United States v. Mickey Weicksel , 517 F. App'x 67 ( 2013 )


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  • BLD-067                                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-3424
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    MICKEY ALLEN WEICKSEL,
    Appellant
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 02-cr-00495)
    District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and Possible
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    December 13, 2012
    Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 11, 2013)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Mickey Allen Weicksel appeals from an order denying his motion for recusal and
    for release on bail. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal to the extent it
    concerns the recusal motion, and deny the appeal to the extent it seeks review of his
    motion for release on bail.
    After a jury trial, Weicksel was found guilty of wire fraud, bank fraud, and a
    money laundering conspiracy. He was sentenced to a total of 168 months in prison. The
    judgment was affirmed on appeal. In March 2011, Weicksel mistakenly filed a motion
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     in our Court. We transferred the motion to the District
    Court. He was given leave to file an amended § 2255 motion, and the Government filed
    a response. Soon thereafter, Weicksel filed a motion asking District Judge Surrick to
    recuse himself, and asking that he be released on bail pending disposition of the § 2255
    motion. Judge Surrick denied both motions, and Weicksel appealed.
    The order denying Weicksel’s recusal motion is not appealable at this time, and
    this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review that portion of the order. It is neither a
    final order under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     nor an immediately appealable interlocutory order
    certified by the District Court under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (b). An order denying a recusal
    motion is reviewable after final judgment is entered in the case. See City of Pittsburgh v.
    Simmons, 
    729 F.2d 953
    , 954 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Green v. Murphy, 
    259 F.2d 591
    , 594
    (3d Cir. 1958) (en banc)).
    Under certain circumstances, a litigant may seek this Court’s mandamus review of
    the denial of a recusal request. While a recusal motion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 144
     is
    not reviewable until after final judgment, see In re School Asbestos Litigation, 
    977 F.2d 764
    , 775 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Green, 
    259 F.2d at 594
    ), mandamus may be appropriate to
    review a denial of a disqualification motion made under 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    . See 
    id.
     at 777-
    78. Here, Weicksel has not filed a mandamus petition, but we have the discretion to treat
    2
    his notice of appeal as a mandamus petition. See Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 
    735 F.2d 763
    , 773 (3d Cir. 1984). However, the allegations in Weicksel’s recusal motion, along
    with the allegations in his motions filed in our Court, do not question the District Judge’s
    impartiality in his case as much as they convey his discontent regarding the manner in
    which his criminal proceedings have been handled. Although he contends in his filings
    that the District Judge is “biased,” and “prejudiced,” and “partial,” the allegations are
    based on the District Judge’s unfavorable and/or allegedly incorrect rulings. See
    Blackledge v. Allison, 
    431 U.S. 63
    , 74 n.4 (1977) (motion under § 2255 ordinarily
    presented to judge who presided at original conviction and sentencing of prisoner). Even
    if the Court were to exercise mandamus jurisdiction to review the order appealed,
    Weicksel would not be entitled to relief. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom
    Inc., 
    224 F.3d 273
    , 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s
    displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”).
    A court’s order denying bail pending disposition of a habeas petition (in this case,
    Weicksel’s § 2255 motion), is “plainly appealable as a collateral order.” Landano v.
    Rafferty, 
    970 F.2d 1230
    , 1237 (citing United States v. Smith, 
    835 F.2d 1048
    , 1058 (3d
    Cir. 1987)). But bail pending disposition of habeas corpus review is available “only
    when the petitioner has raised substantial constitutional claims upon which he has a high
    probability of success . . . or exceptional circumstances exist which make a grant of bail
    necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239. Weicksel
    sought release in order to “collect the evidence proving” that his trial attorney was
    3
    ineffective. He did not make a showing of high probability of success or exceptional
    circumstances, and thus bail was not warranted.
    For the foregoing reasons, Weicksel’s appeal will be dismissed in part and denied
    in part. 1
    1
    We have reviewed the motions Weicksel filed in our Court. Given the
    disposition of this appeal, all pending motions are denied.
    4