United States v. Theodore Brown , 574 F. App'x 176 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-2430
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
THEODORE BROWN,
Appellant
__________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-04-cr-00088-001)
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 16, 2014
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 21, 2014)
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OPINION
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Theodore Brown appeals the District Court’s partial denial of his motion for a
sentence reduction filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm.
I.
On January 31, 2004, officers from the Pittsburgh Police Department stopped a
vehicle being driven by Brown for multiple traffic violations. During the course of the
stop, the officers observed a marijuana cigar in the vehicle’s ashtray. The officers placed
Brown under arrest and conducted an inventory search of his vehicle, which revealed
approximately 24 grams of crack cocaine, 23 bags of heroin, seven small bags of
marijuana, and a loaded .32 caliber semiautomatic handgun.
On April 20, 2004, a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania
returned a three-count indictment against Brown, charging him as follows: Count One,
possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii); Count Two, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and Count Three, possession of a
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Brown pled guilty to all the counts on May 5, 2005.
Because Brown’s offense involved more than five grams of crack cocaine, he was
subject to a mandatory minimum prison term of five years on Count One. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). On September 1, 2005, the District Court sentenced Brown to
70 months’ imprisonment on both Counts One and Two, to be served concurrently, and to
60 months on Count Three, to be served consecutively, for a total prison term of 130
months.
Nearly five years later, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
(“FSA”), Pub.L. 111-120, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), in order to reduce the sentencing
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disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses by increasing the threshold amount
of crack cocaine necessary for imposition of the mandatory minimum sentences set forth
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Relevant to this case, the FSA amended the sentencing provisions
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) by raising the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence from 5 grams to 28 grams.
The FSA also authorized the United States Sentencing Commission to “make such
conforming amendments to the Federal sentencing guidelines as the Commission
determines necessary to achieve consistency with other guidelines provisions and
applicable law.” Id. § 8, 124 Stat at 2374. Pursuant to this authority, “the Commission
promulgated Amendment 750,” which “reduced the crack-related offense levels in §
2D1.1 of the Guidelines.” United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 517-18 (3d Cir.
2012). Amendment 750 was made retroactive by Amendment 759, effective November
1, 2011. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amd. 750.
On January 3, 2012, Brown filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
seeking a reduction of sentence based on Amendment 750 and the FSA.1 He asked the
District Court to reduce his concurrent 70-month sentences for Counts One and Two to
46 months, the bottom end of his amended Guidelines range, for a total prison sentence
1
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to “reduce the term of imprisonment” for
“a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
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of 106 months.2 On April 29, 2013, the District Court issued an opinion holding that it
had the power to reduce Brown’s concurrent sentences for Counts One and Two by 10
months, from 70 to 60, but that it lacked the authority to reduce the sentence any further
because Brown remained subject to the pre-FSA mandatory minimum sentence of 60
months for Count One. The District Court deferred its ruling on the remainder of
Brown’s motion pending review of the parties’ memoranda setting forth their respective
positions regarding the appropriate reduction in Brown’s sentence, if any.
In its sentencing memorandum, the government stated that it did not object to a
10-month reduction of Brown’s sentence, but agreed with the District Court that Brown
was not eligible for a reduction below the statutory minimum in effect at the time of the
original sentencing. On May 22, 2013, the District Court reduced Brown’s concurrent
70-month sentences on Counts One and Two to 60 months, which, when combined with
Brown’s consecutive 60-month sentence on Count Three, resulted in a 120-month term of
imprisonment. Brown appeals, arguing that the District Court erred in finding that it
lacked authority to award him a greater sentence reduction.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s resolution of
a § 3582(c) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 531 (3d
Cir. 2010). We review de novo “a district court’s conclusions regarding the scope of its
2
Both the Government and Brown agreed before the District Court that, “before
consideration of any mandatory minimums,” the post-FSA amendments lowered the
sentencing range applicable to Brown to 46 to 57 months. (App. 3.)
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authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” United States v. Ortiz-Vega, 744 F.3d 869, 870 n.1
(3d Cir. 2014).
Brown’s assertion that the District Court should have reduced his sentence in
accordance with the post-FSA Sentencing Guidelines, even though he was sentenced in
2005, well before the FSA was enacted, is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent. See
United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Reevey, 631
F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2010). The District Court rightly held that Brown is not entitled to
relief under Dorsey v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012), which addresses the
applicability of the FSA to defendants who were convicted of crack offenses prior to the
FSA’s effective date of August 3, 2010, but were sentenced thereafter. Turlington, 696
F.3d at 428.
As we have previously explained, Dorsey “does not address, or disturb, the basic
principle that the FSA does not apply to those defendants who were both convicted and
sentenced prior to the effective date of the FSA.” Turlington, 696 F.3d at 428. The
District Court therefore lacked authority to reduce Brown’s sentence below the 60-month
statutory minimum applicable to his crack cocaine offense at the time he was sentenced.3
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
3
Brown also argues that the District Court should have adopted his interpretation of
the FSA to avoid Due Process and Eighth Amendment issues. The FSA does not raise
the constitutional issues Brown identified, see United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647,
658-60 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and therefore, the constitutional avoidance canon is
inapplicable.
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