United States v. Percy Travillion , 759 F.3d 281 ( 2014 )


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  •                                              PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ______
    No. 12-4184
    ______
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    PERCY WILLIAM TRAVILLION
    Appellant
    ______
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (Crim. No. 2:04-cr-00144-007)
    District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
    ______
    Argued: June 12, 2014
    Before: FISHER, VAN ANTWERPEN, and TASHIMA,
    Circuit Judges
    (Filed: July 7, 2014)
    
    Hon. A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge, United States
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Richard Coughlin, Esq.
    Federal Public Defender’s Office, District of New Jersey
    800-840 Cooper Street
    Suite 350
    Camden, NJ 08102
    Louise Arkel, Esq. [ARGUED]
    Federal Public Defender’s Office, District of New Jersey
    1002 Broad Street
    Newark, NJ 07102
    Attorneys for Appellant
    David J. Hickton, Esq.
    Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq.
    Jane M. Dattilo, Esq. [ARGUED]
    United States Attorney’s Office, Western District of
    Pennsylvania
    700 Grant Street
    Suite 4000
    Pittsburgh, PA 15219
    Attorneys for Appellee
    ______
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ______
    VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Percy William Travillion (“Travillion”), is
    appealing a decision of the United States District Court for
    the Western District of Pennsylvania denying relief sought
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We must address two issues
    2
    certified for appeal: whether trial counsel was ineffective for
    (1) failing properly to cross-examine a witness and (2) failing
    to file a pre-trial motion challenging whether the conspiracies
    charged in Counts Nine and Thirteen of the Indictment
    violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double
    jeopardy. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
    decision of the District Court.
    I. Facts
    Travillion was indicted by a grand jury     in 2004 on
    three counts related to a large drug trade in       the greater
    Pittsburgh area, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §       846 and §
    841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii).1 At trial, Travillion     raised the
    1
    In total the Indictment contained 19 counts. Travillion was
    indicted on Counts Nine, Ten, and Thirteen.
    Count Nine: From on or about November 20,
    2002, and continuing thereafter to on or about
    February 8, 2003, in the Western District of
    Pennsylvania, the defendants . . . did
    knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully
    conspire with one another and with persons
    both known and unknown . . . to distribute and
    possess with the intent to distribute fifty (50)
    grams or more of . . . cocaine base, in the form
    commonly known as crack.
    Count Ten: On or about December 16, 2002 . . .
    Percy William Travillion, did knowingly,
    intentionally, and unlawfully possess with the
    intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more . . .
    3
    defenses that he was not a member of either conspiracy in
    Counts Nine and Thirteen, and also that the drug at issue in
    the Count Ten possession charge was heroin, not crack.2 The
    United States called five witnesses, including Michael Good,
    the main supplier of drugs to Travillion.3 Key to the
    presentation of evidence was a series of phone call wiretaps,
    including a call between Good and Travillion on December
    16, 2002. Respecting this call, Good testified he was checking
    whether or not Travillion needed drugs before Good left town
    for a couple of days, and that what was being discussed was
    five ounces of crack, totaling $4,500.4 Travillion’s attorney
    of cocaine base, in the form commonly known
    as crack.
    Count Thirteen: From on or about November
    20, 2002, and continuing thereafter to on or
    about February 8, 2003, in the Western District
    of Pennsylvania, the defendants . . . did
    knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully
    conspire with one another and with persons
    unknown to the grand jury, to distribute and
    possess with the intent to distribute five
    hundred (500) grams or more of . . . cocaine.
    (Appellee Br. at 20-21; see also App. vol. II at 68, 71-72.)
    2
    We will refer to cocaine base in the form sold by Travillion
    as “crack” throughout the Opinion.
    3
    Good testified the quantities of crack sold to Travillion
    increased during the period between 2002 and 2003, and
    eventually he began fronting the drugs to Travillion, in the
    expectation he would be paid after Travillion made sales.
    4
    Good testified he sold crack to Travillion at $900 per ounce.
    4
    cross-examined Good on his and Travillion’s addiction
    histories, the inability of Good to obtain crack around
    December 2002, Good’s cooperation with the Government
    for a reduced sentence, and Travillion’s role in the larger
    drug-dealing organization.
    Travillion took the stand in his own defense,
    countering Good’s testimony and claiming what was being
    discussed in the December 16 phone call was not crack but
    rather was nine bundles of heroin, with a value of only $450.5
    5
    The relevant transcript portions of the December 16 phone
    call are reproduced below.
    [Good]: I was trying to get in touch with you to
