John Cerverizzo v. John Yost , 380 F. App'x 115 ( 2010 )

DLD-181 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1074
___________
JOHN CERVERIZZO,
Appellant
v.
JOHN YOST, Warden, FCI Loretto
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00286)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 29, 2010
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 14, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
John Cerverizzo, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District
Court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate and remand.
Cerverizzo is currently serving a 70-month sentence for conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) staff
interviewed Cerverizzo in August 2009, and recommended that he be allowed to serve the
final 150 to 180 days of his term of imprisonment in a halfway house.
In September 2009, Cerverizzo challenged the BOP’s decision by filing an internal
administrative remedy informal resolution form. Cerverizzo disagreed with BOP’s
recommendation and requested to serve twelve months in a halfway house, the full
amount allowed under the Second Chance Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Relief was denied,
and Cerverizzo appealed to the Warden. He argued that it appeared that BOP was
violating the Second Chance Act by implementing a policy that categorically limits its
recommendations to a maximum of six months, as opposed to the full one-year
placement. The Warden denied Cerverizzo’s administrative appeal on October 13, 2009.
Cerverizzo did not administratively appeal the decision further.
Instead, in November 2009, Cerverizzo filed the current habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the BOP’s decision and general policy. He acknowledged his
failure to exhaust administratively, and requested that the District Court excuse
exhaustion as futile. Cerverizzo argued that because BOP issued the decision and policy
he challenges, the BOP would likely deny his administrative grievance. Thus, he
asserted, any further administrative exhaustion would have been futile.
The Magistrate Judge found Cerverizzo’s argument unavailing and recommended
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dismissing Cerverizzo’s § 2241 petition for failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies. The Magistrate Judge stated “[t]here is no ‘futility’ exception to the exhaustion
of administrative remedies.” (Report at p. 4 n.2.) In addition, the Report noted that if
Cerverizzo was unsuccessful in the appeals process, he “can obtain review on the merits
when his administrative appeals are concluded.” (Id. at 4.) By order entered December
16, 2009, and over Cerverizzo’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
Cerverizzo timely appealed.1
Ordinarily, we require federal prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Moscato v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). However, we have held that the
administrative exhaustion requirement in this context may be excused if an attempt to
obtain relief would be futile or where the purposes of exhaustion would not be served.
See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005);
Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986); Gambino v. Morris, 134
F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (Roth, J., concurring).
To the extent the Magistrate Judge based his decision on the belief that no futility
exception exists when reviewing a § 2241 petition, we disagree. Moreover, the
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We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and
review the District Court’s ruling de novo. See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314
(3d Cir. 2007).
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Magistrate Judge’s decision to dismiss without prejudice to allow Cerverizzo to pursue
the administrative appeals process gives false hope. Given the time constraints set forth
in the BOP’s regulations, any further administrative appeal would be rejected as untimely
because Cerverizzo did not appeal the Warden’s response within 20 calendar days of
October 13, 2009. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Thus, the District Court’s dismissal
without prejudice effectively forecloses any further judicial or administrative review.
For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal and remand with
instructions to consider whether exhaustion should be excused, and if so, to consider
Cerverizzo’s claims on the merits. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 239 n.2; Strong v. Schultz,
599 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D.N.J. 2009). In addition, the docket reveals that the government
was never served with Cerverizzo’s petition. The District Court may wish to consider
eliciting a response from the BOP before proceeding further in this matter.
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