Emmett Mann v. John Brenner ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-2461
_____________
EMMETT J. MANN,
Appellant
v.
JOHN S. BRENNER; DAVE REDSHAW;
DON HOYT; ROBERT A. KINSLEY;
MATT JACKSON; CITY OF YORK;
YORK COLLEGE;
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF YORK;
STEVEN R. BUFFINGTON; OFFICER WENTZ
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-1715)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 23, 2010
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 30, 2010)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Emmett Mann appeals the District Court’s order granting the motions to dismiss of
defendants City of York (the “City”), its agents, and York College.1 He also appeals the
District Court’s decision to stay discovery pending disposition of the motions to dismiss.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and will affirm.2
I. Background
Mann owned a house in York, Pennsylvania, which he rented to college students.
In 2004 and 2005, York College sought to acquire property for additional student housing
and thus approached Mann about selling his house. However, the parties could not agree
on a sales price. At some later time, Mann’s home was cited for code violations and
declared “blighted” by the City.
The City initiated condemnation proceedings against Mann in the Court of
Common Pleas of York County. Although Mann stipulated to the blight determination,
he argued that the City and York College had conspired to harass and intimidate him into
selling his property for a reduced value. Mann accused the defendants of manipulating
building codes and ordinance violations to bring improper charges against him,
intentionally damaging his property, and lodging other unspecified false criminal charges
1
The City defendants include John S. Brenner (Mayor), Don Hoyt, Matt Jackson,
Dave Redshaw, Steven R. Buffington, Officer Wentz, and the Redevelopment Authority
of the City of York. The York College defendants include York College and Robert A.
Kinsley, a private contractor.
2
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
2
against him. The Court of Common Pleas issued an opinion on October 6, 2006, in which
it found the taking to be proper. It also concluded that the City had not acted in bad faith
or committed fraud in pursuing condemnation proceedings against Mann. The
condemnation concluded in May 2007, when Mann was paid $166,000 for his property.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2006, Mann filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in
which he alleged that the defendants conspired to intimidate and harass him into
accepting a significantly reduced price for his property. As Mann asserts, “[t]heir plan,
plainly put, was to drive [me] crazy.” (App. 34.) The defendants filed motions to dismiss
Mann’s complaint, which the District Court granted, giving Mann leave to replead. The
District Court instructed Mann on how to cure the deficiencies in his original complaint,
and he subsequently filed two amended complaints. Mann’s third version of the
complaint, which was dismissed on the defendants’ motions, is the subject of this appeal.
Mann’s appeal ultimately boils down to two overarching issues. First, he contends
that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and then erred in dismissing his
claims under that standard. Second, he argues that the District Court improperly stayed
discovery while it considered the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
3
II. Discussion
We have plenary review over the question of whether the District Court applied the
correct legal standard in evaluating the motions to dismiss. Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). We review “questions concerning the scope
or opportunity for discovery” for abuse of discretion. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod.
Liab. Litig., 264 F.3d 344, 365 (3d Cir. 2001).
A. Motions to Dismiss
1. Standard
In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
the District Court must accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. The complaint’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at
234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, to survive a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “nudge
[his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
The District Court used the correct standard in evaluating Mann’s claims. It
dedicated an entire section of its opinion to discussing the proper standard under Rule
12(b)(6) and noted that a motion to dismiss should be granted when “taking all factual
allegations and inferences as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
4
law.” (App. 16.) The District Court recognized that the motions were governed by Rule
12(b)(6) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Twombly and this Court in Phillips (id. at
15-16), and it continually referred to those principles in its discussion of each of Mann’s
claims.3 Accordingly, there is no merit to Mann’s contention that the District Court
applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the motions to dismiss.4
2. Merits
Mann also argues that even if the District Court used the correct legal standard, it
erred in applying the standard to dismiss his claims. Specifically, Mann contends that he
adequately stated a claim for relief on three grounds: (1) the defendants retaliated against
him, in violation of the First Amendment, by imposing heftier fines after Mann “used
legal process” to successfully defend himself against other fines; (2) the defendants
maliciously prosecuted him in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the defendants
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection by using
harassment and intimidation to “railroad[ him] into a condemnation.” (Id. at 41-42.)
3
Mann fails to cite either Twombly or the “plausibility” standard it ushered in, instead
choosing to rely on the now defunct “no-set-of-facts” standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (Appellant’s Br. at 22), which the Supreme Court squarely rejected
in Twombly. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (Conley’s no-set-of-facts language “has
earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard”).
4
Even if the District Court had applied the wrong legal standard, that would not in
itself entitle Mann to relief because our review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is de novo. McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
a. First Amendment Retaliation
Mann’s First Amendment retaliation claim is based on the assertion that, after he
defended himself in court against $2,000 in fines for code violations, defendant
Buffington cited Mann with another $2,000 in fines in retaliation for Mann’s initial
successful defense. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim predicated on 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the defendant took adverse action sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights; and (3) the adverse action
was prompted by plaintiff’s protected conduct. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003).
