Dwumaah v. Atty Gen USA ( 2010 )


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  •                                          PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4140
    KWAME DWUMAAH,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    On Petition for Review from an
    Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Board No. A075-462-772)
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Roxanne C. Hladylowycz
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    April 12, 2010
    Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: April 12, 2010)
    Kwame Dwumaah
    Apartment 405A
    215 West Walnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19144
    Pro Se Petitioner
    Eric H. Holder, Jr.
    Thomas W. Hussey
    Kurt B. Larson
    Justin R. Markel
    Stacy S. Paddack
    United States Department of Justice
    Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
    P.O. Box 878
    Ben Franklin Station
    Washington, DC 20044
    Attorneys for Respondent
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    PER CURIAM.
    Kwame Dwumaah, a native and citizen of Ghana, seeks
    review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Finding no error in the
    conclusion that Dwumaah is removable, we will deny the
    petition for review.
    2
    I.
    Dwumaah, currently age forty-nine, entered the United
    States in 1989 on a six-month visitor visa and overstayed. From
    1997 to 2001, Dwumaah was enrolled in two colleges in the
    Philadelphia area, obtaining a degree in nursing which he
    financed in part through student loans procured from the federal
    government under the alias “Simon Dwumaah.” In 1999,
    Dwumaah adjusted status to conditional lawful permanent
    resident based upon his marriage to a United States citizen. In
    July 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
    terminated the conditional resident status after concluding
    through interviews with Dwumaah and his wife that the
    marriage was fraudulent. In November 2004, DHS served a
    Notice to Appear charging Dwuumah as removable under INA
    § 237(a)(1)(D)(i) due to termination of the conditional resident
    status.
    Shortly thereafter, a grand jury in the District Court for
    the Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted Dwumaah on
    multiple fraud charges stemming from his unlawful receipt of
    the above-mentioned student loans. Dwumaah eventually
    entered a guilty plea to one count of theft of government monies
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 641
    . He was sentenced to five
    months in prison and ordered to pay $75,217 in restitution,
    reflecting the total loss from his conduct. This Court affirmed
    the conviction and sentence. United States v. Dwumaah, No.
    06-1399, 181 Fed. App’x 309, 310 (3d Cir. 2006). The District
    Court denied post-conviction relief. United States v. Dwumaah,
    3
    No. 1:05-cr-00157, 
    2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89459
     (M.D. Pa.
    Dec. 5, 2007).1
    In 2006, DHS amended the Notice to Appear in light of
    the conviction to include three additional charges of
    removability: (1) INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime involving moral
    turpitude); (2) INA § 237(a)(1)(A) (inadmissible at time of
    adjustment of status); and (3) INA § 237(a)(3)(D) (false claim
    of United States citizenship). Dwumaah responded before the
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) by arguing that he is not removable
    under any of the grounds charged. He did not apply for asylum
    or other relief from removal.
    The IJ concluded that DHS’s decision to terminate the
    conditional permanent resident status was improper because
    DHS failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    facts and information in Dwumaah’s petition for adjustment of
    status were untrue. Accordingly, the IJ held that Dwumaah is
    not removable under § 237(a)(1)(D)(i). However, the IJ also
    concluded that DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence
    that Dwumaah is removable under § 237(a)(3)(D) for having
    1
    The District Court noted that “[Dwuumah] admitted,
    both in his sentencing memorandum and in open court, that he
    used a false social security number to apply for and receive
    financial aid for his education. Moreover, ... [Dwuumah] gave
    a lengthy statement admitting to applying for and receiving
    loans and other benefits through the use of a false name and
    social security number.” United States v. Dwumaah, 
    2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89459
    , at *11 (quotation marks and citations to
    trial record omitted).
    4
    falsely claimed United States citizenship on his student loan
    applications.2 After Dwumaah appealed, the BIA remanded the
    matter for the IJ to consider Dwumaah’s eligibility for
    cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a).
    On remand, the IJ reaffirmed the finding that Dwumaah
    is removable for falsely claiming citizenship, and denied
    cancellation of removal. Dwumaah challenged both rulings on
    appeal, and the BIA affirmed. The BIA refused to disturb the
    finding that Dwumaah falsely claimed citizenship when
    applying for federal financial aid, concluding that the
    government met its burden by demonstrating removability
    through clear and convincing, albeit circumstantial, evidence.
