United States v. George Oyakhire , 431 F. App'x 126 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    No. 10-4492
    __________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    GEORGE OYAKHIRE,
    Also known as OLIVER OYAKHIRE
    GEORGE OYAKHIRE,
    Appellant.
    __________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00658-001)
    District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell
    __________
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 20, 2011
    Before: HARDIMAN and ALIDSERT, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Int’l Trade Judge.
    (Filed: June 21, 2011)
    __________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    This appeal by George Oyakhire, a.k.a. “Oliver Oyakhire,” requires us to decide
    whether the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (1) committed plain
    error by instructing the jury that George’s use of the alias “Oliver” could support an
    inference of consciousness of guilt, and (2) abused its discretion by admitting into
    evidence a summary exhibit of events selected from Oyakhire’s alien files. We decide
    that there was no plain error in the jury instruction and the Court did not exceed its
    permissible discretion in admitting the exhibit. We will affirm.1
    I.
    Because we write for the parties who are familiar with the facts and the District
    Court proceedings, we limit our discussion to explain only our reasoning.
    In October 2009, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted
    George Oyakhire and Leatha Taylor on one count of conspiracy to falsely assume or
    pretend to be an employee of the Social Security Administration, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    ; one count of false personation of an officer or employee of the United
    States, in violation 
    18 U.S.C. § 912
    ; and two counts of making false statements to
    government officials, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    . Oyakhire was also charged with
    one count of making false statements in an application for a United States passport, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1542
    . Taylor pleaded guilty to the charges against her. Oyakhire
    proceeded to trial, a jury found him guilty on all charges, and the District Court sentenced
    him to 16 months’ imprisonment.
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    2
    II.
    Oyakhire contends that the District Court erroneously instructed the jury that his
    use of a false name could support an inference of consciousness of guilt, and that this
    error mandates a new trial. Because he did not object to the Court’s instruction, we
    review it for plain error. E.g., United States v. Lee, 
    612 F.3d 170
    , 191 (3d Cir. 2010). An
    instructional error constitutes plain error if: “(1) the error is fundamental and highly
    prejudicial or if the instructions are such that the jury is without adequate guidance on a
    fundamental question and (2) our failure to consider the error would result in a
    miscarriage of justice.” Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 
    635 F.3d 606
    , 612 (3d Cir.
    2011) (quotations, modification, and citation omitted).
    Throughout the trial, the government presented evidence that George Oyakhire
    used the name “Oliver Oyakhire” to conceal his identity and to fraudulently obtain legal
    resident status and ultimately citizenship. He challenges the following jury instruction:
    There has been evidence that the defendant may have used a false name. If
    you find that the defendant knowingly used a name other than his own in
    order to conceal his identity and to avoid identification, you may, but are
    not required to, infer that this shows consciousness of guilt on the part of
    the defendant. You may not, however, infer on the basis of this alone that
    the defendant is, in fact, guilty of a crime for which he is charged. Whether
    or not evidence of the use of a false name shows the defendant’s
    consciousness of guilt, and the significance, if any, to be attached to that
    evidence, are matters for you to determine.
    Oyakhire did not object to this instruction, and does not claim on appeal that it misstates
    the law. Rather, he argues that the District Court committed plain error when it instructed
    the jury on consciousness of guilt because the use of a false name is inherent in the
    crimes charged against him.
    3
    We have stated that a factfinder may infer consciousness of guilt from a
    defendant’s attempt to conceal his true identity by using an alias. See United States v.
    Levy, 
    865 F.2d 551
    , 558 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he defendants’ attempt to conceal their true
    identities by providing aliases to the police upon arrest is relevant as consciousness of
    guilt.”). Oyakhire has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any legal support for his
    contention that this general precept does not apply where the crime charged involves the
    use of a false name. To succeed under plain error review, Oyakhire must show that “the
    error is clear under current law.” United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734 (1993);
    United States v. Clark, 
    237 F.3d 293
    , 298-299 (3d Cir. 2001). He has failed to meet this
    exacting standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not commit plain
    error.
    III.
    Oyakhire also contends that the District Court exceeded its discretion by
    permitting the government to introduce at trial an exhibit summarizing information
    contained in the alien files of George Oyakhire and “Oliver Oyakhire.” We review a
    district court’s decision regarding admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. See
    United States v. Serafini, 
    233 F.3d 758
    , 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides trial courts with
    “reasonable control over the mode . . . of . . . presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid
    needless consumption of time.” Courts have interpreted the rule to allow trial courts,
    within their discretion, to admit summary exhibits to “clarify and simplify complex
    testimony or other information and evidence.” United States v. Bray, 
    139 F.3d 1104
    ,
    4
    1111 (6th Cir. 1998). Summary charts admitted in this manner may be used to highlight
    points favorable to a party’s case, but they must be linked to evidence that previously has
    been admitted. United States v. Milkiewicz, 
    470 F.3d 390
    , 397-398 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Oyakhire conceded at trial that the government’s exhibit summarized information that
    had been admitted properly into evidence. He has not claimed that any of the information
    in the exhibit was inaccurate, nor has he explained how he was prejudiced by the facts
    included in the chart. The summary was admissible under Rule 611(a). Accordingly, we
    hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the summary exhibit
    into evidence.
    *****
    We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no
    additional discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    5