Christopher Morris v. Atty Gen Nj ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-4145
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CHRISTOPHER MORRIS,
Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Peter Verniero;
GLYNN MOORE, Trooper; MARC STEPHENS, Trooper;
FIRST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, Paul Zoubek;
SUPERINTENDENT OF NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
Col. Carl A. Williams
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3:03-cv-1001)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
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Argued on November 15, 2011
BEFORE: FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, International
Trade Judge
(Opinion Filed: December 6, 2011)
Thomas Bruno (ARGUED)
Abramson & Denenberg, P.C.
1315 Walnut Street, 12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Honorable Jane A. Restani, International Trade Judge of the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
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Attorney for Appellant
John C. Connell
John P. Kahn
Maureen T. Coghlan
Archer & Greiner, P.C.
One Centennial Square
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033
Mary E. Wood (ARGUED)
Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey
P.O. Box 112
25 Market Street
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
Trenton, NJ 08625
Attorneys for Appellees
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Christopher Morris appeals from the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment
to the Appellees on his malicious prosecution and selective prosecution claims. While he
recognizes that, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim, he must show that his
criminal case was “favorably terminated,” he argues that the District Court held him to
too high of a standard in resolving this question. Morris also argues that he put forward
sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that he had been selectively prosecuted.
2
For the reasons expressed below, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary
judgment to the Appellees.1
I.
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we set forth only the
facts and history that are relevant to our conclusion. On June 1, 1997, Christopher
Morris, an African American male, was stopped by two New Jersey State Troopers,
Glynn Moore and Marc Stephens, on the New Jersey Turnpike. The Troopers testified
that they stopped Morris because he was speeding. Moreover, because Morris‟ car had
tinted windows, the Troopers say that it was not until the car came to a stop that they
were able to observe that Morris and his passenger, Andre London, were African
American. The Troopers testified that they became suspicious because Morris and
London made furtive movements and appeared nervous, among other reasons.
According to the Troopers, Morris and London were subjected to Terry pat down
searches, and were each discovered to be carrying a large, duct-taped package of
cocaine. Morris now disputes this version of events, and instead alleges that the Troopers
searched him three times and found nothing. It is his claim that the Troopers planted the
cocaine on him, and he insists that he had no contraband on his person or in his car,
except for a small amount of marijuana.
Morris was charged with possession with intent to distribute a Controlled
Dangerous Substance. He filed a Motion to Suppress the cocaine on the ground that the
1
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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pat-down search was illegal and the contraband was illegally seized. He did not, at that
time, raise a claim that the cocaine had been planted on him by the Troopers. His motion
was denied.
Morris‟ arrest and criminal prosecution came at a time when the New Jersey State
Police were under scrutiny for using racial profiling in their traffic stops. In 1999, the
New Jersey Attorney General‟s office published an interim report following an
investigation into the racial profiling allegations. The Attorney General concluded that
the State Police did not have an official policy of racial profiling, but he nevertheless
found widespread de facto discrimination by officers who racially profiled motorists on
the Turnpike. Morris filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the suppression issue based
on this report, but this motion was also denied. Finally, Morris filed a Motion to Reopen
the Discovery based on newly discovered evidence of racial profiling. This motion was
denied, and Morris‟ criminal case went to trial. His first trial was declared a mistrial,
however, after jurors were found discussing the matter during lunch.
During jury selection for Morris‟ second trial, the judge became aware of three
Appellate Division decisions that had been issued concerning discovery in cases
allegedly involving racial profiling. The trial judge thus granted Morris‟ Motion to
Reopen Discovery. Morris‟ case was referred to a special proceeding to determine
whether pending criminal cases such as his could go forward. On February 26, 2001, the
Attorney General moved to dismiss 76 pre-trial cases being reviewed, including Morris‟,
because it was too difficult to “„discern which cases involve[d] intentional targeting of
minorities when other drug courier profile-related factors existed to justify the
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stop.‟” Morris v. Verniero, No. 03-1001, 2008 WL 4330179 at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17,
2008). Morris‟ indictment was dismissed on March 23, 2001.