    see if you’re all right [sic] before I go out of
    town.
    [Travillion]: Was you cutting out today?
    ....
    [Travillion]: Cause I still had a couple of them
    things left.
    [Good]: I’m calling to make sure you’re cool,
    because I’m not going to be back till Thursday.
    ....
    [Travillion]: That should hold me till then.
    [Good]: You’ll be alright?
    [Travillion]: Yeah, yeah yep . . . . I’m going to
    try to grab one more then off you, can I do that?
    That way I’ll have more then . . .
    [Good]: What are you turning in? Yeah, what
    you turning in?
    [Travillion]: Just grab one more . . . . I’m going
    to turn in probably like two.
    5
    On cross-examination, the Government challenged Travillion
    on the weight and type of drugs he testified to, because heroin
    was not what he typically sold nor was the amount the
    quantity of any drug he typically purchased. Travillion was
    convicted by a jury on all three counts, and sentenced to 188
    months’ imprisonment.6 On appeal, this Circuit affirmed the
    decision of the District Court.7 See United States v.
    Travillion, 321 F. App’x 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2009).
    [Good]: Cause you uh, we have forty-five cause
    you had five.
    [Travillion]: Right.
    ....
    [Good]: You turn in then, you gonna turn in two
    then make it back at five.
    [Travillion]: Right.
    (App. vol. VI at 1104-05.)
    6
    Travillion received concurrent sentences of 188 months’
    imprisonment and concurrent five-year terms of supervised
    release on Counts Nine, Ten, and Thirteen. This was at the
    bottom end of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range
    of 188 to 235 months, calculated from a total offense level of
    34, including a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice
    under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and a criminal history category of
    III. He also had to pay a $100 special assessment on each
    count.
    7
    On direct appeal, Travillion alleged (1) the evidence was
    insufficient, (2) the jury instruction was improper, (3) there
    were procedural errors in enhancing his total offense level for
    obstruction of justice and for considering a state offense in
    the calculations, and (4) that Congress did not have the power
    6
    Travillion then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the
    United States District Court for the Western District of
    Pennsylvania, seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his
    sentence by adjusting the advisory Guidelines down two
    levels.8 This motion alleged four reasons for collateral relief
    under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:
    (1) Trial Counsel failed to effectively
    investigate and cross-examine Government
    witnesses, (2) Trial Counsel failed to effectively
    investigate facts made known to him by
    Petitioner constituting Petitioner’s only realistic
    defense, (3) Trial Counsel failed to adequately
    advise Petitioner on the risk in his testifying on
    his own behalf, and (4) Trial Counsel failed to
    adequately object to Petitioner’s conviction on
    two separate counts that comprised the same
    conspiracy, thus exposing Petitioner to double
    jeopardy.
    United States v. Travillion, 
    2012 WL 5354530
    , at *2 (W.D.
    Pa. Oct. 29, 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks
    omitted). The District Court denied the motion, noting that
    while counsel’s performance may have been deficient on
    certain issues, Travillion was not prejudiced, as the evidence
    presented against him was “overwhelming.” 
    Id. at *6.
    This
    appeal followed.
    to enact the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act under
    the Commerce Clause. Travillion, 321 F. App’x at 158-59.
    8
    This claim also sought reduction of the obstruction of justice
    enhancement mentioned above. See supra note 6.
    7
    Travillion now argues counsel’s performance was
    ineffective because he failed to impeach Good with his own
    prior testimony in a contemporaneous and factually similar
    case, titled by the parties as the “Ferguson Retrial.”9 See
    United States v. Ferguson, 394 F. App’x 873, 888 (3d Cir.
    2010) (affirming retrial decision by the United States District
    Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania). Travillion
    also contends that counsel failed to object on double jeopardy
    grounds to the indictment charging two separate conspiracies
    in Counts Nine and Thirteen, which caused him to be twice
    punished with a $100 special assessment and an extra
    concurrent term of supervised release for a single conspiracy.
    Travillion now seeks an order vacating and remanding for a
    new trial, or in the alternative, remanding for an evidentiary
    hearing.
    II. Standard of Review10
    A. Section 2255 Motion
    As a collateral challenge, a motion pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 2255 is reviewed much less favorably than a direct
    appeal of the sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456
    9
    During the Ferguson Retrial, Good testified to his prior
    mental health issues and showed confusion when detailing
    which drugs he sold to which dealers. (Appellant Br. at 23
    (citing App. vol. VII at 1569-72, 1665).)
    10
    The District Court had jurisdiction over Travillion’s claims
    pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We now
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253, as a
    final order by the District Court.
    
