Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority , 369 F.3d 227 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-21-2004
Eddy v. VI Water Power Auth
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 02-4057
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
Recommended Citation
"Eddy v. VI Water Power Auth" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 654.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/654
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
PRECEDENTIAL
Samuel H. Hall, Jr. (Argued)
Marie E. Thomas
Birch de Jongh Hindels & Hall
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT Poinsettia House at Bluebeard’s Castle
OF APPEALS 1330 Estate Taarnebjerg
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, USVI 00802
NO. 02-4057 Cathy M. Smith
Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority
P.O. Box 1450
GABRIELLE EDDY Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, USVI 00804
v.
Attorneys for Appellant
VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER AND
POWER AUTHORITY; James M. Derr (Argued)
JAM ES BROWN; P.O. Box 664
JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II; Charlotte Amalie
JOHN DOE III; JOHN DOE IV St. Thomas, USVI 00804
Virgin Islands Water Attorney for Appellee
and Power Authority,
Appellant
OPINION OF THE COURT
On Appeal From the District Court of the
Virgin Islands
(D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-00048)
District Judge: Hon. Thomas K. Moore
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Argued December 9, 2003 The Virgin Islands Water and Power
Authority (“WAPA”) appeals from a
BEFORE: NYGAARD, BECKER and judgment entered on a verdict finding it
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges liable to Gabrielle Eddy (“Eddy”) for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(Opinion Filed: May 21, 2004) WAPA further appeals the denial of their
renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law. Because the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to Eddy will not
support recovery on an intentional the yard. Eddy informed his foreman,
infliction of emotional distress claim that James Brown, that he had not been trained
is not barred by the exclusive remedy for work in the High Yard. Brown
provision of the Virgin Islands Workers’ responded, “Well, Mr. Eddy, we want you
Compensation Act, we will reverse the to do it, or [face] disciplinary action.” JA
judgment of the District Court of the at 1376. Brown then informed Eddy that
Virgin Islands and will direct that work on the switch had to be performed
judgment be entered in favor of WAPA. hot for economic reasons. 2
I. Factual and Procedural Background The crew did not have enough
insulating material to cover up all exposed
A. Factual Background 1 areas of the switch, and, accordingly,
while Eddy covered most of the switch
Gabrielle Eddy was employed by with insulating materials, the back area
WAPA as a first class lineman trained to remained uninsulated. In addition, Eddy
do “hot line” work, where power lines was not provided with an insulated
remain energized while work is being wrench, which was necessary to safely
done. On June 2, 1994, Eddy’s crew was perform maintenance on the switch.
directed by its foreman to report to the
High Yard, an area of WAPA’s St. Nonetheless, Brown directed Eddy to
Thomas power plant with large electrical repair the partially uninsulated switch with
switches that are bigger and closer the uninsulated wrench. Eddy protested,
together than switches found out in the responding to Brown: “You’ve got to be
field where Eddy usually worked. The crazy. You’ve got to be kidding me. In
crew was to perform what an internal there so close, I mean, you got to be
WAPA memo would later describe as kidding me,” JA at 1380, and further
“planned corrective and preventative objected to using the uninsulated wrench.
maintenance” on a high voltage switch in
Eddy had been previously sent home
twice for refusing to perform unsafe work.
1
As our standard of review in
evaluating a motion for judgment as a
2
matter of law, discussed infra, requires us Eddy attended a meeting sometime
to “view[] the evidence in the light most before the day of the accident at which
favorable to the non-movant and giv[e] it WAPA announced that all work in the
the advantage of every fair and reasonable High Yard would be performed hot. Eddy
inference,” W.V. Realty, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co., protested, along with another employee,
334 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 2003), we state that employees did not have the proper
the facts herein in the light most favorable training or equipment for hot line work in
to Eddy. the High Yard.
