Marvin Jackson v. City of Erie Police Department , 570 F. App'x 112 ( 2014 )

CLD-283 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1566
___________
MARVIN JOVAN JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF ERIE POLICE DEPARTMENT; JUDGE THOMAS CARNEY;
JUDGE JOHN BOZZA; JUDGE ERNEST J. DISANTIS, JR.;
DISTRICT ATTORNEY ROBERT A. SAMBROAK, JR.;
LT. MICHAEL NOLAN; GENE P. PLACIDI;
UNIDENTIFIED RESPONDENT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-00003)
District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 19, 2014
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 20, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Marvin Jackson appeals the District Court’s order dismissing with
prejudice the complaint he filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that
follow, we will summarily affirm. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Jackson alleged that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of procedural
irregularities related to his arrest in 2008 and subsequent conviction. He claimed that he
was searched and arrested without probable cause or warrant; that he was not given a
Miranda warning at the time of his arrest; that his bail hearing was conducted by a
Magistrate Judge wearing street clothes, as opposed to a robe; and that evidence was
wrongly admitted during the course of his criminal trial. Jackson, who is still serving his
sentence, claimed gross injury to his psyche and requested monetary damages. Among
the defendants named were four judges who were allegedly involved in Jackson’s
criminal proceedings, the attorney who prosecuted Jackson’s case, the criminal defense
attorney who represented Jackson, the two arresting police officers, and the police
department of Erie, Pennsylvania.
On the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge who screened the complaint, the
District Court dismissed Jackson’s complaint with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1). In doing so, the District Court held that the judges and
prosecutor were immune from liability and that the claims against the police department
failed on the independent basis that the department did not constitute a “person” under
the meaning of § 1983. The claims against Jackson’s defense attorney were dismissed on
the ground that the attorney was not a state actor. Finally, the District Court held that the
2
remaining claims against the two police officers were not viable because Jackson failed
to prove his conviction invalid, as required under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), and, to the extent that Heck did not apply, the claims were time barred by the
two-year statute of limitations. Jackson filed a timely appeal and a motion for the
appointment of counsel.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily
affirm if Jackson’s appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. Our review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Jackson’s
complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Id.
We agree with the District Court that the judges and prosecuting attorney were
immune from suit. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).1 We further agree that Jackson’s private defense
attorney cannot be construed as a person acting under the “color of state law” within the
meaning of § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-25 (1981).
1
The § 1983 claims against the judges and prosecuting attorney are based on the alleged
tort of malicious prosecution. These claims fail on the independent ground that Jackson
did not and cannot prove an essential element of that tort: that his conviction and
sentence have been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994);
see also Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009). To the extent that
Jackson’s claims against the other defendants also sound in malicious prosecution, they
were properly dismissed for the same reason.
3
As to the remaining claims against the individual police officers and the police
department, we concur with the District Court that they are either time barred or
precluded by the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). The statute of limitations for a §1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 645-46 (3d Cir. 2009). Jackson alleged that he was
wrongfully arrested and detained for a twenty-day period in 2008, prior to his preliminary
hearing. Any claims for false arrest and false imprisonment would have accrued at the
latest at the end of that twenty-day period. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397
(2007) (a § 1983 claim “seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the
time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”); see also Heck, 512 U.S.
at 484 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181,
185-88 (3d Cir. 2010). The record indicates that the twenty-day period concluded in late
2008, at which point the cause of action accrued and the limitation period began to run.
Similarly, the statute of limitations for claims for wrongful searches and seizures would
have begun to run at the time of the searches and seizures, alleged to have occurred in
2008. Id. Jackson initiated this lawsuit in January of 2014, well after the two-year
period expired.2
2
We further agree with the District Court that the police department was not a proper
party to this action. Although local governmental units may constitute “persons” against
whom suit may be lodged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a city police department is a
governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality of which it is a part. See,
e.g., Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993). And the
allegations in the complaint do not reach the municipality, in any instance, because the
4
To the extent that Jackson alleged that police actions poisoned material evidence
that was wrongly introduced into his criminal proceedings, we agree with the District
Court that those claims are barred by the favorable termination rule in Heck. Similar to
the claims of unlawful investigation and evidence tampering that were at issue in that
case, Jackson’s allegations related to the integrity of his prosecution implicitly challenge
the legality of his conviction, which has not been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-
87. Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Jackson’s
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.3
III.
Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
judgment below. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. Jackson’s motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.
alleged injury was inflicted solely by its employees. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of N. Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
3
Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the complaint without leave to amend. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,
115-17 (3d Cir. 2000).
5