Keith Mays v. United States ( 2014 )

ALD-232 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-1012
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KEITH MAYS,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00522)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 15, 2014
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 29, 2014)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Keith Mays, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District
Court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. 1
I.
Keith Mays, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill, filed a
complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, seeking
money damages from the United States for “physical injury, pain and suffering, and
future medical expenses.” Dkt. No. 1, at 4. Mays complained of injuries received when
he slipped and fell on a wet floor in the staff dining room at FCI Schuylkill. Specifically,
he claimed the wet floor caused him to fall on his back and hit his head. The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the
Inmate Accident Compensation Act (IAC), 18 U.S.C. § 4126, provides the exclusive
remedy for such injuries. The District Court granted the motion and agreed that because
Mays’s injury was work related, the IAC precluded his FTCA claims. Mays timely
appealed.
II.
“When reviewing an order dismissing a claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review findings of
fact for clear error.” White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).
1
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may
summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial
issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm on any basis supported by the
record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
2
In this case, we discern no error in the District Court’s legal conclusions or factual
findings.
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the IAC precludes Mays from
bringing an FTCA claim. In the IAC, Congress created a scheme to compensate inmates
for injuries sustained in the course of their penal employment. By statute, the Federal
Prison Industries Fund pays “compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries
suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or
operation of the institution in which the inmates are confined.” 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4);
see also 28 C.F.R. § 301.101-301.319 (regulating such claims). Federal prisoners seeking
compensation for injuries sustained during penal employment are limited to the remedy
provided by the IAC, 18 U.S.C. § 4126. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-
54 (1966) (holding that prisoners are barred from bringing FTCA claims in such
situations, as § 4126 is their exclusive remedy).
Mays argued that the IAC did not apply to his claim for compensation because he
was enrolled in a vocational training (rather than work) program and because the injury
occurred during a scheduled break time. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion
that this program is a “work activity” that falls within the ambit of the IAC. The culinary
vocation program at issue paid wages to inmate participants because “[i]nmates enrolled
in this program are not allowed to enroll or participate in other courses, programs, or job
assignments that conflict with the daily, Monday through Friday schedule” of the
program. Dkt. No. 23-1, at 4. Furthermore, hands-on work in locations such as the
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Officers’ Dining Hall constituted a substantial portion of the training program. Id.
Mays’s work was therefore connected to the “operation of the institution” as
contemplated by § 4126(c)(4).
We further agree that the IAC is applicable despite the fact that Mays’s injury took
place during a scheduled break. The relevant regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 301.301(c), states
that “compensation shall not be paid for injuries suffered away from the work location
(e.g., while the claimant is going to or leaving work, or going to or coming from lunch
outside of the work station or area).” Courts have found that injuries that occur inside the
work area while an inmate was going to or from work or to or from a break are
exclusively covered by the IAC. See, e.g., Wooten v. United States, 437 F.2d 79, 80 (5th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that an inmate suffered a work-related injury while
traveling in a freight elevator while on his way to lunch and rejecting inmate’s “narrow
construction of the words ‘activity directly related to the prisoner's work assignment’ as
limiting compensable injuries to those which occur at the work bench.”). Mays stated in
his complaint that he was in the Officers’ Dining Hall when he fell. As this location was
within his work area, we agree with the District Court that the IAC is the exclusive
remedy for Mays’s alleged injuries.
III.
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily
affirm.
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