Stephen Blackstone v. A. L. Thompson , 568 F. App'x 82 ( 2014 )

BLD-272 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-4664
___________
STEPHEN BERNARD BLACKSTONE,
Appellant
v.
A.L. THOMPSON, Sued in his individual and official capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00899)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 5, 2014
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 10, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Stephen Bernard Blackstone, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that Corrections Officer Alfred
L. Thompson violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from an attack by
his cellmate. After discovery, Thompson filed a motion for summary judgment, which
the District Court granted on the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Blackstone
appealed.1 Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm.
I.
Blackstone’s complaint alleged that Corrections Officer A.L. Thompson failed to
protect him from his cellmate, Gary Weedon. According to the allegations, on November
9, 2010, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Blackstone told Thompson that he was having
problems with Weedon, that he did not feel comfortable around Weedon, and that he
wanted to move. In response, Thompson informed Blackstone that he did not have the
authority to move inmates. He provided Blackstone with a DC-135A Request to Staff
form and instructed him to fill out the form and give it to the unit manager the following
day. Blackstone filled out the form and immediately placed it in the unit manager’s
mailbox. He wrote, among other things: “I believe my cellie may try to assault me in the
cell tonight.” [Doc. 1, Complaint, Exh. A]. It is undisputed that Thompson never saw
the written request.
That evening, Blackstone sustained injuries from a fight with his cellmate.
According to Blackstone, he was lounging in the dayroom when Weedon attacked him,
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Blackstone subsequently filed a post-judgment motion seeking relief from the final
judgment in order to introduce new evidence. The District Court denied that motion.
That denial is not before us, as Blackstone did not file a timely new or amended Notice of
Appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
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unprovoked. The attack resulted in facial contusions, blurred vision, lingering headaches
and a fractured orbital bone. Thompson conceded that there was a fight but maintained
that the altercation was mutual, as opposed to an unprovoked assault. Thompson
described the fight accordingly in an incident report. Prison officials conducted a
disciplinary hearing. After the hearing officer reviewed video evidence, Blackstone and
Weedon were both found guilty of fighting. As punishment, Blackstone was assigned to
restricted housing for thirty days.
Blackstone alleged that prison policy DC-ADM 802 authorizes an inmate to
request self-lockup for his own protection, but that he was not given that option by
Thompson. He further claimed that Thompson knew or should have known that Weedon
was likely to assault Blackstone because, in addition to Blackstone’s express statement to
Thompson, Weedon carried an inmate status of “H-Code,” signifying that he was a high
risk inmate. Blackstone also alleged that Thompson knew that other inmates had
complained about Weedon in the past.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily
affirm if Blackstone’s appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4
and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. When reviewing orders granting summary judgment we apply
the same test as the District Court, granting summary judgment where there remains no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010). We view
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the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010).
III.
To survive Thompson’s motion for summary judgment, Blackstone needed to
point to evidence in the record that Thompson both knew of and was deliberately
indifferent to an excessive risk to his safety. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,
131 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). We agree with
the District Court that Blackstone did not adduce evidence to show that Thompson
operated from the requisite mindset.
When making a determination as to deliberate indifference, the court must “focus
[on] what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should
have been (or should be).” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir.1997) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Even if Thompson “knew the
underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise
was insubstantial or nonexistent,” liability will not attach. Id. at 844. Here, there is no
indication in the record that Thompson made the inference that an excessive risk was
present. Prior to the fight, Blackstone had just one communication with Thompson, in
which Blackstone stated that he was not “getting along” and did not “feel comfortable”
with his cellmate. [See Doc. 66, p. 1-2]. Absent any other evidence of Thompson’s
culpable state of mind, that singular, generalized statement is not sufficient to permit a
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reasonable finder of fact to infer that Thompson both knew of and intentionally
disregarded an excessive risk to Blackstone’s safety.
Blackstone points to Weedon’s “H-class” status as circumstantial evidence of
Thompson’s deliberate indifference. The risk that an inmate with some history of
violence might attack another inmate for an unknown reason, however, is too speculative
to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d
Cir. 2012). It is true that the requisite mindset may be proved by circumstantial evidence,
such as where a plaintiff demonstrates that a substantial risk was “longstanding,
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842 (citations omitted); see also Leavy, 117 F.3d at 747. Here, however,
there were no longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or previously noted tensions
between Weedon and Blackstone. Nor is there any indication in the record that
Blackstone told Thompson of any specific incident or cause of tension between the
cellmates from which a greater inference of risk could be drawn. See Bistrian, 696 F.3d
at 368-71 (permitting Eighth Amendment claims to proceed where an inmate repeatedly
advised officials of threats he received as a result of helping an investigation that targeted
those with whom he was placed). To the contrary, Blackstone’s filings repeatedly
describe the type of “out-of-the-blue and unadorned ‘I’m-in-trouble’ entreaty,” id. at
69-70, that is commonly faced by officials, who are charged with the “arduous” task of
managing an inmate population while protecting those in custody. Young v. Quinlan,
960 F. 2d 351, 363 n.23 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform
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Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as recognized in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204
F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).
We acknowledge that the factual assertions of the parties differ as to who
instigated the altercation between Weedon and Blackstone. That dispute, however, is not
material to Blackstone’s claims. See F.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Even assuming that Blackstone
was attacked by Weedon, Blackstone has not pointed to evidence of deliberate
indifference. As we have explained, the combination of Weedon’s “H-Code” status and
one report of unspecified tensions between the cellmates does not support an inference of
deliberate indifference. The District Court thus correctly concluded that summary
judgment was warranted.2
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
2
We also perceive no error in the District Court’s order denying Blackstone’s request for
counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993). We observe that
Blackstone diligently prosecuted his case; his thorough filings reflect that he was able to
effectively conduct discovery and present his arguments. Id.; Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741
F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984). The District Court also did not err in denying Blackstone’s
motion for a temporary restraining order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
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