Zurich American Insurance v. R.M. Shoemaker Co. , 519 F. App'x 90 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2268
___________
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY;
NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK
v.
R.M. SHOEMAKER CO.; COUNTY OF MONMOUTH
v.
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
INSURANCE COMPANY
R.M. Shoemaker Company,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-00873
(Honorable Harvey Bartle, III)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 4, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 27, 2013)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
1
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Insurance companies brought declaratory judgment actions to determine whether
they must defend and indemnify their insured in a lawsuit pending in New Jersey state
court. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies, finding
the commercial general liability policies between the insurance companies and the
insured did not afford coverage under the circumstances of the underlying action. We will
affirm.
I.
The County of Monmouth brought suit against R.M. Shoemaker Company in New
Jersey state court (the “Underlying Action”), alleging Shoemaker, a construction
contracting firm, faultily constructed an addition to the Monmouth County Correctional
Institution in Freehold, New Jersey. Among other things, Monmouth alleges Shoemaker
negligently supervised its subcontractor, thereby permitting the subcontractor to engage
in willful misconduct and resulting in damage to both structural elements and personal
property of the County Correctional Institution.1 Monmouth alleges Shoemaker‟s
negligence permitted water to intrude into the County Correctional Institution, reduced its
structural integrity, and damaged interior property including “the electrical systems, the
suspended acoustic tile ceilings and miscellaneous equipment.”
Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) and Northern Insurance
1
The contract between Monmouth and Shoemaker provided that Shoemaker was
responsible for the “construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures”
associated with “all portions of the Work under the Contract,” and was obligated to
“[c]oordinate, manage, inspect and supervise all phases” of that work.
2
Company of New York (“Northern”) sought a declaratory judgment in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that they were not required to
defend or indemnify Shoemaker, their insured, in the Underlying Action. Shoemaker
served a third-party complaint against another of its insurers, Pennsylvania
Manufacturers Association Insurance Company (“PMA”), and sought declaratory
judgments that Zurich, Northern, and/or PMA had the duty to defend and indemnify
Shoemaker in the Underlying Suit.2
The commercial general liability policies between Insurance Companies and
Shoemaker use the same language, and only provide coverage for property damage
caused by an “occurrence.” The term “occurrence” is defined in the policies as “an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions.”
Insurance Companies moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Finding Pennsylvania substantive law governed the dispute, the district court held
Insurance Companies were not required to defend Shoemaker because Monmouth‟s
allegations in the Underlying Action did not arise from an “occurrence” as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed that term. Shoemaker appeals and seeks to
certify this case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We will affirm the judgment of the
district court.3
2
Zurich and Northern (plaintiffs-appellees) as well as PMA (third-party defendant-
appellee) are hereafter referred to as “Insurance Companies” for ease of discussion.
3
The district court had jurisdiction of the original action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)
and supplemental jurisdiction of Shoemaker‟s third-party complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
3II.
This case involves the intersection of two Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases
construing what may constitute an “occurrence.” In Kvaerner, the court held an insurance
company was not required to defend its insured against claims of faulty workmanship
because such claims were not sufficiently fortuitous to constitute an accident. 908 A.2d at
899. Insurance Companies argue that since Monmouth‟s allegations amount to claims of
faulty workmanship, they cannot be required to defend the suit. But in Donegal Mutual
Insurance Company v. Baumhammers, the court held an insurance company may be
required to defend its insured against claims arising from the intentional acts of a third
party, at least where the insured‟s negligence enabled the third party‟s actions. 938 A.2d
286, 293 (Pa. 2007). Shoemaker contends that since its negligent supervision facilitated
its subcontractor‟s willful misconduct, Baumhammers dictates that Insurance Companies
must defend Shoemaker in the Underlying Action.
Shoemaker oversimplifies Baumhammers, contending it stands for the proposition
that an “occurrence” has taken place whenever the insured‟s negligence leads to a third
1367. See In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig.,
15 F.3d 1230, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We hold that the additional non-diverse
counterclaim defendants do not destroy diversity jurisdiction in the . . . action because
there is complete diversity of citizenship between the originally named parties.”). We
review the interpretation of an insurance policy de novo. Kvaerner Metals Div. of
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). The
court first looks to the language of the insurance policies to determine in which instances
they provide coverage, and then examines the underlying complaint “to determine
whether the allegations set forth therein constitute the type of instances that will trigger
coverage.” Id. at 896-97. If coverage is triggered, “the insurer has a duty to defend . . . .
Although the duty to defend is separate from and broader than the duty to indemnify,
both duties flow from a determination that the complaint triggers coverage.” Gen.
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party‟s willful misconduct. Baumhammers‟ holding actually hinged upon the randomness
of the third party‟s misconduct—a shooting rampage, perpetrated by Richard
Baumhammers—from the perspective of the insured, his parents. Id. at 288. The families
of the shooting victims brought suit against Richard‟s parents, alleging the parents were
negligent in permitting Richard to have a gun and failing to procure mental health
treatment for him. Id. at 288-89. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Donegal
Insurance—which insured the parents under a general liability policy similar to the
present case—was required to defend the parents against the victims‟ suits. Id. at 293.