    8 U.S. 152
    , 167-68 (1982). Indeed, relief under § 2255 is
    available only when “the claimed error of law was ‘a
    fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
    miscarriage of justice,’ and . . . ‘present[s] exceptional
    circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the
    writ . . . is apparent.’” Davis v. United States, 
    417 U.S. 333
    ,
    346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 
    368 U.S. 424
    , 428
    (1962)). While issues resolved in a prior direct appeal will not
    be reviewed again by way of a § 2255 motion,11 United States
    v. DeRewal, 
    10 F.3d 100
    , 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993), they may,
    however, be used to support a claim for ineffectiveness. See
    Graziano v. United States, 
    83 F.3d 587
    , 589-90 (2d Cir. 1996)
    (per curiam) (noting claims of error under the Sentencing
    Guidelines are generally not cognizable on collateral review
    unless to support an ineffectiveness claim).
    In a § 2255 review, we usually have the advantage of a
    § 2255 opinion from the District Judge who presided over the
    original trial. Accordingly, the District Judge is not limited to
    a cold written record, but is uniquely familiar with the overall
    circumstances of the original case. “[A] motion under 28
    U.S.C. § 2255 is entered on the docket of the original
    criminal case and is typically referred to the judge who
    originally presided over the challenged proceedings . . . .”
    Wall v. Kholi, —U.S.—, 
    131 S. Ct. 1278
    , 1289 (2011).
    Although a § 2255 motion is sometimes loosely referred to as
    a habeas corpus motion, unlike a § 2254 habeas petition,
    which usually concerns cases that arose in state court, a §
    2255 challenge is a post-trial motion to vacate, set aside or
    11
    In addition, issues which should have been raised on direct
    appeal may not be raised with a § 2255 motion. See 
    DeRewal, 10 F.3d at 105
    n.4.
    9
    correct a sentence imposed in federal court. Section 2255 is a
    corrective action, United States v. Hock, 
    275 F.2d 726
    , 727
    (3d Cir. 1960) (per curiam), and unlike “a § 2254 petition[,
    which] is a separate civil action, . . . a § 2255 motion is a
    further step in the criminal process,” United States v. Nahodil,
    
    36 F.3d 323
    , 328 (3d Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
    Thomas, 
    713 F.3d 165
    , 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that
    Section 2255 “creates a statutory remedy consisting of a
    motion before the court where a movant was convicted”
    (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
    original)).
    B. Reviewing Standard
    “In a [§ 2255] proceeding, we exercise plenary review
    of the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly
    erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.” Lambert v.
    Blackwell, 
    134 F.3d 506
    , 512 (3d Cir. 1997). The standard of
    review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was set
    forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). To
    prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must
    show
    [first,] that counsel’s performance was
    deficient. This requires showing that counsel
    made errors so serious that counsel was not
    functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
    defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
    the defendant must show that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense. This
    requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
    serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
    a trial whose result is reliable.
    
