Miller v. EEOC, Pittsburgh Area Office ( 2015 )


Menu:
  • ALD-168                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-2787
    ___________
    DUANE MILLER,
    Appellant
    v.
    EEOC, Pittsburgh Area Office
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-00347)
    District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
    ____________________________________
    Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    April 16, 2015
    Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: May 5, 2015)
    _________
    OPINION*
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Pro se appellant Duane Miller appeals from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Pennsylvania’s dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because Miller’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will grant
    Appellee’s motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
    I.
    In 2010, Miller filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission (“EEOC”), asserting that his former employer, Keystone Blind Association
    (“KBA”), discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964. After the EEOC notified Miller that it did not find that KBA
    committed any violations, Miller filed a complaint against KBA in the District Court.
    The District Court granted KBA’s summary judgment motion in 2013, and we thereafter
    affirmed. See Miller v. Keystone Blind Assoc./TPM, 547 F. App’x 100, 101 (3d Cir.
    2013) (per curiam).
    Miller filed the current lawsuit in March 2014, alleging that the EEOC’s handling
    of his 2010 charge had violated his right to a fair investigation. The Magistrate Judge
    issued a report recommending that the complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. In particular, the
    Magistrate Judge determined that Miller could not bring a cause of action against the
    EEOC under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
    2
    Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), challenging its processing of his charge.
    After considering Miller’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, the District Court
    adopted the report and issued an order dismissing Miller’s complaint on April 25, 2014.
    Miller timely appealed, and opposes Appellee’s motion for summary action.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District
    Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a
    claim is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We will
    summarily affirm the District Court’s order if there is no substantial question presented in
    the appeal. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
    After careful review of the record, we discern no error in the District Court’s
    dismissal of Miller’s complaint. As the Magistrate Judge concluded, “no cause of action
    against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim.” Scheerer v. Rose
    State Coll., 
    950 F.2d 661
    , 663 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted); see, e.g.,
    Jordan v. Summers, 
    205 F.3d 337
    , 342 (7th Cir. 2000); Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau
    Int’l, Inc., 
    111 F.3d 2
    , 6 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The proper course of action for a
    plaintiff who contends that his employment discrimination complaint has been
    mishandled is to bring a lawsuit against his employer. See 
    Jordan, 205 F.3d at 342
    .
    3
    Miller has already brought such a lawsuit, and his lack of success there does not give rise
    to a claim against the EEOC.
    Ordinarily, a district court should not sua sponte dismiss a complaint under 28
    U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
    complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
    However, because amendment would be futile in this case, dismissal without leave to
    amend was proper. See 
    id. Accordingly, we
    will grant Appellee’s motion for summary
    action and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
    Miller’s miscellaneous motions for relief are denied.
    4