On March 7, 2003, Morris filed this civil rights action against several defendants,
including Troopers Moore and Stephens, Attorney General Peter Verniero, First Assistant
Attorney General Paul Zoubeck, and Colonel Carl Williams. He alleged claims arising
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and selective prosecution. The
Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but
District Judge Thompson denied this motion. The Appellees then filed a Second Motion
for Summary Judgment, addressing the substantive issues in the case. Judge Thompson
granted this motion and dismissed the case.
This notice of appeal followed.
II.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment.
Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
A. Malicious Prosecution
To prove malicious prosecution a plaintiff must show, among other things, that
that “the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding” and that this “criminal proceeding
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ended in the plaintiff‟s favor.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). As we have
noted, the favorable termination requirement serves “to avoid „the possibility of the
claimant succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of
two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.‟” Id. at 187
(quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). In keeping with this purpose, “we
have held that a prior criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates
the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy the favorable termination element.” Id.While Morris is correct that “[a]ctual innocence is not required for a common law
favorable termination,” Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996), the termination
must at least be indicative of Morris‟ innocence.
As we have stated, “[a] plaintiff may attempt to indicate his innocence by
demonstrating that his prior criminal proceeding terminated . . . [due to] the formal
abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor . . . .” Kossler 564 F.3d at 187.
Morris argues that the Attorney General formally abandoned his case, thereby indicating
his innocence of the crimes charged. However, we do not consider all administrative
decisions to abandon prosecutions to be favorable terminations. See, e.g., Donahue v.
Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a prosecutor‟s decision to dismiss a case
in the interest of judicial economy did not constitute a favorable termination).
In Morris‟ case, we cannot say that the dismissal of his case constituted a
favorable termination because it was not indicative of his innocence of the crimes
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charged. The Attorney General clearly stated that he did not dismiss Morris‟ indictment
because he thought Morris was innocent. On the contrary, in his public announcement
regarding the dismissal, the then-Attorney General said, “„let‟s be clear; the defendants in
these cases may have prevailed in their motions to suppress, but they are criminals
nonetheless. All were carrying some form of contraband for distribution in communities
in this and other states.‟” Appellees‟ Br. 16.
Nor can we say that Morris‟ assertion that the cocaine was planted on him creates
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his case was favorably terminated. There
are many reasons to discredit Morris‟ assertion, first raised almost six years after his
initial arrest, that he did not possess the cocaine.2 Among these are the fact that the state
court judge who heard testimony pursuant to Morris‟ suppression motion found Trooper
Moore to be “truthful, trustworthy, persuasive and detailed” and saw “no reason to doubt
his testimony” that he and his partner recovered cocaine from Morris‟ person. R. 521.
We have noted that, “if the nonmoving party‟s evidence, when viewed in the context of
all of the evidence, could not be credited by a rational juror, summary judgment may be
granted.” U.S. v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993). Because no
rational juror could have credited Morris‟ belated assertion that the drugs were planted,
the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the Appellees.
2
Morris‟ counsel submitted a letter to this Court after oral argument in which he stated
that Morris actually did raise his claim that the drugs were planted on him during his
criminal trial. Specifically, counsel pointed us to two questions that defense counsel
asked at trial during her cross examination of Trooper Moore. However, these two
isolated questions are insufficient to show that Morris raised a claim that the drugs were
planted on him at that time.
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B. Selective Prosecution
“A decision to prosecute is selective and violates the right to equal protection
when it is made on a discriminatory basis with an improper motive.” United States v.
Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989). To establish a claim of selective
prosecution, a plaintiff must, among other things, “provide evidence that persons
similarly situated have not been prosecuted.” Id. Morris actually “acknowledges in this
case that he did not produce evidence to „show that similarly situated individuals of a
different race were not prosecuted.‟” Appellant‟s Br. 48. However, he believes that his
claim should succeed nonetheless because he “produced ample statistical evidence of
bias.” Id.The District Court properly concluded that this evidence was unavailing. Judge
Thompson noted that the statistical evidence, “at best, establish[es] that the New Jersey
State Police maintained a de facto policy of racial profiling in the course of effecting
traffic stops.” Morris v. Verniero, No. 03-1001, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71187 at *16
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008). She added that the statistical evidence did not “provide insight
as to whether similarly situated suspects of a different race than [Morris] were prosecuted
when violations of the drug laws were found.” Id. Morris‟ selective prosecution claim
fails because he did not prove this necessary element.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary
judgment to the Appellees.
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