    10 466 U.S. at 687
    . Thus, to prove a valid claim, Travillion must
    show both deficiency and prejudice. 
    Id. As the
    Supreme Court has stated, “the Constitution
    guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a
    competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel
    will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional
    claim.” Engle v. Isaac, 
    456 U.S. 107
    , 134 (1982). On review,
    we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
    conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional
    assistance.” Berryman v. Morton, 
    100 F.3d 1089
    , 1094 (3d
    Cir. 1996) (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
    ). “In essence,
    ‘the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell
    below an objective standard of reasonableness’ meaning
    ‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” 
    Id. (quoting Strickland,
    466 U.S. at 688). Regarding the interplay
    between Strickland and § 2255, if Travillion shows both
    elements of Strickland, he satisfies the requirements of §
    2255. See United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 
    612 F.2d 740
    , 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[P]ersons . . . can attack a
    conviction for fundamental defects, such as ineffective
    assistance of counsel.”).
    III. Discussion
    We now turn to the two certified ineffective assistance
    of counsel claims before us. First, Travillion claims that
    counsel was ineffective because he “failed to cross-examine .
    . . Michael Good, on matters that would have undermined
    Good’s credibility and supported Travillion’s defense,
    particularly on the crack possession charge, . . . [from] readily
    available transcripts of Good’s testimony in [the Ferguson
    Retrial].” (Appellant Br. at 19.) Second, Travillion avers that
    11
    “counsel’s failure to challenge the [conspiracy] indictment[s]
    on double jeopardy grounds also constituted deficient
    performance . . . [where] [t]he circumstances of the case
    amply satisfied the nominal burden required to . . . challenge
    at the pretrial stage.” (Id.) Travillion contends both failures of
    counsel prejudiced the outcome of his trial because they
    resulted in multiple convictions and increased sentences.
    We begin, as above, with the steps outlined in
    
    Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687
    . We may address the prejudice
    prong first “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
    claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.” 
    Id. at 697.
    We will address both claims in turn, undertaking plenary
    review, and reminding ourselves that both deficiency and
    prejudice must be proven to have a valid claim for relief. 
    Id. at 687.
    A. Failure to Adequately Cross-Examine
    Travillion avers that trial counsel’s performance was
    deficient for failing to obtain the prior testimony and cross-
    examine Michael Good with contradictory and impeachment
    evidence from the Ferguson Retrial, and these errors
    significantly prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
    1. Prejudice
    In determining prejudice, “a court hearing an
    ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the
    evidence before the judge or jury.” 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695
    . Travillion claims counsel prejudiced his defense, and
    that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
    12
    been different.” 
    Id. at 694.
    This alleged prejudice concerns
    the failure of trial counsel to utilize statements made by Good
    at the Ferguson Retrial to impeach his statement that he sold
    Travillion crack and failing to bring up Good’s prior
    testimony on his mental health issues.12 For example, during
    the Ferguson Retrial, Good testified he could not remember
    the terminology he used for drugs with buyers and which
    drug he sold to another dealer in a prior deal. (See Appellant
    Br. at 29 (citing App. vol. VII at 1752).)
    [Good:] I served them their drugs that day, I
    know that. I remember that.
    12
    These issues included schizophrenia, for which Good
    collected Social Security disability benefits. Good testified at
    the Ferguson Retrial, stating:
    [Attorney:] During the interview, did the
    probation officer ask you questions about
    mental health problems that you’ve had?
    [Good:] Yes.
    [Attorney:] Did you tell the probation officer
    you had had mental health problems?
    [Good:] Yes . . . .
    [Attorney:] Mr. Dietz showed you your
    presentence report and questions were asked
    about . . . what you were diagnosed with, and at
    one point you were asked whether you were a
    life-long schizophrenic, and that was corrected
    to paranoid schizophrenic related to drug use.
    (App. vol. VII at 1860-61.)
    13
    [Attorney:] When you say you served them
    their drugs, what are you referring to?
    [Good:] Heroin, cocaine.
    [Attorney:] Do you recall which one as you sit
    there?
    [Good:] No. I don’t recall which that he got that
    day.
    (App. vol. VII at 1572.) Travillion argues Good’s inability to
    remember the type of drug sold undermines his testimony that
    Travillion purchased crack on December 16, rather than
    heroin, as Travillion alleges. This forms the basis of
    Travillion’s assertion that Good’s confusion, along with his
    testimony in the Ferguson Retrial to occasionally selling
    small quantities (or “bundles”) of heroin,13 would have
    created reasonable doubt that the December 16 phone
    conversation referenced crack. Travillion argues that there is
    a reasonable probability that, had counsel more aggressively
    13
    A “bundle” is “ten stamped bags wrapped together” and
    five bundles is the equivalent of one brick. (App. vol. III at
    315-16.) Good typically sold bricks, but testified to selling
    these small quantities on occasion. Travillion’s argument was
    that at times Good sold small quantities and that he did so on
    this occasion.
    [Attorney:] Would you sell [heroin] in less than
    [brick size]? Would you ever sell bundles to
    anybody you know?
    [Good:] Yeah. I didn’t like that neither, but I
    did it sometimes.
    (App. vol. VII at 1813.)
    14
    cross-examined Good, the jury would have acquitted or
    deadlocked on the crack possession charge. This, in turn,
    would have altered Travillion’s sentence in two ways: first,
    by exposing him to one less concurrent term of supervised
    release and one less $100 special assessment; and second, by
    precluding the District Court’s assessment of a two-level
    upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, based on its
    conclusion that Travillion perjured himself when he testified
    that the drug at issue was heroin, not crack.14 (See Appellant
    Br. at 36-37.)
    14
    At trial, Travillion offered as a defense, elicited through his
    own testimony, that the December 16 phone call was
    referring to heroin.
    [Attorney:] Mr. Travillion, . . . you say, cause I
    still had a couple of things left.
    ....
    What are you referring to?
    [Travillion:] I am referring to bundles of
    heroin.
    ....
    [Attorney:] Is it fair to say that at some point
    prior to December 16, 2002, you and Michael
    Good hooked up and did a heroin transaction?
    [Travillion:] Yes.
    ....
    [Attorney:] The price was $90.00 a bundle?
    [Travillion:] Right.
    ....
    [Attorney:] And you had five bundles?
    [Travillion:] Yes.
    15
    The District Court, in denying relief, held the
    “Petitioner’s narrow focus on the minutiae of counsel’s cross-
    examination is misguided.” 15 Travillion, 
    2012 WL 5354530
    ,
    at *7. As the District Court determined, “[e]ven if counsel’s
    actions were deficient, there can be no prejudice because the
    evidence was otherwise overwhelming.”16 
    Id. at *6.
    This
    conclusion was based on “the totality of the circumstances” of
    trial evidence. The District Court cited “Good[‘s] open[]
    admi[ssion] that he was serving a fifteen-year sentence for
    drug trafficking crimes” as well as “incriminating wiretap
    evidence and [the] testimony of other witnesses against the
    [Attorney:] So, and how much did Michael
    Good charge you for those five bundles?
    [Travillion:] He charged me $450.00 . . . .
    (App. vol. V at 813-17.)
    15
    As noted, the same District Judge presided over the
    Ferguson Retrial as well, and heard the testimony now raised
    by Travillion as necessary for impeachment. While not
    dispositive, this same District Judge, after observing the
    conduct of trial counsel and the evidence presented, found no
    evidence of deficiency.
    16
    The District Court disposed of this claim under the
    prejudice prong, but also found no merit to the claim counsel
    was deficient. 
    Id. (“Even if
    the court were to conclude that
    petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions, there is
    nothing in the record to indicate that his counsel’s actions
    were professionally deficient in the way the petitioner
    alleges.”).
    16
    petitioner, including Sherri Hunter, Keeley Sowell, and
    Special Agent Jimenez.”17 
    Id. at *7.
            Like the District Court, we also do not find trial
    counsel’s actions to have prejudiced Travillion. The right to a
    fair trial does not translate into the right to a perfect trial. See
    Gov’t of the V.I. v. Bradshaw, 
    726 F.2d 115
    , 119 (3d Cir.
    1984); see also United States v. Wilensky, 
    757 F.2d 594
    , 599
    (3d Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court has stated “[v]igorous
    cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
    careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
    and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
    evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    , 596 (1993).
    It is true that Circuit courts, including ours, have found
    counsel deficient for failing to cross-examine a witness with
    prior inconsistent statements, see, e.g., Berryman v. Morton,
    
