Tyrone Green v. Cynthia Sneath ( 2013 )

BLD-048 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-2157
___________
TYRONE GREEN,
Appellant
v.
DET SNEATH;
LT. HOLTZ;
SUPT.LAWLER;
DEPUTY FISHER;
C/O SETTLE;
C/O TRESS;
C/O EBERLING;
LT. KENDRICKS;
HEARING EXAM. MITCHELL;
JOHN DOE I all are employed at SCI Huntingdon;
JOHN DOE II all are employed at SCI Huntingdon;
DEPUTY CORBIN;
CHAPLAIN KORHORCHIK
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00154)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 21, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 7, 2013 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
On January 26, 2009, Tyrone Green, a Pennsylvania state inmate currently
incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Forest, filed a pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, naming as defendants numerous state corrections and law
enforcement officials. Green’s complaint included allegations of retaliation, violations of
his right to the free exercise of religion, violations of his due process rights, and the
denial of his right of access to the courts. On March 26, 2012, the District Court granted
the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Green timely filed this appeal.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we
agree with the District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
each of Green’s claims, we will affirm.
I.
At the time Green filed his complaint, he was incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”). On August 24, 2006,
Pennsylvania State Trooper Daniel Sneath was assigned to investigate a complaint by
Green that he had been pushed down the stairs at SCI-Huntingdon by Corrections Officer
Trainee Montgomery. Sneath first interviewed Green about this allegation at J.C. Blair
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Memorial Hospital, where Green was recovering from the fall, and his investigation
continued for several months after Green was returned to SCI-Huntingdon. After being
discharged from the hospital, Green was transported to the State Correctional Institution
at Smithfield (“SCI-Smithfield”) to recuperate. While at SCI-Smithfield, Green was
placed in disciplinary custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) after receiving
multiple misconduct reports charging him with threatening corrections staff.
On September 6, 2006, Green returned to SCI-Huntington and was placed in the
facility’s RHU. Green’s request to be released into the general population was denied by
prison officials, who informed Green that when an inmate alleges that he was assaulted
by corrections staff, he is placed in administrative custody for his own safety pending an
investigation. In the ensuing months, Trooper Sneath’s investigation into Green’s
allegations continued, and included additional interviews with Green as well as
interviews with Officer Montgomery and at least one other corrections officer who was
present at the time Green alleged that he was pushed down the stairs. During his follow-
up interviews with Sneath, Green alleged that while at SCI-Smithfield he was tortured
and issued fabricated misconduct reports. On October 3, 2006, Green filed a civil lawsuit
in Pennsylvania state court, naming numerous corrections officials as defendants.
On December 19, 2006, Sneath interviewed Green again at SCI-Huntingdon.
Green contends that during this interview, Sneath and a corrections official from SCI-
Smithfield threatened that if he did not drop his complaint against Officer Montgomery,
he would remain the RHU for the duration of the investigation, which could take years.
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Green also alleges that Sneath told him that SCI-Smithfield employees were interviewed
and had no recollection of Green. Green did not thereafter drop his complaint against
Officer Montgomery. On February 26, 2007, Sneath terminated the investigation after
finding no evidence to corroborate Green’s claims that he was pushed down the stairs by
Office Montgomery or that he was mistreated while recuperating at SCI-Smithfield.
On April 10, 2008, Green was placed in the RHU pending the completion of an
unrelated investigation into whether he violated prison rules. Green was released into the
general population three weeks later, after sufficient evidence was not found to warrant a
misconduct charge. On December 8, 2008, Green was again placed in the RHU, this time
because a search of his cell on December 4, 2008, uncovered an unauthorized razor and,
according to corrections officials, Green became agitated and threatening when he was
ordered to leave his cell. Green was thereafter taken to the infirmary and placed on
suicide watch before being transferred to the RHU because corrections officials
determined that he was a danger to himself. On December 5, 2008, Green was issued a
misconduct report relating to the incident, charging him with threatening an employee,
refusing to obey an order, and possession of contraband in the form of a weapon.
On December 16, 2008, Green was transferred to a different cell within the RHU.
According to Green, the corrections officer who moved him to his new cell made
negative remarks about Green’s complaint against Officer Montgomery. After moving to
the new cell, Green was no longer in possession of his Quran. On December 17, 2008,
Green filed a grievance charging that his Quran was purposely taken from him during the
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cell transfer. He requested the names of the officers who discarded his Quran, as well as
$50,000 in damages. On January 19, 2009, the grievance officer found the claim without
merit, informing Green that pursuant to prison policy it was his responsibility to bring the
Quran with him when he moved to a new cell, and because he failed to do so the Quran
was discarded along with any other property that remained in his old cell. The grievance
officer also noted that Green had since been supplied with a new Quran, albeit a different
translation, and that prison officials were working on obtaining a replacement copy of
Green’s preferred version. Green’s direct administrative appeal of the decision was
denied, as was his final appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Grievances and Appeals.
II.
Green advances a number of retaliation claims in his § 1983 complaint, arguing
that his First Amendment right to free expression was infringed. We agree with the
District Court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
Green’s claim that Sneath and the SCI-Smithfield official coerced him into
dropping his criminal complaint against Officer Montgomery during the December 19,
2006, interview is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Kach v.
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). Green does not dispute that this claim accrued
on December 19, 2006. The instant complaint was signed by Green on January 21, 2009,
more than one month beyond the two-year deadline for the claim to be considered timely.
