Jaynes v. Grace ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-1271
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JERREL JAYNES,
Appellant
v.
JAMES L. GRACE; THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF
PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 05-CV-2567)
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
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Argued June 5, 2008
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 19, 2011)
Teri B. Himebaugh, Esq. (Argued)
220 Stallion Lane
Schwenksville, PA 19473
Counsel for Appellant
David C. Glebe, Esq. (Argued)
District Attorney=s Office
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Jerrel Jaynes appeals the order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth
below, we will vacate the order and remand for the District Court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing.
I.
Because the facts are well known to the parties, we will discuss them only briefly.
On July 20, 1995 at about 1:00 a.m., William McClam was parking his car, when another
car pulled up and the man in the passenger seat shot McClam, hitting him in the back.
The car then sped off.
When the police arrived at the scene, McClam identified the shooter as “Jerrel.”
McClam subsequently explained that he and Jerrel Jaynes‟ girlfriend, Brooky Price, had
been in an altercation and he believed that Jaynes had shot him in retaliation for the
incident. The gun, car, and clothing McClam described the shooter as wearing were
never found.
Jaynes was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses in January 1997
after a trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania. The sole evidence against
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Jaynes at trial was the victim‟s identification of him. Jaynes subsequently appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing, inter alia, that trial counsel, Louis T. Savino,
rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to introduce James Wing as an alibi
witness at trial.
In support of his ineffective assistance claim, Jaynes attached an affidavit by
Wing, explaining that he lived in the same house as Jaynes and had seen Jaynes at home
on the night of shooting. According to Wing, Jaynes was babysitting his niece that night
and “[t]here was no way possible that Jerrel Jaynes left the house that night, without me
seeing him go down the stairs or asking [his mother] or myself to watch the child.”
Supplemental Appendix (“SA”) 7.
According to Wing, he gave counsel this information several weeks before trial,
and counsel told Wing that “he would get back to [him],” but Wing never heard from
counsel again. SA 7-8. Although Wing did not receive a subpoena to appear in court, he
decided to attend the trial. During a recess, Jaynes told his counsel that Wing was
present, and Jaynes‟ counsel interviewed Wing about his recollection of the night of the
shooting. Counsel did not, however, ask Wing to testify.
The Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas‟ judgment of sentence.
The court concluded that Wing‟s affidavit “fail[ed] to allege sufficient facts to create an
alibi defense that would, if absent from trial, so prejudice defendant that he could not
receive a fair trial.” SA 19. According to the court, “Mr. Wing alleges that he saw
appellant between 8:30 and 9:30, but does not claim with assurance that appellant did not
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leave the house. Therefore, appellant has not fulfilled the threshold requirements to
establish a claim for relief due to counsel‟s ineffectiveness.” SA 19 (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Jaynes‟ request for allocatur.
Jaynes subsequently filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”). Counsel was appointed, but did not raise the issue of trial counsel
ineffectiveness for failure to notice the alibi witness. The PCRA court dismissed the
petition and the Superior Court affirmed its decision. Jaynes‟ request for allocatur was
again denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Jaynes then filed this federal habeas petition. With respect to the issue on appeal
here, Jaynes argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to notice and present
Wing as an alibi witness. The District Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge
Jacob P. Hart. Magistrate Judge Hart issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R),
recommending that the District Court grant Jaynes a new trial to allow the alibi witness
testimony to be presented. The Magistrate Judge rejected the Superior Court‟s
conclusion that Wing‟s affidavit was insufficient to establish an alibi defense and
determined that Jaynes was prejudiced by counsel‟s failure to call Wing.
The Commonwealth objected to the R&R, and the District Court sustained the
objections, denying the habeas petition in its entirety. The District Court agreed with the
Magistrate Judge that “[c]ontrary to the finding of the Superior Court, . . . Mr. Wing did
claim with assurance that Mr. Jaynes did not leave the house. Thus, we find that in this
respect, the state court‟s decision was erroneous.” Appendix (“App.”) 35 (emphasis in
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original). The District Court, however, determined that “Mr. Wing=s alibi testimony may
not have been as air-tight as Petitioner would have us believe.” App. 37. The District
Court concluded that “as we are required to give deference to trial counsel=s strategy, we
cannot say with assurance that Mr. Savino=s representation and trial strategy was
objectively unreasonable.” App. 37.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.
We review de novo whether the District Court applied the appropriate standard of review
in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See
Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2007).
Under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254, as amended by AEDPA, a state court‟s legal and factual
determinations on the merits are entitled to deference. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d
210, 238 (3d Cir. 2004). Federal courts cannot grant habeas relief in claims adjudicated
on the merits “[u]nless the adjudication of the claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2).