2
Several other WAPA workers testified to problems with impotence, and his
having similar experiences.3 Eddy personality has changed completely since
believed that if he refused to work on the the accident. He has been, at times,
switch in the High Yard that day, he would severely depressed, angry, and stressed
be sent home, and would be terminated or out. Eddy’s treating psychologist, Dr.
suspended. Thomas Tyne, initially diagnosed him as
suffering from general anxiety disorder,
Eddy climbed twenty feet up a ladder along with posttraumatic stress disorder.
as directed to repair the switch. During the In 1995, Dr. John Massimo, Eddy’s
repair, as Eddy used the uninsulated socket treating psychiatrist, diagnosed him as
wrench to loosen a nut, the nut moved suffering from major depressive disorder
suddenly and the back of the wrench made and posttraumatic stress disorder. Eddy
contact with the back of the switch, was prescribed antid epressants, an
causing an electrical arc. Eddy was burned antipsychotic, and sedatives.
by the hot flash from the arc and briefly
lost consciousness. By 1997, nearly three years after the
accident, Dr. Tyne diagnosed Eddy as
Eddy was in severe pain after the suffering from a permanent moderate
accident. He suffered partial and full psychological impairment. In 2001, Dr.
thickness burns (requiring skin grafts), and Tyne determined that Eddy was still
was burned on his face, chest, legs, and suffering from posttraumatic stress
groin. Eddy has since suffered flashbacks disorder and anxiety disorder. His general
during his sleep, seeing himself being anxiety disorder resulted in major
electrocuted again. He has suffered from depression, and Eddy still suffered from
flashbacks, remembrances, inability to
concentrate, inability to sleep, and
3 disruption in eating and daily functioning
At least three other individuals
activities.
testified as to having similar experiences:
Joel Dowdye (“I was one of those
B. Procedural Background
individuals who was sent home numerous
times for refusing to do work when I
Eddy collected worker’s compensation
thought it was unsafe.”), JA at 1098-99,
as a result of the June 2, 1994 accident.
Kenval Thomas (WAPA’s policy was
He also filed this five-count lawsuit on
“either you do the work or you get sent
March 21, 1996. Counts IV and V were
home.”), JA at 1180 et seq., and Cleve
tried by a jury. Count IV alleged a
Stridiron (“[W]ell, if you refuse, they
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Brown
basically say – they send you home. They
for depriving Eddy of various rights, but
suspend you. Like you either do it or you
the jury found in favor of Brown. Count V
don’t, and then you’ll be, you know,
alleged intentional infliction of emotional
punished after that.”), JA at 1223-24.
3
distress against both Brown and WAPA. WAPA argues that the record is devoid
of evidence to support the elements of a
After moving for judgment as a matter claim for intentional infliction of
of law at the close of Eddy’s case, WAPA emotional distress, the claim on which the
renewed its motion at the close of jury found WAPA liable. “We review the
evidence, arguing, inter alia, that District Court’s decision denying a motion
“[p]laintiff presented no evidence that he for judgment as a matter of law de novo,
suffered emotional distress after hearing and apply the same standard that the
Defendant Brown’s alleged words, nor District Court did, namely whether,
was there any emotional distress flowing viewing the evidence in the light most
from Brown’s conduct prior to Plaintiff favorable to the non-movant and giving it
climbing the latter.” JA at 216. The the advantage of every fair and reasonable
motion was denied. The jury found inference, there is insufficient evidence
against Brown and WAPA on Count V, from which a jury reasonably could find
and reached a verdict in the amount of liability.” W.V. Realty, Inc., 334 F.3d at
$5,000.00 against Brown and 311 (citing Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco
$1,000,000.00 against WAPA. The jury Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).
determined that Brown either (1) acted as We set forth the familiar standard for
WAPA’s alter ego or (2) was directed or determining the sufficiency of the
authorized by WAPA. evidence in the margin.4
The District Court entered a judgment
reflecting the verdict. Brown paid the 4
In determining whether the
judgment against him and did not appeal.
evidence is sufficient to
WAPA filed a timely motion for judgment
sustain liability, the court
notwithstanding the verdict. WAPA’s
may not weigh the evidence,
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
determine the credibility of
verdict was thereafter denied, and WAPA
witnesses, or substitute its
filed this timely appeal.
