United States v. Robert Gaines , 515 F. App'x 151 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-2717
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT DEJAUN GAINES,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 11-cr-088)
District Judge: Hon. John E. Jones, III
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 5, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 13, 2013)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Robert Gaines appeals the sentence imposed by the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and his attorney moves to withdraw as counsel
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We will grant the motion to
withdraw and will affirm Gaines’s sentence.
I. Background
On November 28, 2010, the Pennsylvania State Police attempted to conduct a
traffic stop of a car that they observed operating without rear registration lights. The
driver of the car attempted to flee, and a high-speed chase ensued. During the chase, the
police drove over a silver object in the roadway. They lost sight of the fleeing vehicle but
later discovered it in a nearby parking lot without its driver. The police returned to the
area in which they had seen the silver object and recovered a loaded, nickel-plated Ruger
.22 magnum handgun. The police ultimately apprehended Gaines in connection with the
chase.
An officer read Gaines his Miranda rights, and, afterward, on the way to the police
station, Gaines admitted that he had thrown a nickel-plated handgun out of the car
window. At the police station, Gaines was re-read his Miranda rights. He then told
police that he was carrying the gun for protection.
A grand jury indicted Gaines on one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He initially pled not guilty but
changed his plea to guilty on October 31, 2011, pursuant to a written plea agreement with
the government.1
1
At the change of plea hearing, Gaines said he understood that by entering a guilty
plea he was giving up, inter alia, the right to have the court decide any pretrial motions.
He verified his signature on the plea agreement and told the District Court that he had
read and understood the agreement. The terms of the agreement were also summarized
for Gaines, who agreed that the summary was accurate. He then stated that no threats had
been made against him or his family to induce him to sign the plea agreement, and that he
had signed it of his own free will. The Court also discussed Gaines’s concerns over some
of the facts presented by the government and aspects of his criminal history. In the
2
The District Court held a sentencing hearing on May 31, 2012, and calculated the
sentencing guidelines range as 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Citing § 4A1.3 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines,2 Gaines moved for a downward departure from the
guidelines range, on the grounds that his criminal history category of VI overrepresented
the seriousness of his past crimes. Gaines also requested a downward variance in
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and requested that any
sentence imposed by the Court run concurrently with his state prison sentence. The
Court denied the motion for departure, noting that there had been an escalation in the
seriousness of the crimes committed by Gaines and that he had recently been convicted in
state court on five counts of drug trafficking. The Court also noted that Gaines had been
sentenced in absentia in state court one week before the current offense. After
considering the § 3553(a) factors at length, including the fact that Gaines’s employment
history was sporadic, that a substantial amount of his income was derived from drug
trafficking, and that Gaines had been sentenced in state court on drug charges just before
he was arrested on the present offense, the Court went on to consider that Gaines had a
agreement, Gaines agreed that his offense met all of the elements of a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), as they were explained to him by the Court. Gaines reserved the right to
direct and collateral appeal by having the waiver of appeal section stricken from the plea
agreement. The government agreed not to pursue any further prosecution directly arising
out of the charged offense and moved for a three-level reduction in Gaines’s calculated
offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
2
That guideline provides, “If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s
criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s
criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a
downward departure may be warranted.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 4A1.3(b)(1).
3
serious drug abuse problem, which he admitted, and that he had a supportive family. The
Court declined to have Gaines’s sentence run concurrently with his state sentence,3 but it
imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively
with Gaines’s state sentence.
II. Discussion4
Gaines filed this timely appeal of his sentence on June 14, 2012. Submitting that
all potential issues for appeal are frivolous, Gaines’s counsel asks permission to
withdraw. Under Anders, appellate counsel may seek withdrawal after conducting a full
and conscientious examination of all the proceedings and determining that there is no
non-frivolous basis for appeal. Anders, 386 U.S at 744. Counsel must accompany such a
request with a brief identifying any issues that might support an appeal. Id.
