United States v. Wilson Ramirez , 460 F. App'x 119 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 10-4538
    _______________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    WILSON RAMIREZ,
    a/k/a BEJE
    a/k/a ENAMO
    Wilson Ramirez,
    Appellant
    _______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    For the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-09-cr-00579-001)
    District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 23, 2012
    _______________
    Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: February 3, 2012 )
    _______________
    OPINION
    _______________
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    Wilson Ramirez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent
    to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and
    possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). The
    District Court sentenced him to 234 months’ imprisonment, which exceeded the
    maximum sentence recommended under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Ramirez
    filed a timely notice of appeal. He asserts that the Court committed procedural and
    substantive error in varying upward from the Guidelines range. We disagree and thus
    affirm. 1
    I.
    Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
    decision. Ramirez pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement that preserved his
    right to appeal the District Court’s sentence if it exceeded the Guidelines range. At the
    sentencing hearing, the Court calculated the Guidelines range as 168-210 months. It then
    considered the relevant sentencing factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), specifically
    discussing Ramirez’s lengthy and “disturbing” criminal history, the seriousness and
    sophistication of his offense, its concern that incarceration would not deter him from
    reoffending on release, its need to provide a sentence that would promote respect for the
    law, and its duty to protect the public. The Court also stated that Ramirez would “still be
    a young man when [he gets] out” if sentenced based on the Guidelines range. Appendix
    at 84. Finding that the Guidelines range did not reflect the seriousness of Ramirez’s
    offense and would be too lenient to promote respect for the law and adequately protect
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    . We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    2
    the public, the Court decided to vary upward and sentenced him to 234 months of
    imprisonment and five years of supervised release upon the completion of his prison
    term.
    On appeal, Ramirez focuses on the District Court’s statement that he would still be
    a “young man” if sentenced based on the Guidelines range. He notes that he would be 50
    years old when released if sentenced to the maximum sentence recommended under the
    Guidelines, an age he contends is not “young.” He thus argues that the Court based its
    sentence on an erroneous factual conclusion, thereby committing procedural error. He
    further argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because an upward
    variance of two years will not change his status as a “young man,” and thus the sentence
    did not advance the Court’s goal of deterring him from reoffending.
    II.
    We review a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Jones, 
    566 F.3d 353
    , 366 (3d Cir. 2009). We apply a two-step process to determine
    whether a district court committed procedural or substantive error. 
    Id.
     First, we “ensure
    that the district court committed no significant procedural error in arriving at its
    decision.” United States v. Wise, 
    515 F.3d 207
    , 217 (3d Cir. 2008). Significant
    procedural errors include “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
    based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-
    including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). If we determine that the sentence is procedurally sound,
    “we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Jones, 
    566 F.3d at 366
    .
    3
    A sentence is substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court would
    have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district
    court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 
    562 F.3d 558
    , 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
    A sentence outside of the Guidelines range is not presumptively unreasonable. 
    Id. at 567
    . We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
    factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    . “As long as
    a sentence falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered
    reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.” Wise, 
    515 F.3d at 218
    .
    The District Court based its decision to vary upward from the Guidelines range on
    a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, including Ramirez’s criminal history, the
    seriousness and complexity of the crime, the need for general and specific deterrence, and
    the protection of the public. Its passing remark that Ramirez would be a “young man” if
    sentenced to the maximum sentence recommended under the Guidelines was part of its
    detailed and comprehensive analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. It did not commit
    procedural error.
    In addition, the sentence is substantively reasonable. In addressing the § 3553(a)
    factors, the District Court “set forth enough to satisfy [us] that [s]he . . . considered the
    parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [her] own legal
    decisionmaking authority.” Jones, 
    566 F.3d at 366
     (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted). A reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the same sentence.
    *   *   *   *   *
    For these reasons, we affirm.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-4538

Citation Numbers: 460 F. App'x 119

Judges: Ambro, Chagares, Hardiman

Filed Date: 2/3/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024