version of the facts for the
jury’s version. Although
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
judgment as a matter of law
should be granted sparingly,
The District Court had supplemental
a scintilla of evidence is not
jurisdiction over the intentional infliction
enough to sustain a verdict
of emotional distress claim pursuant to 28
of liability. The question is
U.S.C. § 1367(a) and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).
not whether there is literally
We have jurisdiction to review the final
no evidence supporting the
judgment of the District Court under 28
party against whom the
U.S.C. § 1291.
motion is directed but
whether there is evidence
4
III. Discussion After discussing the elements of an
IIED claim and the claim preclusion
While WAPA raises numerous provision of the WCA, we will address the
arguments as to why it is entitled to sufficiency of the evidence with respect to
judgment as a matter of law, WAPA’s the two IIED theories discussed by the
central argument attacks the sufficiency of parties. The first theory is that Eddy
the evidence in support of a claim for suffered severe em otional distress
intentional infliction of emotional distress compensable under IIED because Brown
(“IIED”), given the liability limitations forced him to choose between performing
imposed by the Virgin Islands Workers’ an unsafe task or potentially losing his
Compensation Act (the “WCA”). Because job–a job he could not afford to lose (the
it is dispositive of this appeal, we will only “pre-accident emotional distress claim”).
address that argument. 5 According to WAPA, this is the only
theory that could escape the bar of the
WCA, but there is no evidence to support
upon which the jury it. The second theory, stressed by Eddy on
could properly find a appeal, is that Brown coerced Eddy into
verdict for that party. performing unsafe maintenance work,
Thus, although the thereby causing the accident, physical
c o u rt d r a w s a ll injury and severe emotional distress (the
reasonable and “post-accident emotional distress claim”).
logical inferences in
t h e n o n m o v a n t ’s A. The Tort of Intentional Infliction
favor, w e m u s t of Emotional Distress
[reverse] an order
[denying] judgment “[T]he Virgin Islands has designated
as a matter of law if, the Restatement as its law, until a contrary
upon review of the statute is approved.” Monk v. Virgin
record, it is apparent Islands Water & Power Authority, 53 F.3d
that the verdict is not
supported by legally
sufficient evidence.
Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 425 n.20 WAPA or (2) WAPA authorized or
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lightning Lube, directed Brown’s conduct. Because our
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d other holdings are dispositive of this
Cir. 1993) (citations and internal appeal, we will assume arguendo that
quotations omitted)). sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
finding that WAPA is liable for Brown’s
5
WAPA argues, inter alia, that there is conduct, and we treat the actions of Brown
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s and WAPA as one for purposes of this
finding that (1) Brown was the alter ego of appeal.
5
1381, 1387-88 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 1 unjustified. The same comment
V.I.C. § 4). 6 Section 46 of the further notes that severe distress
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: may encompass mental anguish,
fright, horror, grief, worry, and
One who by extreme and other emotional disturbances. The
outrageous conduct intentionally or extent of the severity is to be
recklessly causes severe emotional measured by whether any
distress to another is subject to ‘reasonable man could be expected
liability for such emotional distress, to endure it.’
and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595
harm. F.2d 1265, 1275-76 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (quoting § 46 cmt. j).
Id.
With respect to the “intentional” or
For there to be “severe emotional “reckless” element of § 46, according to
distress,” Comment i to § 46,
Comment j to § 46 requires that The rule stated in this Section
a plaintiff prove that he suffered applies where the actor desires to
severe distress that is not inflict severe emotional distress,
unreasonable, exaggerated, or and also where he knows that such
distress is certain, or substantially
certain, to result from his conduct.
6 It applies also where he acts
1 V.I.C. § 4 provides:
recklessly . . . in deliberate
disregard of a high degree of
The rules of the
probability that the emotional
common law, as expressed
distress will follow.
in the restatements of the
law approved by the
Id.; see Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1275 (analyzing
American Law Institute, and
comment i); see also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The
to the extent not so
Law of Torts § 303, at 826 (2001)
expressed, as generally
(“Dobbs”) (for the “intentional” or
understood and applied in
“reckless” element of § 46 to be met, the
the United States, shall be
“defendant must intend severe emotional
the rules of decision in the
harm (or reckless risk of it) and such harm
courts of the Virgin Islands
must in fact result”). A defendant acts
in cases to which they apply,
“intentionally” when he acts with the
in the absence of local laws
purpose or desire to inflict severe
to the contrary.