    100 F.3d 1089
    , 1098 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the failure to
    cross-examine using inconsistent statements from a prior trial
    to be deficient); Nixon v. Newsome, 
    888 F.2d 112
    , 115 (11th
    17
    At trial, Special Agent Jimenez of the Drug Enforcement
    Agency testified his understanding of the December 16 phone
    call to be “Good . . . was telling Mr. Travillion that he owed
    him $4,500.00 because he had given him five ounces of
    crack.” (App. vol. III at 373 (emphasis added).) Keeley
    Sowell, a user and dealer with Good, also testified she saw
    Good sell crack to Travillion. Finally, another dealer in
    Good’s network, Sherri Hunter, testified that in a call on the
    same day, she and Good discussed whether or not she had
    enough crack before he went away, similar to Good and
    Travillion’s conversation.
    17
    Cir. 1989) (determining deficiency by trial counsel for failing
    to confront the witness with evidence available in the
    transcript), however, this is not ultimately decisive under the
    prejudice prong.
    Nevertheless, the collective evidence presented by the
    Government and the evidence elicited by trial counsel in his
    cross-examination of Good shows Travillion was not
    prejudiced, as the outcome of the trial would not have been
    different. Counsel’s strategies, as expressed in his closing
    argument, were to attack the credibility of Good as a witness,
    call into question his recollection of what drug he sold to
    Travillion, and establish a two-fold defense that: (1)
    Travillion was not a co-conspirator with Good, and (2)
    Travillion possessed heroin, not crack. Counsel stated:
    [I]f you listen to the conversations, the
    words, there is no question that Mr. Travillion
    possessed heroin on that day with the intent to
    distribute it to someone else . . . . What we are
    arguing is the drug.
    ....
    Police say anything about the 12-16-02
    of substance? No . . . . Keeley say anything
    about that? No. Sherri Hunter? No. Lamont
    Washington? No. No physical evidence. Wasn’t
    arrested with any stuff. No drugs seized. No
    drugs found. No statement. No surveillance,
    whether it just be eyeball from police officers or
    videotape. Nothing.
    It boils down to, folks, to Michael Good.
    ....
    18
    I am going to argue to you that the facts
    and circumstances are going to demonstrate to
    you that it was heroin, not coke.
    ....
    Before we get to that, central to our
    theme, the government’s theme to get a
    conviction on that, you guys need to believe
    Michael Good . . . . No doubt about it, did
    Michael Good present himself to you as
    someone who has a firm grasp of the facts[?]
    Long drug history.
    And then we are being asked questions
    about an event four years ago. Imagine yourself
    without drug history, and fried brain cells, being
    asked what happened four years ago. It would
    be very, very difficult.
    (App. vol. V at 1034-35.) Counsel was able to employ this
    strategy effectively through his cross-examination of Good,
    during which he elicited testimony of Good’s addictions,18 his
    18
    [Attorney:] Sir, you told this jury about your
    addiction history. One addiction was to heroin,
    right?
    [Good:] Yes.
    [Attorney:] Another addition was to cocaine?
    [Good:] Yes.
    ....
    [Attorney:] And you were addicted to crack
    cocaine?
    [Good:] Yes.
    (App. vol. IV at 585.)
    19
    lack of memory of specific events,19 and his exchange of
    testimony for a reduced sentence.20
    Travillion testified and claimed instead the drug
    discussed on December 16th was heroin. On cross, however,
    Travillion undermined his own testimony by admitting the
    conversation was the first ever dealing of heroin between the
    two.21 Further, Travillion also admitted that Good typically
    19
    Counsel also addressed Good’s inability to recall his
    dealings without the aid of telephone calls as evidence.
    [Attorney:] Not referencing the tape-
    recordings[,] [a]s you sit here today, are you
    able to give us specific date[s], specific amounts
    of drug deals that you had with Percy
    Travillion?
    [Good:] No.
    (Id. at 637.)
    20
    An example of this line of questioning is as follows:
    [Attorney:] Sir, your sentence was fifteen years,
    ten months, do I have that right?
    [Good:] Yes.
    [Attorney:] And your testimony here is
    designed so you may very well get a reduction
    in that sentence?
    [Good:] Yes.
    (Id. at 638.)
    21
    This evidence is relevant to the outcome of the trial because
    it helps determine that it would be unlikely the coded
    language and quoted prices during the December 16 call
    20
    sold in large quantities, much larger than what Travillion
    claims was being discussed in the call.
    Finally, it must further be noted that the District
    Court’s jury charge informed the jury regarding Good that
    [t]he testimony of an alleged accomplice,
    someone who said he or she participated in the
    commission of a crime, must be examined and
    weighed by the jury with greater care . . . .
    Michael Good . . . may be considered to
    be [an] alleged accomplice[] in this case or
    related cases.
    ....
    The jury must determine whether the
    testimony of the accomplices has been affected
    by their self-interest or by their own agreements
    with the government . . . . You should never
    convict a defendant solely upon the
    unsupported testimony of an accomplice unless
    you believe the testimony beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    (App. vol. V at 975-75 (emphasis added).) This charge further
    protected Travillion by instructing the jury to heavily
    scrutinize Good’s testimony as a key witness for the
    Government.22
    would have occurred for heroin, if the two never dealt it in the
    past.
    22
    Trial Counsel did not object to this charge in the pretrial
    proceedings.
    21
    Nothing in the evidence presented shows that
    counsel’s errors in his cross-examination of Good were so
    serious, in light of all the evidence and jury instruction, to
    deprive the defendant of a trial whose result is reliable. See
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    . The totality of the evidence
    presented, and jury instruction concerning the reliability of
    Good’s testimony, created a fair trial in which Travillion was
    found guilty. Thus, we believe trial counsel was not
    ineffective for failing to cross-examine Good with evidence
    available from the Ferguson Retrial because the outcome of
    the trial was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions.
    2. Deficiency of Counsel’s Performance23
    23
    We note that we must assume from Travillion’s pro se
    assertion made in his § 2255 motion and the collective record
    that counsel failed to obtain and investigate the transcripts
    from the Ferguson Retrial. (Appellant Br. at 22 (“Travillion
    asserted in his § 2255 motion that his trial counsel failed even
    to obtain the transcripts and other relevant records from the
    prior trial.”).) In a pro se § 2255 petition, as here, we must
    accept “as true the allegations of the petitioner, unless they
    are clearly frivolous.” Moore v. United States, 
    571 F.2d 179
    ,
    184 (3d Cir. 1978). More importantly, the “failure to
    investigate a critical source of potentially exculpatory
    evidence may present a case of constitutionally defective
    representation.” United States v. Baynes, 
    622 F.2d 66
    , 69 (3d
    Cir. 1980).
    Assuming Travillion’s allegation to be true, the
    “failure to conduct any pretrial investigation generally
    constitutes a clear instance of ineffectiveness.” United States
    22
    Having found trial counsel’s representation not to be
    prejudicial to Travillion, we need not address the deficiency
    prong, as both deficiency and prejudice must be proven to
    support a valid claim for relief for ineffective assistance of
    counsel. See 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    . “[T]here is no
    reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . .
    even to address both components of the inquiry if the
    defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Marshall v.
    Hendricks, 
    307 F.3d 36
    , 86-87 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal
    citation and quotation marks omitted).
    B. Double Jeopardy24
    v. Gray, 
    878 F.2d 702
    , 711 (3d Cir. 1989). “While counsel is
    entitled to substantial deference with respect to strategic
    judgment, an attorney must investigate a case, when he has
    cause to do so, in order to provide minimally competent
    professional representation.” United States v. Kauffman, 
    109 F.3d 186
    , 190 (3d Cir. 1997). This per se deficiency,
    however, is not dispositive, as we have found Travillion was
    not prejudiced by the actions of trial counsel.
    24
    A double jeopardy claim was never raised by Travillion
    during the course of his trial or original appeal, and thus
    would be waived. However, now the claim that is being put
    forth by Travillion is “not . . . an actual double jeopardy claim
    . . . but rather . . . to vacate or correct his sentence because of
    ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise a double
    jeopardy claim.” Travillion, 
    2012 WL 5354530
    , at *13 n.15
    (emphasis in original). The District Court describes correctly
    why this claim has not been waived for failing to raise the
    issue of double jeopardy during the original trial: “[i]t is
    manifest that a claim of double jeopardy is an affirmative
    23
    Travillion alternatively argues that trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial motion challenging the
    indictments charging Travillion with two conspiracies as
    violative of double jeopardy.25 Even though he received
    concurrent jail sentences on each count, Travillion maintains
    he had to face an additional concurrent term of supervised
    release and pay an extra $100 special assessment on the
    second conspiracy conviction.26 Again, we undertake plenary
    review under the two-prong Strickland test for deficiency and
    defense which must be raised properly [i.e., before trial] or
    may be deemed waived.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Young¸
    