The court explained:
The extraordinary shooting spree embarked upon by Baumhammers
resulting in injuries to Plaintiffs cannot be said to be the natural and
expected result of Parents [sic] alleged acts of negligence. Rather,
Plaintiffs‟ injuries were caused by an event so unexpected, undesigned and
fortuitous as to qualify as accidental within the terms of the policy. Because
the alleged negligence of Parents resulted in the tragic accidental injuries to
the individual plaintiffs, Donegal is therefore required to defend Parents.
Id. As Baumhammers indicates, the crucial inquiry dictating whether a general liability
insurer must defend its insured under an occurrence-based policy is whether an event was
sufficiently fortuitous from the perspective of the insured to qualify as an “occurrence.”
See id. at 292 (“An injury . . . is not „accidental‟ if the injury was the natural and expected
result of the insured‟s actions.”).
Kvaerner and cases following it make clear that faulty workmanship under a
contract is not sufficiently fortuitous to qualify as an “occurrence.” In Kvaerner, a steel
company brought suit against Kvaerner for breach of contract and breach of warranty,
Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted).
5
alleging a coke oven battery Kvaerner designed and built was damaged and failed to meet
contract specifications. 908 A.2d at 891. In determining that Kvaerner‟s insurer did not
have to defend the suit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[t]he key term in
the ordinary definition of „accident‟ is „unexpected.‟ This implies a degree of fortuity that
is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.” Id. at 898. Therefore, the court held
the definition of “accident” required to establish an “occurrence” under the
policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship.
Such claims simply do not present the degree of fortuity contemplated by
the ordinary definition of “accident” or its common judicial construction in
this context. To hold otherwise would be to convert a policy for insurance
into a performance bond. We are unwilling to do so, especially since such
protections are already readily available for the protection of contractors.
Id. at 899 (footnotes omitted). The court further rationalized this rule, stating that such
policies cover “tort liability for physical damages to others and not . . . contractual
liability of the insured for economic loss because the product or completed work is not
that for which the damaged person bargained.” Id. at 899 n.10 (quoting Insurance
Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations; What Every Lawyer Should
Know, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 415, 441 (1971)).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court expanded upon Kvaerner in Millers Capital
Insurance Co. v. Gambone Brothers Development Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007). The analysis in Gambone is apposite because of its factual similarity to the present
case. See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000)
(stating a federal court should not disregard the opinion of a state‟s intermediate appellate
court unless convinced by persuasive data that the state‟s supreme court would decide
differently). Gambone specifically rejected the argument that faulty workmanship by a
6
subcontractor may constitute an “occurrence” or “accident” from the perspective of the
contractor. 941 A.2d at 715. Gambone further noted that insurance coverage and defense
was precluded for “natural and foreseeable acts, such as rainfall, which tend to exacerbate
the damage, effect, or consequences caused ab initio by faulty workmanship,” since such
acts, like faulty workmanship, were not sufficiently fortuitous. Id. at 713. Moreover, in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. CPB International, Inc., we relied in part on
Gambone to predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not require a general liability
insurer to defend an action arising out of a contract dispute—even if the plaintiff in the
underlying action asserted consequential damages. 562 F.3d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 2009).
Kvaerner and Gambone control the outcome of this dispute. Faulty
workmanship—whether caused by the contractor‟s negligence alone or by the
contractor‟s negligent supervision, which then permitted the willful misconduct of its
subcontractors—does not amount to an “accident” or “occurrence.” See Bomgardner v.
State Farm Ins. Co., Civ. No. 10-1287, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96379, at *11-12 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 14, 2010) (stating Gambone stands for the proposition that “faulty
workmanship, whether the fault of the insured or a subcontractor” does not constitute an
occurrence). Nor does a foreseeable act like the subsequent water infiltration into the
structure. See Specialty Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 609 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir.
2010) (“Faulty workmanship, even when cast as a negligence claim, does not constitute
[an occurrence]; nor do natural and foreseeable events like rainfall.”); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 562 F.3d at 596 (finding no insurance coverage because consequential damages
were “too foreseeable to be considered an accident”). Monmouth‟s allegations do not
7
present the requisite fortuity to qualify as an “occurrence.”4
III.
Because Pennsylvania law dictates the outcome here, we will affirm the judgment
of the district court and deny Shoemaker‟s motion for certification to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Insurance Companies are not required to defend or indemnify Shoemaker
in the Underlying Action because the faulty workmanship on which Monmouth‟s claims
are based does not constitute an “occurrence” triggering the protections of the policies
between Insurance Companies and Shoemaker.
4
A more difficult question may be presented when a plaintiff sues a defendant for faulty
workmanship without an underlying contract between the parties (such as when the
plaintiff sues a subcontractor directly). See, e.g., Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 557 F. Supp. 2d 502, 515 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding the existence of a
contract crucial to the question of whether there has been an “occurrence,” since where
there is a contract, “it can hardly be said that the insured‟s failure to perform up to its
own bargained-for, self-imposed standards was fortuitous from the insured‟s point-of-
view”); Schuylkill Stone Corp. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158
(D.N.J. 2010) (finding there is an occurrence where there is no contract between the
parties and the plaintiff in the underlying action alleges the defendant negligently
manufactured products in violation of industry standards). But this is not such a case.
Monmouth‟s claims in the Underlying Action are entirely based on Shoemaker‟s
allegedly faulty workmanship in the execution of the construction contract. Since this
case requires a straightforward application of Kvaerner and Gambone, we needn‟t reach
the issue of whether faulty workmanship constitutes an “occurrence” in the absence of a
contract between the relevant parties.
8