6
emotional distress, or acts knowing that to, or disease or death of, an
such distress is substantially certain to e m p l o y ee n o t e n t i tl e d to
result from his conduct. Restatement compensation under this chapter,
(Second) of Torts § 8A. “Mere risk, the liability of the employer is, and
however, even a very high risk, is not shall continue to be the same as if
enough to show substantial certainty.” this chapter did not exist.
Dobbs § 24, at 48. Instead, a defendant
acts with substantial certainty where he 24 V.I.C. § 284(a).
knows with virtual certainty “that [his]
actions will bring about the result.” Id. A The threshold inquiry in determining
defendant acts “recklessly” where he “whether the exclusive remedies of
workmen’s compensation apply is whether
does an act or intentionally fails to the injuries complained of fit within the
do an act which it is his duty to the definition of ‘injury’ set forth in the statute
other to do, knowing or having [as compensable], namely, ‘harmful
reason to know of facts which change[s] in the human organism.’”
would lead a reasonable man to Robinson v. Hess Oil V. I. Corp., 19 V.I.
realize, not only that his conduct 106, 109 (D.V.I. 1982) (quoting 24 V.I.C.
creates an unreasonable risk of § 251(a) (1981));7 see
[severe emotional distress] to
another, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that 7
Despite not having been expressly
which is necessary to make his
repealed, in 1994 the § 251 referenced in
conduct negligent.
Robinson and entitled “Definition and
application,” providing definitions for
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500; see
various terms used in the workers’
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46.
compensation chapter, no longer appeared
in the Virgin Islands Code. At that time,
B. The Exclusive Remedy Provision
Session Law 6033 added to § 251 new
of the WCA
definitions for several terms. See 1994
V.I. Sess. Laws 6033, at 239. However,
The exclusive remedy provision of the
another portion of that same Act read
WCA, 24 V.I.C. § 284(a), provides, in
“Section 251 is amended to read as
pertinent part:
follows” and provided for an entirely
different § 251 that was unrelated to
When an employer is insured under
defining terms used in the Act. Id. at 245.
this chapter, the right herein
24 V.I.C. § 251 now codifies the new,
established to obtain compensation
unrelated § 251, and the previous list of
shall be the only remedy against the
definitions of terms used in the workers’
employer; but in case of accident
compensation chapter, including the terms
7
Chinnery v. Gov’t of the V. I., 865 F.2d 68,
71-72 (3d Cir. 1989) (to be compensable
under the WCA, “injuries must have arisen
that were supposed to have been added in
out of and in the course of his
1994, no longer appears in the Virgin
employment” and have “resulted in a
Islands Code.
harmful change to him”) (internal
Since Session Law 6033 was
quotation marks and alterations omitted);
passed, two courts have assumed that the
see also 6 Arthur Larson, Larson’s
pre-1994 § 251 is still in existence. See
Workers’ Compensation Law § 104.05, at
Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water and Power
104-18 to -21 (2000) (“Larson”)
Authority, 955 F. Supp. 468, 478 (D.V.I.
(analyzing in the context of IIED whether
1997) (noting that “Section 251 of Title 24
physical injury of the kind dealt with by
of the Virgin Islands Code defines the
the relevant workers’ compensation statute
terms used in the Workers’ Compensation
is present). Where the employer’s conduct
chapter” and quoting a definition from the
has caused physical injury and the only
pre-1994 § 251); Boudreaux v. Sandstone
emotional distress is that resulting from
Group, 1997 W L 289867, *6 (V.I. Terr.
those physical injuries, the injury fits the
Ct. 1997) (referring to the definition of
statutory definition and is compensable
“employer” in the pre-1994 § 251). At
under the WCA. The employee is entitled
least one Court has held that the workers’
to workers’ compensation but cannot make
compensation statute in the Virgin Islands
an additional claim for emotional distress.
explicitly does not define “employer.” See
Chinnery, 865 F.2d at 72 (where employee
Nickeo v. Atlantic Tele-Network Co., 2003
suffered a physical injury compensable
WL 193435, *4 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 2003)
under the WCA, it “does not matter that
(“Conspicuously absent from the workers’
[he] also suffered mental or nervous
compensation statute is a definition of
injuries”); see also Larson § 104.05, at
‘employer’. . . .”).