Green’s remaining retaliation claims allege that as a result of his pursuing a
criminal complaint against Officer Montgomery and filing a civil action against prison
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officials in state court, he was placed in the RHU on April 10, 2008, and December 8,
2008, and then moved from one RHU cell to another on December 16, 2008, during
which time his Quran was destroyed. We agree with the District Court that, at least with
respect to Green’s filing of a civil suit against prison officials in state court, he was
engaged in conduct protected from retaliation under the First Amendment. See Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002). We also agree that placement within the
RHU for filing a civil action may be sufficient to constitute adverse action. However, as
the District Court observed, Green is required to demonstrate a causal connection
between the exercise of his constitutionally protected rights and his placements within the
RHU in order to prevail on a retaliation claim under § 1983. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000). Green attempts to demonstrate such a causal link by
asserting that an April 10, 2008, order of the state court in his civil suit, which had at that
time been pending for 18 months, directly resulted in the prison’s repeated decisions to
place him in the RHU. We agree with the District Court that this scenario is implausible
not only because the state court’s order was temporally attenuated from the allegedly
retaliatory responses, but also because the order was actually favorable to prison officials.
III.
Green also argues that his right to the free exercise of religion was infringed based
on his allegation that his Quran was intentionally taken from him during his RHU cell
transfer on December 16, 2008. The defendants responded on summary judgment with
evidence that prison policy is that inmates are responsible for taking all property with
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them during cell transfers, and any property left behind is discarded. We agree with the
District Court that Green fails to establish that he was prohibited from practicing his
religion in violation of the First Amendment under the four-factor test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The first Turner factor asks
whether the action that is alleged to have infringed on the inmate-plaintiff’s religious
rights is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Sharp v. Johnson,
669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012). On this factor, courts afford substantial deference to
the judgment of prison officials, who undertake the “formidable task” of administering a
prison. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 254 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, we find that
Green points to no evidence in the record that his Quran was intentionally thrown out
rather than discarded pursuant to prison policy regarding inmate property left behind
during cell transfers. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir.
2007) (when burden in summary judgment shifts back to non-moving party, that party
must point to “specific facts” in the record such that a reasonable jury could find in its
favor). Accordingly, we find that the first Turner factor, which is “foremost” in the
analysis, weighs against finding a First Amendment violation here. See Sutton, 323 F.3d
at 253; see also Sharp, 669 F.3d at 156 (noting that the burden on prisons to show that an
action is reasonably related to a legitimate interest is “slight”).
Moreover, we find that the remaining Turner factors also weigh against finding
that Green’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion was infringed. The
second factor asks whether the prisoner has an alternate means of exercising their
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constitutional right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. In this context, the relevant inquiry is
whether the inmate has other means of practicing his religion generally, not whether he
has other means of engaging in any particular practice. See Sutton, 323 F.3d at 255.
Here, after Green’s lost possession of his Quran, corrections officials provided him with a
replacement within one day. When Green rejected the replacement because it was not the
translation he preferred, officials sought to obtain a satisfactory version. Although there
was a bureaucratic delay in finally delivering the new version of the Quran to Green, we
cannot conclude under these circumstances that he lacked an alternate means of
practicing his religion generally. We conclude that the third and fourth Turner factors,
which focus on the impact that accommodating the inmate’s religious practice would
have on prison staff and other inmates, also do not sufficiently weigh in Green’s favor.
We also agree with the District Court that Green fails to establish that he suffered
a substantial burden on the practice of his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2009).
This Court has explained that in order to establish a substantial burden on the practice of
his religion under RLUIPA, an inmate-plaintiff must show that (1) following the precepts
of his religion would force him to forfeit the benefits otherwise available to other
inmates; or (2) he faced substantial pressure to modify his behavior and violate his
beliefs. See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277-80 (3d Cir. 2007). Under this
standard, we do not find that the circumstances surrounding Green’s loss of his Quran, or
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the prison’s administrative delay in obtaining for him a replacement of his preferred
translation, was sufficient to constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA.
IV.
Green further claims that his due process rights were violated on December 5,
2008, when he was issued a misconduct report for threatening an employee, refusing to
obey an order, and possession of a weapon. Green alleges that the report was fabricated
and that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. The Due Process
Clause does not provide inmates with protection against the imposition of discipline
unless it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). We have
held that confinement in administrative or punitive segregation is insufficient, without
more, to establish the requisite “atypical” hardship necessary to implicate a liberty
interest. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-07 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, Green was
issued a misconduct report because a search of his cell uncovered a weapon and he
became threatening when ordered to leave his cell. Green was read the charges contained
in the misconduct report, rather than being provided with a copy of the report, because
inmates on suicide watch are prohibited from having paperwork in their cell. Following a
hearing at which he was found guilty, Green was sent to the RHU for 60 days of
disciplinary custody. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Green was
subjected to the sort of “atypical and “significant” discipline contemplated in Sandin and
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Griffin. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding 7-month
term of disciplinary custody insufficient to trigger due process violation).
V.
Finally, Green alleges that he was denied his right of access to the courts when
Trooper Sneath and an official from SCI-Smithfield threatened him into dropping the
complaint against Officer Montgomery. We agree with the District Court that this claim,
which accrued on December 19, 2006, and was not filed until January 21, 2009, is barred
by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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