Government of the Virgin Islan v. Richard Fahie , 574 F. App'x 84 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-4381
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GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
v.
RICHARD FAHIE,
Appellant
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On Appeal From the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. Crim. App. No. 3-06-cr-00027-001)
Chief Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gómez
District Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Julio A. Brady
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 16, 2014
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: July 18, 2014)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Richard Fahie appeals his convictions and requests a new trial. Fahie argues that
his attorney provided ineffective assistance, and he contends that the Superior Court
erroneously admitted certain testimony. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On April 9, 2005, Patrick Benjamin was shot near the Tau Club in the Smith Bay
area of St. Thomas. Officer Earl Mills was dispatched to the scene of the shooting. When
he arrived, Mills observed Benjamin on the ground, lying in blood. Benjamin was taken
to the hospital and treated by Dr. Sidney Commissiong for gunshot wounds in his left
shoulder, left hand, and back.
Detective Joel Dowdye visited Benjamin in the hospital and interviewed him
about the shooting. Dowdye later provided Benjamin a photo array of six faces from
which Benjamin identified Fahie as the shooter. Fahie was subsequently arrested.
The government filed a five-count Information against Fahie, which was later
amended. Count One charged Fahie with attempted first degree murder, in violation of 14
V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 331. Count Two charged Fahie with carrying an unlicensed
firearm during the attempted commission of a first degree murder, in violation of 14
V.I.C. §§ 2253(a), 921, 922(a)(a), and 331. Count Three charged Fahie with first degree
assault, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 295(1). Count Four charged Fahie with carrying an
unlicensed firearm during the commission of a first degree assault, in violation of 14
V.I.C. §§ 2253(a) and 295(1). Finally, Count Five charged Fahie with possession of
ammunition, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2256(a).
The case proceeded to trial, during which the government presented testimony
from Mills, Dowdye, Commissiong, and Benjamin. Both Mills and Dowdye testified that,
on multiple occasions, Benjamin identified Fahie as the shooter. Benjamin himself
testified that, after he was shot, he yelled, “Richard Fahie from Bordeaux shot me.” J.A.
90. After a two-day trial, the jury found Fahie guilty on Counts One, Two, Three, and
Four of the amended Information. The jury found Fahie not guilty on Count Five.
Fahie appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin
Islands. He asserted that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. He also argued that
the Superior Court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony by Mills, Dowdye, Benjamin,
and Commissiong and character testimony by Benjamin. The Appellate Division declined
to address Fahie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In pertinent part, the Appellate
Division explained that “the record is inadequate for a comprehensive inquiry into the
strategy and tactics behind counsel’s decisions not to object to evidence introduced by the
People or present alibi evidence.” J.A. 12. With respect to the challenged evidence, the
Appellate Division held that the hearsay testimony fell within Section 932(1) of the
Virgin Islands Code and that the admission of Benjamin’s character testimony did not
amount to plain error. Fahie now appeals.1
1
The Appellate Division had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 48 U.S.C.
§ 1613a(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). “Because ineffective
II. Analysis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, Fahie renews his argument that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel, and he contends that the record is adequate for us to address this
claim on direct appeal.
“It has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of
trial counsel to a collateral attack.” United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir.
2003). Our “refusal to entertain [ineffective assistance] claims on direct review stems
from the reality that such claims frequently involve questions regarding conduct that
occurred outside the purview of the [trial] court and therefore can be resolved only after a
factual development at an appropriate hearing.” United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d
547, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A narrow exception
to the rule against hearing ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal applies in rare
circumstances “[w]here the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective
assistance of counsel” and “an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not needed.”
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991). However, Fahie’s
challenge does not “fit[] into that narrow class of ineffectiveness claims amenable to
review on direct appeal.” McLaughlin, 386 F.3d at 556. The record before us is
insufficient to address Fahie’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because we cannot
assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law and fact, our review is
plenary.” United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 187 (3d Cir. 1997). We review for
plain error the Superior Court’s decision to admit evidence in the absence of an objection
to its admissibility. See United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2007).
discern if his attorney’s performance was due to trial strategy or ineffectiveness.
