The Board conducted a parole violation hearing and, by
written decision, determined that he had violated the terms of his parole and that his
sentence would now expire on June 17, 2010. In arriving at that new maximum sentence
date, the Board determined that 489 days, the entire amount remaining on his sentence as
of his June 2007 release, had yet to be served. The Board rejected his contention that he
should receive credit against his sentence for the 366 days of custody by Warren County.
He was ultimately released from Pennsylvania prison on June 17, 2010.
of the case, documents which can be considered by us in reviewing a motion to dismiss.
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 258 n.1, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
2
After the Warren County charges were dismissed, Deemer was transferred to
Bergen County, New Jersey, and served time on an unrelated conviction for which parole
had been revoked. The period of incarceration in Bergen County is not relevant to
Deemer’s § 1983 claim.
3
While he was incarcerated, Deemer challenged through several avenues the
Board’s decision to imprison him for a full 489 days. He filed a petition for
administrative review with the Board that it denied on December 18, 2009. He then
appealed the Board’s decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. That appeal
remained pending, without decision, as of the date of his release from SCI Mahanoy on
June 17, 2010. Once Deemer was released, the Board filed an application with the
Commonwealth Court to dismiss the appeal as moot, which the court granted on June 23,
2010. Two months earlier, in April 2010, Deemer filed in the Schuylkill County Court of
Common Pleas a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the alleged illegality of his
continued confinement. In addition, while in prison, he directed correspondence to
various agencies and individuals, explaining that he had served his full sentence and
asking to be released.
Deemer filed this § 1983 action for damages following his release. He alleged that
the Board’s failure to credit against his remaining sentence the 366 days spent in Warren
County’s custody had resulted in incarceration beyond the maximum sentence imposed
by the court of conviction, in violation of both Pennsylvania law and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. His complaint identified a number of
individual defendants who, he alleged, were responsible for his unlawful incarceration.
The defendants moved to dismiss.
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion, relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heck v. Humphrey. Heck holds that a plaintiff may not challenge the
4
constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action unless he can
demonstrate that the prior criminal proceeding terminated in his favor. Although Deemer
had made previous attempts to overturn the Board’s decision, none had yielded a
favorable disposition. Therefore, he did not satisfy the mandate of Heck and the Court
found that this action was barred. Moreover, the Court felt constrained by binding
precedent from this Court to apply the Heck favorable termination rule even if to do so
would effectively deny Deemer another forum in which to challenge the Board’s
decision, given that he was no longer in custody and could not pursue a habeas claim.
This appeal followed.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the Court’s
ruling on a motion to dismiss, and assess the sufficiency of the well-pleaded allegations
in the complaint under the familiar plausibility standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206, 209-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
Deemer argues that the District Court erred in applying the Heck v. Humphrey
favorable termination bar to the facts of his case. He contends that Heck’s rule does not,
and should not, apply to § 1983 plaintiffs who, like him, are no longer in custody and
who, through no fault of their own, never had alternate access to the federal courts’
5
habeas corpus jurisdiction. In view of our existing precedent, we disagree.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court announced that a plaintiff cannot attack
the validity of his conviction or sentence in a § 1983 damages action without proving that
the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.”3 512 U.S. at 486-87. Heck determined that this requirement emanated from
§ 1983 itself. Recognizing that § 1983 creates a particular kind of liability for
constitutional torts, the Court turned to common-law tort principles to inform its
interpretation of the federal civil rights statute. It first concluded that the common-law
tort of malicious prosecution “provides the closest analogy” to § 1983 claims for
damages predicated on the unconstitutionality of a conviction or sentence. Id. at 484.
That being so, § 1983 claims of this sort, like the common-law cause of action for
malicious prosecution, require a showing that the prior criminal proceeding terminated in
the plaintiff’s favor. Heck went on to state that “the principle barring collateral attacks”
on a conviction or sentence, which motivates the favorable termination requirement, “is
not rendered inapplicable by the fortuity that a convicted criminal is no longer
incarcerated.” Id. at 490 n.10.
3
Deemer does not dispute that his § 1983 claim, predicated as it is on the Board’s
alleged miscalculation of his remaining sentence, is an attack on the duration of his
confinement otherwise subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule. See Williams v.
Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying Heck to claim of unlawful
detention based on parole board decision).
6
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter endorsed the majority’s favorable
termination rule, but found that it applied only to those individuals in state custody, as
they had access to federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and were required to first
challenge their sentence or conviction through that mechanism. Id. at 498-500 (Souter,
J., concurring). He explained that imposing a categorical favorable termination
requirement would have the “untoward result” of denying any federal forum to claimants
who were not in state custody and could not invoke federal habeas jurisdiction. Id. at
500.
Subsequently, in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), five of the justices, in
three concurring and dissenting opinions, adopted the reasoning of Justice Souter’s
concurrence in Heck. Id. at 19-21 (Souter, J., concurring, and joined by O’Connor,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Because the concurring and dissenting justices did not coalesce behind an
authoritative majority opinion, however, it has remained an unsettled issue before the
Supreme Court whether the “unavailability of habeas . . . may . . . dispense with the Heck
requirement.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004) (per curiam).
The main dispute between the parties before us is in identifying the position staked
out by this Court. Taking a cue from the five-justice Spencer plurality, seven courts of
appeals have found that the Heck favorable termination rule does not apply to plaintiffs
for whom federal habeas relief is unavailable, at least where the plaintiff is not
responsible for failing to seek or limiting his own access to the habeas corpus remedy.
7
See Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 2012); Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d
1311, 1315-17 (10th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 267-68 (4th Cir.
2008); Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 602-03 (6th Cir.
2007); Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2003); Nonnette v. Small,
316 F.3d 872, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2002); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001).
We have not adopted this approach. We, along with three other courts of appeals,
have declined to follow the concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer, and have
interpreted Heck to impose a universal favorable termination requirement on all § 1983
plaintiffs attacking the validity of their conviction or sentence. See Williams, 453 F.3d at
177-78; Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005); Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d
998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Cohen,
621 F.3d at 1315 (finding our Court has aligned itself with the First, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits on this question); Powers, 501 F.3d at 602 (same). Thus, our decisions in Gilles
v. Davis and Williams v. Consovoy already resolved the issue raised in this case,
concluding, as they did, that Heck’s favorable termination rule applies to all § 1983
plaintiffs, not just those in state custody.
In Gilles, one of the § 1983 claimants, Timothy Petit, was arrested for disorderly
conduct after he videotaped an associate preaching controversial views on a college
campus. Petit voluntarily entered into a court-supervised probation program and, after its
successful completion, the charge was expunged from his criminal record. In the § 1983
8
action that he later filed, Petit argued that he had been engaged in protected First
Amendment speech rather than disorderly conduct, a claim that would have invalidated
his placement under court supervision. Because Petit’s probation bore several features
that were “not consistent with innocence,” we found that participation in the program did
not constitute a favorable termination of his criminal charge and we dismissed his suit
pursuant to Heck. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211.
In concluding that the claim was precluded, the Gilles Court did not mention
Justice Souter’s concurrence in Heck and did not so much as intimate that Heck’s
favorable termination rule was anything less than a categorical requirement stemming
from § 1983 itself. We acknowledged that the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Spencer “question[ed] the applicability of Heck” to Petit’s case, as he was not in state
custody and “ha[d] no recourse under the habeas statute.” Id. at 209-10. Yet, we
determined, “these opinions do not affect our conclusion that Heck applies to Petit’s
claims.” Id. at 210. We doubted that the pronouncements in Spencer by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Stevens undermined Heck, and, even if they did, we joined with the First
and Fifth Circuits in leaving it to the Supreme Court to scale back or overrule Heck’s
holding. Id. (citing Randell, 227 F.3d at 301-02; Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 81 n.3).
Less than a year later, in Williams, we again addressed Heck’s reach. In 1997,
John Williams was arrested as a parole violator, his parole was revoked, and he was re-
incarcerated. After his release, in 2001, Williams brought a § 1983 action challenging,
among other things, the legality of his arrest and parole revocation. We affirmed the
9
dismissal of Williams’ action for failure to comply with the Heck favorable termination
rule and reiterated that Heck applied across the board, stating that “a § 1983 remedy is
not available to a litigant[, like Williams,] to whom habeas relief is no longer available.”