104-18 to -21.
The Virgin Islands legislature may
wish to amend Title 24 to ensure that the
There is, however, an implied
Code contains definitions for the workers’
exception to this literal application of §
compensation chapter. Nonetheless, we
284(a). We recognized in Chinnery that,
need not resolve today this ambiguity
regardless of the character of the injury,
between the pre-1994 § 251 and the
“amended” § 251 now codified at 24
V.I.C. § 251. Even assuming arguendo
that Virgin Islands law no longer provides would constitute physical “injury” under
definitions for terms used in the any definition, thereby bringing Eddy’s
workmen’s compensation chapter (and post-accident injuries within the scope of
therefore no longer defines “injury”), there the WCA. Indeed, Eddy applied for and
can be no doubt that Eddy’s severe burns was granted benefits under the WCA
resulting from the June 2, 1994 accident because of his post-accident injuries.
8
there is an exception to the exclusivity bar An overwhelming majority of
for tort suits where the employee can show American jurisdictions recognize
that “the conduct [of the employer can] be that an employer may be sued at
regarded as so egregious as to exceed the common law for inflicting “genuine
bounds of negligence and constitute the intentional injury” upon the
sort of intentional wrongdoing necessary employee. To fit within this
to comprise an exception to the exclusive narrow exception, the putative
remedy provision of WCA § 284(a).” plaintiff must allege that the
Chinnery, 865 F.2d at 72 (citing Johnson employer committed the tortious
v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., act with an actual, specific and
503 A.2 d 7 08 , 7 14 (M d. 1986) deliberate intention to injure him.
(Maryland’s Act will only allow a tort suit
“where [the] employer had determined to Ferris, 23 V.I. at 188.
injure an employee or employees within
the same class and used some means to Based on this standard, the Ferris
accomplish this goal.”)). Court rejected the claim that § 284 was
inapplicable because the employer’s
The scope of this implied exception to failure to provide Ferris with appropriate
the bar of § 284(a) was explored in Ferris tools, safety clothing, and adequate
v. Virgin Islands Industrial Gases, Inc., 23 instruction made an accident virtually
V.I. 183 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1987), in a case certain to occur:
much like the one before us. There,
Ferris’s supervisor gave him an electric Ferris’ proposed amended
drill and ordered him to remove a complaint alleges that VIGAS
defective safety plug from an acetylene c r e a te d a d a nge r ous work
cylinder. The electric drill ignited the gas, environment through “negligence,
seriously burning Ferris. When he sued recklessness and intentional
his employer, it moved for summary misconduct” by failing to provide
judgment on the ground that, under § 284, him with the appropriate tools,
Ferris’s sole remedy was workmen’s safety clothing and adequate
compensation. Ferris argued in response instruction. Attempts to classify
that § 284 was not intended to bar suit for similar contentions as intentional
injuries recklessly or intentionally caused. torts a r e a lm o s t a l w a ys
While the Court recognized an implied unsuccessful because the actual
exception for intentionally inflicted injury remains accidental in
injuries, it stressed that that exception was character even where the corporate
limited to situations in which there is an employer knowingly permitted a
“actual, specific and deliberate intention to hazardous work condition to exist,
injure”: willfully failed to provide a safe
place to work or intentionally
9
violated a safety statute. Thus,
the compensation bar has been Ferris, 23 V.I. at 189-90 (quoting 2A
enforced where an employer Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation
operated a saw mill despite Law § 68.13 (1986)).
