Ronald Johnson v. Philip Morgan , 512 F. App'x 124 ( 2013 )

ALD-089 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3770
___________
RONALD G. JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
PHILIP MORGAN, Warden; BUREAU OF PRISONS;
HOWARD R. YOUNG CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-00007 )
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 17, 2013
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:January 28, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
In 2009, Ronald Johnson filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983and 1986, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was held for several days at
the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“HYCI”) on an erroneous violation of
1
probation (“VOP”) charge. His complaint named as defendants the HYCI, the Delaware
Bureau of Prisons (“DBOP”), and Warden Phil Morgan. The District Court dismissed
the claims against the HYCI and the DBOP, finding them immune from suit. On March
30, 2012, the District Court granted Warden Morgan’s motion for summary judgment.
On May 1, 2012, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court
denied on September 7, 2012.1 On September 24, 2012, Johnson filed a notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 with respect to the District Court’s
September 6, 2012, order. We begin by making clear the limited scope of this appeal.
We do not have jurisdiction over the District Court’s March 30 order granting summary
judgment to Morgan because Johnson’s notice of appeal was untimely filed with respect
to that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456
(3d Cir. 2012). Johnson’s May 1 motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(a)
because the motion for reconsideration was itself untimely. See Baker, 670 F.3d at 460.
As to the denial of reconsideration, we will summarily affirm.
On December 16, 2008, Johnson was arrested pursuant to an outstanding capias
for disorderly conduct and for charges stemming from an unrelated domestic violence
1
Shortly after filing his motion for reconsideration, Johnson filed a flurry of additional
motions in the District Court, including a second motion for reconsideration, two motions
to reopen case, a motion for mental evaluation, a motion to stay, a motion to strike
response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a motion for appointment of
counsel, and a request for a competency hearing. The District Court’s September 6,
2012, order denying reconsideration also addressed and denied each of these motions.
2
complaint. He was committed to the HYCI and bail was set on each of the charges. The
outstanding capias was resolved at a hearing on December 17, 2008. On December 18,
2008, a hearing was held on the domestic violence charges; a trial date was set, and
Johnson’s bail was increased. Thereafter, Johnson’s offender status sheet, dated
December 18, 2008, erroneously reflected an additional VOP charge that increased the
amount of his bail. Instead of posting bond for both the domestic violence charges and
the erroneous VOP charge, Johnson decided to remain in custody and attempt to have the
VOP charge cleared from his record. On December 19, 2008, he submitted a complaint
that he had never been on probation, had never been arrested for a VOP, and had never
been arraigned on such a charge. An administrative investigation was conducted and on
January 1, 2009, Johnson was advised that the VOP charge had been removed. The
following day, he posted bond for the remaining charges and was released.
Johnson’s subsequent complaint in the District Court sought monetary damages
for mental suffering, anxiety, and stress resulting from the additional days he spent in the
HYCI while he attempted to clear the VOP charge from his record. The District Court
determined that Warden Morgan was entitled to summary judgment because Morgan had
no personal involvement in the placement of the VOP charge on Johnson’s record, he did
not have a duty to personally investigate Johnson’s grievance, and there was no evidence
that he was involved in a conspiracy to deprive Johnson of his rights based on
discriminatory animus. Johnson unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration on the basis
that he was suffering from a mental breakdown, depression, and anxiety.
3
Generally, we review an order denying a motion for reconsideration for an abuse
of discretion, and only exercise plenary review when the denial is based on the
interpretation and application of a legal precept. See Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers,
Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985). In this case, the District Court’s denial of
Johnson’s motion for reconsideration was not based on the interpretation and application
of a legal precept, but on its failure to demonstrate, as a proper reconsideration motion
must, either (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). We detect no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the basis for Johnson’s motion,
which was that he was suffering from a mental breakdown, depression, and anxiety, did
not conform to any of those requirements. Notably, Johnson’s motion did not suggest
any error in the District Court’s reasoning. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s September 6, 2012, order denying Johnson’s motion for reconsideration. 2
2
We will also summarily affirm the denial of Johnson’s second motion for
reconsideration, two motions to reopen case, motion for mental evaluation, motion to
stay, motion to strike response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, motion for
appointment of counsel, and request for a competency hearing, substantially for the
reasons expressed in the District Court’s September 7, 2012, order.
4