Therefore, we affirm the Appellate Division’s decision not to entertain Fahie’s ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal.
B. Benjamin’s Testimony
Fahie next argues that the Superior Court erroneously admitted Benjamin’s bad
character testimony. In particular, Fahie challenges the admission of three statements that
Benjamin made about Fahie. Benjamin testified that: (1) he was the victim of a prior
unprovoked attack by Fahie, (2) Fahie always said, “He’s a wanted man he can do
anything,” and (3) Fahie always said, “He hate Dominicans, he hate Antiguans, and he
hate Jamaicans, he have to kill all of them.” J.A. 99-100. Because Fahie failed to object
to the admission of these statements at trial, we apply plain error review.
To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate “that the error was clear or
obvious under current law” and “affected the outcome of the trial.” Rivas, 493 F.3d at
136. Assuming, without deciding, that Benjamin’s three remarks were inadmissible, the
Superior Court did not commit plain error because this testimony did not affect the
outcome of Fahie’s trial. As the Appellate Division correctly noted, Benjamin’s
“statements did not comprise the heart of [his] testimony, nor did they play a particularly
important role in the People’s case.” J.A. 16. Given the overwhelming evidence against
Fahie, the outcome of the case would have been the same regardless of Benjamin’s
testimony about Fahie’s past conduct. Therefore, we conclude that the admission of
Benjamin’s statements did not amount to plain error.
C. Commissiong’s Testimony
Finally, Fahie argues that Commissiong’s testimony that “[Benjamin] said he
knew who shot him” should have been excluded because it was irrelevant and
inadmissible hearsay.2 J.A. 60. Because Fahie failed to object to the admission of
Commissiong’s testimony at trial, we review his challenge for plain error.
Section 771(2) of the Virgin Islands Code broadly defines “relevant evidence” as
“evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.” 5 V.I.C § 771(2).3
Commissiong’s testimony was relevant because it helped corroborate the credibility of
Benjamin’s identification of Fahie as the shooter.
Moreover, Commissiong’s testimony fell within a hearsay exception. Hearsay is
defined as “a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” 5 V.I.C § 932. While hearsay
testimony is generally inadmissible, Section 932(1) of the Virgin Islands Code permits
the use of a statement “previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and
available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter.” 5
V.I.C § 932(1). Here, Commissiong testified about a statement previously made by
2
On appeal, Fahie appears to have abandoned his previous hearsay challenges to the
testimony of Mills, Dowdye, and Benjamin. Therefore, we do not address these claims in
our opinion. See New Jersey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d 545, 547 n.3 (3d Cir.
2011).
3
At the time of this case, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, codified as 5 V.I.C. §§ 771-
3
956, the time of this case, thePeople, 2009 WL 707182, at *7 (V.I. Mar. V.I.C. §§ 771-
At applied. See Phillips v. Uniform Rules of Evidence, codified as 5 12, 2009); see
956, applied. See Phillips v. People, 2009 WL 707182, at *7 (V.I. Mar. 12, 2009); see
also Chinnery v. Virgin Islands, 2011 WL 3490267, at *8 (V.I. May 27, 2011)
(explaining that the Uniform Rules of Evidence were not repealed and replaced with the
Federal Rules of Evidence until April 7, 2010).
Benjamin, who was present at Fahie’s trial and available for cross-examination.
Therefore, Commissiong’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s statement was admissible
pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 932(1).
Even if the Superior Court erred in admitting Commissiong’s testimony, it did not
commit plain error because the testimony did not affect the outcome of Fahie’s trial.
Commissiong’s statement occurred during the course of a two-day trial. Due to the
overpowering evidence against Fahie, the result in this case would have been the same
regardless of Commissiong’s testimony that “[Benjamin] said he knew who shot him.”
J.A. 60.
Given that Commissiong’s testimony was relevant, fell within a hearsay exception,
and did not affect the outcome of the trial, the admission of this testimony did not
constitute an error, let alone a plain error.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment in all
respects.