knowledge of a potentially fatal
hazard, [Williams v. Int’l Paper Ferris pointed the Court to § 8A of the
Co., 181 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Restatement (Second) of Torts under
Ct. App. 1982)], failed to which intent to cause injury includes not
instruct an unskilled employee only situations in which the actor desires
how to perform a hazardous to cause injury, but also situations in which
task, [K i tt el l v . V t. the actor believes that the injury is
Weatherboard, Inc., 417 A.2d substantially certain to result. In response,
926 (Vt. 1980)], or removed the Court acknowledged that a minority of
safety devices from machinery, jurisdictions had expanded the exception
[Griffin v. George’s, Inc., 589 beyond “actual, specific, and deliberate
S.W.2d 24 (Ark. 1979)]. See intent to harm,” but construed § 284
also [Rosales v. Verson, 354 c onsistent with the majority o f
N.E.2d 553, 558-60 (Ill. App. jurisdictions interpreting analogous
Ct. 1976)]. In each case, the workers’ compensation statutes.
result was inescapable because
what is being tested . . . is More recently, the District Court of the
not the degree of gravity or Virgin Islands reaffirmed the limited scope
depravity of the employer’s of this exception to § 284 in Gass v. Virgin
conduct, but rather the Islands Telephone Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d
narrow issue of intentional 205, 211 (D.V.I. 2001) (granting summary
versus accidental quality . . . judgment for employer because “nothing
o f the precise event suggest[ed] that Gass’ injuries resulted
producing injury. The from his ‘employer’s conscious design’”),
intentional removal of a rev’d in part on other grounds, 311 F.3d
safety device or toleration of 237 (3d Cir. 2002).
a dangerous condition may
or may not set the stage for The Ferris Court was correct in its
an accidental injury later. conclusion that a majority of jurisdictions
But in any normal use of the construe their analogous statutes to permit
words, it cannot be said, if a common law suit only when there is an
such an injury does happen, intent to cause harm. See Larson § 103.03,
that this was deliberate at 103-7 to -8 (it remains an “almost
infliction of harm unanimous rule” that “the common law
comparable to an intentional liability of the employer cannot . . . be
left jab to the chin. stretched to include accidental injuries
10
caused by . . . reckless . . . misconduct of actual, specific and deliberate intention to
the employer short of a conscious and cause injury.
deliberate intent directed to the purpose of
inflicting an injury”). It was likewise C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
correct in concluding that it should not
attribute to the Virgin Islands legislature In order to uphold Eddy’s judgment,
an intention to adopt the minority rule. As we must find that the evidence viewed in
we explained in a comparable situation the light most favorable to him will
where the District Court of the Virgin support a claim that both satisfies the
Islands adopted a majority rule of statutory elements of § 46 of the Restatement
construction: (Second) of Torts and avoids the bar of
WCA § 284. As we have noted, two
As the district court observed, the theories of recovery have been suggested.
Daniels present no evidence that We will examine each in turn to determine
the Virgin Islands legislature, in whether either of them meets both of these
enacting [the statute], intended to requirements.
adopt the minority position on this
issue. Accordingly, we cannot say 1. The Pre-Accident Emotional
that the district court erred in Distress Claim
following the majority rule. Cf.
V.I. Code Ann. titl 1, § 4 (1967) The first theory suggests that Eddy
(rules of common law, as generally suffered compensable pre-accident
understood and applied in the emotional distress because Brown forced
United States, shall be the rules of him to choose between performing an
decision in Virgin Islands courts); unsafe task and losing his job. We agree
see also Dyndul v. Dyndul, 541 with WAPA that a rational jury could not
F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1976) (even find for Eddy on this claim.