We have plenary review of the District Court=s determination regarding
exhaustion. Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 2004).
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III.
Before a federal court can review a habeas petition under § 2254, a petitioner must
“exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
A petitioner must “„fairly present‟ all federal claims to the highest state court before
bringing them in federal court.” Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir.
2002) (quoting Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2002)). Jaynes raised his
claim regarding counsel‟s ineffectiveness for failure to present the alibi witness on direct
appeal, the Superior Court rejected the claim on the merits, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal. Jaynes therefore exhausted his
state court remedies, and we next consider the merits of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
IV.
Jaynes argues that the District Court erred in denying his habeas petition, claiming
that counsel‟s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and he
was prejudiced by his counsel=s failure to call the alibi witness. In the alternative, Jaynes
requests that we remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons stated
below, we will grant Jaynes‟ request for remand.
At the outset, we consider whether AEDPA deference is appropriate. As both the
District Court and the Magistrate Judge correctly observed, the Superior Court erred in
finding that Wing “d[id] not claim with assurance that appellant did not leave the house.”
SA 19. Indeed, Wing asserted that “[t]here was no way possible that Jerrel Jaynes left the
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house that night.” SA 7. Upon considering this error, the Magistrate Judge determined
that “the Superior Court‟s conclusion regarding prejudice was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts which resulted in an unreasonable application of the
[Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] standard.” App. 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2)). The District Court disagreed and deferred to the state court‟s decision. We
need not decide this issue, however, as we reach the same result either under de novo
review or in light of AEDPA deference. See Taylor, 504 F.3d at 453 (explaining that
“under either standard of review,” AEDPA or de novo, habeas petitioner=s claim was
meritless) (citing Holloway, 335 F.3d at 719 & n.6, 729 (determining that under either de
novo or AEDPA standard of review, result in habeas case would be the same)).
It is well-established that under Strickland, a “defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quotation marks omitted).
Significantly, however, there is a “tiered structure with respect to Strickland‟s strategic
presumptions.” Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2005). If the record
indicates that counsel has conducted a “thorough investigation of the relevant law and
facts,” then a “strong,” “virtually unchallengeable” presumption attaches to counsel‟s
actions. Id. at 500. Otherwise, “strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.
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The current record in this case indicates that the extent of Savino‟s investigation
involved calling Wing three to four weeks before trial, listening to Wing‟s account of
events, and never following up – a far cry from the kind of “thorough investigation of the
law and facts” to which a “strong presumption” of reasonability attaches. As a result,
Savino‟s conduct is “reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. A
“defendant can rebut this „weak‟ presumption by showing either that the conduct was not,
in fact, part of a strategy or by showing that the strategy employed was unsound.”
Thomas, 428 F.3d at 499-500 (footnote omitted). In regard to the former approach, we
have explicitly noted “that an inquiry into whether counsel actually had some strategy is
permissible.” Id. at 499 n.7. Such an inquiry seems particularly appropriate in a case
such as this, in which the record discloses little and that virtual silence is attributable
neither “to lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner [n]or . . . to the unavailability of
counsel,” id. at 500, but rather to the frustration of petitioner‟s attempts to develop the
requisite facts. Indeed, the record before this Court only casts doubt on Savino‟s decision
not to provide notice of an alibi or call Wing as a witness at trial. Wing‟s testimony
would have directly contradicted the only evidence presented at trial against Jaynes – the
victim‟s identification testimony. Significantly, “„an attorney‟s failure to present
available exculpatory evidence is ordinarily deficient, unless some cogent tactical or
other consideration justified it.‟” Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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The District Court does not appear to have previously considered the necessity of
an evidentiary hearing, at least not explicitly.1 Both of the considerations identified by
this Court in Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2010), however, counsel in
favour of such a hearing. Specifically, (1) assuming that Jaynes‟ factual allegations are
true, “the petition presents a prima facie showing which, if proven, would enable the
petitioner to prevail on the merits of the asserted claim,” and (2) “the factual allegations
are [not] „contravened by the existing record‟” in this case. Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393
(quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007)). Accordingly, rather than
engage in speculation regarding Savino‟s strategy, we will remand to the District Court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order denying Jaynes‟ petition and
remand to the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
1
This failure may be attributable to two factors: first, the case came before the District
Court in the form of the Magistrate Judge‟s R&R granting Jaynes habeas relief without
the aid of an evidentiary hearing, and second – and perhaps related – Jaynes did not
request an evidentiary hearing before the District Court. Jaynes did, however, request an
evidentiary hearing before the state court, and was thus “diligent in his attempt to develop
a factual basis for his claim in the state court proceedings.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592
F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010). As a result, the District Court is not barred from holding an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
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