Joseph Aruanno v. Commissioner Social Security , 471 F. App'x 87 ( 2012 )


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  • CLD-126                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-4643
    ___________
    JOSEPH ARUANNO,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY; JOHN/JANE DOES 1-25
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-02521)
    District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    February 24, 2012
    Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed March 26, 2012)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Joseph Aruanno appeals an order of the United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    Aruanno filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against the Commissioner of
    the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and twenty-five John and Jane Doe
    Defendants seeking judicial review of his suspension of Social Security disability
    (“SSDI”) benefits.
    In July 1995, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded Aruanno SSDI
    benefits with an entitlement date of November 1993. In December 1996, after the SSA
    learned that Aruanno was incarcerated as a result of a New Jersey state court conviction
    for second-degree sexual assault, his SSDI benefits were suspended. In 2004, while still
    serving his prison sentence, Aruanno was involuntarily committed pursuant to the New
    Jersey Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”) and placed in civil detention in the
    Special Treatment Unit (“STU”), where he currently resides. His SSDI benefits remain
    suspended.
    According to Aruanno’s complaint, he contacted the SSA via letter in 2004
    seeking to have his benefits restored, but was unsuccessful. Several years later, in
    November 2007, Aruanno again wrote the SSA demanding that his benefits be restored.
    After receiving no response from the SSA for several years, Aruanno filed the instant
    action in April 2011. Aruanno sought an order from the District Court restoring his SSDI
    benefits retroactive to 2004. The SSA moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
    because Aruanno failed to exhaust administrative remedies and thus did not obtain a
    judicially reviewable “final decision,” the District Court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over the complaint. In December 2011, the District Court concluded that it
    2
    lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit, granted the SSA’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed
    Aruanno’s complaint. Aruanno appeals.
    We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    Our review of the dismissal of Aruanno’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    is plenary. Tobak v. Apfel, 
    195 F.3d 183
    , 185 (3d Cir. 1999). The District Court’s
    jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act is provided by 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), which states, in part, that an “individual, after any final decision of the
    Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing . . . may obtain a review of such
    decision by a civil action.” Without a “final decision,” the District Court has no
    jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s determination. Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 
    148 F.3d 232
    , 234 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 328 (1976)). We
    agree with the District Court that there is no such decision here.
    Under SSA regulations, an individual claiming entitlement to benefits first
    receives an initial determination. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.902
    . If dissatisfied with that
    determination, the claimant may seek reconsideration. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.907
    . If the
    claimant is dissatisfied with that determination, he or she may request a hearing before an
    ALJ. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.929
    . If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ’s hearing
    decision, he or she may request that the Appeals Council review the decision. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.967
    . The Appeals Council may deny the request for review and allow the ALJ’s
    decision to stand as the final decision of the Commissioner. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.981
    . The
    Appeals Council may also grant the request for review and issue its own decision. 
    Id.
     In
    3
    either case, the claimant may then seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
    decision by filing an action in federal district court within sixty days after receiving
    notice of the Appeals Council’s action. Id.; see also 
    20 C.F.R. § 422.210
    . If the claimant
    does not pursue administrative appeal rights, the administrative determination or decision
    becomes binding. 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.905
    , 404.921, 404.955, 404.981.
    Aruanno’s benefits were suspended in 1996 after he was incarcerated. Under the
    Social Security Act and pursuant to SSA regulations, disability insurance benefits may
    not be paid to an individual who is incarcerated for a criminal offense, or who is
    committed to an institution as a sexually dangerous person. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 402
    (x)(1)(A); 
    20 CFR § 404.468
    . The regulations indicate that nonpayment of benefits
    due to incarceration is considered an initial determination. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.902
    (t).
    Aruanno does not dispute that he failed to seek formal reconsideration of the initial
    determination to suspend his benefits, or otherwise pursue an administrative appeal.
    Because Aruanno did not exhaust his administrative remedies, he did not receive a “final
    decision” for the District Court to review and thus, the complaint was properly dismissed
    for lack of jurisdiction.1
    As this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the judgment of
    the District Court. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
    1
    We agree with the District Court that Aruanno’s complaint did not raise any claims
    collateral to his claim for benefits which might justify waiving the exhaustion
    requirement. See Fitzgerald, 
    148 F.3d at 234
    .
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-4643

Citation Numbers: 471 F. App'x 87

Judges: Rendell, Hardiman, Van Antwerpen

Filed Date: 3/26/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024