Keith Dijuan Dawson v. Jose Frias , 397 F. App'x 739 ( 2010 )

ALD-301 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2200
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KEITH DIJUAN DAWSON,
Appellant
v.
JOSE FRIAS, UNICOR Staff; GLEN LAWHORN, UNICOR SOI;
NICOLE BROWN, UNICOR Business Ofc. Mgr.; ROBERTO ORTIZ, UNICOR factory Mgr.;
NORMA WOODALL, UNICOR Associate Warden; JOSE SANCHEZ, BOP Counselor;
KEVIN BULLOCK, BOP Case Mgr.; ROBERT WHRITENOUR, BOP Unit Mgr.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-06050)
District Judge: Honorable Renée Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 30, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : October 14, 2010)
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OPINION
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1
PER CURIAM
Keith Dijuan Dawson appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint by the
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We will affirm.
Dawson, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey,
complains that he was unjustly terminated from his position in the prison’s UNICOR 1
program, leading to financial hardship and fear of future reprisal. He alleges that this
dismissal was accomplished by means of a forged “Inmate Request to Staff” (“Cop-Out”)
submitted by defendant Frias, which had the net effect of causing him to lose his job.
Dawson charges the other named defendants with “covering up” the forgery.
The District Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding the accusation of
forgery undergirding Dawson’s allegations to be a “distinction without difference,” as
prisoners have neither a property nor a liberty interest in prison employment and thus lack
a due-process interest in same. Dawson v. Frias, Civ. No. 09-6050, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30513, at *7 n.6 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010).
Our review of the District Court's sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is plenary. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,
223 (3d Cir. 2000). We must “accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all
1
UNICOR is also known as Federal Prison Industries or FPI. See generally About
UNICOR – Frequently Asked Questions – General Overview, Unicor.gov,
http://www.unicor.gov/about/faqs/faqsgeneral.cfm (last visited September, 2010).
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom,” Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1996), but we require more than mere assertions devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted). As Dawson proceeds pro
se, we liberally construe his pleadings and apply applicable law even if he has failed to
mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). We may
summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented by the appeal. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6; Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002).
We agree with the District Court that Dawson’s complaint does not state a claim.
Chief among his obstacles is the well-established principle that prisoners have neither a
liberty or property interest in prison employment. See James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630
(3d Cir. 1989). Since stating a cognizable claim under due process requires a liberty or
property interest, id. at 629, Dawson would not be able to maintain his action even if he were
terminated for no cause. Therefore, regardless of the circumstances surrounding his
departure from UNICOR, Dawson is unable to successfully demonstrate a constitutional
violation based solely on this set of facts.
Similarly, while Dawson asserts throughout his complaint that his was a “retaliatory”
job firing, he has failed to present facts supporting a claim of retaliation. Dawson must show
that the conduct that led to the retaliation was constitutionally protected, that he suffered
from “‘adverse action’ at the hands of the prison officials,” and that the retaliation and
adverse action were causally related to the initial conduct. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,
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333–34 (3d Cir. 2001). He has identified an adverse action but has done little else to suggest
retaliation beyond using the word itself.
Finally, we agree with the District Court that to the extent Dawson’s complaint seeks
restoration of good-time credits, such a claim must be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 255 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).
Ordinarily, a District Court should not sua sponte dismiss a complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim without providing the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint. Dawson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30513, at *11. For
the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that amendment would be futile in this case
and, thus, conclude that the District Court did not err in declining to afford Dawson leave to
amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
Because Dawson's appeal does not present a substantial issue, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court
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