for matters that are not strictly part
of the common law, V.I. Code Ann. The evidence viewed in the light most
tit. 1, § 4 is impressive evidence favorable to Eddy does establish that
that the Virgin Islands legislature Brown’s directive presented Eddy with a
intends majority rule to govern). hard choice and that this conduct could be
regarded by a rational juror as extreme and
Benoit v. Panthaky, 780 F.2d 336, 339 (3d outrageous and done in reckless disregard
Cir. 1985). of an obvious risk. There is no evidence,
however, which could support a finding
We thus conclude that the intentional that being presented with that choice
tort exception to the exclusive remedy occasioned emotional distress for Eddy “so
provision of the WCA is limited to severe that no reasonable man could be
situations in which the employer had an expected to endure it.” Restatement
11
(Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j. Neither not barred by the exclusive remedy
Eddy’s own testimony nor that of the provision of the W CA.
others who were present reveals any
indication of such severe distress resulting As we have explained, a literal
from the directive prior to the accident. To application of § 284 bars recovery for
the contrary, Eddy’s own testimony severe emotional distress occasioned by an
suggests that he believed he could perform injury giving rise to a right to
the work Brown requested without getting compensation under the WCA. To escape
hurt. Eddy testified, “I didn’t know I this bar, Eddy was required to prove that
would have get hurt. . . . If I know I was his injury was the result of conduct
going to get hurt, I wouldn’t have be intended to cause injury. Thus, to escape
there.” JA at 1414. Further, Eddy the bar of § 284, Eddy would have had to
indicated that “[i]f Mr. Brown tell me to prove that Brown gave his directive for the
go do the job, I figure everything is safe.” purpose of causing harm to Eddy. He did
JA at 1417. There is no evidence Eddy not do so.
suffered any symptoms immediately
preceding the accident that one would Because the District Court erroneously
associate with severe emotional distress. regarded all IIED claims as being beyond
Instead, Eddy accepted the assignment, the scope of § 284,8 it did not ask the jury
prepared the job site for the work, whether Brown acted with a purpose to
removed three nuts off the top of the injure – rather, it instructed that liability
switch while working within three feet of could be predicated on a finding of
the energized conductors, and requested recklessness. The jury apparently found
another wrench because the one he was recklessness on the part of Brown, and the
using would not fit. He waited for the record clearly supports that finding. The
second wrench to arrive, took it, and record provides a basis for concluding that
continued his work until his hand slipped Brown’s conduct created a very grave risk
and the accident occurred. of injury to Eddy and that Brown acted in
deliberate disregard of that risk. Indeed, as
2. The Post-Accident Emotional Eddy stresses, his expert expressed the
Distress Claim opinion that the “chance of an accident
Assuming arguendo that the emotional
distress Eddy suffered as a result of the 8
See Eddy, 955 F. Supp. at 478 (“claims
accident and his physical injuries would
such as reckless infliction of emotional
otherwise be compensable under IIED, this
distress . . . are not in themselves related to
claim comes within the literal scope of the
the type of injuries covered by the Virgin
WCA because Eddy clearly suffered
Isla nds w orkm en’s c om pens atio n
statutory “injuries.” Accordingly, there
scheme”) (quoting Robinson, 19 V.I. at
can be liability on this claim only if it is
109) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
occurring” was “a hundred percent.” JA at District Cour t a n d r em and w ith
1539. Nevertheless, the record undeniably instructions to enter judgment in favor of
shows that Eddy was injured in an WAPA.
“accident.” Brown’s conduct may have
set the stage for that accident, but nothing
suggests that he had an affirmative desire
to inflict severe emotional distress on
Eddy.
Accordingly, Eddy’s post-accident
emotional distress claim is barred by WCA
§ 284(a).9
IV. Conclusion
We will reverse the judgment of the
9
Relying upon § 47 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, W APA raises a
provocative argument suggesting that no
IIED cause of action can lie with respect to
this post-accident theory because Brown
risked invading Eddy’s right to physical
well-being as opposed to his right to be
free from severe emotional distress. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 47
(“Except as stated in [the Restatement’s
sections on assault], and in [the section on
IIED], conduct which is tortious because
intended to result in bodily harm to
another or in the invasion of any other of
his legally protected interests does not
make the actor liable for an emotional
distress which is the only legal
consequence of his conduct.”). We have
no occasion here to express an opinion as
to whether in the absence of the WCA an
IIED claim could properly be predicated
on this second theory.
13