    503 F.2d 1072
    , 1074 (3d Cir. 1974) (alteration in original)).
    The District Court further states, “[we] need [not] reach an
    ultimate conclusion about whether a claim of double jeopardy
    would have been sustained. The court must follow the
    Strickland analysis in determining whether counsel’s
    assistance was deficient and whether petitioner was
    prejudiced by this deficiency.” 
    Id. 25 Count
    Nine charged Travillion with conspiracy to distribute
    crack cocaine, and Count Thirteen with conspiracy to
    distribute powder cocaine.
    26
    We have determined that Travillion was not prejudiced
    with regard to his claim of inadequate cross-examination and
    this ends his contention that he improperly received a
    sentencing adjustment for obstructing justice. With regard to
    the double jeopardy claim, there remains an issue as to
    whether or not a $100 special assessment and additional
    concurrent term of supervised release, standing alone, are
    sufficiently prejudicial to support a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
    2255. Since we resolve the double jeopardy claim on the
    merits, we need not reach this issue. See Fields v. United
    States, 
    201 F.3d 1025
    , 1029 (8th Cir. 2000).
    24
    prejudice. For this analysis we will begin by determining
    whether Travillion was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to
    challenge the indictment prior to trial.
    The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
    to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person
    shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
    jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double
    Jeopardy Clause “prohibits [the government] from splitting
    one conspiracy into several prosecutions.” United States v.
    Becker, 
    892 F.2d 265
    , 268 (3d Cir. 1989). The key is whether
    the multiple crimes charged were the same “in law and in
    fact.” United States v. Garcia, 
    919 F.2d 881
    , 887 (3d Cir.
    1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This
    Circuit employs a “totality of the circumstances” test when
    determining whether a pretrial evidentiary hearing is
    necessary to determine if an indictment is invalid under the
    Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Liotard, 
    817 F.2d 1074
    , 1078 (3d Cir. 1987).
    “If the defendant makes the requisite showing, he is
    entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing to adjudicate his
    double jeopardy claim.” United States v. Smith, 
    82 F.3d 1261
    ,
    1267, 1273 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The defendant need only be able
    to identify alleged facts and other evidence which, if credited,
    gives reason to believe that any alleged conspiratorial activity
    was in furtherance of a single conspiracy.”). “The ultimate
    purpose of the totality of the circumstances inquiry is to
    determine whether two groups of conspirators alleged by the
    government to have entered separate agreements are actually
    all committed to the same set of objectives in a single
    conspiracy.” 
    Id. at 1271
    (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a]
    non-frivolous showing of a single conspiracy will be made
    25
    when the record reveals a degree of participant overlap,
    which together with other factors, permits an inference that
    members of each alleged conspiracy were aware of the
    activities and objectives of the other conspiracy and had some
    interest in the accomplishment of those objectives.” 
    Id. Under Liotard’s
    “totality of the circumstances” test,
    the threshold is not high, and requires four factors to be
    considered.
    [A] conspiracy defendant will make out a non-
    frivolous showing of double jeopardy if he can
    show that (a) the “locus criminis” of the two
    alleged conspiracies is the same, (b) there is a
    significant degree of temporal overlap between
    the two conspiracies charged, (c) there is an
    overlap of personnel between the two
    conspiracies (including unindicted as well as
    indicted coconspirators), and (d) the overt acts
    charged and the role played by the defendant
    according to the two indictments are 
    similar. 817 F.2d at 1078
    (citations omitted) (citing United States v.
    Felton, 
    753 F.2d 276
    , 279-81 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
    Inmon, 
    568 F.2d 326
    , 328 (3d Cir. 1977)). These factors need
    not be applied in a rigid manner, as “different conspiracies
    may warrant emphasizing different factors.” 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1267
    .
    1. Prejudice
    The District Court denied Travillion’s claim, finding
    Travillion was not prejudiced by counsel failing to move to
    quash the multi-conspiracy indictment. The District Court
    26
    reasoned instead, “[t]he ultimate question is whether there are
    multiple agreements or only one.” Travillion, 
    2012 WL 5354530
    , at *13 (citing 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1267
    ). The District
    Court found without merit Travillion’s argument that the
    conspiracy charges were duplicative and unnecessary because
    both the crack and cocaine conspiracies were charged under
    the same conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, which does not
    include type of drug as an element of the offense. 
    Id. at *14.
    We will now undertake the totality of the
    circumstances test to determine if a nonfrivolous showing
    was made which would have supported a pretrial evidentiary
    hearing. If a showing was made, counsel’s performance may
    be determined to have prejudiced Travillion.
    a. “Locus Criminis”
    “‘Locus criminis’ is defined very simply as the
    ‘locality of a crime; the place where a crime was
    committed.’” 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268
    (quoting Black’s Law
    Dictionary 941 (6th ed. 1990)). The Government conceded,
    and we agree, that the locus criminis of the Western District
    of Pennsylvania or the greater Pittsburgh area was the same
    for both Counts Nine and Thirteen. (Appellee Br. at 52.)
    b. Temporal Overlap
    It is clear there was a “significant degree of temporal
    overlap” between the two conspiracies because Counts Nine
    and Thirteen both state the same timeframe of the
    conspiracies as “[f]rom on or about November 20, 2002, and
    continuing thereafter to on or about February 8, 2003.” (App.
    vol. II at 68, 72.)
    27
    c. Overlap of Personnel
    We have outlined the importance of reviewing the
    personnel involved in the two conspiracies in determining
    whether a double jeopardy claim exists:
    An overlap in membership is useful to a double
    jeopardy analysis to the extent that it helps
    determine whether the alleged conspirators in
    both indictments were committed to the same
    objectives and consequently were members of a
    single conspiracy. . . . [I]n evaluating the degree
    of overlap-in-participants factor in a particular
    case, one must look to the circumstances of
    both the common participants and the
    participants apparently connected with only one
    of the alleged conspiracies.
    