    The BIA also agreed that Dwumaah is not entitled to
    cancellation of removal. Dwumaah timely filed his petition for
    review.
    II.
    2
    Although the IJ’s final order stated that Dwumaah “is
    removable under section 237(a)(1)(A), 237(a)(2)(A)(i), and
    237(a)(3)(D) of the Act,” A.R. at 499, we agree with respondent
    that the IJ’s April 13, 2007, opinion, and the subsequent October
    23, 2008, opinion, clearly reflect that the finding of removability
    was based upon § 237(a)(3)(D). See Respondent’s Br. at 13 n.3,
    17 n.4. The BIA also limited its analysis to the question of
    removal under § 237(a)(3)(D). A.R. at 32-33.
    5
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). Where,
    as here, the BIA essentially adopted the IJ’s findings and
    discussed the IJ’s decision, we review the decisions of both the
    IJ and the BIA. Chen v. Ashcroft, 
    376 F.3d 215
    , 222 (3d Cir.
    2004). We review agency factual determinations under the
    substantial evidence standard and accept those determinations
    as conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Dia v. Ashcroft, 
    353 F.3d 228
    , 249 (3d Cir.
    2003) (en banc). We exercise de novo review over legal
    determinations. Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 
    455 F.3d 409
    , 413 (3d
    Cir. 2006).
    Dwumaah’s sole challenge in this Court is to the
    determination that he is removable under INA § 237(a)(3)(D).3
    Section 237(a)(3)(D) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny alien
    who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be
    a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under ...
    any Federal .. law is deportable.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(3)(D).
    The government bears the burden to establish removability “by
    clear and convincing evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
    “Only if [DHS] satisfies this burden, based on evidence
    presented at a hearing, may the immigration judge issue an order
    authorizing removal.” Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 
    436 F.3d 382
    , 388
    (3d Cir. 2006). “No decision on deportability shall be valid
    3
    Dwumaah does not challenge the denial of cancellation
    of removal in his opening brief, and thus we deem that issue
    waived. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 
    396 F.3d 530
    , 532 n.1 (3d Cir.
    2005).
    6
    unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
    Dwumaah argues that DHS failed to meet its burden of
    proof because he never admitted that he completed the loan
    applications, and he objects that DHS made its case solely
    through circumstantial evidence linking him to the applications.
    These arguments are plainly insufficient. The record contains
    verified copies of Federal Student Aid applications for 1996-97
    and 1997-98 submitted by “Simon Dwumaah.” A.R. at 807-
    814. The applicant marked “yes” to indicate that he is a citizen
    of the United States and signed both forms. While Dwumaah
    claims no knowledge of these forms, he conceded that he
    applied for student loans, that he used the alias Simon Dwumaah
    when he did so, and that he attended the school listed on the
    applications. In addition, the forms set forth his correct home
    address and marital status, as well as a social security number
    and false date of birth that were linked to Dwumaah through his
    own admissions. Given this record, the IJ did not err in drawing
    the clear inference that Dwumaah completed the applications
    and falsely claimed citizenship for an improper purpose – a
    finding that is further supported by the undisputed record of his
    conviction for theft of government monies.
    While Dwumaah correctly notes that DHS was unable to
    verify conclusively through forensic analysis that the signatures
    on the applications belonged to him, we discern no error in the
    IJ drawing a negative inference from Dwumaah’s refusal to
    provide a handwriting exemplar. As the IJ observed,
    Dwumaah’s mere denial of having completed the forms does not
    7
    undermine the clear and convincing evidence supporting the
    ground for removal.
    In short, substantial evidence supports the finding that
    DHS met its burden of proving that Dwumaah falsely claimed
    citizenship on at least two occasions in connection with federal
    student loan applications. Because proof of even one false claim
    of citizenship supports removal under § 237(a)(3)(D),
    Valenzuela-Solari v. Mukasey, 
    551 F.3d 53
    , 58 (1st Cir. 2008),
    the charge of removability was properly sustained.
    III.
    We have considered Dwumaah’s remaining contentions
    but find them without merit and in need of no separate
    discussion. We will deny the petition for review.
    8