Our review of the record leads us to agree with the District Court that Mann failed
to properly allege a retaliation claim. Nowhere in Mann’s third amended complaint does
he allege facts that could reasonably support the necessary “causal link” between his
protected speech (successfully defending the initial fines) and the unlawful retaliation (an
additional $2,000 fine). Id. Instead, Mann makes vague and conclusory allegations that
he was assessed some unreasonable fine for some unspecified violation, in retaliation for
“cho[osing] to use legal process as a way to protect and extend his rights.” (App. 50.)
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (a complaint must do
more than allege a “mere possibility of misconduct;” it must show the pleader’s
entitlement to relief). These allegations fall far short of what is required to put the
6
defendants on notice of the claims and the bases for them. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233
(under Rule 8(a), plaintiff must plead enough facts to provide the defendant “fair notice”
of the claim and the “‘grounds’ on which the claim rests”) (citation omitted)); Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (on a motion to dismiss, “we are not
compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)). Accordingly, Mann has not established that he was unlawfully retaliated
against in violation of the First Amendment.
b. Malicious Prosecution
Mann next contends that defendants Buffington, Wentz, and Redshaw violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution by citing him with
thousands of dollars in fines and bringing other “frivolous criminal charges” 5 against him.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution predicated on the Fourth Amendment, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant acted maliciously for a purpose other
than bringing the plaintiff to justice when (2) he initiated a criminal proceeding (3)
without probable cause (4) which ended in the plaintiff’s favor, but (5) caused the
plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure. Johnson v. Knorr, 477
F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007).
5
As the District Court observed, “[a]lthough [Mann] was strongly encouraged to do so
in the Court’s previous order, [Mann] still does not identify the date, the forum, or
specifically what charges were involved in these ‘criminal charges.’” (App. 18.)
7
Even though on its third iteration, Mann’s complaint wholly fails to allege that the
defendants acted without probable cause in citing him for code violations. See Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 522 (3d Cir. 2003) (an “essential element of a malicious
prosecution claim” is that plaintiff prove lack of probable cause). Furthermore, Mann did
not allege that he suffered a “deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of a
seizure” as a result of the criminal citation proceedings. Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82. The
only deprivation Mann claims to have suffered is “legal fees, court costs, and
interminable inconvenience.” (App. 38.) Such deprivations are insufficient to establish
that Mann was the victim of a malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. See
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005) (plaintiffs failed to
state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because the inconvenience of attending trial
was not a Fourth Amendment seizure; their travel was not restricted, they did not post
bail, and they did not have to report to pretrial services). Accordingly, the District Court
properly dismissed Mann’s malicious prosecution claim.
c. Due Process
Mann alleges a violation of his substantive due process rights based on the
defendants’ unlawful agreement “to deprive [him] of his rights through the unlawful use
of state authority as a way to coerce him into compliance with their wishes.” (Appellant’s
Br. at 18.) Mann’s due process claim that he was unfairly harassed into a condemnation
proceeding is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel applies
8
when: “(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party
being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action.”
Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted). We have plenary review over a district court’s decision regarding
collateral estoppel. Id. at 248. Mann disputed only the identity of the issues prong in the
District Court and now raises the additional argument that the issue was never actually
litigated.
The Honorable Sheryl Ann Dorney presided over the condemnation proceeding in
the Court of Common Pleas of York County. Judge Dorney rejected Mann’s precise
argument that the defendants harassed and intimidated him into selling his property for an
unreasonably low price. (App. 69 (describing Mann’s argument that the City had “bad
faith or tainted motive” in obtaining his property “for as nominal price as possible” and
noting that “we fail to see how this argument is valid.”).) Addressing Mann’s contention
that the City “acted in bad faith by acting in consort with York College to obtain the
propert[y] as inexpensively as possible,” Judge Dorney concluded that Mann had “not
overcome the heavy burden to show that the [City] has committed fraud or an abuse of
discretion.” (Id. at 68-69.) This record makes clear that the identical issue 6 Mann seeks
6
We have held that “[t]o defeat a finding of identity of the issues for preclusion
purposes, the difference in the applicable legal standards must be ‘substantial.’” Raytech
Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1995). Judge Dorney evaluated Mann’s claim
9
to raise on appeal was actually litigated in the state condemnation proceeding.
Accordingly, to the extent that Mann seeks to relitigate whether the defendants unlawfully
coerced him into selling his property for a nominal value, the issue is barred by collateral
estoppel.7
Mann’s complaint also raises, though not explicitly, a “class of one” equal
protection claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that similarly situated individuals be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be brought by a
under state condemnation law, which places a “heavy” burden on the plaintiff to prove
that “the condemnor is guilty of fraud, bad faith or has committed an abuse of discretion.”
(App. 68 (quoting Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. DiFranesco, 557 A.2d 819, 820 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989)).) Mann apparently asks us to evaluate his claim under a general due
process rubric, which focuses on whether “the alleged harassment ‘remove[d] or
significantly alter[ed]’ plaintiffs’ liberty and property interests.” Thomas v. Independence
Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although we recognize that
the plaintiff’s burden is greater in the context of state condemnation law than in pleading
a due process violation, we find that the issue addressed and resolved in the
condemnation proceeding is “in substance the same” as Mann’s due process claim.