Williams, 453 F.3d at 177. We again noted that the holding in Heck had not been
undermined by the several, disparate opinions in Spencer, and specifically rejected the
Second Circuit’s position, in reliance on Spencer’s non-majority opinions, that § 1983
relief must be available where a federal habeas corpus remedy is not. Id. (rejecting the
reasoning of Huang, 251 F.3d at 75).
Notably, in neither Gilles nor Williams did we find at all salient the reason why the
§ 1983 claimant could not access the federal courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction. We,
therefore, see no cause to distinguish between the plaintiffs in those cases, who seem to
have voluntarily relinquished the ability to launch a federal habeas challenge,4 and
Deemer, who arguably lacked access to federal habeas relief solely due to the short
duration of his confinement.
Gilles and Williams dictate that, under Heck, any claimant, even if the door to
federal habeas is shut and regardless of the reason why, must establish favorable
termination of his underlying criminal proceeding before he can challenge his conviction
4
Petit voluntarily “waive[d] his right to prove his innocence” by entering into
Pennsylvania’s pre-trial probationary program, Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209, and Williams sat
on his habeas rights for three years while he was incarcerated, challenging the loss of
parole only after he was released from custody, see Williams, 453 F.3d at 175-76 & n.1.
10
or sentence in a § 1983 action. We are bound by that precedent.5 See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1;
Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003). The fact that a cobbled-together
majority of the justices in Spencer endorsed a different course does not permit us to
deviate from our authoritative interpretation of Heck. If subsequent opinions of the
Supreme Court undermine or supersede Heck, we leave it to that Court to declare so. See
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); Gilles, 427 F.3d at 210.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
5
To the extent that certain non-precedential decisions by panels of this Court
suggest that Heck’s favorable termination requirement is limited to individuals who had
access to federal habeas relief or that the scope of the Heck requirement remains an open
question within this Circuit, we find them unpersuasive.
11
Deemer v. Beard, No. 13-1986
RENDELL, J., concurring:
While I agree with the majority that our precedent dictates that we must reject
James Deemer’s argument, I believe that the principles that animated the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Heck should lead to a different result, were the Court to consider the
issue anew in the fact pattern before us.
In Heck, the majority noted that the issue presented was at the intersection of the
habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994) ("This case lies at the intersection of the
two most fertile sources of federal-court prisoner litigation - [] 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Both of these provide access to a federal
forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials, but they
differ in their scope and operation.”) A concern was expressed that permitting suits via §
1983 without the favorable termination of the conviction would lead to inconsistent
results. Id. at 484-85. That is, an award of damages for wrongful incarceration would be
inconsistent with the fact of the prisoner’s 'lawful' incarceration.
However, these concerns disappear once the defendant is no longer
incarcerated. Not only does the possibility of inconsistent results disappear, but as some
of our sister courts of appeals have noted, it could be said that fairness mandates that a
former prisoner, who no longer has habeas review available, should be permitted via §
1983 to seek recourse for alleged violations of his rights. See infra Cohen v. Longshore,
621 F.3d 1311, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir.
1
2008); Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir.
2007). Given the scope and history of § 1983 as designed to redress constitutional
violations, I think that fairness is a persuasive consideration.
A judgment in Deemer’s favor, post-release, would only vindicate his rights
in the face of unlawful state action – serving the exact purpose of § 1983 – not create the
inconsistent result of continued incarceration and a favorable civil judgment. Absent the
availability of § 1983, a former prisoner is left with no recourse through no fault of his
own. As Justice Ginsberg noted, such individuals “fit within § 1983’s broad reach.”
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (internal quotations
omitted). Why should the former prisoner be denied even the opportunity for such
vindication?
As the majority notes, reasonable minds differ as to the reach of Heck.
Compare Wilson, 535 F.3d at 267 (“[W]e are left with no directly applicable precedent
upon which to rely.”) to Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (Heck
directly applicable as a bar to former prisoner’s § 1983 action). I, for one, believe that it
should not reach to deny Mr. Deemer the opportunity for vindication via § 1983. Even
so, until the Supreme Court decides this issue, we will continue to hold that Heck’s
majority, and not the “cobbled-together” group of judges who have expressed concern
regarding the denial of § 1983 relief for someone in Mr. Deemer’s position, must dictate
the fate of persons like Mr. Deemer. Thus, I concur in the result.
2