We apply a two-step review when Anders is invoked: first, we determine whether
counsel has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a),5
3
The District Court concluded that to run the sentence concurrently with the state
sentence would almost eclipse the sentence that it imposed and that Gaines would
effectively avoid punishment for the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
4
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
5
We implement Anders through our Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a):
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is
persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable
merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and supporting
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
which must be served upon the appellant and the United
States. The United States must file a brief in response.
Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. … If the
panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant
4
and, second, we examine “whether an independent review of the record presents any
nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
When deciding whether counsel has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of
Rule 109.2(a), we turn to the adequacy of counsel’s supporting brief. To be adequate, the
brief must satisfy us that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of
appealable issues and has explained why those issues are frivolous. Youla, 241 F.3d at
300. “Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim,” but must still carefully
examine the record. Id. If the Anders brief is adequate, our review is limited to those
issues implicated by the brief. Id. at 301. When the Anders brief is inadequate, we may
expand our review to portions of the record implicated in the defendant’s pro se brief or
other filings that provide “guidance concerning the issues [the defendant] wishes to raise
on appeal.” Id. Regardless of the adequacy of the brief, we may affirm the conviction
and sentence without appointing new counsel if we find, after reviewing the record, that
the “frivolousness [of the appeal] is patent.” United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316,
321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Anders brief here identifies three potentially appealable issues:6 (1) whether
Gaines’s statements to police should have been suppressed, (2) whether Gaines
counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without
appointing new counsel.
3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).
6
Gaines was informed by this Court of his right to submit a pro se brief in support
of his appeal but has failed to do so. Gaines’s counsel, however, has included in the
Anders brief issues proposed by Gaines.
5
voluntarily entered into the plea agreement with the government, and (3) whether the
District Court imposed an unreasonable sentence and abused its sentencing discretion.
Gaines’s counsel examined the record and contends there is no merit to this appeal. We
are satisfied that the Anders brief is adequate and will confine our review to the issues it
contains.7
The argument that Gaines’s statements to police should have been suppressed is
meritless. After entering an unconditional guilty plea, as Gaines did here, an appellee
may not raise on appeal any issues concerning pretrial rulings. See Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”). The District Court here informed Gaines
at the change of plea hearing that he would be waiving the right to bring any pretrial
motions by pleading guilty, which Gaines acknowledged. Gaines made no pretrial
motions for suppression, nor did he make his guilty plea conditional. Thus, he is
precluded from arguing the suppression issue, and it represents no basis for appeal.
Gaines’s contention that he did not voluntarily enter into the plea agreement with
the government is likewise unfounded, as it contradicts his testimony to the District Court
7
Counsel’s Anders brief also discusses a possible jurisdictional objection, but that
issue is patently frivolous because district courts have original jurisdiction over “all
offenses against the laws of the United States” under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Gaines was
indicted for and pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), a law of the United
States.
6
at the change of plea hearing and is without support in the record. A guilty plea is not
constitutionally involuntary merely because the government threatens to pursue more
serious charges, as this is part of the “give-and-take” of the plea bargaining process.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978). Gaines testified at the change of
plea hearing that he had not been threatened and had entered into the plea agreement of
his own free will. Therefore, Gaines’s argument that his guilty plea was not voluntary is
frivolous.
Finally, Gaines’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence is, like his other
arguments, frivolous. We review the sentencing decision of a district court for abuse of
discretion, looking for procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 2011). The District
Court recognized the guidelines as advisory and imposed a sentence below the guidelines
range. It considered and dismissed Gaines’s motion for a departure from the guidelines
because it did not find that his criminal history was overstated. The Court thoroughly
considered the § 3553(a) factors, and explained its analysis, considering the nature of the
crime, the escalation of offenses committed by Gaines, his committing the present
offense promptly after an in absentia sentence for drug offenses in state court, his
personal history and circumstances, the sufficiency of the sentence, the need for
deterrence, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities. Thus, his sentence was
procedurally reasonable. A sentence eight months below the minimum guidelines
sentence is certainly not outside the broad range of possible sentences, and it is therefore
7
substantively reasonable as well. Gaines’s sentencing argument is therefore patently
meritless.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the
sentence imposed by the District Court.
8