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1269
    . Determination of an overlap of
    personnel can help decide the relevant objectives of each
    conspiracy. 
    Id. at 1270;
    see also 
    Becker, 892 F.2d at 268
    (noting a conspiracy to grow and distribute marijuana and one
    to smuggle and distribute foreign-grown marijuana with
    overlaps in personnel had “two different objectives” and
    “hence [were] two conspiracies”).
    Travillion avers that while only he and Keeley Sowell
    were named in both Counts, the language in the Indictment
    referring to “persons unknown” encompasses other
    participants, most notably Michael Good. He correctly set
    forth the standard to support a pretrial evidentiary hearing as
    merely a “nonfrivolous” showing of commonality, and argues
    28
    that enough evidence was available for trial counsel to seek a
    hearing to challenge the indictments. On the commonality of
    participants alone, the District Court agreed with Travillion,
    finding that, although on the face of the Counts evidence of
    the same parties is limited, it was “at least nonfrivolous to
    claim commonality of participants.” 
    2012 WL 5354530
    , at
    *15.
    While we agree with the District Court that some
    participants overlapped, we disagree that their knowledge of,
    and objectives for, the selling of crack and cocaine were
    common enough to create a single conspiracy. See 
    Becker, 892 F.2d at 269
    . The overlap of participants in the two
    conspiracies, at least as far as Travillion and Seeley, together
    with evidence from witness testimony centering the sale of
    both powdered and crack cocaine around Michael Good, is
    not enough to “permit[] an inference that members of each
    alleged conspiracy were aware of the activities and objectives
    of the other conspiracy and had some interest in the
    accomplishment of those objectives.” 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1271
    .
    To decide whether multiple conspiracies existed, and
    thus if Travillion was prejudiced, we must ask not only
    whether the conspirators involved in Counts Nine and
    Thirteen were the same, but more broadly, under Becker,
    whether they had the same objectives. In Becker, this Circuit,
    under the “totality of the circumstances” test of Liotard,
    determined that a “party can be involved in more than one
    conspiracy at one 
    time.” 892 F.2d at 268
    . Further, we must
    look at whether “the two conspiracies did not depend on each
    other for success and [if] they had different ultimate
    objectives.” 
    Id. at 269
    (citing United States v. West, 
    670 F.2d 675
    , 681 (7th Cir. 1982)). Finally, “[w]hen the evidence
    29
    indicates that the activities of the alleged conspiracies are not
    interdependent or mutually supportive and that there are
    major participants in each conspiracy who lack knowledge of,
    or any interest in, the activities of the other, this factor weighs
    heavily in favor of the conclusion that two conspiracies
    exist.” 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1269
    .
    Travillion failed to show many of the overlapping
    participants had knowledge of other dealers involved, or sold
    both drugs alleged here as part of two conspiracies. Had a
    pretrial evidentiary hearing been undertaken upon trial
    counsel’s petition, evidence would have been brought forth
    concerning a stipulation between the parties that some
    participants were solely dealers of cocaine, and others only
    dealt crack, and thus had different objectives.27 (See
    27
    The stipulation states:
    The United States and defendant Percy
    William Travillion stipulate that Isaiah Sherrell
    . . . would testify that . . . he was involved in
    Michael Good’s crack cocaine distribution
    conspiracy, . . . that Jerome Thompson . . .
    would testify that . . . he was involved in
    Michael Good’s powder cocaine distribution
    conspiracy, . . . that Mark Craighead . . . would
    testify that . . . he was involved in Michael
    Good’s powder cocaine distribution conspiracy,
    . . . that Sam Frazier . . . would testify that . . .
    he was involved in Michael Good’s powder
    cocaine distribution conspiracy, . . . [and] that
    Coty Youngblood . . . would testify that . . . he
    30
    Stipulation, App. vol. V at 801-02.) The relevant part states
    other dealers, such as Isaiah Sherrell, “had no dealings or
    personal interaction in drug trafficking with defendant Percy
    Travillion.” (Id. at 801.) As in Smith, “[e]xcept for [Good],
    the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether
    any [deal] except his own went through. . . . The conspiracies
    therefore were distinct and disconnected, not part of a larger
    scheme . . . . There was no drawing of all together in a single,
    overall, comprehensive 
    plan.” 82 F.3d at 1270
    (quoting
    Blumenthal v. United States, 
    332 U.S. 539
    , 558 (1947)).
    d. Similar Overt Acts
    The District Court described this prong of the totality
    of the circumstances test as “problematic,” because 21 U.S.C.
    § 846 does not require overt acts. Since there is no
    requirement of an overt act, we hold that this strict approach
    to this prong is too narrow and rigid under the modern
    “totality of the circumstances” test. 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268
    (“Undue emphasis on the alleged overt acts is precisely the
    problem we sought to avoid when we adopted the totality of
    the circumstances approach. That approach requires us to
    look into the full scope of activities described and implied in
    the indictments.”). Thus, we now broaden our analysis and
    decide whether to infer only one conspiracy from the relevant
    activities of those involved. See 
    Felton, 753 F.2d at 280
    .
    was involved in Michael Good’s powder
    cocaine distribution conspiracy . . . .
    (App. vol. V at 801-02.)
    31
    Applying this broad standard, Travillion argues we can
    infer a single conspiracy to distribute cocaine-based drugs in
    the Pittsburgh area. Other Circuits have found that multiple
    transactions can constitute a single conspiracy. “The unity
    essential to a conspiracy is derived from the assent of its
    members to contribute to a common enterprise. Seemingly
    independent transactions may be revealed as parts of a single
    conspiracy by their place in a pattern of regularized activity
    involving a significant continuity of membership.” United
    States v. Kelley, 
    849 F.2d 999
    , 1003 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
    United States v. Grassi, 
    616 F.2d 1295
    , 1303 (5th Cir. 1980)).
    Conversely, the Eighth Circuit held, even if “the statutory
    offenses charged are the same, . . . in context with the other
    factors, this is a minor point, since one can certainly enter two
    conspiracies to commit the same type of crime.” United
    States v. Ledon, 
    49 F.3d 457
    , 460 (8th Cir. 1995) (referring to
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846); see also United States v. Kienzle,
    