Raytech Corp., 54 F.3d at 193. Both schemes require a court to decide whether the
defendants engaged in unlawful conduct to deprive the plaintiff of his property, and Mann
has failed to persuade us that the legal standards are substantially different in this case.
We therefore conclude that the identity prong is satisfied.
7
Mann apparently concedes that he is collaterally estopped from relitigating whether
the condemnation action was brought in bad faith. He states that Judge Dorney “decided
(and quite correctly so) that the aforementioned misconduct was not relevant to the issue
of the Condemnor having the power to take the subject property, nor did the obvious
misconduct interfere with the procedure which eventually decided ‘just compensation.’”
(Appellant’s Br. at 27.) However, Mann maintains that although “Judge Dorney decided
properly on the condemnation issue,” she failed to address “any civil rights issues which
may have shared a possible commonality of facts.” (Id.) For that reason, we address
Mann’s due process claim, as well as his retaliation and malicious prosecution claims.
10
“class of one,” an individual claiming “that []he has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). To
state a claim under the “class of one” theory, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant
treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so
intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Phillips,
515 F.3d at 243 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)).
In Olech, the Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim that the village violated the
Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily demanding a 33-foot easement to connect her
property to the municipal water supply while only demanding a 15-foot easement from
other property owners. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565. The Supreme Court later clarified that
“[w]hat seems to have been significant in Olech ... [was] the complaint alleged that the
board consistently required only a 15-foot easement, but subjected Olech to a 33-foot
easement.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008).
In his complaint, Mann sets forth general allegations that “he was subjected to
unequal and unauthorized mistreatment on a selective basis because of the defendants[’]
unlawful desire for his property,” in violation of his right to equal protection. (App. 49.)
Although he alleges that “[o]ther citizens are not treated in this fashion, particularly the
political leaders of the City of York” (id. at 41), Mann fails to plead that he was treated
differently than other similarly situated individuals, that is, other property owners of
11
blighted structures in the City of York. While Olech may not require plaintiffs to
“identify in the complaint specific instances where others have been treated differently,”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245, the complaint is still deficient. Without any allegation
regarding other blighted property owners, Mann simply cannot “nudge [his] claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570);
see also Hill, 455 F.3d at 239 (“class of one” claim failed because plaintiff, a Borough
Manager, did “not allege the existence of similarly situated individuals – i.e., Borough
Managers – who [the Mayor] treated differently than he treated [plaintiff]”). Mann’s bald
assertions that the defendants violated his right to equal protection because “he was
selectively and vindictively cited and prosecuted by the City in an effort to force him into
cooperation with York College” (App. 44), “amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic
recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1951 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Mann’s equal
protection claim.
B. Discovery
Mann contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to stay
discovery while it considered the defendants’ motions to dismiss.8 In certain
8
Mann urges us to apply dicta contained in our decision in Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d
229 (3d Cir. 2004), to determine that he was entitled to discovery before dismissal. The
facts of Alston are easily distinguishable from those in the case at hand. For one, the
plaintiff in Alston was pro se and a prisoner involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
hospital. Furthermore, despite our recognition that “confined prisoner[s]” face difficulty
12
circumstances it may be appropriate to stay discovery while evaluating a motion to
dismiss where, if the motion is granted, discovery would be futile. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1954 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to
discovery.”). That is precisely the case here. As laid out above, none of Mann’s claims
entitle him to relief. That, as Mann contends, he could have produced “a litany of facts”
substantiating his claims (Appellant’s Br. at 30), if he had more time to conduct
discovery, misses the mark. See Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2007)
(because plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim for relief, “it follows that the district
court did not err in granting defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion before permitting
discovery by plaintiffs”). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a claim, and therefore may be decided on its face without extensive factual
development. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) (the purpose of Rule
12(b)(6) is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and
factfinding”); Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“A motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim for relief should ... be resolved
in bringing civil rights actions “owing to their incarceration or institutionalization,” we
concluded that the district court did not err in failing to order discovery because “it is not
essential at the pleading stage.” Id. at 233 n.6, 236. Moreover, the central holding of the
case was that the district court improperly applied a stringent pleading standard that
conflicted with Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading. Id. at 232 (“[T]he lack of discovery was not
the real barrier blocking Alston’s path to relief. Rather, it was the stringent pleading
standard presupposed by the parties and the District Court.”). Accordingly, we decline to
extrapolate the reasoning of Alston to this case, brought by a represented party and
properly evaluated under Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading standard.
13
before discovery begins.”); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738
(9th Cir. 1987) (the idea that discovery should be permitted before deciding a motion to
dismiss “is unsupported and defies common sense [because t]he purpose of F. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without
subjecting themselves to discovery”). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss.9
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
9
Mann suggests that the District Court should have granted him leave to amend his
complaint. Because Mann was permitted to do so twice before the present motions to
dismiss were filed, we think the District Court was well within its discretion in finding
that allowing Mann a fourth bite at the apple would be futile. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at
245 (dismissal without leave to amend is justified where the amendment would be futile);
Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1993) (district court may deny
amendment based on “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed”) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
14