    896 F.2d 326
    , 329 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating “[w]hile both
    indictments charge[d] . . . a drug conspiracy violative of the
    same statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, entirely different controlled
    substances are named”). Further, the Sixth Circuit has found
    two conspiracies existed when charged under the same statute
    as those in question here. See United States v. Wheeler, 
    535 F.3d 446
    , 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting an indictment charging
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine and a
    second charging a conspiracy to distribute the same and
    additional drugs were, when considering all the factors,
    different enough to constitute two separate conspiracies).
    Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that “a
    defendant may be subject to multiple prosecutions of the
    same conduct if Congress intended to impose multiple
    punishments for that conduct.” United States v. Rigas, 605
    
    32 F.3d 194
    , 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Albernaz v. United
    States, 
    450 U.S. 333
    , 344 (1981)). While Travillion was
    charged in each under the same conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C.
    § 846, the underlying offenses for each count are two separate
    statutory provisions. Crack is punished under §
    841(b)(1)(A)(iii), while powder cocaine falls under §
    841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Congress intentionally created separate
    statutory provisions and, more importantly, separate
    punishments. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 
    462 F.3d 237
    ,
    242 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the weight ratio differences for
    punishment purposes for crack and cocaine). “It is well
    settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct
    offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double
    Jeopardy Clause.” 
    Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344
    , n.3 (citing
    Harris v. United States, 
    359 U.S. 19
    (1959)). Most
    importantly, “[t]his is true even though the ‘single
    transaction’ is an agreement or conspiracy.” 
    Id. (citing American
    Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 781
    (1946)). The potential punishments for crack and powder
    cocaine differ and it is important to know whether the jury
    convicted the defendant of conspiracy to distribute crack or
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine, or both. The use of separate
    conspiracies provides a convenient way of determining this.
    In sum, judging the “totality of the circumstances” by
    the standards set forth in Liotard, Travillion would not have
    met the “nonfrivolous” threshold necessary to support an
    evidentiary hearing on his double jeopardy claim, and thus he
    was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to challenge the
    indictment. While a number of the Liotard factors are met,
    nothing in the evidence presented overcomes the
    discontinuity between the cocaine and crack conspiracies.
    The parties involved, other than Michael Good, did not have a
    33
    singular agreement or objective, nor did they overlap in all
    respects. Simply put, Travillion “has failed to provide a basis
    for inferring that all conspirators were tied together into one
    conspiracy.” 
    Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268
    .
    In light of our determination Travillion was not
    prejudiced, we need not address the deficiency prong. See
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697
    . In addition, we need not reach
    the issue of whether or not a concurrent additional term of
    supervised release and an extra $100 special assessment were
    sufficiently prejudicial to support a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
    2255.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, because Travillion failed to
    prove he was prejudiced on either ground due to counsel’s
    alleged ineffectiveness, he has not met his burden. No
    “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
    miscarriage of justice” has been shown to exist and the result
    of the trial is reliable. Accordingly, we will affirm the
    decision of the District Court denying Travillion’s § 2255
    motion.
    34
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-4184

Citation Numbers: 759 F.3d 281, 2014 WL 3029837, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12744

Judges: Van Antwerpen, Fisher, Van Antwerpen Tashima

Filed Date: 7/7/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (34)

Hill v. United States , 82 S. Ct. 468 ( 1962 )

Albernaz v. United States , 101 S. Ct. 1137 ( 1981 )

Francesco Paul Graziano v. United States , 83 F.3d 587 ( 1996 )

United States v. David L. Nahodil , 36 F.3d 323 ( 1994 )

United States v. Liotard, Russell , 817 F.2d 1074 ( 1987 )

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 113 S. Ct. 2786 ( 1993 )

United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc. A/K/A Pre-... , 612 F.2d 740 ( 1979 )

United States v. Kerry David Wilensky , 757 F.2d 594 ( 1985 )

United States v. Tyrone Anthony Gray , 878 F.2d 702 ( 1989 )

United States v. George Henry Hock, Jr. , 275 F.2d 726 ( 1960 )

United States v. Dante Angelo Grassi and Jack Louis Gail , 616 F.2d 1295 ( 1980 )

earl-berryman-v-willis-morton-administrator-new-jersey-state-prison , 100 F.3d 1089 ( 1996 )

James Arthur Nixon v. Lanson Newsome , 888 F.2d 112 ( 1989 )

united-states-v-eugene-baynes-aka-bo-james-fox-eugene-hearn-russell , 622 F.2d 66 ( 1980 )

United States v. Calixto Raymond Ledon, Also Known as ... , 49 F.3d 457 ( 1995 )

United States v. Stephen Becker A/k/a/ "Steven Fox" A/k/a/ "... , 892 F.2d 265 ( 1989 )

United States v. Inmon, Martel A/K/A Marty , 568 F.2d 326 ( 1977 )

United States v. George Kelley , 849 F.2d 999 ( 1988 )

American Tobacco Co. v. United States , 66 S. Ct. 1125 ( 1946 )

United States v. Johnny Gunter , 462 F.3d 237 ( 2006 )

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